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ESSAYS
IN
JEWISH PHILOSOPHY

BY
DAVID NEUMARK

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PREFATORY NOTE

Dr. David Neumark won his place in the world of Jewish scholarship through his labors in the realm of Jewish Philosophy. His contributions to its history are embodied in the three volumes of the "Geschichte der jüdischen Philosophie des Mittelalters, nach Problemen dargestellt." Part of the same material is presented in the first volume of the Hebrew "Toledot Hapilosophia Beyisroel" and in the second volume being published by the Alumni Association of the Hebrew Union College. His treatment of the development of dogma in Judaism is contained in the two volumes of his "Toledot Haikkarim Beyisroel." Numerous essays of historical and systematic character appeared in German and Hebrew periodicals. In English he wrote "The Philosophy of the Bible" and a number of articles for various publications. A selection from these scattered studies is herewith published by the Central Conference of American Rabbis, as a tribute to the memory of the distinguished scholar and thinker and as a valuable contribution to the all too scanty literature on Jewish thought in English. The fairly complete list of Dr. Neumark's writings will prove helpful to the student of Jewish Philosophy.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF JUDAISM AND HOW IT SHOULD BE TAUGHT¹

I HAVE gone into the question of the functions of Jewish philosophy as a branch of systematic knowledge in the recently published first volume of my "History of Jewish Philosophy of the Middle Ages." But you are justified in expecting me to do more here than merely to repeat what I have said there. You are interested in what I propose to do as a teacher of Jewish philosophy in an institution that has assumed the task of training for a sacred office in the Jewish communities of America men of profound learning and unshakable loyalty to their faith. For decades the Hebrew Union College has been accomplishing this task most successfully. Nothing, therefore, is farther from my intention than to speak here of entirely new functions. The question can be only this: How do I propose, under the venerable guidance of so thoroughly learned and religiously inspired a man as the revered President of the College, and at the side of my esteemed colleagues, to do my share of the sacred, exalted work that the faithful teachers of the College have been accomplishing for more than a generation?

If, however, I intend nevertheless to speak of new tasks, it is in the sense implied in the exhortation of our sages: **בכל יום ויום יהיו כחדשות בעיניך** "Let the teachings of the Torah be new to thee every day." To this our sages add: **שלא יהיו** "Thou shalt not consider the Torah an ancient document that is no longer regarded by men." Here I find the most general formula, the

¹ This address, delivered by the late Professor David Neumark on January 29, 1908, when he assumed the chair of Jewish Philosophy at the Hebrew Union College, was found among his literary remains. It was delivered in the German language and has been translated by his daughter, Mrs. Joseph Brainin.

most comprehensive expression for the duties for which the directors of the College have chosen me: To foster and keep alive the realization that the true principles of Judaism are not antiquated, but that they are in full accord with the most positive findings of modern science and philosophy. However, there is also the personal factor in the efforts I shall make to live up to the best traditions of the College; and from this angle I may speak of new tasks. The new element of my task consists of constant clarification and enlargement of the doctrines of Judaism in the sense of our modern conception of the world; and I may say that my earnest and devoted labors in this field were rewarded with a new formulation of the questions to be considered here—that I have succeeded, to a certain extent, in finding new solutions for them. Now, you are entitled to know how I propose to put to pedagogic use the new methods and points of view. And here we find two lines along which I must develop my program: The *objective*, and the *pedagogic*.

We are therefore confronted with two questions: What is the philosophy of Judaism? And how is the philosophy of Judaism to be taught?

I. WHAT IS THE PHILOSOPHY OF JUDAISM?

The philosophy of Judaism cannot be—and actually is not—different from philosophy in general. Judaism itself is no philosophy, for it is more than a philosophy—it is a practical *system of life*, based on a definite conception of the world, and thus on a definite philosophic system of thought. Judaism is no philosophy, for it is more: it is a religion—nay, still more, it is *the* religion. We admit, of course, the great value of the other religions because—and to the extent to which—they are based on the fundamental principles of Judaism. But if we can say that Judaism is *the* religion it is only because the essentially theoretical fundamentals of the Jewish religion actually represent philosophic doctrines that are as far removed from all mythology and superstition as from any unhealthy degeneration into agnosticism. Thus the philosophy of Judaism is the system of thought

that represents the theoretical conception of the world and of life peculiar to the Jewish religion—the conception on which the Jewish system of living is based.

To this view of life our prophets have given so simple and easily comprehensible a formulation that it can be understood by the man in the street. But the simplicity of the language in which they proclaimed the doctrines of Judaism must not blind us to the fact that what they meant and taught could stand out in its full and deepest significance only in the course of history. For it is the essence of prophecy that it reveals truths which men would otherwise realize only after a long spiritual development, and even then only obscurely and imperfectly. If our tradition speaks of the cessation of prophecy, we can accept this idea in only one sense: That immediate, so to speak psychic prophetic revelation had developed to such a degree that its place had to be taken by conscious, logical intellectual effort. We know, moreover, that in the ancient days of the First Temple, at the precise time when the prophets proclaimed with fiery tongue the laws of God and enjoined them upon the people, this people turned away from God again and again; and from our point of view we can explain this only by the lack of actual intellectual work. As a rule only that which the greatest minds of a people have won through supreme effort acquires a universally comprehensible form, becomes the common property of that people, and later of all mankind. This is particularly true of the concepts that touch the most fundamental problems of the human heart and mind—the problems of the beginning and end of all things, of the significance of our narrow ego within the immeasurable universe, of the relationship of our own soul to the other living beings of the world, of the relationship of our own spirit to the all-embracing and all-engendering universal spirit. Historical developments permit us no doubt that the great contribution of the golden age of prophecy was for the future, that the innermost meaning of what the prophets taught could be made clear and accessible to the people only through the intellectual effort of later generations. And it is only in

accordance with our point of view for us to say that even today this intellectual work is unfinished. For today, more than ever before, we are coming to an ever deeper and more adequate comprehension of prophetic Judaism. It has been our good fortune to inherit the priceless spiritual treasures that our ancestors, particularly the philosophers of the Middle Ages, accumulated for us. True, we possess greater treasures than our ancestors, and are convinced that our modern religious views are more in accord with the fundamental principles of the Jewish religion than were the views of our medieval philosophers. But we owe this to the general progress of the human intellect, a progress in which we also have a share—a progress in the bringing about of which the Jews, the Jewish religion, and Jewish philosophy played an important part.

Here we have touched on another significant point that must be considered in this connection. The course of general cultural history proves beyond any doubt that it was the historic mission of Jewish prophecy to bring about a union with the scientific-logical spirit of the Greeks. Just as nature does not progress by leaps and bounds, so history is not based on chance; and this is particularly true of the spiritual history of man. Just as the individual phenomena of nature fit together to form a well-organized whole, so all important historical forces are, and always have been, directed toward one another, and have tended to unite in a common effort. None can doubt that the prophets of Israel proclaimed the word of God for all the peoples of the earth, as well as for the Jews. But only if we do not understand the meaning of prophecy can we believe that it brought the other nations a message that they could grasp without the collaboration of their best forces. No; if we sincerely believe that the teachings of Israel are destined to become the common property of all peoples—and we must believe this with utmost sincerity—then we must accept also the logical consequence of this belief: That all nations are and at all times have been destined to co-operate in the exposition of the true meaning of the prophetic message.

The union in Jewish philosophy of the Jewish with the Greek spirit doubtless was one of the most important intellectual unions that led to the clarification and expansion of the prophetic doctrines. Jewish prophecy revealed its truths in simple, easily comprehensible phrases; Greek philosophy furnished the means wherewith to expose the profound meaning of these phrases, and to prove their agreement with the findings of natural science. Upon both together fell the great task of overcoming the mythological chaos of antiquity—a task that has not been fully accomplished to this day. Our pride in having progressed beyond the mythology of ancient Babylon and Egypt, as well as the Egyptian-Greek mythology, will be justified only when the last remnants of this mythology about us—and, to an appreciable extent, in our midst—will have vanished and have been displaced by pure prophetic-philosophic cognition.

It would not be in place to trace here the course of this development, the relapses and revivals that have been recurring from ancient times to the present—always with the final result of furthering the progress of human knowledge. I have dealt with these problems in a series of scientific works, most recently and exhaustively in the “History of Jewish Philosophy” that I have mentioned. But even from what I have said here we can derive the answer to our first question: What is the philosophy of Judaism?

It is the function of Jewish philosophy to trace the development of the Jewish religion in antiquity—in the days when prophecy fought single-handed against paganism, and in the days when a fermentation was caused by the first contact with Greek philosophy. The purifying effect of this fermentation was recognizable even at that time, in the last two centuries of the old and the first five of the new era; but it came out with full force only later. We call this function *the presentation of the history of Jewish dogma from the philosophic point of view*. The second task is the examination of the second union of Jewish prophecy with Greek philosophy, which we may call the *logical* union, in contradistinction to the first, the *psychological*.

This function we call *the history of Jewish philosophy of the Middle Ages*. The third task of Jewish philosophy is the one that was the first to strike us here: *The exposition of the philosophic system that supports the theoretical doctrines of Judaism*. And this includes the clashes of Judaism with the destructive currents of modern philosophy, as well as the proof that not one of the theoretical doctrines of Judaism was ever refuted by scientific arguments, nor will ever, at any future time, be subject to such refutation, no matter how distant that future nor how far science shall then have advanced. In a Hebrew treatise that appeared two years ago, "The Seven Great Problems of the World," I demonstrated that the theoretical doctrines of Judaism deal with those questions to which my teacher Dubois Reymond applied his famous "Ignorabimus." "Ignorabimus—we shall not know," said this great scholar; science will not solve these problems, will answer these questions neither affirmatively nor negatively. But Jewish philosophy must show that there is another road to knowledge besides that of natural science, the only one recognized by Dubois Reymond and his school: this is the moral-philosophic road, which gave rise to Judaism, and which was rediscovered by Kant after a several thousand years' growth of the human intellect. This philosophy, conceived and developed in the sense of the living Jewish God-concept, will show us that all scientific and technical progress brings forward new proof for the truth of the Jewish doctrines.

II. HOW IS THE PHILOSOPHY OF JUDAISM TO BE TAUGHT?

Here we come to the other question we are considering: How is Jewish philosophy to be taught? The modern definition of philosophy requires it to deal with the problems and questions which the individual exact sciences exclude from their narrower limits as bordering on metaphysics. Philosophy must establish the inner continuity of the individual sciences. Hence the teacher of philosophy must use the problems of the various sciences to throw light on the problems of philosophy, and must

base his philosophic solutions on the findings of the sciences; and this, of course, applies to Jewish philosophy also. It is therefore unnecessary for me to dwell on this phase of the teaching of Jewish philosophy; but I must speak of its special problems. Here we must include in the general sciences the numerous branches of the *science of Judaism*. The teacher of Jewish philosophy must link it very closely with the other branches of modern Jewish lore. Neither this task nor this method are entirely new. Men like Formstecher, Einhorn, Geiger, Samuel Hirsch, Krochmal, Steinheim, and others have already considered the findings of modern science in their systematic presentations of Jewish tenets. True, the science of Judaism was only in its initial stages at the time when these men lived and worked; but to a certain extent its status today shows that there has been retrogression in the last fifty years. As matters stand now, we must lay especial emphasis on the necessity for a change in two directions:

A Jewish philosophy cannot properly be called by this name if it does not include all branches of modern Jewish science. The reading of a few texts of the religious-philosophic literature of the Middle Ages is not sufficient preparation for the teaching of Jewish philosophy. Certainly we, too, must consider the most important conclusions of this magnificent literature, and extract its inner meaning. We, too, must take especial care to understand its philosophic language. But this is only part of the task before us. The philosophy of Judaism must bring to our students the realization of the importance of every subject taught at the College; they must learn to know the inner bonds that join all these various branches into one harmonious and complete whole. They must learn to know the importance of familiarity not only with the Bible, but with talmudic literature also, for an understanding of the fundamental teachings of Judaism; and this means the whole of talmudic literature, including those parts which we today cannot recognize as essential to Judaism, whose dicta we cannot accept as binding. There is a great temptation for our youth

to believe that, since we no longer observe certain rules of conduct and certain regulations for divine service that even our immediate ancestors held sacred and inviolable, we deny these rules all ethical and historic value. Jewish philosophy must teach our youth to distinguish between grain and chaff. It must teach them to realize that much to which we, from our point of view, no longer ascribe fundamental and imperative significance, has a profound ethical and philosophic meaning, and therefore is worth preserving even today.

This is one phase of our standpoint that we must emphasize: Jewish philosophy as such has a meaning only when it is based on the other branches of Jewish science, clarifies and strengthens their findings, analyzes and correlates them. Our other point assigns philosophy its place in Jewish lore. Philosophy must be based on the other sciences, must elaborate on their conclusions, and unite them into one complete whole. But, as we all know, the students of the various sciences include some scholars who believe philosophy to be quite superfluous. Now, this is not the place to quarrel with this view as far as philosophy in general is concerned. But when this opinion is applied to Jewish philosophy, when men believe that it is enough to dwell on the individual branches of Jewish lore without paying any particular care to the philosophy of Judaism, then we cannot point out too emphatically the error and absurdity of this view. Those scientists who believe that they can do without philosophy are depriving themselves of a scientifically established ideal view of life. But can Judaism exist without an ideal view of life? If we would do without a scientifically established view of life in Judaism, as do many really orthodox Jews of the old school, then we must, like them, do without all science. But those who attach importance to science in subordinate matters, but rule it out in the most important matter, in their view of life—they become involved in contradictions that cannot possibly escape their attention. Or can there be any justification for their insisting on scientific exactness in the date of their birth and similar unimportant

points, and then, in the establishing and elucidation of the principles of Judaism, excluding everything that can lead to their goal? Besides, these atomists of Jewish lore must, perhaps regretfully, do without scientific exactness in various matters. Before certain questions they must stop—the doors are locked. This is the situation we find in various seminaries for the training of rabbis and preachers. Certain questions are simply ignored. Nothing is farther from my intention than to wound the feelings of the estimable teachers in these important schools—teachers of whom many are recognized scholars in their field, and for whom I cherish the deepest respect. But I would be omitting the most important point of what I have to say here were I to refrain from pointing out this gaping wound in the science of Judaism, and from crying out with all my power: *This must change!* We recognize the importance and significance of Jewish science for the regeneration and preservation of Judaism; and we may not close our eyes to the self-evident fact that all branches of Jewish science have meaning only when their findings are brought together in Jewish philosophy to form a unified picture, a well-founded view of life.

The students of the College—which is the pedagogic result of our point of view—must learn to realize that the study of the various branches of Jewish science must be pursued in such a way that the goal is never out of sight. They must learn that the spirit of untrammelled research that rules here in all branches of Jewish lore derives its logical potency and its moral greatness from the fact that it alone has the power to overcome the atomistic tendency in the science of Judaism—that it alone has the power to bring to light the great value of Jewish philosophy, to establish the truth of our Jewish doctrines, and to defend them against temptation and obscurity.

These, ladies and gentlemen, are the principles that will guide me while I teach at the College.

יְיָנוּ נִשְׁמַח וְיִשְׂרָאֵלנוּ נִשְׁמַח וְיִשְׂרָאֵלנוּ נִשְׁמַח

May the grace of God fall upon us, and make our works to flourish and succeed. Amen.

THE BEAUTY OF JAPHET IN THE TENTS OF SHEM

A Meditation in Commemoration of the
Twenty-third Hundredth Anniversary
of the Founding of Plato's Academy.

IN one of these current years twenty-three centuries will be completed since Plato founded his Academy in Athens (the exact date of the founding being uncertain). This was one of the greatest events in the spiritual history of the world and ought to be worthily celebrated as such by the world at large. The purpose of this article, however, is to celebrate that event from the Jewish point of view by a popular historical outline of those currents in the history of Jewish thought which were produced or influenced by the contact of Judaism with Greek thought, and which the Talmudists characterize by the most felicitous phrase: "The Beauty of Japhet in the Tents of Shem."

By the time when the first contact between these two great centers of thought and culture, Palestine and Greece, took place, there was some striking resemblance in the spiritual situation in the two otherwise so essentially different camps. At the end of the third century B.C., which may be considered as the time in which the fruitage of that contact became appreciably efficient, authoritative Palestinian Judaism represented a definite monotheistic God-conception and in general a religious system of doctrine and life which could satisfy the most advanced philosophic postulates of those times. On the other hand, however, there were at that time certain currents of thought and practice which, as a remainder of the Persian period, and strengthened through the prevailing disorganization of all authority, have permitted Judaism to

appear as a religion wrapt up with ideas and practices catering to the desire of the masses for the hidden and the occult. Ideas about angels of all sorts carrying out certain functions bearing upon the daily affairs of man were widely cherished and practiced by the people. In a word, there was a gap between the high thought of the authoritative leaders and what may be considered as popular Judaism of that time. A similar breach between the high thought of Platonic and Aristotelian philosophy and the religion of the people existed at that time, and it had been existing since the time of Socrates and Plato, in Greece. In Palestine the purer thought was the authoritative expression of the genius of the Jewish people, while the popular religious life was admitted to be unlawful even by those that led it. In Greece, on the other hand, the popular religion with the many gods and goddesses and all the levity in thought and life in the wake of those beliefs was the authoritative state religion, while the purer thought was the heritage of a few only. But in spite of this difference the situation was much the same. Here, as there, there was a breach between a highly intellectual minority on the one side, and the coarse-minded superstitious masses on the other. The purer thought in Palestine was truly monotheistic in that they believed that everything outside of God was created by God. In Greece even the representatives of the purer thought believed in two principles of reality, spirit and matter, and within the spiritual principle again they believed in a plurality of independent entities, "Ideas," designating some heavenly entities, according to the Platonists, or "Form-Principles," designating incorporeal entities working within the physical things as their "entelechies," or energies, according to Aristotle. But this difference notwithstanding, the struggle was essentially the same, that of the idea of unity against that of plurality. The Greek philosophers designated this problem as that of "the one and the many," and reduced all ethical demands to the postulate of the idea of unity within the plural forces and conflicting

energies in nature and history, in the lives of individuals and nations. In both camps, then, the postulates of higher and purer thought and life spoke in the name of unity while the drift of the masses tended away from unity to plurality, from oneness to division, from harmony to dissension, from sympathy to conflict, from the ideal to the sensuous. The Jewish masses were not as far from the religious and ethical ideal as were the Greek masses, but then we must allow also for the difference between the Jewish ideal and the Greek ideal. High as was the ethical ideal of Plato, it was surpassed by that of authoritative Judaism in religious firmness and sanctity. So the proportions of the distance of life from the ideal were resembling each other in the two centers. This in spite of another most vital difference, the formulation of which is rather difficult. The Jewish authoritative ideal, while higher in firmness and sanctity, was also more worldly, or, rather, more practicable than that of the Greek philosophers. Plato's ideal of life never got rid entirely of the general Greek note of sensuousness, but at the same time it indulges in ascetic hostility towards the most basic energies of life. Plato's ethical enthusiasm in its exaggeration is subversive of the elementary needs of the flesh, while the higher Jewish ideal never forgets that it is frail man whom it tries to uplift and to sanctify. This is one of the reasons why even the Greek philosophers themselves never succeeded in freeing themselves from sensuousness. They formulated their ethical ideals while at their best, but were unable to carry them through in all of their theorems and discussions, and, most especially, in life itself, just because of their exaggerated features. This weakness developed in reaction to the rigidity of the ideal, just as the rigidity of the ideal developed in reaction to general Greek sensuousness. At the time of the first contact between Judaism and Greek culture these two currents flowing from the fountain-head of Platonic philosophy had found expression in two extreme ideals of life in the philosophic schools, the ascetic ideal of the Stoics and the hedonistic ideal of the Epicureans.

So in the end the sensuousness of the masses was strengthened by some of those who set out to ennoble life and sanctify it.

Now it seems that at the time of the first contact between Judaism and Greek culture there developed a class of Jews whom we call Hellenists, and of whom we are told that it was Greek sensuousness and Greek levity to which they felt attracted. We have no means at our command to get an objective view of the intentions and tendencies of the Hellenistic movement, all material coming from sources hostile to them. The Hellenists either left no literature, or it was very thoroughly taken care of by their adversaries (as to Koheleth later on). At any rate, the general belief that the object of the strife between the Hellenists and their opponents, the Hassideans, was the question whether or not to allow Greek culture to influence Jewish thought and life, is due to a wrong perspective taken in the appreciation of Graeco-Jewish literature. If we carefully examine the Maccabean Books, the very ones which bring out the condemnation of the Hellenists most strongly, and the entire literature of that period, we find that the Hassideans were full of appreciation of Greek philosophy, and that their writings are full of philosophic thoughts and motifs taken from or formulated under the influence of Platonic philosophy. Moreover, we find that influence in clear evidence already in the sayings of Ben Sira, the oldest document of Graeco-Jewish literature, and even in the oldest parts of the Septuagint, supposed to be older than Ben Sira. Evidently the controversy hinged only about the question: which elements of Greek culture were to be drawn upon for the enrichment of Jewish thought and life, the original philosophy of Plato, or the artistic sensuousness and licentiousness of the Greek masses as enhanced by Epicureanism, the late miscarried offshoot of Platonic philosophy. The Hassideans insisted on Platonic philosophy being the best element in Greek culture and on enriching Judaism by allowing Platonic philosophy to serve them as a new means of orientation in their own heritage.

In fact, all the vast and rich literary heritage that we have from the Graeco-Jewish period bears witness to this fact. This literature is best divided into two groups, a historical and a philosophic. To the historical group belong all writings that relate or pretend to relate of historical events, such as the Book of Jubilees, Testaments of Adam and Eve, and others, clear through to the most comprehensive historical writings of Josephus. The philosophic group consists of writings that present thoughts and reflections in any other than historical form, such as Ben Sira, the Wisdom of Solomon, and others, up to the most comprehensive philosophic writings of Philo (who, however, is represented with comprehensive writings in the historical group also). The common aim of both of these two groups of writings is to orient Judaism in Plato's philosophy, especially in his Ideal Constitution as advanced in his book "The State." The historical writings, in presenting the history of the Jews, emphasize those principles in the Jewish constitution which make the resemblance between it and the ideal constitution of Plato stand out in bold relief (slight reminiscences of the influence of Plato on the conception of Jewish history may be found even in the biblical book of Chronicles). The writings of the philosophic group intend in the first line to develop certain principles of doctrine and conduct in such a way as to make it clear that the principles underlying the Torah are the best of those we find in the philosophy of Plato, concluding, as a rule, with a historical review showing that the workings of these principles are manifest in the course of history. (The influence of Plato is plainly evident also in the biblical book of Koheleth or Ecclesiastes, which is nothing else but the Jewish counterpart of Plato's *Philebos*: The problem of Koheleth: which is better, *Hochmah* or *Holeluth*, is the problem of *Philebos*: *Sophia* or *Hedone*, Wisdom or Pleasure? Plato answers: Wisdom. Koheleth, under subversive Greek influence, answers: try both, both are vanity. It is not altogether impossible that in the book of Koheleth we possess a bit of real Hellenistic literature; the pious religious turn

given to the subversive thoughts in some passages being later additions. The influence of Plato is also evident in some later interpolations in Proverbs and Job, as also in some late Psalms). Oriented in Plato these writers have indeed brought out the genuine Jewish thought of doctrine and conduct more clearly than it would have been possible without such an orientation. For one thing, they could learn from the Greeks the exact expression of thought. Then, too, by studying Greek philosophy and culture they got conscious of the *differences* between Plato's doctrines and those of Judaism, both in theory and practice. They became aware of the fact that the philosophic God-conception is far from real monotheism, and so they became enhanced in monotheism. Some of them realized the difference between the Greek conception of creator as an agent who works on given materials and the Jewish conception of creator as creating out of nothing (II Macc.; Letter of Aristeas). All of them realized the Jewish God-conception as the God of Justice and Mercy as against the conception of Greek philosophers at their best of God as the exponent of rigid justice. From the greater purity of the God-conception they came to a further realization of the greater purity of the Jewish conception of life; Jewish purity and chastity of family life as against Plato's postulate of communion of family in the higher classes of the ideal state; Jewish charity in public institutions and in the home in accordance with the Jewish conception of the God of mercy as against the "Laws" of Plato where the element of mercy and charity is reduced to a minimum.

The contact with Plato had also some influence decidedly detrimental to the purity of Judaism. The mystical theory of ideas as heavenly entities according to the pattern of which God created the beings of the physical world, found fertile ground in the old mystical elements against which authoritative Judaism had been struggling for many centuries past. Those who believed in angels had no difficulty in identifying angels with ideas. But even those who opposed the doctrine of angels, found in the theory of ideas something that appealed

to them very strongly. The theory of ideas was by no means a wholly original creation of Plato's. The theory is of old Semitic origin. The Babylonian theologians in their day knew of an ideal heavenly creation according to the pattern of which the things of the earth were created. It is from old Semitic sources that Plato drew this theory which, however, he filled with a deep philosophic content, even though he never was able to rid himself entirely of the mythological element inherent in this theory. And in the doctrine of man having been created in the divine image, and of the tabernacle having been erected according to the heavenly pattern which Moses was shown on the mount, the Jews, too, had adopted some element of this theory even before they came into contact with Greek culture and Platonic philosophy. Moreover this element of the theory of ideas was introduced into Jewish thought just by that party of rigid monotheists which rejected the belief in angels and formulated the doctrine of monotheistic creation. Here was a back door for mysticism to re-enter. And, indeed, no sooner did the Jews come in contact with Platonism than the theory of ideas attracted and at the same time embarrassed the rigid monotheistic leaders and writers of that time. In the beginning we find a sort of compromise. The ideas were taken in their totality to represent the Wisdom of God, a concept of legitimate sound grafted upon the old biblical idea of the divine Wisdom by which heaven and earth were created. This is the way the theory of ideas appears to have been conceived of by almost all writers of the Graeco-Jewish period (and also in some late passages in biblical books). Some identified Wisdom with Torah and considered the latter as an eternal entity, as the living Word of God, by which He created heaven and earth. Others speak also of Sabbath, of Israel, and of Moses as representing heavenly entities in line with the conception of the Platonic ideas. But it was not in Palestine, but in Alexandria where Philo, as the most comprehensive representative of the philosophic movement in Jewish antiquity, adopted the theory

of Plato in its entirety. In combination with the theory of divine Wisdom as the totality of all ideas Philo develops the idea of the *Logos* (Word), whom he calls also the "*Second God*," and of ideas as emanating from the *Logos*. These mythological entities emanate dynamic forces into the eternal primary matter, and produce the physical beings. This is plainly a combination of Plato's theory of heavenly ideas as separated from the physical things, and Aristotle's theory of form-principles inherent as energies in the physical things. Philo's theory of ideas is thus less mystical than Plato's, but it impaired the Jewish conception of unity, even though Philo was very careful in his language to emphasize again and again that ultimately all incorporeal forces flow from the eternal source of reality in "The First." And even more so the Jewish conception of creation was impaired. Philo adopted the theory of matter as an eternal principle, as the source of all evil, alongside of God, the source of all good. In the course of time these two mystical currents, angels and ideas, both strengthened by the contact with Greek culture, led up to the rise and development of Christianity. Christianity in its pristine phase is built on the theory of angels. Jesus appeared on earth in the flesh as any archangel would appear. This was a legitimate doctrine from a biblical point of view. The later and final phase of Christianity, with its antinomistic christology, centered in the idea of Jesus as the original image of the Father, the son of God, the *Logos*, the Word, that has been with God from eternity and has come down in the flesh to reveal that word of God which was given through "Moses the servant of God"—this younger and final phase of christology which has become the foundation of the Church, was built on the theory of ideas as fashioned by Philo. All of which, has, of course, imperiled Judaism in its very foundations and brought untold sufferings upon the Jews. But at the same time it meant the realization of the great divine plan of the beauties of Japhet in the tents of Shem as the great moving force in the history of mankind. The theory of ideas was instrumental in bringing

the message of Judaism, even though in a limited and impaired form, to the world at large, and in redeeming it by and by from the lower forms of idolatry. The theory of ideas was also instrumental in developing the philosophic thought of the world. Parmenides, the old Eleatic philosopher, was an opponent of the theory of ideas, and criticized it severely. "But," he is introduced by Plato as saying to the young Socrates, "go on, young man, with your theory of ideas, else there will be no philosophy." Indeed, each new turn in the history of philosophy was a new interpretation of the theory of ideas, purified ever more and more from the mythological elements and deepened in its philosophic tenets. Kant also insists that his critical philosophy is but a new interpretation of Plato's theory of ideas.

The Greek, especially the Platonic, influence is as evident in Talmudic literature as in Graeco-Jewish literature. This is generally admitted by the scholars, even though there are differences of opinion as to the extent of that influence. Generally the belief goes that this influence came by way of Alexandria. As a matter of fact, however, we have seen that this influence started in Palestine at a time when there was as yet no spiritual center in Alexandria. Be this as it may, in Talmudic Judaism the same two currents of mystical thought attract our attention. In Talmudic literature at large, two mystical disciplines of thought are spoken of: "Ma'asseh Mercabah" or "the (description of the) Work of the Chariot (or the Throne)," and "Ma'asseh Bereshith" or "The Work of Creation." Upon examination these two doctrines prove to be identical with the theory of angels and the theory of ideas respectively. Rabbi Yohanan ben Zaccai, the authoritative representative of Judaism in his time (after the second destruction) is mentioned as the father of the Mercabah-tradition. That was the time of the older phase of Christianity, and the struggle against it led the authoritative representatives of Judaism to fight it on its own soil. Rabbi 'Akiba, in his time the foremost defender of Judaism against Christianity,

is mentioned as the one who introduced the Theory of Bereshith into the circle of the Tannaim, corresponding to the younger phase of Christianity, that of antinomistic christology. These two disciplines were considered as dangerous to the teachings of authoritative Judaism and were permitted to be expounded to not more than one in the case of Mercabah and not more than two in the case of Bereshith, and this only to men of high character and ability. But the need of the times forced it upon them to engage their attention with the possibility of combating Christianity on its own ground. The authority of the Mishnah seems to have overcome the gravest features of the two mystical disciplines. The Mishnah succeeded in establishing the doctrine of monotheistic creation on firm ground. What does it matter if one embellishes God's world with Mercabahs, angels and ideas, as long as he believes that all and everything was created by the one almighty God. Indeed, right after the edition of the Mishnah, in the first generation of Amoraim (third century of the present era), Mercabah and Bereshith are no longer forbidden disciplines; on the contrary, the leading Amoraim in Palestine are cultivating both of them freely and almost without restraint. And even in Babylon, where speculation of that kind did not appeal to the Amoraim in general, we find Rabb, evidently under the influence of Palestine, where he had spent his years of study, a great expounder of the theory of ideas. It is his sayings which we find in an enlarged form in the mystical book known under the title "Sepher Yecirah," or "Book of Creation." This book which appears first around the ninth century, has become, in the course of time, the vehicle of both Cabbalah and Philosophy. Both of these disciplines of the Middle Ages have started with commentaries to this book. The book is based chiefly on the theory of ideas, and thus was an ideal instrument for the development of philosophy. But it contains some interpolations from the Mercabah-theory, and so it has become the vehicle of Cabbalah also. All classics of Cabbalah do not claim more for themselves than to be

considered as commentaries to the book of Yecirah. Thus again it was the theory of ideas which helped the Talmudists develop their thought on metaphysical and ethical problems.

The influence of Plato on the Graeco-Jewish writers and the Talmudists as a bequest to the Middle Ages, was greatly enhanced by another phase of the beauty of Japhet in the tents of Shem. In the early Syrian churches not only the influence of Plato, but also that of Aristotle, entered into the development of religious thought. And when the last philosophic school of Athens was destroyed (529), the neo-Platonic philosophers fled to Persia, and the academy in Gondashapur became a center of Greek culture, and lasted deep into the era of Arabic dominion. In the meantime, the Jews, who originally felt but little attracted by Aristotle (his influence in Jewish antiquity being of some moment only with Aristobulus the Peripatetic, Pseudo-Phokylides and Philo), had developed Talmudic dialectics, and so prepared themselves for the influence of Aristotle. In a broader sense now we see the workings of the beauty of Japhet in the tents of Shem. The Syrian churches and the Arabic schools of thought, themselves influenced by Greek thought, helped the Jews to develop the most original philosophic systems of the Middle Ages. These Syrian and Arabic centers of Greek philosophy were under the strong influence of Plotinus and neo-Platonism. But Plotinus himself developed his system under the influence of Philo, the great exponent of the beauty of Japhet in the tents of Shem in Jewish antiquity. Moreover, the system of Plotinus has been laid down in the *Enneades*, arranged, explained, and published by his Semitic disciple Porphyry (also called Basileus, or King, according to his Syrian name Malchus). And also the Jewish philosophers themselves were under the direct influence of Philo and the whole development in the Graeco-Jewish period. All these influences combined, and the Jewish thinkers occupying themselves with the study of Aristotle's philosophy, brought about the result, that the Jewish philosophers are less of mystics than

any other school of philosophy in the Middle Ages. They divide into two great schools, the Saadya-group, which represents the monistic school of thought, as based on Aristotle's *Physics*, which is a more philosophic interpretation of the theory of ideas; and the Gabirol-group, which represents the dualistic school of thought in that its adherents believe in eternal primary matter, as based on Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, which is the theory of form-principles in the things mentioned above, a theory nearer to the mythological interpretation of the theory of ideas. It is then Maimonides who, strongly opposed to the theory of ideas in its mythological interpretation, evolves the deepest philosophic core of that theory, harmonizes the two leading schools in Jewish philosophy, and blends them into a higher unity. Through Gabirol and Maimonides, and their influence upon Thomas of Aquine and Albertus Magnus, and through the activities of Jewish translators of philosophic works from Arabic into Latin, as well as through the great influence of Jewish philosophy, especially the philosophy of Crescas, upon Spinoza, the influence of Jewish philosophy reaches deep into the development of modern philosophic thought, down to our time.

Thus the beauty of Japhet nourished by Semitic thought dwelt first in the tent of Shem represented by the Jews, from there it came to the tents of Shem other than Jewish, only in order to unite with the direct influences coming from Jewish antiquity and develop into a set of magnificent systems of thought which furthered the development of philosophy in the world at large. And not only European philosophy, but also general European civilization was furthered by the activities of Jews under Greek influence, as writers and translators of works in the different fields of science, such as mathematics, astronomy, and medicine. The genius of the Arian races, with its highest expression in the Greek people, and the genius of the Semitic races, with its highest expression in the Jewish people, furnished the motive power in the development of the human race, and built up human civilization.

This great influence in the work of humanity is by no means superseded by the activities of the great historic races of modern times. On the contrary, it is still the united influence of the spirits of Jewish and Greek culture that is the driving power in and the great modifier of the energies developed by other great races of history, beginning with the Romans, down to the great national entities of our day. The spirit of Greece lives on and works without the people that originated it, and no doubt also the spirit of Judaism would continue to live and work in the development of mankind, even if the Jews were to disappear from the face of the earth. But the Jews have not disappeared, and we are called upon not only to keep up the work of the Jewish spirit through history, but even to increase its scope and efficiency. Jewish philosophy by no means ended its career in the past. It must rather look forward to the future for great tasks which devolve upon it. New orientations in the general trend of thought of the times call for new orientations in and new formulations of the tenets of Jewish doctrine and life.

SPIRIT

I. THE PRIMARY ELEMENTS

WHEN we speak of Spirit in contradistinction to Matter, we are satisfied that we express ourselves clearly. Not only are we sure that we ourselves connect with this word a definite idea in our mind, but we take it for granted that those who hear or read this word connect with it the same idea as we do. So much so that most of us do it quite unconsciously, never suspecting that such may not be the case at all. We speak of God as a spirit, and declare it as a distinguishing feature of the higher God-conception. Conservative biblical scholars tell us that the God-conception of the prophets was a new discovery, not so much because the heathen believed in many gods, while the prophets spoke in the name of the one God, but rather because the prophets recognized that God is an incorporeal, spiritual being. We also speak of the spirit of man in contrast to his body. In speaking of immortality we connect with this expression the idea that the body of the deceased disintegrates and resolves into other bodies, while the spirit, or soul, of that individual continues to live, i. e., to be conscious of its identity.

Thus all religion, and, particularly, Jewish religion, depends entirely on the meaning of the word spirit as contradistinct to matter.

And yet it is safe to say that only very few of those who thus build their religious and ethical life on the reality of the Spirit as distinct from matter would try to define what they mean by this word. And the few that may try it would no doubt soon find out that it is a rather difficult

task they have undertaken; at any rate that it will take some slow and quiet thinking and some worshipful meditation to get at a clear conception of spirit in their own minds, to grasp it with, and hold it in, their own thought. And, then, not every one who may succeed in this, will be able to give it adequate expression, so as to make himself understood to others.

It is this general idea of Spirit that this article would try to express in generally understood terms, if possible.

Often, when asked for a definition of "mind," I have replied: If you have a mind of your own, you know, and need not be told, what mind is; and if you have no mind to your name, no amount of explanation will help you.

This is not a joke, but the beginning of the explanation, or, rather, explication. In trying to explain the meaning of mind, or spirit, or intellect, or mentality, or soul, to others, we are in the convenient position, that those to whom we speak, have some experience in the matter under discussion.¹ In fact, telling one what mind or spirit is means no more than to analyze his own mind, and make him realize consciously, what he always knew in an unconscious, or, rather, subconscious, mode of realization.

Now for thousands of years the great thinkers of the world have divided, roughly speaking, into two groups: The first group may be called Materialists. They believe that what we call "spirit" or "mind" is really nothing but a phenomenon of matter. They, then, are "monists": all goes back to *one* principle, matter. To this school the concepts "God," "soul," "immortality," and the like, have practically no meaning, and religion, as we understand the term, has no basis in reality. The second school declares matter to be, wholly or to a certain extent, the product of spirit. Not all the adherents of this school were religious,

¹ The linguistical differences in the use of these terms may, for our purposes here, be neglected. To a certain extent, however, the present article will bring out some essential features of differentiation.

but those of them that were could claim for their religion a basis in reality. Those who believe that matter is a mere "representation" or "phantom" within the only principle of reality, mind, are absolute monists (Idealists), while the others concede to matter a certain degree of reality; of these some declare the spirit to be the "real" reality, as it were (Spiritualists), while others (Realists) rather tend toward materialism.²

For our purpose here it is best to adopt the view of the Spiritualists; not only because it is the nearest to the opinion of the average intelligent man, but also, and even more, because it is the most scientific stand that can be taken on this question. There is, critically considered, no prospect that any of the extreme monistic schools will ever prove their point to the satisfaction of others. In such a case the best scientific method is to take the middle ground, on which we find also some great and pious Jewish thinkers in talmudic and medieval times. The reason for this decision shall not be discussed here. This article takes the religious outlook, the reality of the spirit, for granted, its scope being solely the question what, within this view, spirit means. Incidentally, however, our discussion will show that a correct analysis of our concept of spirit is in itself a great source of strength to the religious outlook.

So far we have gained only what may be called a negative description of spirit: Spirit is something which is not matter. This description, while far from being a really explaining definition, would give us some idea of the nature of spirit, if we only knew what matter is. But as a matter of fact, while we all know what matter is, it is very difficult to express it, even more difficult than in the case of spirit. The old witty answer to the question: "What is mind?" namely: "No matter!", is not acceptable to us, because it

² The term "realism" here is used in the modern sense; realism as used in medieval times, as opposed to nominalism, almost coincides with spiritualism, as used here (not "spiritism"!).

matters much to us what mind, the basis of the reality of religion, means. Neither can we afford to dispose of the question: "What is matter?" by the answer: "Never mind!" For the very first idea of mind or spirit that the analysis reveals, is the negative description that it is contradistinct to matter. So we have to mind it.

What, then, is matter? Of course, we could reply: "Matter is not spirit," and this answer would be a negative description of matter, just as the answer: "Spirit is not matter," is a negative description of spirit. It seems we are moving in a circle. However, this movement brings us nearer to the right formulation of the problem, which in itself is a step forward to its solution. We know neither the definition of spirit nor that of matter. But we know that matter is not spirit, and spirit is not matter. And we also know that our entire experience consists of nothing but matter and spirit. Consequently, spirit is our experience minus matter, and matter is our experience minus spirit. So the next step is prescribed: We must take an inventory of the contents of our experience, and then try to find some method of determining what of those contents is matter rather than spirit, and what, again, spirit rather than matter.

Clearly, it is not meant to take at once an inventory of all the contents of our experience; this is neither possible nor necessary. Each individual phase of our experience contains necessarily both, matter and spirit, and so the analysis of a single datum of our experience will give us the first clue to the solution of our question. There are, however, as is evident, different classes of experiences, and it will be necessary to analyze a number of these classes, in order to approach anything like a typical segment of our experience. It follows, therefore, that the selection must be carefully planned and executed, so as to give a real representative collection of our total, actual and possible, experience.

Here is an apple. We feel its peculiar touch. Our eyes see its shape and color. We produce a peculiar sound by

knocking with it against some other object, our ears perceive that peculiar sound. We eat it and perceive its taste. While eating it we perceive also its specific aroma. All these perceptions peculiar to the apple are properties, or qualities, of the apple. Now, the usual idea we connect with this experience is that there is a something which is the possessor of these qualities. This something then is matter. But there is another way of looking at the thing. If we analyze a machine into its component parts, as wheels, bars, screws, sheets, &c., we also say that all these parts belong to, or are possessed by, the machine. And yet, if we enumerate all the component parts that the machine "possesses," there remains nothing which we may declare to be the "possessor." The machine as "possessor" of its parts is an abstract, and the sentence: The machine possesses wheels, screws, &c., is an inaccurate expression of the relation of the machine as a whole to its component parts. Correctly speaking we ought to say: The machine consists of wheels, screws, &c. And there is a way of thinking that the apple in our illustration is like the machine: The apple consists of the impressions of touch, shape, color, sound, taste, and aroma, which it makes upon us. According to this view all these qualities together are the component parts of, and make up what we call, the matter of the apple. But even according to the first view, that there is some material substratum which is the "possessor" of these qualities, we will have to admit that these latter constitute a part of the matter of our experience. For altho matter itself may not be identical with the impressions of color, taste, &c., which the apple makes upon us, yet these impressions are the only things which enter into our conscious experience, matter itself escaping us altogether (Extreme idealists, therefore, really maintain that matter is but a spiritual idea; but we have accepted the middle course of spiritualism).

Comparatively speaking, however, viz., if we consider the question which elements of the experience furnished by the apple, if any, would appeal to us as more fit to be con-

sidered as belonging to the spiritual part of that experience, than others, the following descending line would suggest itself: External form (round, square, rectangle, triangle, &c.) of the apple in its natural shape or cut from it at will; sound; color; touch; aroma; taste. This line differs a little from other current classifications. The English philosopher *Locke* divides the properties of things into primary and secondary. The primary are identical with what we termed external forms, which are also called extensive qualities; the secondary comprise all the physical qualities enumerated above, and which are also called intensive qualities. Another designation used by *Locke* is mathematical (primary) and physical (secondary) qualities. The reason why we consider the external form as nearer the spiritual element than the physical qualities is evident. It is the least peculiar to the apple, any other substance is subject to the same external form as the apple. In other words, it is a general, primary, quality, embracing all things. These primary, quantitative, qualities go under the general name of *Quantity*. The general idea of quantity is not given to us by the apple. If we see it in its natural form it suggests the idea of a sphere, if in other shapes, natural or cut at will, it suggests just that particular present form. The general idea of quantity, therefore, is a rather *mental* element which is by no means contained in the impressions we receive from the apple as such. The element of quantity in the experience conveyed to us by the apple is, therefore, more akin to what we would term spiritual than all the other elements mentioned above.

Developing our thought along the same line we find that also the physical qualities of the apple enrich our experience with something which is by no means contained in the impressions we perceive from the apple as such. For one thing, they suggest, as mentioned above, the idea that all these, physical (and mathematical), qualities are the manifestations of some matter, or substance, which "possesses" them as its properties or qualities. So we have the general ideas of

Quality, Substance, and Relation, as additional mental elements, not contained in the impressions conveyed to us by the apple as such.

Continuing our meditation in the same direction we will find additional mental elements not contained in the impressions coming from the apple that happens to be the present object of our experience. The idea of Quantity contains also the idea of numbers. We have before us *one* apple, but we know that there are *more* apples, and we think also of *all* apples, of which our apple is a specimen. The idea of quality again contains also the *idea* of the apple, by which we measure our present experience. Our apple may not come up to our idea of an apple in taste or in some other respect. It does not taste like an apple at all, or it tastes sweet, while we would expect an apple of that shape and color to taste sour, or the other way. Or the apple does come up to our expectations, it is just as sweet, or sour, as its shape and color suggest, in accordance with our idea of an apple. We then say, the apple is not sweet, or not sour; the apple is sweet, or is sour. By which we express our idea of an apple, that it may be sweet or sour, and also our judgment whether and how far our apple comes up to our idea of an apple. Furthermore, our idea of an apple, and our judgment about the present apple express the idea that the principle, or energy, working in the apple-tree is *bound* to bring about just that kind of fruit. In other words, we judge the apple according to our idea of *cause* and *effect*. The fact, however, that not all apples come up to our expectations or to our idea of an apple, shows that there are certain limits to the workings of the law of cause and effect. Some of the elements of the experience conveyed to us by the apple are present in all apples: they are the *necessary* effects of that cause, the principle of the apple-tree. Other elements are *possible*, as, for instance, the different colors and tastes of apples, while elements of experience which are contrary to our idea of an apple, are *impossible*; for instance, an apple will never look or taste like an almond.

These are the first *necessary* elements of our experience, always connected with the apple. There are more, some of them more comprehensive and more involved. Still larger is the field of the *possible* experience, i. e., experience not always connected with the apple which we have chosen as the object of our illustration. Some of these elements we will treat later on. The real meaning of spirit will become ever clearer and ever richer, the farther we will go in the analysis of the necessary and possible experience connected with the apple. But it is advisable to stop here and review the results achieved so far:

Matter may be something that "possesses" the qualities which we perceive with our five senses. But what we find in our experience is solely the perception of those qualities: external form, sound, taste, &c. Likewise, Spirit may be something that "thinks," or "possesses" the ideas spoken of above. But what we find in our experience is solely the ideas of quantity, quality, cause and effect, &c. Clearly we must confine ourselves to what we actually find in our experience. The matter of the apple in our experience is the sum total of our sense-perceptions, the spirit of it is the sum total of the ideas found in it.

As it was said, so far we have dealt only with such elements of the apple-experience as are always, i. e., necessarily connected with it. And while the average man may not be fully conscious of it, he will find, upon reflection and analysis, that by excluding any of the above enumerated elements, he would destroy the apple as an object of his experience. Of course, he may think of the apple with some other sense-qualities than those usually found in the apple. But then all that was said above remains true of the new thing into which the apple was converted, which only means that he has changed the object of illustration. This possibility, however, that of changing the object of illustration at will, suggests another valuable result of our analysis: The change of the object of illustration will change only the sense-perceptions, the material

elements, of our experience, while the ideas, the spiritual elements, remain the same as in the case of the apple. Consequently, the experience of the apple, or that of any other object, is impossible without the presence of the spiritual elements.

The next question: Is the sum total of the spiritual elements in the apple-experience *our* spirit (or mind)? If we answer this question in the affirmative, we of course mean to say that these spiritual elements represent, neglecting for the time being the other necessary and possible elements, *all* of our mind, since these elements are the same in the case of any given object of experience. So it is only the material elements of our experience that are subject to change, while the spiritual remain always the same. This would bear out what was intimated above, that the definition of matter is comparatively more difficult than that of spirit: Matter furnishes the great variety of our experience, while spirit furnishes the mental frame-work identical in all experiences. This may be true only in this phase of the analysis of our experience. But at the same time it establishes the fact that the spiritual elements of our experience are most essential and real, and that without them no experience is possible.

Arrived at this point, it would seem that the reality of our spirit is sufficiently evident. But it is easy to see that the word "our," at least in this initial phase of the analysis, does not necessarily warrant the reality of your or my *individual* spirit, mind, mentality, or soul. Just because the mental frame-work is the same in all experiences, and, consequently, in the experiences of all humans, we evidently have not yet arrived at that element of our spiritual experience which in any way guarantees us the reality of our individual spirit. What we have really arrived at so far is this undeniable fact:

There are certain spiritual elements, making up our mental frame-work, and there are certain material elements, the sense-perceptions, and wherever these two classes of elements meet, and work upon each other, there appears that consciousness, or self-consciousness, which is expressed when we say "I."

Where do these two different classes of elements come from?

At this stage of the analysis, this question cannot be answered. But there are two undeniable facts which admit of a certain conclusion: (1) Our spirit may be immortal in the future (we will touch on this problem later on), but as far as we know, it was not eternal in the past. Our individual consciousness goes back a certain number of years. It clearly has a beginning. It is not self-sustaining, otherwise it would have existed eternally. Clearly, the appearance of our individual consciousness is dependent on some conditions, it is incidental to some large, comprehensive process which the individual does not control. (2) The spiritual elements of our consciousness are the same, and also the material elements thereof are almost the same in all individual consciousnesses. These two facts combined admit of the following conclusion:

The two classes of elements found in our individual consciousness come from two different sources. The source of the material elements we call "general materiality" or "Matter," and that of the spiritual elements, "general consciousness," or "general Spirit," or "Spirit." These two sources are in constant touch with, and the elements flowing from them constantly work upon, each other. And whenever this constant process evolves certain favorable conditions, there appears that phenomenon which we call "individual consciousness."

We will have to go much farther afield in the analysis of our consciousness in order to find the "Spirit" as God, or as our (individual) "Soul," as religion, and especially the religion of Judaism, teaches. But the first step has been made. We are on the road.

II. THE OBJECTIVE SYSTEMATIC ELEMENTS

The elements of spirit taken up so far were those which are necessarily connected with the perception of the apple, or any other natural object, considered by itself. But there

are other spiritual elements necessarily connected with the apple, altho we do not always realize them. The apple belongs to a certain class of plants. Even the crudest mind has some idea of those data of knowledge the totality of which we call *botany*. Some of us have studied that branch of science, and under certain conditions will enlarge the apple-experience to the idea of the apple as a part of a larger system to which it belongs. Thus the wealth of spiritual elements connected with the apple-experience will vary with the amount of knowledge of botany the observer possesses. And it will further vary with the degree of the actual conscious effort the observer will make to visualize in his mind the details of the system to which the apple belongs. Thus we will find that the amount of spirit, or spiritual elements, with reference to our apple, must be considered under two different aspects, under that of *actuality* and that of *potentiality*. A man who knows botany well, may actually think of all the biological relations and laws connected with the idea of the apple. Or he goes through only a part of those relations and laws in his mind. Or he thinks of those relations and laws in more or less general terms, covering the most general principles.

From the foregoing it becomes evident that much of the elements making up our spirit, with regard to the apple-experience, is, at any given time, rather potential than actual. If we have acquired the necessary knowledge, we *may* actualize the spiritual elements represented by that knowledge, but usually we do not do it, or only in a most general way.

This calls our attention to another important fact: To develop the spiritual elements just described we must go through them, think them out. This takes *time*. You can realize a certain system of knowledge, as that suggested by the apple, in a supple, intimately concentrated way. And then it would appear that you realize this entire system of thought in an instant, or "in no time," as the phrase goes. But as a matter of fact, the actual conscious realization of those thoughts requires a measurable length of time, and the more

intense the actual realization is, the more time we consume to accomplish that realization.

It would then seem that this class of spiritual elements differs from the preceding also in this regard, that these latter are not subject to time. But upon reflection we find that also the first, the necessary, group of spiritual elements is subject to time. For no matter how much concentrated the realization of the primary spiritual elements may appear to be, the actual, even though not distinct, realization of them spreads over a certain length of time. It is easier to see this in the second group of spiritual elements, because it takes more time than in the case of the first group.

This leads up to a further orientation. The conscious realization of sense-perceptions is in itself more of a spiritual than a material element. So that even the most material elements of our experience are accompanied by inseparable spiritual elements (a fact which in itself most strongly suggests that there is more reality in spirit than in matter). The reason for this is easily seen: The primary fact of spirit, self-consciousness, means but this: We realize our own distinct entity by the presence in our mind of something which is an entity not identical with our own entity. An empty mind, so to say, could not realize itself. It is only by contrast relations to something else that we realize our own individual entity. This process of considering two different entities takes time. But "takes" time is not the accurate expression. We rather ought to say "makes" time. Time reduced to what it really amounts in our experience, is nothing but the repeated realization of difference and change. We usually express it by saying: The things and circumstances of our experience change, while our individual identity remains. What we ought to say, however, is: We realize our identity by successively contrasting our own entity with different things and circumstances as they successively appear in the course of things. Now we could, and at times we do, realize our identity by contrasting our own entity repeatedly with the same element of outward experience.

In this case it is easily seen that succession is essentially but repetition. In reality, however, succession is nothing but repetition in those cases also where the object with which we contrast our own entity changes. The change of the object serving as contrast does in no way alter the essential feature of the process, namely the realization of our identity by contrast.

This makes it clear that the concept of *time* is really the same as that of *repetition*. The repeated contrasting of our own entity with something different produces in us the "feeling" of time. Whether this feeling would be produced if there were but one unchangeable object by the contrasting with which we would realize ourselves, is a futile speculation; there *are* many objects, and no object remains in an unchangeable condition. All that matters here is the fact that our concept of time is a feature accompanying the realization of our own identity by contrast with something else.

Time, accordingly, is inseparably bound up with our individual mentality, or spirit.

From this aspect we could appreciate the view of those thinkers who believe that animals have no concept of time. But we will revert to this question later, at a more advanced stage of our analysis. Here it is another angle that we must pursue.

Among the primary elements of our experience we have found the idea of *quantity*, quasi the border line between the material and the spiritual elements. Now it is easy to see that quantity again is nothing but repetition. Quantity as expressive of extension and dimension is *space*: Space is another expression for the concept of repetition accompanying our self-realization through contrast. We contrast our identity with different things, arranged in a certain order in space. The same would be achieved if there were but one thing in many copies arranged in space. In fact, it would make no difference, if there were only one continuous body in space, and we would contrast ourselves with its different parts. Moreover, self-realization would be achieved, if there were only one small

thing easily perceived in its entirety. The repeated contrast with it would keep up our self-realization. And, as in the case of time, we could appreciate here the view of those who believe that animals live in a bi-dimensional space, but this also will better be discussed later on.

Time and Space, then, are both the sensation of repetition. Are they identical? Why two different conceptions, sensations, or feelings? Quantity, we have seen, covers both, time and space. Quantity is repetition, so is space, and so is time. Time and space, then, are the same feature from two different aspects. Speaking of space we speak from the viewpoint of the objects, as it were. The plurality of the objects and the plurality and variety of the sense-perceptions they offer, is subsumed under the term space. Word and concept "Space" are the expression of our realization that somehow the things out of the contrast with which we become aware of our own individual entity, do not depend for their existence on the process which produces our own *individual* entity. Time again is the expression of repetition from the viewpoint of the subject. It expresses the fact of repetition as producing our own individual self-consciousness.

We have come to the discussion of time and space from the discussion of the question of potentiality and actuality of mind or spirit. Reverting now to that question, the relation of things obtaining here may be expressed thus:

Philosophers of antiquity count among other essentials of all things also "sameness" and "otherness." Whether they have meant it or not, we may accept these terms in the sense resulting from the preceding: Whatever we perceive, or think of, we realize in contrast with our own identity. We realize our sameness, or identity, as contrasted with the object of our perception or thought in its otherness, or distinction, from us. The more often we repeat this process of contrasting our own entity with the objects around us, the more actual, the richer, and the more substantiated our mind becomes. It is this what we mean when we say of a man who is given, day in, day out,

entirely to a certain routine work in the same limited sphere of activity, that his mind does not grow. A man of varied and comprehensive activities grows in his mind, his mind becomes richer and more individualized.

While, then, everybody has a mind, it is a matter of degree. The minds of men differ in broadness and firmness and individuality. The more knowledge a man has, the broader and richer is his mind. The better he knows a subject, the richer are the contents of his mind, the shorter is the time he needs to go through all details of the particular branch of knowledge he masters. Let us conceive of a human genius who masters all branches of natural science to their full extent. Such a mind would be the most complete and most actual mind conceivable. And let us further equip that human genius with such swiftness of grasp that he looks over the entire field of knowledge, no matter from which detail he takes his starting point. Such a mind in perceiving the apple in our illustration would at once perceive all the objective systematic elements of all possible experience in natural science. For the apple is really so much a part of the system of the universe that a human genius of the above description should be able to perceive at once the entire system of which the apple is an integral part.

Now, since it is true that the greater the mind, and the swifter the grasp, the less time is consumed in visualizing the contents of a certain branch of knowledge, we may perfect our creation to the utmost and equip our human genius with such swiftness of grasp as to reduce the time he needs for the visualizing of all natural science to a minimum, a trice. His mind, then, will, relatively speaking, grasp all details in no time. This mind would be fully actual, without interruption. At a certain given moment, when this mind grasps the entire universe, in all its details, laws, relations, and systematic coherence, at once, he will be relatively free of the feeling of repetition which connotes our conception of time. But there will fully remain that feeling of repetition which connotes our conception of space. The reason for this is clear: The sub-

jective feeling of repetition may be partly overcome, but not the objective. Objective repetition, as pointed out above, means the realization of a source of rich and varied realities independent of the individual mind.

Now, that human genius was our own creation. Such a human mind has never existed, nor is there any such prospect for the future. But there have been, and there are with us, great minds whose capacity of grasp has covered a considerable part of what we would expect of the human genius of our creation, if he were a reality. And then, too, many individual men at any given time have a clear idea of the objective systematic coherence of all things in the universe. This idea, of course, is of a most general nature, as far as individual scientists are concerned. But if we take the total sum of the knowledge of all natural scientists at a given time, we come pretty near that human genius of our creation, who seemed to be lacking altogether the indispensable detail of reality. It is by no means impossible that all natural scientists of the world would at one given moment visualize the essential data of their several branches of knowledge. That human genius of ours is not so altogether unreal after all.

If we compare these objective systematic elements with the primary elements of our experience, we will find that the former are really contained in the latter. While many of us are not aware of their presence in our mind, the knowledge of the entire universe is really contained in those primary elements of spirit which we call the mental frame-work. Their presence in the individual mind is largely only potential, but in the aggregate they are actually present. Whether we see the apple in the simple way of the primary elements or in the larger manner of that almost real human genius, it is the same thing that happens. The self-consciousness of the individual (or the aggregate consciousness of individuals) is the product of the eternal process going on between Matter and Spirit.

That comprehensive spirit is evidently much more responsive to the requirements of the conceptions of God and Soul in

religion than the spirit of the primary elements. But in order to find the religious conception of Spirit, we must continue our analysis.

III. THE ELEMENTS OF FREEDOM

The analysis of the contents of our spirit thus far advanced, we may say that we have found an entity which has the dignity of the divine. Our self-consciousness within the sphere of the primary elements of experience points to a larger mentality and to a larger process going on between that world-mentality and matter. The appearance of our individual consciousness can be comprehended only as a product incidental to the eternal process of contact between Spirit and Matter. These primary spiritual elements of our experience contain in reality all the data of all possible natural science. So the small segment of natural science which any individual man possesses, points again to a larger, cosmic, spirit in whom all natural science is eternally and actually present. Such a spirit in itself is already worthy of that kind of admiration which we accord to what we call divine being. And our own self-consciousness, or soul, representing that spirit to some extent shares in the nature of the divine.

But thinking the matter over, we will find that the results of our analysis so far do not entitle us to the conclusions just drawn:

We have spoken of the primary elements of the simple mental frame as containing all data of all natural science including all realms of nature inclusive of the heavenly bodies, of all the relations obtaining among the different classes of beings and their individuals, and of the laws governing them in their mutual systematic coherence. We have, then, on the ground of this premise, arrived at the great comprehensive Cosmic Spirit. Granted this to be so, the idea of admiration for that spirit is still a most incongruous thing. It is, as far as adequate illustration in these questions is at all possible, as if a small piece of dynamite while exploding would be overawed

with admiration for an exploding large stick of dynamite of which it was originally a part. As a matter of fact both, the small piece and the large stick of dynamite, follow the same law and are performing the same action. Or, more exactly, both are governed by the same process over which neither has any power to do or to let. The spirit obtained by our analysis thus far, and its influence upon matter, would have just as little power or choice in the process in which it is one factor, as has the individual consciousness of any one of us which is only incidental to that larger process.

However, it was only by way of arbitrary elimination of essential elements of our experience that we spoke of our own fragmentary knowledge of natural science, and of the comprehensive knowledge possessed by the world-spirit in a way, as if such "pure" natural science, fragmentary or comprehensive, were a reality. The obvious truth is that our experience is a much more complicated thing than that. The apple in our illustration contains more, and may contain still more, spiritual elements than those thus far discussed. The apple may come from our own orchard, inherited or acquired, tilled and taken care of by ourselves or by hired labor; or it may have been bought on the market, from a fruit-store, or a street-vendor. Thus our apple-experience contains the elements of the economic and political system under which we live, and also points to economic and political systems different from ours, such as exist in other lands, as have existed in past ages, and as may be striven for by some of us for the future. This points to the large *historical* experience of the human race. The apple itself is a product of historical development. The apple as we know it today is not a wild product of nature, but brought about by the activity of man super-induced by his intelligence and by his power of choice; by the same power of intellect and will, by which the different economic and political systems were developed. The apple may be a gift of charity received from, or given to a fellow-man; it may have been given to us by a dear relative or friend. It

thus opens up the great treasure of emotional experience in all of its ethical and religious significance. The apple may remind us of the religious and artistic motifs which it furnished in legend fiction, and drama. (Paradise-story, Paris-Venus-legend, Wilhelm Tell, and the like.) Other objects and events may be more illustrative than the apple of the spiritual elements of freedom in our experience. And if we take an inventory of all the elements of our experience, we will soon find that the elements of freedom are the overwhelming major part of our experience in its totality. We could express it by saying that the primary (or epistemological) and the scientific elements of our experience, which constitute our *mental* make-up, are generally the minor, while the elements of freedom which constitute our *spiritual* make-up, are generally the major part of our experience in its totality. But it is not for this reason that we call all non-material elements in our experience spiritual. This would only entitle us to say that our experience consists largely more of spiritual than of mental elements. In using the designation "spiritual" for all non-material elements we have a definite point in view: The spiritual elements of the third division, the elements of freedom, are the *source* of the preceding two divisions, the primary and the objective systematic elements. This we will see when we continue our analysis with the discussion of the elements of freedom with a view to find the mutual relation between the elements of freedom and the other spiritual elements in our experience:

The average man we meet is a complex product of history (heredity) and individual training. It is, therefore, quite difficult to get at the exact nature of the primary elements by themselves without an admixture of the elements of the other two classes. To a certain extent, however, we are in a position to get a glimpse at the workings of these elements by the observation of savages, wholly uneducated, subnormals, and children. The best illustration is undoubtedly the child. When a child has developed his senses to such an extent that you cannot persuade him to take a pear for an apple, especially

when he knows the difference not only by the looks, but also by the taste of the fruit, he is a good illustration of the workings of the primary elements. He then knows nothing, or very little, of the objective systematic elements. The child, of course, is the product of heredity and environment; he develops his senses under the influence of people who speak among themselves and talk to him in accordance with certain principles and rules derived from natural science, even tho they themselves may not have actual knowledge of natural science. Nevertheless, the child in the phase of development indicated above is as near an example of the workings of the primary elements by themselves as is attainable; for sub-normals and savage adults have some knowledge of natural sciences.

So the individual human mind develops first under the workings of the primary mental elements by whose guidance it gets gradually to realize the systematic coherence of all things as revealed in the natural sciences of all description, including all branches of applied science, such as mathematics, physics, medicine, and the like. But while this is so, the real order of relation is evidently the reverse. The primary mental elements of the individual human mind, this being a mere incident in the cosmic process going on between world-spirit and world-matter, have their origin in the world-spirit in its higher capacity, viz., in that of its comprehensive realization of the systematic coherence of all things in nature. The primary mental elements are, so to speak, the first manifestations of a new center of individual consciousness brought about under favorable conditions in the course of the larger cosmic process between matter and spirit.

Now, we speak of the world-spirit as of the one who realizes at once all the objective data of all natural sciences. However, this is clearly fiction, not so much because the people who do not see the spirit deny it,—no, we here may ignore them, as we speak from the religious point of view,—but because that world-spirit must actually be much greater and

much more comprehensive than the one who realizes all objective data of natural science, and, consequently, also more than all the individual minds combined, whether in the state of the primary elements or in that of the realization of the coherence of things as established by natural science:

It has already been indicated above that natural science, especially applied natural science, is inseparably bound up with elements of freedom. To think of a world without man is very difficult, since the process between matter and spirit is bound to produce the human mind, but it is, at least, imaginable. Let us then imagine such a world in existence. And let us further take for granted that the activities of animals in such a world have no meaning at all from the viewpoint of the elements of freedom (a view utterly untenable). The world-spirit of such a world would be one of a relatively constant character. The changes going on in such a world would be few and insignificant in comparison with the world comprising the important addition of human beings as we know it. Even in such a world, then, there would be no absolute constancy of the volume of the world-spirit. It would be changing and growing continuously. To think of a world-spirit of a constant nature we would have to think of a world of dead matter in which nothing happens. But aside from the fact that such a world cannot be even imagined, the spirit comprising such a world would be fairly empty of contents.

Now let us take natural science as it is, developed under the intelligent and free creative power of man; neglecting, however, all ethical and religious valuation and all significance of human activities. The world-spirit who bears in his consciousness such a world cannot be a constant entity. On the contrary, with the application and development of science in the course of history the world-spirit must be continuously growing in his comprehensive actuality. In fact, some Jewish philosophers, in order not to impair the idea of the absolute unchangeability of God, have accepted the theory of some non-

Jewish philosophers of Greek antiquity, that God knows only the general laws of nature, as embodied in the distinct realms of nature their divisions and subdivisions in genus and species, and in their objective systematic relations to each other. The particular applications of these general laws, by which individuals appear, develop, disintegrate, and go, have no meaning to God. (We quote this view only as an illustration. Our own attitude in the question of the unchangeability of God will developed with the progress of the discussion.)

This view seems acceptable as long as we leave the ethical and religious valuation of human action out of consideration. By ethical and religious valuation we essentially understand the responsibility of man for his actions. In such a world, the details in the changes going on in nature have really no significance at all, and thus may be conveniently ruled out from the consciousness of the world-spirit.

But a world in which free human activity is developed, is really unimaginable without the corollary of ethical and religious valuation, of human responsibility. To release man from responsibility means necessarily that he is not a free agent, that he acts under the rule of unchangeable natural laws. There are philosophers, or such that go under this name, who try to reconcile ethical valuation, including human responsibility, with the absolute rule of unchangeable natural laws with which no interference is possible. But while this point shall not be argued here in detail, as we speak here exclusively from the positive religious point of view, this much may be said: These people try to cover by many words the evident contradiction between the idea of the dominion of unchangeable law over man and the idea of man as a responsible free agent. They say man's freedom is one of the forces of nature, and acts under unchangeable natural laws, so his freedom does not interfere with natural law, but still he is responsible inasmuch as he acts as a free agent, and he is rewarded or punished for his actions, but the happenings by which he is rewarded or punished likewise follow from the workings of natural law

as surely as the explosion of dynamite follows upon the application of a match to it. All of which amounts to the answer of the judge in the anecdote: "I am not responsible for my action, I have acted under the compulsion of conditions," claimed the defendant. "So do I," answered the judge. The difference is but this: The judge made a good joke, while these people undertake it in all seriousness obstinately to say yes and no in one breath.

The world as it is, or, at any rate, as religion sees it, is a much richer world than that imaginary world in which there is the absolute rule of a natural law with which there is no interference. In the world of religion man is really free. In the world as religion sees it there are two different orders of law, the order of natural law, and the order of ethical law. In a certain given situation there are two possibilities for man as to how to act. Of course, there may be many different ways of handling a situation. But from the religious point of view they are all reduceable to one of these two (or to combinations of elements of both): A man may follow the promptings of his law of nature, of his natural desires, of selfishness, or he may follow the ethical and religious laws which move him to act against the promptings of his natural law, to interfere with its workings, and to act in accordance with the ethical law, which in that particular situation postulates and commands a course diametrically opposed to that required by natural law. Nor are reward and punishment, in this view, always mere natural consequences of the actions, and, like them, the result of the workings of uninterfered with, unchangeable, natural laws. On the contrary, according to the sincere religious view of things, God does interfere with what appears to us as the workings of unchangeable natural laws. To state it clearly: A sick man, whom the doctors have given up as beyond help, may still recover by the help of God, even when the doctors had all data in the case before them, and judged them with the utmost exactness. This is not the place to defend this religious attitude, but to state it, and to find out

what, within this view, not obscured by any obscure substitute, spirit is.

It is clear that in a world so constituted, the world-spirit cannot possibly be that poor sort of doctor who knows his lesson, the general systematic structure of nature, by heart. The details resulting from the application of those general natural laws, and the individuals, and the happenings in the lives of those individuals, cannot be neglected as insignificant. From the irreligious point of view grief and joy may indeed mean much to those concerned, but hardly anything to the world-spirit, poor thing that he is, a helpless onlooker to a play in which his part is set for him without his having any choice in the matter. Or if the human feelings do mean anything to him, he knows of them as he knows of other natural phenomena in their general formulation. But from the religious viewpoint grief and joy of a human soul in their ethical valuation mean more than all the rest of the phenomena of nature.

In the religious outlook the elements of freedom are the source of both, the primary elements of mind and the objective systematic elements. The relation of natural law to the primary elements is evident: A closer comparison of the two reveals that the former are the most general expression of the latter. This is especially evident in the case of the primary idea of cause and effect. This idea is the most comprehensive expression of all natural laws. The process, then, which is going on between matter and spirit, in producing the individual consciousness, tends to create a new center where the conscious realization of the laws which govern nature will create a new reflex of the world-spirit. The first helpless sense-perceptions of a child are nothing but the initial steps of the world-spirit to manifest himself ever anew in new centers. The child may not live to develop much of that spirit, his mental powers may be crippled by some accident. And, in general, no man, even the greatest and most comprehensive natural scientist, will ever actually embrace the full contents of the world-spirit.

But, no matter how little the ultimate achievement, the impetus of the world-spirit goes on the whole. He sets out to achieve as great and as full a reflex of himself as possible.

The same relation obtains between the systematic elements and the elements of freedom. It is these latter elements of spirit that give impetus to the large process of which the individual consciousness is the product. Not considering the elements of freedom the aim of that process appears to be the individual mind as a reflex of the world-spirit in the conscious realization of natural science. But with the elements of freedom considered, the conscious realization of natural science is but a *means*, an intermediate stage, to a higher end. Were it not for the will of the world-spirit to reflect himself in the human being, endowed with the capacity of free action, the process of manifesting the primary and the systematic elements in ever new individual centers would not take place at all. In fact, the very existence of the world-spirit has no other meaning but this: The existence of the world-spirit *per se*, without his relation to what we call matter, and without producing all these things with their crowning phase, man as a free agent, has no meaning, and the speculation about it (as spun, for instance, by Aristotle) is of no interest to religion and religious philosophy. Reality, existence, the large world-process going on between Matter and Spirit, all processes aim in the ultimate at the production of human individuals as free agents and responsible ethical subjects.

In other words: The aim of the world-process is not merely the reflex of the world-spirit in the individual *intellects*, but rather in individual intellects as moral agents. It is in man that this tendency of all reality and all development achieves its highest realization. But the element of freedom really is evident in all of nature in a gradually ascending line, as we go along from the lowest to the highest natural beings and processes. Compare the plants and all the processes about them with the inorganic world, and you will find that, comparatively speaking, we may say that there is an element of

freedom in plants. Likewise compare the animals with the plants, and you will find that the element of freedom with the animals is much more pronounced than that found with the plants. Natural science applied to animals will never work as accurately as in the case of plants, in which in turn it will not work as accurately as in the case of inorganic matter. In some animals there appears something which almost resembles the element of freedom in man. This is simply due to the fact that all reality and all becoming in nature is a gradual realization of man as the most perfect embodiment of the element of freedom. We have mentioned above the views of some thinkers that animals have no notion of time, or that they have only a bidimensional notion of space. From our point of view here this corresponds to the lower degree of the element of freedom in the "mental" constitution of the animals: Even the primary elements of our mentality are a part of our moral equipment, inasmuch as their very manifestation in ever new individual centers is the product of the general ethical tendency of all reality and of all processes going on in the universe.

Arrived here, we fathom what spirit in its full reality may mean: It is the conscious, actual, realization of the primary and systematic elements of mentality and intellect as a basis, a substratum, for the elements of freedom. It is the realization of the two orders of law, natural and ethical, as incentives to actions. It is not a question of mere actual knowledge of the ethical principles, as would be the case with the general principles of natural laws in a world ruled by unchangeable laws. It is the knowledge of the actual application of the ethical law to each case as it comes up. It is the *action* itself, carried out in accordance with the ethical law which represents the ultimate reality of Spirit. Take an individual case of collision of the two orders of law, natural and ethical. In such a case we value the intellectual and spiritual worth of the individual the higher, the more comprehensive his intellectual grasp of all the factors

involved; and again the more varied and numerous the instances in which he evolved the high powers of moral resistance and ethical conquest. The same holds true in the conception of the world-spirit: The more frequent, and the more varied and complicated, the individual instances in which the ethical law prevails over the natural law, in the conduct of man as well as in the adjustment of his fate, by real reward and punishment, to the ethical law, the greater, and the richer, the world-spirit becomes.

IV. GOD AND THE INDIVIDUAL SOUL

In the beginning of this essay we touched upon the question whether spirit is the "possessor" of its thoughts, or, rather, consists of them. Then, in the course of our analysis we spoke in the usual terms of mind or spirit "having" certain thoughts or ideas. We did so for the sake of convenience. Now, however, being about to consider the meaning of individual spirit, we must revert to this question and discuss it.

Maimuni maintains that intellect consists in the act of thinking; in other words, the mind, the acting subject of thinking, and the process of thinking in itself, are identical. We, of course, are used to the idea that mind, or spirit, is something apart from the act of thinking. Mind, or intellect, to our current view of it, is an agent whose existence is independent of the act of thinking. There may be a mind which happens not to think at all. Upon reflection, however, we will find that in speaking thus of mind we really think of some material substratum, which we make the "possessor" of the faculty of thinking. The circumstance that we do not think of mind as being a definitely described matter helps us to keep up the delusion that we think of mind as an incorporeal being, which is a reality even when it does not happen to be actually engaged in thinking. It is difficult for us to realize that the process of thinking in itself, without the addition of an agent that "performs" the act of thinking, is all the reality

which mind contains. The great objection to such a conception is that all actions going on in the physical world take place on some matter as their *substratum*, and so we cannot depart from our notion that the act of thinking should be carried out by some entity not identical with the act of thinking it performs. This objection could be met by admitting, as we do, that spirit, while it is the source of all energy, has its indispensable function in its relation to and its influence upon matter. But the case of matter is, as already indicated in the beginning of this essay, not much different from that of spirit: Matter, we have said, may not be the "possessor," but rather *consists* of the properties which it produces in our senses. The apple is not a piece of matter that conveys to us the properties of taste, color, and so on, but rather an energetic center from which these impressions come. The notion that an energetic center must have a material substratum is a logical delusion which vanishes upon reflection and immediate realization of reality, as it presents itself to us.

By this orientation we could, perhaps, get away from dualism. If the elements of our experience which we call matter, are just as much flowing from an energetic center without substratum as the spiritual elements, a new vista of absolute monism of reality opens before us. May it not be that there is only one reality which manifests itself in different degrees, beginning with the elements of our sense-perceptions, through the primary and systematic mental elements up to the highest spiritual elements in our experience. Not that the spiritual elements *produce* the material—this, we have said above, cannot be demonstrated, or even realized in our thought. Rather, we say, the only one reality *is* so constituted that it manifests itself in these different elements as found in our experience. The relation obtaining here may be the same as in the case of *temperature*. Antiquity and Middle Ages spoke of two substances, heat and cold. To-day we speak of one temperature with different degrees; the critical point, zero, which divides temperature in warm and cold, being

a matter of subjective determination. There are, of course, two objections: First, this orientation leads us to conceive of matter as a part of the only one reality, as a part of God. Second, this orientation gives up that dualism without which freedom, responsibility, and retribution, in short, ethics and religion, are mere illusions. But the answer to these objections is indeed very easy. The opposition of Jewish prophetism and philosophy (as against the mystical tendencies, expressed later in Cabbalah) to any suggestion deriving matter from God in any way other than by its creation out of nothing by a free divine act,—this opposition, I say, was justified and necessary, so long as we understood matter to be a substratum, upon which some energy works. The moment, however, this delusion is given up, and we think of the co-called material elements of our experience as being the manifestations of an energetic center without a substratum, we have really eliminated that feature of matter from reality, which makes prophets and philosophers so strong in their denunciation of the material God-conception. We will see this more clearly, so we attend to the second objection. The idea of the only one reality as expounded above does not necessarily mean that dualism is given up altogether. To use again the above illustration: The place of the zero on the thermometer is fixed differently by different scientists. But they all agree as to the meaning of the freezing point. There cannot be any difference as to that; our perception of the freezing of water settles the question beyond dispute, and establishes the dualism of temperature-zones. The same relation may obtain in the only one energetic center of which all elements of our experience are manifestations. *Quantity*, or, rather, the realization of the idea of quantity, as found in our experience, may correspond to the freezing point on the thermometer. By it the elements of our experience are divided into two zones. The dualism that we need for the realization of freedom, ethics, and religion, is different from the dualism of other representatives of religion and philosophy throughout the ages.

Some declared matter to be a reality independent of God, and to be the source of all evil, natural and moral, in that it resists the influence of God who forms and molds it. Others went still farther and conceived of matter as of a *positive* principle of evil (an idea tantamount to the idea of the devil as the adversary of God). Others, who would not go as far as that, tried to conceive of a relation of matter to God which would allow them at any rate to consider matter as the seat of evil. Not so the dualism that we need. We are not looking for a seat of evil. In our orientation there is but one center of energy, which is so constituted that it produces two orders of law, the order of natural law and the order of ethical law. Evil is certainly real, but only as a *means* to produce the good. The reality of evil in our orientation does not mean that there is a power of evil which fights the good, the spirit, who tries to overcome it. It means rather this: The only one reality is so constituted that it manifests itself gradually in all the elements of our experience. Evil in our orientation is not really opposed to good. What we call evil is rather the *conditio sine qua non* of the good. Were it not for the possibility of what we call evil, there could not be what we call good, either. If, indeed, our prophets spoke of a world in which there will be no evil, we can accept this ideal only in the interpretation that there will be no actual evil, but the *possibility* of evil must remain. Maimuni, for instance, thinks that the ultimate aim of creation is to resolve into a pure spiritual world without matter and without evil. But our orientation, much as it owes to the philosophy of Maimuni, differs with him in this important point. To Maimuni matter is negative and, consequently, evil, too, is negative (a deep doctrine which cannot be explained here), and, therefore, may be eliminated entirely. In our orientation, on the other hand, matter and spirit are both alike positive and indispensable in the only one reality. Good is not separable from evil. "The world is good in its entirety" means just this: The only one reality is the eternal center of energy without substratum.

This center of energy manifests itself in all the elements of our experience, material and spiritual. The plants may be considered as that realm of nature in which the material elements are manifested with a slight admixture of the spiritual. The animal world shows more of the spiritual element, and, finally, man is the most comprehensive manifestation of the only one reality. And man is this because he represents the very essence of the only one reality; because he is the being in whom all energies flowing from the divine center of energy are so concentrated that the two orders of law, the natural and the ethical, as far as man's actions are concerned, or the natural and the providential, as far as man's fate is concerned,—that these two orders of law, in their double aspect, come to realization.

The great contradiction charged to the religious view of things has always been that a God who is creator and master of natural law, cannot possibly have endowed man with the power of freedom to break that law; nor can He Himself possibly break His law of nature by interfering with its workings in order to execute providence on the basis of reward and punishment. Our orientation, however, is entirely free of this contradiction. This contradiction is real only in the view of God as a spiritual substratum and of matter as a substantial substratum. In such a view, we may think of matter as created out of nothing, or as emanated from God, or as an eternal primary being independent of God in its naked being, but worked upon by Him, as the principle of energy. In every one of these orientations as we find them in the different philosophical schools in history, the above contradiction can hardly be overcome. In every one of these orientations the dualism is conceived on the ground of two different substrata, and is hard to overcome. And even in the much more attenuated dualism of *Kant*, to whom our analysis owes its very starting-point, the dualism is still one of substrata (a subject which cannot here be gone into). In all of these orientations God is conceived of as the source

of Good, as opposed to matter, the (positive or negative, emanated, created, or eternal) source of Evil.

Our orientation eliminates the idea of contradictory opposition between matter and spirit, or between good and evil. Matter and spirit, or good and evil, are as little contradictorily opposed to each other as positive and negative electricity. Both combined carry out the functions of electricity. Nor is there any contradiction in the workings of the two different orders. This may be illustrated,—as far as illustrations from the world of man's activity are applicable to the workings of absolute reality,—by the principle of manœuvres or sham battles: The army that is to attack the port of New York, for instance, works according to a plan opposed to that of the army that is to defend that port. They work according to two different orders of law, transiently opposed to each other. In the mind of the chief commander, however, these two different orders of law are both integral parts of a higher unity, the plan how to make the port of New York safe. In the different philosophic orientations alluded to the opposition between good and evil is of the kind of the opposition between two hostile armies, each of which works according to the plans of its general staff, so that two really and ultimately opposed orders of law clash with each other. In our orientation Good and Evil work according to two different plans, transiently opposed to, but ultimately in harmony with each other. The goodness of God in our orientation does not consist in the help He offers to man, who without this help would be wicked because he would be ruled by the forces of evil. Such an expression of the relation of God to man has no meaning. The relation of God to man in our orientation must rather be expressed thus: God is good, because He, the only reality, the only center of energy, manifests His essence in man, the free, ethical subject. For the realization of this goodness the material elements of our experience, those which we *call* matter, are just as integral and indispensable as the spiritual, those which

we *call* spirit. The Good has no meaning without the *possibility* of Evil. And even though the actuality of evil appears to be greater than the actuality of the good (a problem not to be treated here), the possibility of the good through the individual human soul is the fulfillment of the very essence of the divine.

Thus in our orientation the speculation about the essence of God *per se* has no place. God is the cosmic center of energy. He is a conscious Being as evidenced by our own consciousness which cannot be conceived of in any other way than as an incident in a larger process. The individual human soul is the highest fulfillment of the cosmic divine energy. The more human souls in which the divine energy finds its fulfillment, the richer God becomes, richer in essence and majesty. The divine energy finds its fulfillment in the individual human soul in proportion to the actualization of the intellectual powers of man in the service of the spiritual or ethical order of law.

In this orientation, the question of the permanent entity of the individual human soul has long been overtaken. Every human soul, to the extent it helped to increase the dominion of the spiritual over the material, has enriched the divine energy radiating from the only one reality. This seems to violate the old principle of the unchangeability of God, as mentioned above. But already Maimuni has explained that this may only mean that there is no cause outside of God that causes Him to change his will; and that, on the contrary, the right conception of God as a free agent requires the belief that God may, for instance, decree that the material (negative) form of reality should vanish altogether. In our orientation the constant enrichment of the divine through the constant manifestations concentrated in new human souls does not mean changeability in the sense denounced by the philosophers. It is not a change superinduced by an outside cause, but it is the nature of the divine energy to grow richer in content by the ever new and added fulfillments of the divine essence by

the manifestations in new human individuals who add to the dominion of the spiritual order of law over the order of natural law. That such a soul becomes a permanent increase in the all-embracing divine consciousness is an idea by no means difficult of conception and realization. Indeed, the idea is highly suggestive that the individual soul that helped to enrich the divine energy retains an individualized entity in the ever increasing divine essence.

But this question transcends the confines of this essay. Nor is this the only problem which presses for discussion from the new outlook opened by our analysis and orientation. In the problem of immortality just touched upon there are many other questions to be discussed; such as what of the souls of the wicked and the undeveloped; the relation of intellectual and practical ethical development, and the like. In fact, all problems of philosophy and religion must be discussed from the aspect of things as presented here. True, the real meaning of spirit, of God and of the human soul, would become much clearer and much more adequate by the discussion of such problems as prophecy, free will, retribution, the meaning of history in its intellectual, artistic, national, social, and political aspects, and the like. But this essay attempted to present the meaning of spirit in its general essential contents to the extent it was possible to do so without the adequate discussion of all the problems indicated. And, likewise, the meaning of spirit, God, and the human soul, would be brought out much more fully and much more adequately by the discussion of the different philosophic views and systems, and of the arguments for and against the views adopted here. But also this is beyond the set task of this essay. In some isolated instances the arguments had to be slightly touched upon in order to make our view more definite and distinct. But the definite aim of this essay was merely to state the sincere and unequivocal religious belief as to the meaning of spirit and its workings under the principles of freedom and retribution in the true, unobscured meaning of these terms. We believe

that our suggestion to get away from dualism through the idea that matter is not substratum will make the religious outlook more acceptable and more adequate to our immediate experience. But our analysis of human experience has fulfilled its task without this addition. If we retain the dualistic view of matter and spirit, we have greater difficulties to overcome. Some may never be overcome, from any point of view. But there is one general argument in favor of the religious outlook as presented which may be advanced here: No entity is postulated which is not given to us as an *immediate reality*. If we accept unity of energy without material substratum, we do so because it is so present in our immediate realization. We do not reduce matter to spirit or spirit to matter. Our opponent, the materialist, has the burden of the proof. If he is not able to produce before our eyes an homunculus with a fully developed mind out of chemical ingredients, and to explain to us the entire process in all its details, he has lost his case. But so long as our friends of the other side are not able to do so, our simple inference that the individual human spirit in its fullest intellectual and ethical meaning is a manifestation of the world-spirit, of God, is the more scientific and the more acceptable; nay, it is almost an immediate, and to some of us it is the most immediate, experience.

DUALISM IN RELIGION AND ETHICS¹

MY thesis is that some element of dualism is essential to religion and ethics. My argument for this thesis is a twofold one, historical and systematic. Should I not succeed in my historical argument, it will not affect my thesis. All historical systems of religion and philosophy have some element of dualism, I believe. But should any one of my critics succeed in showing that there are some or even many systems that have no element of dualism it will not prove that my thesis is wrong, since it is well possible that those systems are wrong and my thesis right.

THE HISTORICAL ARGUMENT

I begin with the historical argument. Generally we know that religion begins with polytheism, just as philosophy begins with pluralism. Then, too, we generally believe, and it is true, that the highest stages of development in religion and philosophy are Monotheism and Monism, respectively. Now I say that while the highest phase of development is reached by monotheism or monism, still some element of dualism is necessary to religion and also to philosophy if this latter aspires to a system of ethics. By this I do not propose to unite two extremes; to say that monotheism or monism is true and dualism as well. I will have to define dualism: There are two kinds of dualism, one which we may call absolute, and another which we may call relative dualism. We may also designate them as ontological and phenomenal dualism, and some would say final and temporary dualism. It is the relative dualism which I mean when I say that dualism is essential to religion and ethics.

¹ Lecture delivered before the Jewish Theological Society of Cincinnati, of January 11, 1915.

This statement may appear to some almost trivial. For it seems to be an axiom of religion and ethics. In fact, I had this experience with my students. We discussed this question, and in the first phase of the discussion one of the students said: "Doctor, this is evidently true, but why lay so much stress on it?" But after the discussion had proceeded for a while half of the class was opposed to this seeming truism. And so I have to insist that this truism is true, and it will not be amiss to prove it. Let us orient ourselves first in the history of Judaism. Our ancestors, too, started as polytheists, but even later, when they already were monotheists, they believed in angels as mediators between God and man. I would not say that our forefathers who believed in angels, were polytheists, as some say, at least as far as the authoritative representatives are concerned, but I would say that even these latter were pluralists. The angels were considered to be eternal (Gen. III, 22), and as such they certainly constitute a pluralistic element. And even if some would hesitate to consider the authoritative representatives in the earliest period as pluralists, they will have to admit that in the angels there was an element of dualism. For not only were some angels considered as angels of destruction, thus having a function of producing natural evil, but even the moral evil was believed to have its seat in some angels specifically entrusted with the task of producing evil inclinations in the hearts of men. It was not until the time of the great Deuteronomic reformation that authoritative Judaism attempted to uproot the belief in angels as intermediators. But even these rigid monotheists had to admit some dualism. Take that great representative of the school of the strict monotheists whom we know under the name of Isaiah the Second. He was confronted by a new situation, the question was no longer monotheism or polytheism, but monotheism or dualism. To fight dualism meant much more than to fight polytheism. Parsism, the form of dualism that this prophet had to fight, was a remarkably systematic structure of thought. The belief in two principles,

in that of light and that of darkness, or that of good and that of evil, rests on undeniable facts. The prophet could not attempt to deny that there is a principle of evil opposed to the principle of good, and his only contention was that God is the creator of both: "In order that they know from the rising of the sun to his going down that there is nothing beside Me, I am JHVH and none else. Producer of light and creator of darkness, the maker of Good and the creator of Evil, I am JHVH, the maker of all these" (Is. XLV, 6-7). And another writer of this period insists that both the evil and the good come from God (Lam. III, 37-38). Thus these great monotheists not only admit but insist on dualism. Their only contention is that the dualism is not primitive, it being a creation of God. Thus the struggle between monotheism and polytheism ended with what we may call a victory of the former, but not so the struggle between monotheism and dualism. Polytheism could be overcome by the monotheists, at least in their conviction. Dualism, however, was a claim with which they had to compromise. Now we know that even old Parisism advanced the idea that in the end the principle of light or good will conquer the principle of darkness or evil. This idea was later developed by the Manichaeans, who emphasized just this point that the evil, while a primitive principle, is ultimately to be overcome by the good. In this their Messianic idea they neutralized in part the old dualism, in that they declared the evil to be a primitive but not a final principle. Thus the opposing views, monotheism and dualism, met each other half way, both of them compromising.

This we may consider as the result of the development in biblical times. Going on to the Greek period, there is no doubt to any one who knows the literature of that period, that dualism was admitted to even a greater extent than in the biblical period. And this not only by such writers who are deeply steeped in angelology and demonology like those whose products make up the Book of Jubilees, the Book of Enoch and the like, but even the more philosophic writers

of that period were dualists to some extent, and Philo, the foremost representative of the philosophy of that period is even a real dualist. Philo, influenced by Plato and Aristotle, believes in the eternity of matter as a positive principle. Moreover, enlarging upon an idea of Plato's, he declared matter to be the positive principle of evil. And so strong was Philo in his belief in the primitivity of evil that he believed in the eternity of evil in the future. Evil to him is not only primitive but also final. Evil according to Philo will never cease, there will never be an ultimate overcoming of evil. To him the aim of creation is the fighting of evil, evil therefore must be eternal, otherwise the world would lose its aim and the reason for its existence. This world is here as the substratum whereon evil should be fought continually, and the good should be victorious again and again. God is free from all evil, free from any reproach for its existence, since evil is a principle different from God and independent of Him. God is the principle of good and it is he who enters the combination with the material principles in order to fight them, and it is this what creation means, the entering of a combination to fight evil. Each would try to get the upper hand, by which I mean to say only that matter would try to get the upper hand in a passive, but not active way. In other words we should not understand Philo so as to mean that matter has consciousness, being bent on victory, but rather that matter offers passive resistance. There is only one active principle, and that is God, while all the evil we see in the world is representative of the passive resistance of matter. By this Philo mitigates his dualism, but remains a dualist nevertheless.

In talmudic times the trend of thought which we may consider representative of authoritative Judaism is in general the same as in biblical times. True, there is the mystical speculation the two branches of which are known under the names of Maasseh Mercabah and Maasseh B'reshith in which the question of dualism receives a solution somewhat different from the authoritative. The adherents of the former seem

to have believed in eternal angels, and also in emanation of matter from God, while the adherents of the latter seem to have believed in the theory of Ideas and in eternity of matter. In the Mercabah theory there is a certain element of pluralism while according to the theory of B'reshith evil is accounted for in the same way as in the systems of Plato and Philo. But we don't have to press this interpretation in order to find dualism in the Talmud. It is sufficient to mention the idea of the good will and the evil will both struggling in the heart of man, both being angels of God entrusted with the task of trying all their powers on the free will of man to win him for the good or evil, respectively. We find in many places of the Talmud arguments against dualism, and they certainly were fighting dualism, but in the end they could not go any further than Isaiah the Second. They, too, had to admit an element of dualism in the world.

Coming down to medieval times, we find again two trends of thought which result in different attitudes toward this question. There is one group of philosophers who believe in *creatio ex nihilo* pure and simple. They are strict monotheists. To them the unity of God means uniqueness in being; God alone is real, and all other things are real only inasmuch as He produces their reality out of nothing. They fight dualism, especially Saadya, the most representative exponent of this group, who advances the most efficient arguments against dualism, taking them from general phenomena in nature and particularly from the perceptive and cognitive functions of the soul of man. But he, too, not only admits, but even insists on a positive principle of evil which he finds to be inherent in matter. Saadya is known for his strict monotheism, in which he goes so far as to exclude the existence of any pure incorporeal being besides God. Unity of God, to him, means uniqueness in incorporeality, so that even angels and the immortal soul of man in his view are not free from matter altogether. Even these beings are composed of spirit and matter, this latter, of course, of a very subtle nature. In-

corporeality is the criterion of divinity, and that is why no incorporeal being besides God is conceivable. Translated from the metaphysical into the ethical, Saadya maintains that in matter God has created the positive possibility of evil. The soul of a sinner becomes defiled by material spots, which find expression even in his face. The soul of the sinner who forfeited immortality turns into matter with only animalic sensibility enough for the eternal pain of hell. The immortal soul, on the other hand, lives on in a body of a most subtle matter, in which the possibility of evil is reduced to a negligible minimum. Thus even the strictest monotheist must resort to dualism in the principles, insisting, of course, that it is God who created the other principle.

The second group, whose first and foremost representative is Gabirol, went back to an even more primitive dualism. To them matter is an eternal principle besides God and independent of him in its naked being. They differ from Persian dualism only in that matter to them is only potentially a substance; matter to them is dead, being capable of neither good nor evil. It is only when the spirit—that is to say, God, the form-principle—works on it that it acquires the faculty of doing both good and evil whenever it reaches the high degree of organic development represented in man. Abraham ibn Daud, one of the most brilliant thinkers of this group, permits us an even deeper insight into the necessity of primitive dualism. Evil cannot come from God, God being the source of all good. God as the form principle requires the material principle to master it. God for himself is inconceivable; the conception of function is not only complementary, but absolutely indispensable to the proper God-conception. Metaphysically it is God's relation to matter as its creative principle, ethically it is God's relation to man as his commander and his judge that makes him a live issue and a reality to man. God as the creative principle implies the obstruction and resistance of matter; God as the commander implies the reality and possibility of moral evil; God as the judge implies the reality

and possibility of natural evil. Nay, the existence of evil, natural and moral, is not only the *conditio sine qua non*, but the very essence of creation. If you ask, "Why is there evil?" you are not conscious of what you really ask. What you really ask is, why is there a creation at all? The question, why is there moral evil? implies the postulate that all men should be perfectly good, and equally good; there should be no such thing as hatred, envy, &c., and no natural causes to call forth such sentiments. Now, if you realize what you ask, you will find that you postulate perfect equality of all individuals in all of their virtues and faculties. Any difference in the natural gifts or even in the external appearance of men will produce envy and hatred and will become the source of evil; even the difference of sex should be absent, according to this postulate. Your question implies even more, there being no reason to confine it to man. You will have to extend it to the rest of nature. Why should there be animals, why should there be plants? Is it not an injustice to leave these realms of nature on a lower stage of development? And then, too, could God not make all of us angels? And even then you will not be satisfied, for why should we be angels could we not be Gods? All of which goes to show that our question, why is there evil? implies the postulate that there be no creation at all. Creation means variety, variety means different degrees of perfection, difference in degree and in quality requires at least a dualism in the principles.

And even Maimuni, the strictest monotheist that ever lived, cannot do without dualism altogether. To him there is one principle of reality only—Intellect, or God. God is free to exist exclusively in the full, undiminished glory of His reality. But He chose to manifest Himself in the creatural world also, the different realms of which are as many different degrees of reality. And not only the four realms, or kingdoms—inorganic, plant, animal and man—but also the genera and species, and within the species the individuals, represent different degrees of reality. The more suggestive of intellect

a thing is the more of reality it represents. Man, in whom intellect is not only indicated by suggestion, but really developed into an active creative power, is the highest manifestation of reality in the sublunar world (the spirits moving the heavenly bodies being the highest manifestation of creatural reality). And the higher a man develops his intellect by means of true thinking and ethical conduct the more of reality he brings to light and the more divine he is (Moses having reached the highest degree possible in the sublunar world). What we call Matter is no positive principle, but a restricted manifestation of the only real, the Intellect, God. Intellect and matter are no more two than light and shade. Shade screens light, so matter screens intellect. To be sure, matter is the source of all evil, but evil is negative—the absence of the good.

Now, this conception of things does away with dualism entirely, but only *ontologically*. Ontologically, matter and evil do not exist at all, but their phenomenal reality is undisputed—nay, insisted upon—by Maimuni no less than by any ancient dualist. When it comes to the reality of sin, or to the reality of matter as a screen between man and God, Maimuni speaks of matter and evil in terms that any dualist would readily adopt as his own. For all intents and purposes of religion and ethics Maimuni's phenomenal dualism is as real as any primitive and ontological dualism ever conceived of.

The Jewish philosophers of the post-Maimunian period can easily be classified according to the systems of the classic period (IX–XII centuries). As to Cabbalah, it will be mentioned more conveniently in connection with neo-Platonism.

Thus we have seen that the religious development in Judaism had been able to do away with polytheism entirely, but had to retain some element of dualism. We are mostly interested in Judaism; in reality, however, Judaism here is representative of the entire religious development of the human race. For having proven that the most rigid monotheistic religion had to retain some shade of dualism, there

is no need to extend the proof over other forms of religion, in sight of the fact that all other religions with a *positive* ethical ideal have been either polytheistic, or, as in the case of Christianity, monotheistic with certain restrictions: the principle of good as a trinity in eternal fight with the principle of evil, the devil, the anti-Christ, or whatever name there be attached to it. Orthodox Mohammedanism represents about the same phase of development as early pre-Deuteronomic Judaism.

Orienting ourselves in the general philosophic development with a view of completing the historical argument as regards ethics, we find *Plato*, the flower of Greek philosophy and ethics, holding matter, as the principle opposed to the non-corporeal entities, God and the world of Ideas, responsible for all imperfection and all evil, natural and moral. His great disciple, Aristotle, rather detached ethics from metaphysics, but feeling that by doing so ethics loses all higher meaning, he retains enough of the moral dualism of his master as to help prove our thesis. The same is true of the later schools of Greek philosophy. None of them retained more of the positive ethical ideal of Plato than of his dualism. The question whether the Stoics or the Epicureans had a positive ideal is a controverted one. But those who interpret these philosophers in the sense of a positive ethical ideal do needs interpret them in the sense of a dualism in the principles. A new departure in Greek thought on our question we find in neo-Platonism as represented by Plotinos and his followers. They try to overcome dualism by the theory of emanation of Spirit and Matter from the One, the Unknown, God. But neo-Platonism, reduced to its *four* basic principles—emanation of matter from God, matter as a positive principle of evil, the theory of Ideas, and agnosticism—means simply this: They recognize dualism as an undeniable fact, metaphysically as well as ethically. For this reason they believe in two principles, spirit and matter, considering the former as the principle of good, and the latter as the principle of evil. Again they recognize the fact that within the non-corporeal principle

there are certain phenomena which justify the belief in a plurality of principles. So they adopt the theory of Ideas. At the same time, however, they are not ready to deny those facts and phenomena in the world which tend to make us posit complete unity of principle and purpose in the universe. So they posit emanation of the opposing principles from the One. But if you ask them how it is possible that two contradictory principles should emanate from one, and of what nature that One is that permits such an emanation, they answer: "We do not know." In fact, this is the essential trait of all mystical speculation. The mystic follows all impressions of reality in their contradictory features without caring much for a logical explanation, offering all kinds of suggestive fancies instead. Neo-Platonism, then, is another expression of the historic fact that a certain element of dualism is indispensable wherever there is a tendency toward a positive ethical ideal. All Arabic philosophers were neo-Platonists, particularly in their oriental, or esoteric, philosophy. The same holds true of Cabbalah, which rests entirely on the four principles of mysticism formulated above. Of the Christian Scholastics I certainly do not have to prove that they admitted an element of dualism. In modern philosophy Decartes and Spinoza have emphasized dualism in the distinction between Thinking and Extension. On this Dualism Spinoza bases his *Ethics*. Spinoza's *Parallelism*, expressed in the basic sentence of his philosophy—"The order and the connection of the things (material) are identical with the order and the connection of the Ideas" (*Ordo et connectio rerum est idem ac ordo et connectio idearum*)—is based on the dualism of Matter and Spirit. As to Kant, I have defended the thesis of his dualism, not only in his ethics, but also in his epistemology, in a public disputation on the occasion of my promotion to the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at the University of Berlin, in 1896 (July 11), on the ground of my Doctor-thesis (*Die Freiheitslehre bei Kant und Schopenhauer*, Verlag Voss, Leipzig und Hamburg, 1896).

II. SYSTEMATIC ARGUMENT.

In the historical argument I did not press the arguments that pluralists and dualists advanced in favor of their views, mentioning such incidentally only, to the extent required for the bare explanation of the views quoted. Now, it would be very instructive to discuss in this connection all the arguments pro and contra. But such a discussion would amount to a large volume, one of the volumes of my book on the "History of Jewish Philosophy." Here I intend to present offhand a few arguments of a more popular character.

1. *Free Will.* There is no way of doing without the principle of free will in religion and ethics. True, there were some religious sects in the course of history who denied this principle and believed in a sort of religious determinism. Moreover, I have to admit that in Judaism also we had some philosophers whose views on the subject amount to a denial of free will in its popular meaning (Crescas), and some who greatly restricted the sphere of man's freedom (Bahya, Hallevi and, even, Maimuni, and others). But if we are to take a firm stand in this most important question we will have to say this: Those theologians and ethicists who deny free will altogether simply contradict themselves, and are, at their best, deceiving themselves by using words and making statements that can not be realized logically (cf. More Nebukhim I, 51). If man is determined in his actions, always bound one way or the other, command or prohibition are mere words, void of all content. Religion and Ethics without the moral law mean nothing. But as to those who restrict free will to a certain extent, we will have to admit that, while some of their individual views may be wrong, they are right in their general contention that free will can not mean that monstrous *liberum arbitrium* according to which a man is free to act without any motive whatever. On the contrary, freedom means to choose between opposing motives. This common sense meaning of moral freedom is the one that religion or

ethics need for their substantiation. This involves the idea that man's nature, lower or higher—it does not matter how you qualify it—seems to permit him to do one thing, but he is free to do something different, contrary to the promptings of that nature, for a certain reason which comes from the sphere of a different nature in man. So there are “two *wills*” in religion, the good will and the evil will, and “two natures” in ethics (Kant).

Ethics, then, religious or philosophic, insists on dualism in man. In fact, *pedagogy* also implies this dualism. Were there no dualism in man there would be no need for any training of any kind. Just let things go on in their own way; they will turn out all right. You do not have to train fire to burn, you do not have to train any part of nature as long as no element of freedom enters into the combination. Most of the interference with and changes in the natural development of things is attributable to man's free will. Of course, there are animals that interfere with nature, and improve on it very effectively. But this only proves that moral freedom in man is the *climax* in an infinitely graded scale of freedom, beginning with the lowest forms of organic locomotion. Real monism is conceivable in the sphere of *mechanics* only. And even there it is rather confusing to think of mechanical processes going on without the element of freedom which comes from a free agent and interferes with the dead monotony of the unchangeable natural law. Yes, even the simplest processes in “nature” call for at least “two natures,” for else why, pray, should there be any processes at all? The most satisfactory conception of “action” or “process” is the one which interprets all processes and actions to be brought on by the impetus produced by the relations of the two natures. These relations find expression in an infinite scale of activities, grading from the lowest processes in dead, inorganic nature, through the more individualized instinctive functions and reactions in the realm of the organic, up to the highest moral action of man.

2. *Retribution.* Neither religion nor ethics means anything tangible without the principle of retribution. If good conduct brings no good as reward and bad conduct brings no evil as punishment, there is no basis for anything like a postulate regulating the conduct of man by religion or ethics. We hear very often that "to serve under the condition of receiving reward" is a lower degree of good conduct, the higher being "to serve not under the condition of receiving a reward," not "out of fear," but "out of love," "for its own sake" or "for the sake of God." And this is true to a certain extent. But this does not mean that there is any basis for the postulate of ethical conduct other than the idea of retribution. An individual who insists on deriving some personal good from every good act of his is indeed on a low stage of ethical development. Higher than this is the ethical conduct for the good of the family, the community, the state, humanity. But the real meaning of this postulate is that there is no such thing as an absolute individual account, the individual being bound with a thousand ties to his environment, the family, the tribe, the community, the state, the human race; an idea emphasized by the old Jewish doctrine of "visiting the sins of the parents on their children." The postulate of doing good out of love tries to impress upon the individual the idea of universal retribution. But this idea has no standing and no meaning unless based upon the primary idea of individual retribution. Unless you are ready to admit the blank nonsense that a real ethical act is one that brings good to none, and a real evil act is one that brings evil to none, you do believe in retribution. Now, if you admit that by acting one way you influence the course of events, while acting the other way you influence the course of events in the opposite direction, you have already admitted dualism in nature and history. For else there would be only one way for the course of events, predestined from the beginning of all beginnings, on the strength of the first move, if there ever was any such beginning, or on the strength of the eternal arrangement of things, as we would have to believe from this point of view.

This general idea of retribution is common to both religion and ethics. This phase of the principle of retribution implies no more than the belief in reward and punishment as *natural consequences* of ethical or unethical conduct, respectively. The dualism guaranteed by this indispensable principle is essentially no more than another expression of the dualism necessitated by the idea of free will. But from the religious point of view the principle of retribution necessarily means much more than this. From the religious point of view we believe that any good or evil act produces some (individual or universal) reward or punishment, respectively, which would not come about if things were left to the course of natural consequences alone. To express it more adequately: There are two orders of things—the order of natural law and “the moral order of the world.” This expression is not a mere phrase. The natural law is His, He made it, but the moral order is His also, He made it. And just as no act of man is really moral unless it subdues something that we expect from the workings of natural law, so retribution in the religious sense means nothing unless it interferes with what we expect to be the course of events under natural law. We do not hesitate to use the word “interference,” but in reality both orders are related parts of one and the same system, the interference being the systematic relation of the orders, ordained by the Only One. (We, of course, do not believe in ethics without divine authority, and while here is not the place to state our arguments, it is sufficient to point to the fact that the dualism in ethics is absolute, while that of religion is only relative, thus permitting the higher development towards monism.) If *providence* and *prayer* are not empty words, then they surely connote a dual order of things. If God really *provides*, then He must bring about something that would not happen under the natural course of events. We speak of prayer as confession of faith, as communion of the soul with God, as a psychological realization of truth, as an artistic elevation of the mind, and as a rejuvenation of the ethical

energy. All of which is very true, but each and every one of these features of prayer is based on the *original* phase of prayer, which is prayer as *petition*. Prayer as a petition means to pray for something that we could not get without prayer. He who believes in prayer without sophistry and hypocrisy, in prayer pure and simple, has certainly great problems and perplexities to face. But we are not concerned here with the question whether or not religion is true. But granted religion as a reality, then prayer, too, prayer pure and simple, must be a reality. If what you call God can not bring about anything that is not determined by what you call natural law, then he is no more worthy of our worship than any good working machine. (By the way: The difficulties facing the believer in prayer and retribution are to be overcome by a critical analysis of the conceptions of "natural law" and "moral order." This has nothing to do with the question of *Miracles*. Miracles interfere with nature by *interruption*, providence by systematic relation.)

3. *The Individual Soul*. The conceptions most indispensable to ethics, such as character, personality, moral subject, responsibility, conscience, remorse, and the like, are empty words without the belief in the individual soul as a real entity. Those who declare the soul to be a mere epiphenomenon concomitant to certain mechanical and chemical processes in the human organism have no right to use any of the specifically ethical concepts mentioned above. (Of course, I am aware of the fact that many who deny the individual soul as a real entity do use those expressions, but they do this only by virtue of the fact that there is no law punishing a certain class of people for their silly habit of using language borrowed from a conception of things which they pretend to have abandoned.) From the viewpoint of religion the reality of the individual soul of man is even more indispensable. For you can not do in religion without the belief in *immortality* of the soul. Some think lightly of this question. They try to hide their ignorance on the subject by displaying an air of superiority in their

realization of what they term the realities of natural law. They pretend to know something about what religion is without the belief in immortality of the individual soul of man. But so far I have never met a man who was able to tell me what religion is good for without this item, nor have I ever read an argument in justification of religion without immortality that carried any weight with me. Admit that the soul of man is cut off after he has taken a certain number of breakfasts, lunches, dinners and suppers, and has performed some other actions of that kind, and the least that any man with common sense could expect from his minister would be to be let alone, and not to be bothered by his insistence on using language which may have meant something to a past age, but which is void of all meaning to the "modern" minister; to him who pretends to have a religious message to that poor wretch of mere flesh and blood whose entity is exhausted within the confines of birth in dirt and death in decay.

Now, the moment you admit the reality of the individual soul of man, you admit dualism. No matter whether a mere ethicist or a religious ethicist, in both cases you will have to admit dualism in order to make the individual soul possible; the difference between ethics and religion narrowing down to the question of immortality, as indicated in the preceding. This can be shown by a brief discussion of the famous controversy between *Mendelssohn* and *Kant* on the question of immortality.

Reduced to its essentials, Mendelssohn's proof in his *Phaedon* for immortality of the individual soul can be expressed as follows:

No substance can be destroyed, so the only thing to be proven is that man's mentality is a substance independent of the material contents of his knowledge to the result of which the materialist reduces what we term soul or mentality. But this, Mendelssohn claims, is impossible. The contents of our knowledge, or the totality of our experience, is made up of certain elements which by no means can be derived from the

material impressions which come from without. These elements can be accounted for only by the position of a mental substance which furnishes them. Thus our very experience, though made up of notions on material impressions from without, would be impossible were it not for the existence of our mentality, which is the frame, as it were, in which the outside impressions receive color and meaning of reality. Mendelssohn did not try to give a systematic description of this frame. Nevertheless, from the general terms he uses, we are entitled to say that they are essentially the same as Kant's four "notions of the understanding," each one of which branches off into three distinct "categories" (1. Quantity: Unity; Plurality; Totality. 2. Quality: Reality; Negation; Limitation. 3. Relation: Substance and Accident; Cause and Effect; Interdependence. 4. Modality: Possibility and Impossibility; Existence and Non-Existence; Necessity and Chance).

Kant, feeling that he owes this valuable element of his epistemology to the Jewish philosopher (who was five years his junior), acknowledges this fact by his criticism of "this sharp-minded philosopher's" proof for immortality, taking occasion to show the essential difference between Mendelssohn's epistemology and his own. Kant attacks first the premise that a substance can not cease to exist. He admits that a substance can not be *destroyed*, but, says he, a substance of an *intensive* nature, as soul and mentality, is subject to increase and decrease of intensity, as, in fact, we must admit that even our consciousness, or self-consciousness, is a matter of degree. Now, a substance which is under the sway of the ebb and flow of intensity, can surely *disappear* by gradually diminishing to nothingness, or, mathematically expressed, to the intensity of the degree of *zero*. This leads to the correct conception of the relation between mentality and the outward impressions, the "given sensations." Our experience—nay, even our self-consciousness—requires the existence of a mental substance; moreover, self-consciousness is essentially nothing else than even the realization of the difference between materiality and

mentality and their relation to each other. But this does by no means warrant the conclusion that there is anything like an *individual soul*. The individual souls which the rational psychologist considers as individual entities are sufficiently accounted for by the position of a *general mental substance* and a general materiality, the individual self-consciousnesses being the phenomena resulting in all cases of contact between the two general substances under certain conditions. The individual may, after all, be a mere *accident* to the two general substances, but no substance, no real individual entity. Thus Mendelssohn's proof for immortality labors under his uncritical epistemology. There is no thinking ego (individual subject) prior to the epistemological process, the former rather being the result of the latter. So there is no direct proof for immortality within the theoretical reach of our understanding. For the same reason, however, Kant continues, there is no proof to the contrary, as the naturalist claims. For though we are unable to prove the individual soul, we are able to prove the existence of general mentality—the general soul, as it were, and thus there is the *possibility* of the individual soul being a “persistent substance” untouched by the ebb and flow of the intensity of the individual self-consciousness. Moreover, the “practical reason,” that which guarantees the reality of the moral law, *postulates* the immortality of the individual soul.

Coming now to orient ourselves as to the difference between mere ethics and religion, or religious ethics, we must be aware of the fact that Kant in his “Ideas” is more than a mere ethicist. The Idea (postulate) of immortality is in intimate connection with his Idea of God. Kant, then, when taken in the light of his Ideas, is representative of religious ethics. Accordingly, the difference between mere ethics and religion as to the individual soul would be this: Ethics requires the individual soul only as an accident to the relations between general mentality and general materiality, in the sense of Kant's objection to Mendelssohn, while religion requires the individual soul as a persistent substance in the sense of Mendels-

sohn's "proven" statement, or of Kant's postulate. It can readily be seen that the difference between the two does not touch at all the fact of dualism; on the contrary, both have to insist on dualism with equal determination in order to account for the bare epistemological requirement of our elementary experience. The individual soul, then, requires dualism, no matter whether you interpret it as a passing phenomenon, an accident to the relation of two general substances, or as a persistent immortal substance.

Concluding, I repeat that my object in this essay is only to lay stress on the thesis of dualism. We should not (this is the lesson I wish to convey here) allow ourselves to be driven by a sort of uncalled-for "modernism," much abroad in our midst, to abandon the very principles of Judaism, overtly or covertly. Of course, I do not overlook the problems and perplexities that face the true believer in monotheism in all of the questions I touched upon in this essay. There are many ways of harmonizing the indispensable element of dualism with the basic principle of monotheistic Judaism. We have mentioned some of them, modern thought may suggest new ways. But let us never lose sight of the fact that a *living* religion, a religion based on *truth* and *sincerity* (yes, first of all, *sincerity* to the congregation!) requires both absolute monotheism and relative dualism.

INDIVIDUAL AUTHORITY IN JUDAISM

IT has often been said that one of the essential differences between Judaism and Christianity concerns the position of Jesus in Christianity. Of course, those who say so, do not overlook the position of Moses in Judaism. But the distinction is made that Moses, even tho called at times "the man of God," is not considered a divine being in Judaism, as Jesus is considered in Christianity. This is undoubtedly true in a general way, but in detail the question calls for discussion and explanation.

Maimuni in *Hil. Jesode ha-Torah* IX, 2, feels that Deut. XVIII, 18: "A prophet will I cause to arise from the midst of their brethren like thee" (comp. *ibid.*, verse 15), is conflicting with the idea, championed by him in the preceding chapters, that Moses is the only source of prophetic authority. The explanation given by Maimuni that the authority of later prophets does not entitle them to make any permanent change in the law of Moses, and that even in other, indifferent, matters their authority is based on the law of Moses determining the credentials of a prophet, is hardly acceptable from the critical and historical point of view. The passage in Deut. XXXIV, 10: "And there has arisen no more prophet in Israel like Moses whom God knew face to face," while not directly contradictory to the passages quoted above, certainly suggests this idea of Moses' superiority over the other prophets to a greater extent than the passages just alluded to. And this is even more true of Num. XII, where the distinction between the prophecy of Moses and his contemporary prophets, Aaron and Miriam, is set forth at some detail by God Himself.

The best way of harmonization seems to be, in this case as in many other cases, not to harmonize at all. There were in biblical times two opposing views as to the position and

authority of Moses as a prophet. Some conceived of Moses as of a man with unique superhuman (if not divine) qualities. Among these there seem to have been even such as otherwise were strict monotheists, repudiating the belief in angels, but more so those to whom the belief in angels was an essential element of creed and outlook. Especially it would seem that those passages which credit Moses with having seen the face of God belong to a source in which angels and *Mercabah* are integrally bound up with the idea of prophecy and divine revelation.¹

However, the tendency in Biblical times to assign to Moses a singular position of authority over all other prophets has always found a check in the counter-tendency to let him share this authority with other prophets.²

In *Graeco-Jewish literature* we find the tendency to assign to Moses a singular, supernatural position in a new setting. Here it is the influence of Plato which evolves a new conception of the personality of Moses. Whether the royal Psalms (and the corresponding passages in Proverbs), conceived after the image of Plato's "philosopher-ruler," refer to Moses (as suggested by some midrashic observations) or not, the general conception of Moses in those circles was that he was the most perfect model of the philosopher-ruler that history brought about. And some went so far as to assign to Moses a pre-mundane existence and to speak of a pre-mundane Moses in the Idea.³ Moreover, according to a quotation from the book just mentioned by Gelasius, "the spirit of Moses went forth from before the face of God, and the world was created." So the unique cosmological position of Moses under the theory of Ideas becomes even more pronounced than under the aspect of *Mercabah*.

¹ Cf. Num. XX, 16; Moses = angel, Is. LXIII, 9; Moses = angel of His face; comp. verses 10, 11 and 14, as also Neh. IX, 20, with Gelasius' quotation below; Spinoza, *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*, I, missed the point.

² Dan. IX, 10-11.

³ The Assumption of Moses I, 14.

If we now revert to the question of the relation between the position of Moses in Judaism and that of Jesus in Christianity, considering the above historical facts and the later development growing out of them, we come to the following conclusion:

It was just these mystical tendencies in the conception of Moses, which, unable to get authoritative recognition in Judaism, found vent in the creation of the personality of Jesus.

Christianity in its initial phase conceived of Jesus as a sort of archangel who came down in the flesh. This was the realization of the old conception of Moses under the aspect of Mercabah. The later, anti-nomistic phase of Christology conceived of Jesus as of the Logos. This was the realization of the old conception of Moses under the aspect of the theory of Ideas.

From this point of view the many passages in the New Testament in which the rivalry between the personalities of Moses and Jesus is fought out, become imbued with a new meaning and assume a new significance. It is the authoritative conception of Moses in struggle with the two mystical conceptions of Moses, the latter being represented by the two successive christological conceptions of Jesus.⁴

And also the position of Moses in *Talmudic literature* can be best understood under the aspect of this rivalry. There are passages in which Moses is defended against the slighting remarks in the N. T. writings.⁵ But at the same time they are very careful not to emphasize too much the personality of Moses as against the personality of Jesus. That such danger was real is best shown by a midrashic characterization of Moses which is very much similar to that of Gelasius quoted above. God has endowed Moses with the name "Elohim" (Ex. VII, 1), with which he created the world, meaning "Elohim" of Gen.

⁴ 2 Cor. III, 3 f.; Galat. IV, 22-24; Heb. II, 2 f.; III, 3-6; IX, 18-26; X, 1f-.

⁵ Siphre Num. 27, 103, 134, 135, 157, 306 and others.

I, 2.⁶ But this is found in a later Midrash; in early Tannaitic times two tendencies are visibly at work.

In order to counteract the slighting anti-nomistic remarks against the authority of Moses as law-giver, the Talmudists, or some of them, speak of Moses in terms expressing his authority over all other prophets and sages, such as: "father of the sages," "master of the prophets," "father of the prophets," "the best of the prophets," and the like.⁷ Especially is it the title "our master," which seems to have come in vogue in those days of rivalry between the personalities of Moses and Jesus, corresponding to "Kathagetes" or "Magister" (later "Dominus") of Jesus.⁸

But there was great opposition to the magnifying of the personality and authority of Moses in the early Tannaitic period. Especially we find Rabbi Akiba, the great antagonist of Christianity, emphasizing the idea, that the authority of Moses goes back to the people of Israel and is shared by him with "our fathers," and with other prophets.⁹

Rabbi, the redactor of the Mishnah, protests against magnifying Moses at the expense of God Himself.¹⁰ R. Akiba says it was a great privilege for Moses to become *messenger* between Israel and their father in heaven.¹¹ He who acknowledges idols, denies the ten commandments, what Moses was commanded, what the patriarchs were commanded, and what the prophets were commanded.¹² Is it from Moses that we have the Torah? Have not our fathers (or "patriarchs")¹³ possessed it? ¹⁴ Can the hands of Moses make war or break

⁶ Tanhuma, ed. Buber, W'a-era, 7.

⁷ Siphre Num. 134, 135, 139; Deut. 306.

⁸ Matth. XXIII, 8-10; John XIII, 6, 13, 14; Acts IV, 36.

⁹ Mech. Bo. introd. ed. Friedm., p. 2 a.

¹⁰ Ibid., Bahodesh IV, cf. IX end, and Beshalah II, IV.

¹¹ Siphra Behuk. II end.

¹² Siphre Num. III.

¹³ Cf. Mishnah Kidd. end.

¹⁴ Siphre Deut. 345.

war?¹⁵ Abraham observed the entire Torah.¹⁶ This is said not only of Moses, but of all the righteous.¹⁷ As against such tendencies as expressed in the above Tanhuma passages they interpret "Elohim" in Ex. VII, 1, to mean "judge" (Mech. Bo, introd.).

Most significant, however, is the fact that an attempt to mention the name of Moses in the benediction before the reading of the Torah: "Praised be thou, O God, who hast given the Torah to Israel through Mosheh Rabbenu,"¹⁸ failed to find the sanction of the Synagogue. Moreover, the authoritative Tannaitic document, the Mishnah, never attaches the title "Rabbenu" to the name of Moses. Once where the attachment of a distinguishing attribute was unavoidable, the Mishnah uses the attribute "ha Tsaddik," instead of Rabbenu in the corresponding Baraitha.¹⁹

It would be interesting to follow up the further discussion of this subject in medieval Jewish philosophy (and in Cabalah). But as this would require too much space, and as none of them either claims or is conceded as much authority as the sources treated so far, we may sum up the discussion with this general conclusion:

There were in Judaism at all times, as there are at present, tendencies abroad to attach mystical, supernatural attributes and corresponding exclusive authority, to an individual man (Moses, and, in a restricted sense, to others). But authoritative Judaism always took the middle ground. It paid high tribute to deserving individuals, but was always mindful of the dangerous element of apotheosis. It decentralized the seat of authority, and placed it in the "fathers" in the past, in the prophets of all generations, and in the People of Israel.

¹⁵ Mishnah Rosh ha-Shanah III. It is interesting to note that in the same paragraph the Mishnah expresses its opposition against the healing power of the *Nahash* (Num. XX, 8) under which N. T. understood Jesus (John III, 14-16; V, 28; XII, 32; Rom. III, 25; V, 8; VIII, 32; 1 John Ep. IV, 9; and especially the apocryphal Barnabas Ep. XII, 5-7.

¹⁶ Mishnah Kidd. end.

¹⁷ Mishnah Sotah, I.

¹⁸ Siphre Deut. 305.

¹⁹ Nedarim III; Babli p. 31 b.

HEBRAISM¹

I FEAR that some readers will fail to understand the title of my article. It deals with something that is quite new.

I shall begin with those Zionists who believe themselves to be atheists. It might be necessary to recollect that there be those who, even though they do not consider themselves atheists, believe that their education is so large, and their knowledge of natural science so vast, that under no circumstances would they allow their names to become associated with any religious community or definite confession of faith. It so happens, however, that these "co-religionists" are writers, and unfortunately, "philosophical" writers; hence, they reach the "logical" conclusion that it is a great folly to be both a Zionist and a Jew.

Having reached this conclusion, they have begun writing a good deal about "the Hebraic Idea," "Hebraeismus," "Hebraism." They play the game of "blind man's buff" with Jewish history, they twist their own thoughts, they resort to all sorts of intellectual acrobatics, and force meanings into the words of the poor Prophets (whose words can be interpreted so as to suit any one's taste)—they pervert the words of the sages of the Talmud even, to some extent. And out of this whole upheaval and restlessness issues forth a sort of nonsense of which educated men might well be ashamed. The weighty question, "Why are we Jews?" they answer with a

¹ Authorized Translation by Abraham J. Feldman.

conglomerate of "conceptions," which, try as he would, the plain Jew cannot conceive.

What, then, is "Hebraism"? This I will endeavor to answer in this article.

The clearest and simplest expression of this idea has been given by the Prophet Jonah in the following words: "Iv'ri anochi ve'eth Adonai elohe hashomayim ani yareh"—"I am a Hebrew, and (as such) I worship the God of heaven" (Jonah 1:9).

Hebraism is ethical Monotheism, which is Judaism. You might argue the question whether a Jewish state is good or whether it is necessary for the historical purposes of Judaism, but as to this, that without Judaism, without the Jewish religion, there is no need of the Jew, and ipso facto also not of Zionism, as to this—I say—there can be no room for the slightest doubt.

I cannot repeat in a few lines here what has been the object of all my studies, and to which I have given all my energies. You cannot state the difference between Judaism and other religions and systems of philosophy in a brief newspaper article. This difference varied in every historical period, as well as in every province of culture in any given historical period. In my works on the evolution of Jewish thought I endeavor to prove that the specific Jewish element occupied a very large and a very important place in all periods and in every province of culture, and that this element was worth all the sacrifices that were made for its preservation. I cannot go into the details of this proof, nor do I think them essential here. Suffice it to say here that all Jews who, during the thousands of years have suffered on account of their Judaism, did so for the upholding and the preservation of their religion, and it is for this same religion that Jews are suffering to this very day.

Were the religious philosophers to tell the ordinary, every-day Jew whereof consisted and does still consist the distinctly Jewish element in every historical period as well as

in every province of culture, he would not understand it. The main question, however, will present no novelty to him and he will understand it perfectly. Hence, I believe, that every Jew possessed of some common sense will be able to follow what I wish to say here:

The greatest contribution of the patriarchs was not their discovery that there must be but one God, which is the highest, all other deities being merely angels. The Babylonians had something similar. The patriarchs have merely given a better and a clearer expression to this conception. Their chief merit, however, consisted in their declaration that God and divine beings have no goddesses, nor sexual desires. This was the first and greatest achievement, for, through this they came to conceive of the incorporeality of God, and that God and divine beings are pure spirits.

This led to the later prohibition of all divine images. The conception that God had no passions, and cannot be bribed, led to the later development of the conception of social justice, to the introduction of just relations between man and man. The idea of social justice then appears strongest in the time of the great Prophets, Amos, Hosea, Isaiah, Jeremiah, and others.

But the statement, often made, that the idea of social justice and social righteousness was the main contribution of the Prophets, is false. Social justice was recognized also by other nations. The difference between the Hebrew Prophets and the prophets of the nations was that Israel's Prophets believed in a God with no passions, a God who can be just, and is just, a conception not attained unto by the prophets of the nations. It is for this reason that the Hebraic idea of justice and righteousness was higher. Their justice had both a better and a firmer foundation, viz: a God without passions. The very first contribution of the Hebrew to the world was, then, the purity of the family, the purity of sexual life. Then, and not till then, did he establish a better and a higher system of social justice.

So you see, that the underlying difference between our Prophets and those of the nations—was a religious one. Ours had a new God-conception, therefore were their conceptions of family-purity and social justice better and higher. Later, beginning with the period of Jeremiah, our Prophets began to speak of God as the Creator of the Universe. Their efforts against idolatry, sexual impurity and social unrighteousness, have not, as they themselves tell us, brought the desired results. They delivered the most inspiring addresses against idolatry, unchastity and injustice, but these were of little or no avail. Why? Because the earlier Prophets (Amos, Hosea, Isaiah, Micah, Zephaniah, and the others who preceded Jeremiah) did not speak to the people, of God the Creator. In other words, their religious God-conception was not strong enough to win the hearts of the people.

This was a new difference between the "Hebraic Idea" and those of the nations. The nations believed that many and different gods created different parts of the universe. The Hebrew Prophets, on the other hand, maintained that one God created the entire universe. One God is pure and just. Many gods, gods with goddesses, are impure and unjust. "Hebraism," then, was again religion.

With the conception of God as Creator, also the other beliefs of the Jews have improved: the beliefs in prophesy, in freedom of will, in retribution. If during the second temple, the Jews were better than they were during the first temple, it was due largely to the fact that in the days of the second temple they had better and higher beliefs. If they were better than the nations, it was because their religious beliefs were better. "Hebraism," then, is once again, religion.

During the last 200 years of the second temple, Judaism came into contact with Greek culture. That period has given us a great literature, which we call "Graeco-Jewish." The Apocryphal writings, the works of Philo of Alexandria, Josephus Flavius, and others, are the products of this period. Now the question is, "What difference is there between the

Hebrew Prophets and the Greek philosophers, especially between them and Plato, by whom the Jewish writers of that period were mostly influenced? Was it ethics, morality?"

Plato's ethics is undoubtedly very high, even though it did not attain unto the heights reached by the Hebrew Prophets. The difference between him and the Prophets lay in the fact that he was not enough of a monotheist, he did not believe in one God as decidedly as did the Prophets. His belief in unity was not as firm, not as certain, as was that of the Jews. Nor did he believe, to the same degree as did the Jews, in the divine attributes of mercy. Another difference between him and the Prophets lay in the fact that his teachings were too deep for the masses, for the common people of Greece. The masses did not understand him. When Plato thought out the reason for man's duty to be good and ethical, it did not reach the people, because it was too deep. The Hebrew Prophets, on the other hand, knew how to give expression to their thoughts and teachings of God as Creator, of prophesy, free will, and retribution, in such form as to be easily understood by the man on the street. Thus also in that period, the distinctly Jewish idea, "Hebraism," was again, religion.

In literature and in art, as well as in all other provinces of ancient culture, that which was specifically Jewish was always religion. The entire field of Jewish literature (with the one exception of Canticles) is religious, the historical books not excepted.

Originally the Jews were participating in all the arts cultivated by the Semitic peoples, i. e., so long, only, as they remained idolators, heathen. Later, however, when the making of images was prohibited, two groups were formed. The one, was unalterably opposed to all kinds of images—the other insisted on having cherubim, and various artistic decorations and ornaments. The arguments of both groups, for and against art—their own, Jewish art-motifs—were based on religion. They differed in their opinions on art merely because their

religious beliefs were different. Jewish music was developed mainly in the (second) temple. The same thing might be said of dancing. It is true that the Jews took much from their environment, from the surrounding nations, but they also developed their own motifs. And these motifs were religious, because they were developed in and with the religion.

Thus "Hebraism," "the Hebraic Idea," throughout ancient times was nothing else than religion.

All this was at the time when the Jews dwelt in their own land and had all the conditions requisite to a national existence, yet, throughout this entire period, their national existence was expressed in religious forms.

We need go no farther. Judaism after the destruction of the second temple is no more than an inheritance of the period of national existence. Of course, there was development also after the destruction: Christianity brought with it new struggles. It reintroduced the sex-motif in the conception of the deity, and Judaism rejected it. The question, then, arises: What difference is there between Christianity and Judaism? Is it ethics? No; Christianity accepted the whole of Old Testament ethics. The difference was a religious one.

The Jews believe that the moral law can have no existence when the religious beliefs are false. It is not to be deduced from this, however, that we consider the religious beliefs important only to the extent in which they strengthen the moral law. No, the religious beliefs among the Jews as among the Christians, are important in and for themselves; at least as important as the morally good and pure life. The sages of the Talmud, who led the fight against Christianity, leave not the slightest doubt that they defend the religion and not the ethics; or better still, they rejected Christianity because it made a distinction between religious beliefs and ethical laws on the one hand, and ritual laws on the other, a distinction which, they, the sages of the Talmud, considered as being un-Jewish. They would maintain Judaism in all of its aspects, beliefs and system of life, religious and ethical.

Judaism rejected also Islam. Why? Was it because of its ethics? No; Islam adopted the whole of the Jewish ethics and a part of the Jewish religious code. But Islam failed to adopt certain religious beliefs and the greater part of the system of Jewish ritual law—sufficient ground for Judaism to reject it.

Whatever we do, then, wherever we turn, we come again and again to the same conclusion, viz.: that Hebraism, that which is distinctively Jewish, "the Hebraic Idea," is religion and nothing but religion.

And what, for example, was the life of the Jews in the Middle Ages? Once again, I say, purely religious! There was a large philosophic movement which occupied itself exclusively with religious beliefs. Some dared say that the Jewish people, the large masses of the Jewish people, have derived nothing of this philosophy, were not interested in it. This could be said only by ignorant tyros. The fact is that the sum total of Jewish philosophy was embodied into the prayer book, and formed the frame—as it were—of all the Jewish prayers. On week-days the prayers begin with the philosophical "Adon Olam" and close with the thirteen articles of faith, formulated by Maimuni. On Sabbaths and festivals the prayers begin also with the "Adon Olam" or with the equally philosophic "Yigdal" and close with the philosophic "Shir Ha'yihud" or "Unity Hymn." On Kol Nidre or Atonement eve the Jews chant the philosophical poem, "Kether Malhuth" (by Solomon Gabirol). The Cabbalists (Jewish Mysticians) interpret all their prayers according to their religious beliefs and theories. In truth, our entire prayer book is one long credo.

The little which the Jewish Middle Ages gave us of art was purely religious. And what of Jewish literature in the Middle Ages? It is true that we have a considerably large scientific literature on medicine and mathematics which was produced during that period, but the rest, the immensely larger part, was entirely religious.

Hebraism, "the Hebraic Idea," is again Jewish religion.

Now, consider our own times. Consider every field of cultural activity: literature, music, the plastic arts; find those Jews who have put into their work a specific Jewish motif, and you will discover that in every case it is religious.

The Zionists and nationalists who speak of Hebraism without religion, are to be divided into two groups. One group maintains that Hebraism is ethics. This group is deserving of being argued with, which I have done in this brief historical review. But the second group I cannot even understand. That group speaks a language, to me unintelligible. They who belong to this group claim that the Jewish masses must conserve their characteristics, irrespective of their quality, because, say they, even the gypsies have a right to preserve themselves as a nationally distinct group. This is beyond my comprehension. Once we drop the argument that ours is a better religion and a higher ethics, then I fail to see what there is left to us, excepting, perhaps, "gefillte fisch" and "knobelbraten."

One more thing in conclusion. Among the Zionists—I refer to the more earnest and intelligent Zionists—there are very few who love their Judaism for any other than a religious reason. The earnest Zionists, as the Mizrachists (the religiously orthodox Zionists), for example, on the one hand, and the Zionists among the reform Jews on the other, certainly expect a great gain for Judaism, i. e., for the Jewish religion, from Zionism. I agree with them. I believe that in addition to other benefits which the realization of Zionism will bring in its train, much good will come also to the Jewish religion. At any rate, I believe that it is well worth our while to give Zionism a fair trial, if such a trial be at all possible. I believe that the large centers of Jewish life in the different countries will gain very much from the establishment of a spiritual center in Palestine.

True, we can no longer confine ourselves within the boundaries of small Palestine. The whole great world has become our sphere of activity. But what we need is a spiritual center

in Palestine. Let it always be remembered, however, that such a spiritual center must be religious.

Try as I would, I cannot understand why the earnest Zionists allow the few non-religious workers in the Zionist movement to play so important a rôle. Some sixteen years ago I wrote (*Ha'shilloah*, Vol. V, No. 2, Shevat, 5659) that Zionism must be given a religious content. Ahad Ha'am's comment to that article was, that the real individuality of the Jewish nation is not—as I believe—religious, but—as he believes—ethical. Now, after the lapse of sixteen years, I can say even more:

Had the Zionist movement not allowed deniers of religion to be among its leaders, it would now have many more, and more important adherents than it has. The Zionist movement began among young men. It was well that it thus began. When those young men reached their manhood they fled the movement—the great majority of them did—because the movement lacked that which was most distinctively Jewish, it was not truly Jewish in spirit. To hold the youth in the movement when they become older and more serious-minded, to hold them in their later years, Zionism must become Jewish, that is, religious. Some scribblers may desert with, perhaps, some youngsters in their wake, but others will come—more important men, better Jews.

REFORM JEWS AND NATIONALISTS

IN the heated controversy over the question of Jewish Nationalism which has been going on in the Jewish press for some time, there is certainly much sincerity of purpose and genuine conviction on both sides. A gap of indefinite, but evidently tremendous proportions between the two warring camps opens before the eyes of the average reader who either sides in some subconscious way with one of the two opposing theories or dismisses the subject as too intricate for him, reassuring himself that after all he may go on with his brand of Judaism as he had been doing before he ever knew of the existence of that elusive problem.

That elusive problem! Yes, that's what the problem is; at least, to those who make up the people. I mean the real people, the Jewish people minus the few writers and politicians and all other kinds of celebrities who participate in the discussion. Let us then try to come down to the essentials of the question as they may present themselves to the common Jew, to that beloved average reader for whose benefit we all work, write and speak, lecture and preach.

To analyze our question and present its essentials from the standpoint of common sense we will have to give up all abstract subtleties and all the big words usually employed in discussions of this nature and try to present the differences between the two opposing views in terms of practical every day life.

The radical Jewish nationalist does not care for religion at all. He is an atheist or an agnostic (which means one who is sure he knows that he does not know anything about God and the like). He does not attend services in the synagogues and does not observe any religious ceremonies in his home, or if he

does he takes pains to explain that what he really means is not the religious but the national or national-ethical idea of the ceremony. He does not value Jewish literature for the religious ideas it espouses, but as plain "literature," as "Hebrew literature," which he cultivates himself (as a famous writer or prominent supporter of Hebrew literature), he teaches the language diligently to his children, but in a secular way, not caring to give them any religious education. All that his children learn about Judaism is conveyed to them in the way of mere information about what others are believing or doing. He is interested in Jewish questions, in Jewish art and in all things Jewish, not because Judaism as a religion is something worth while to him or to others, but because the suffering Jews are his kin in flesh and blood and in what he calls "spirit." Jewish art is very dear to him, not because of the religiousness of the Jewish spirit which expresses itself, consciously and subconsciously, in the artistic work of any (even the non-conforming) Jew, but because Jewish art is a manifestation of the Jewish soul. He is a Zionist. He wishes and hopes for the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine and surrounding, wherefore he is an ardent supporter of Palestinian colonization. He does so and is that not because he hopes that in their own state the Jews will be able to live according to their own religious idea of life, to observe the Sabbath and the holidays in their own fashion without loss in business and social prestige, but because of mere secular reasons. He wants the Jews to enjoy all the national and political rights and privileges that other small nations enjoy. He hopes the Jews will create new ideals in art, new institutions of social justice and produce, new ideas in all fields of human endeavor.

The reform Jew, on the other hand, who is a radical anti-nationalist, cares for his Judaism primarily on account of the religious ideas it teaches. He attends services in the synagogue and observes religious ceremonies recognized and retained by modern Judaism for the sake of the religious ideas they express. He values Jewish literature because it is the source of

Judaism as a religion. He teaches Hebrew to his children to the extent necessary to help them follow the service in the synagogue and to recite the Kaddish, caring less for the Hebrew language as such than for the religious ideas contained in the Hebrew books. He admits the historic right of orthodox Judaism. He is interested in works of art created by Jews and in all things Jewish, because he feels himself one with all Jews as his brethren in the faith. The communion of flesh and blood does not mean much to him; the communion of spirit being the thing he cares for. He is an anti-Zionist, believing that the destiny of the Jew is not to re-establish a small Jewish state, but rather to fill the world with his omnipresence carrying out his mission to be an eternal witness to the truths of Judaism—truth, equity and justice. At the same time he may be a supporter or friend of the colonization of Palestine by Jews who desire to settle there, not on account of any national-political aspirations, but for religious sentimental reasons.

Taking for granted that these two extreme types are really existing, it will be readily seen that the real difference between the two is not so much that between nationalism and anti-nationalism, but rather that between religion and irreligion. The question of fact in the sphere of pure national postulates reduces itself to the amount of Hebrew taught to the children, all the rest being rather a difference of interpretation given to the same practices. I for one do not admit that the radical anti-national reform Jew is less national than the radical national. On the contrary, the religious interpretation placed upon his interest in Judaism renders the so-called anti-national reform Jew a truer and more genuine Jewish nationalist than is the Jewish radical nationalist.

Nationalism, as so many another isms, has two aspects—a secular one and a religious one. Jewish nationalism is religious. I do not mind the words used by the opposing sides. The radical irreligious Jewish nationalist of the foregoing type may confess nationalism, but I consider him a denation-

alized Jew and do not care a whit for his love of Hebrew and of Hebrew literature, and still less for his Zionist political aspirations.

However, the situation is much more fortunate than that.

First, there is a question as to the reality of the two types. One could raise the suspicion that I have drawn the picture of the radical anti-nationalist with much more sympathy than that of the radical nationalist. He would say that the picture of the radical nationalist is taken from the sermons of reform rabbis, while I have omitted to enter many ugly traits in the picture of the anti-nationalist which I could find in the writings and speeches of the radical nationalists in at least such abundance as I have found the rather repelling anti-religious traits which I have entered so faithfully in the picture of the radical nationalist. And I am ready to admit that this is so, but at the same time to insist that there is no unfairness in his procedure. The radical Jewish nationalist as I described him hardly exists outside of the sermons and speeches of the anti-nationalists who create him just as they need him for stage purposes to kill him outright before the eyes of their audiences. Not counting the "little foxes" that do not count even if they do exist, Max Nordau is perhaps the only man of note who may represent a real living example, at least to some extent, of that radical type of nationalist which I have taken from the literature of the anti-nationalist. All others, like Ahad Ha'am and others, explain. And they explain so much that their antireligious attitude changes colors the moment you try to take it under close analysis. Read, for instance, the article on Ahad Ha'am's philosophy in one of the recent issues of the American Jewish Chronicle, and you will find how deeply religious Ahad Ha'am is, what pure God-conception he has. Or, still better, read the introduction to the collection of his Essays in the English translation and some of the reviews in the Jewish Press in England and in this country, and you will find that in all essentials he is in harmony with the apostles of reform Judaism.

Not finding the type of the radical nationalist in real life, I had to take him where I found him, from the literature of his opponents who draw his picture on the wall to frighten their audiences with the bugbear of nationalism endangering Jewish religion. I admit this, because this is one of the points that I want to make in this article. The anti-nationalists may be sincere in their belief that the radical type of nationalist they speak of are real living creatures; some of them certainly are sincere. But as a matter of fact, that type, if it exists at all, is so rare that it is hardly worth while to take cognizance of its existence.

It is quite different with the type of the radical anti-national reform Jew in the above picture. I know of the ugly distorted traits to the reform Jew, notably of the reform rabbi, in the literature of their opponents, but I was in a position to omit all of them, because I know many living men who represent exactly the type I pictured. Of course, I know also of anti-nationalists who show some of the ugly traits which appear as typical of the anti-nationalist or assimilationist in the utterances of their opponents, but since I know the better type as a living being, I took it for the illustration of my point that there is so much that is attractive in his type of the anti-nationalist that we would do well not to mind so much his words as his actual life.

But if the extreme type of the anti-national Jewish reformer is not as unreal as the extreme nationalist, his species is by no means as widely spread upon the face of the earth as one would gather from their own protestations. On the contrary, the masses of the Jewish people are so far from these two extreme types that a classification of the Jews from the viewpoint of our question may neglect these noisy extremes altogether without committing thereby any perceptible inaccuracy.

The Jews of our day divide themselves mainly into two camps, orthodox and reform, the latter being in the minority. The orthodox masses are, of course, nearer the nationalistic view than the reform Jews of western Europe and America,

but this is not due to any difference in the national, but exclusively to one in the religious outlook. The orthodox believe in the literal divine inspiration of the Torah and in the authority of tradition. And since the belief in the Messiah and the restoration of the Jewish state is one of fundamental importance for orthodox Judaism, consequently they are national Jews, because they are orthodox religious Jews. On the other hand, the reform Jews are less national, not because they are opposed to nationalism, but because they do not believe in the Messiah and the restoration of the Jewish state. The difference in the form of observing the religious ceremonies on Sabbath and Holy days is by no means of such a nature as to entitle us to consider them denationalized. For even those who do not observe the Sabbath and Holy days regularly have not given up their adherence to Judaism in these particulars. They rather believe that as long as these days are observed in the synagogue, Judaism is well taken care of. On certain occasions of a private or public character they do attend services on Sabbath, almost all (in fact all of them attend the synagogue on Rosh-ha-shonoh and Yom Kippur and many of them also on other Holy days. And then, too, some members of the family, or at least the children, attending the Religious School, as a rule attend services every Sabbath. In all of these ceremonies the historic character of the observance is emphasized. To say that this is not national religion, or that this is even anti-national religion, is to divest the words of their plain meaning and to insist on using them in a distorted fashion—a sin that is persistently committed by both reform Rabbis and their radical opponents. Another difference between the two main camps is the observance of the dietary laws by the orthodox which has been given up almost entirely by the reform Jews. But this, too, is a purely religious difference.

And even that only real national difference between the two grand divisions of Judaism, namely, that concerning the belief in the Messiah and the restoration of the Jewish state, is

by no means of great importance. First the question has no practical significance. There is nothing that the orthodox Jew is bound to do for the sake of this belief, except the recital of certain prayers which have been omitted in the reform prayer books.

Then, too, if the reform Jew does not recognize the article of the Messiah and the restoration, it does not necessarily mean that he is opposed to the idea of establishing a Jewish state for those who desire it, if such an undertaking is within the reach of those who desire it. Moreover, some of them would certainly take great pride in the existence of such a state; nay, they would even find in it a source of new strength for their religious faith. This sentiment has been growing for the last decade or two; a fact which leads us to the recently developed subdivisions within the two main divisions of the Jews. I mean the two groups of Zionists, the secular Zionists and the religious Zionists, or the Misrachists. From the viewpoint of the main division the Misrachists are a subdivision of the orthodox, while the Zionists (which term I reserve for the designation of the secular Zionists) are a subdivision of the reform wing. The Misrachists, as all orthodox Zionists who may not belong to the Misrachi organization, have added a new feature to orthodox Judaism. They postulate the actualization of the belief in the Messiah and the restoration not only by the recitation of pertinent prayers, but also by participation in all undertakings which may prepare the Jews for the time when God will see fit to bring about the redemption of Israel and His land. I am sure no Misrachist will object to my interpretation of the Misrachi movement and to the place assigned to them in any classification. But as to the Zionists I am not only afraid, but quite sure, they will strenuously object to being characterized as a subdivision of reform Judaism. They will point out that right at the outset modern Zionism was opposed by the "Protestrabbiner," under which term everybody understands the reform Rabbi. But this very historical fact needs an explanation. Among the "Protest-

rabbiner" there were many orthodox rabbis, like Horvitz of Frankfurt, and others. And still the wrath of Herzl and his followers was aroused chiefly, almost exclusively, against the reform rabbis. But this is just the point. Herzl could understand the orthodox rabbis if they were opposed to the Jews taking matters into their own hands instead of waiting for God to take His own time to carry out the promise of redemption given to His people through His prophets. However, he could not see any but ulterior motives in the opposition of the reform rabbis to the modern idea of redemption of the Jews through their own efforts.

But he knew reform Judaism pretty well, as he himself was a reform Jew. I remember the impression Herzl made upon me when standing before the Torah in the synagog in Basle. He recited the benediction, got a "Mi-sheberach" and "shenodered" all right. He impressed me as a reform Jew who says to his fellow reform Jews: "All right, you do not believe in the Messiah and the restoration in a religious way. But why oppose it? There is nothing essential in reform Judaism that would prompt you to oppose." He impressed me that way because I knew that he was much concerned about the question whether his plan was acceptable from a religious point of view. Before publishing his "Judenstaat" he submitted the manuscript to Oberrabbiner Dr. Güdemann, of Vienna, and rejoiced when he got the manuscript back with the remark: "Es ist nichts zu monieren." For the same reason Herzl was very anxious to get into the first Congress, and in general into his sphere of influence, as many rabbis as possible. Herzl was a reform Jew, and the older he got the more he grew in his attachment to Judaism as a religion, and certainly as a religion in the sense of reform, not in that of orthodoxy. He differed with his fellow reform Jews in a vital question, hence that ire, hence that warth. He could not find any genuine reason why reform Jews should oppose his plan.

In fact, all modern Zionists, except, perhaps, a very few who may not be religious at all, are good reform Jews. Ahad

Ha'am is a good reform Jew, at least in the interpretation mentioned above. So are the leading Zionists in Germany (some of them are orthodox). So are Dr. Klausner, Sokolow, and all Zionists in Europe and in America whom I know personally or by their utterances. All are good reform Jews who want to return to the idea of redemption by using secular means to bring it about. Some of them, not only some of the Zionist reform Rabbis, but also prominent secular writers, are in hopes that an independent Jewish state will give the Jews a new religious impetus to create new religious values which will once more redeem the world of the decadence and savagery so manifest in our day.

In conclusion: I am ready to concede to many of those who differ from my view of the situation that they are sincere in their conviction, and to give the benefit of the doubt to others, but I really think that the controversy between religious liberalism and nationalism in Judaism is largely a controversy of words, and not one of principles. "I have created man straight, but they desired manifold complications." That is the situation in a nutshell. Neither the theory of reform Judaism nor the majority of reform Jews is opposed to Zionism. And even those who are opposed are still in favor of colonization in Palestine, which is only another way of expressing the indefinite hope that a multitude of Jews in the land of our fathers may become a source of strength to Judaism as a religion. At any rate. No Jew who adheres to his faith, in any form, orthodox or reform, can rightly be termed anti-nationalist, even though he may protest his anti-nationalism ever so loudly. As on the other hand: Nobody is entitled to read Zionists or nationalists out of the Jewish fold. The Misradichs are good orthodox Jews, the greater number of Zionists are good reform Jews, as good as any reform Jews I know, and some of them are even better reformed Jews than some of the anti-Zionistic reform Jews I know.

That whole controversy is an exaggeration of the facts as they actually exist. There are, of course, those real differences which I mentioned, and which indubitably are worth while fighting about. But there is no reason for exaggerating the actual state of affairs. The idea in vogue that there is a difference in principles between reform Judaism and Jewish nationalism is the product of confusion and distortion—confusion of ideas and distortion of language to be laid at the doors of both sides to the noisy and superficial controversy.

THE PRINCIPLES OF JUDAISM IN HISTORICAL OUTLINE

INTRODUCTION

ARE THERE DOGMAS IN JUDAISM?

THE phrase "Chopher be-'Ikkar" (בּוֹפֵר בְּעִיקָר), "Denier of the Root," designating the *atheist*, is found in the oldest talmudical sources (Tannaitic collections). And there are quite a number of passages in talmudic literature at large where the 613 commandments are reduced to a few principal ethical laws, and even to the *one* principle of *faith*, or where a classification of practical and theoretical commandments and principles is effected in some other way. Nevertheless, it must be admitted that the *technical* concept of "Dogma" in talmudic literature is rather rudimentary. This evidently accounts for the fact that the Jewish medieval philosophers had to face a strong opposition, when they formulated the principles of Judaism with a view to giving certain beliefs a standing much similar to that of "Dogma" in the Christian Church. Every commandment is a dogma, was the terse reply of the representatives of talmudic Judaism. The first commandment: "I am the Lord, thy God," has no precedence over the commandment: "Thou shalt make fringes unto thee." And also the stand taken by *Moses Mendelssohn* may be traced, in part at least, to the one-sided talmudic training of his youth. In his "Jerusalem" (editio princeps Berlin, 1783), he advances the thesis that Judaism never commanded the Jews to *believe*, but rather to *know* and to *recognize*, concluding the discussion with the since famous sentence: "Wherefore, ancient Judaism has no 'Symbolical Books,' no Articles of Faith" (p. 55). The

question whether or not there are dogmas in Judaism has since been discussed by many.¹ But the fact of the matter is that all of these scholars, both of the pro and con side, have discussed the question without a previous understanding about the *definition* of the term "dogma." What is "dogma"? The most *essential* feature of dogma is the insistence of a religion on a certain belief. Now, there can be no doubt that Judaism at all times has been insisting on certain beliefs. In fact, it may be said that Judaism, as compared with the old Semitic religions out of which it has developed, *created* this essential concept of dogma. Pagan religions hardly insisted on theoretical beliefs. Examined from this aspect, both sides to the controversy, we will find, really admit that Judaism has dogmas, the difference of opinion affecting only the *non-essential* features of dogma. The opponents of dogmas in Judaism claim that the Jewish religion is lacking in the following features which make up the dogma in Christianity and Islam:

1. There is no *fixed formula* authoritatively expressing the principles of Judaism.
2. No *Recital* of a *fixed creed*.
3. No *Authoritative Documents* (Symbolical Books).
4. No *Controversy* about dogmas in Jewish Antiquity (admitted even by Loew, *Ges. Schr.* I, p. 153).
5. No *Authoritative Decision* reached after such a controversy.
6. No solemn public *Declaration of Principles*.
7. No *Anathema* of heretics.

¹ To mention a few: David Einhorn, *Das Princip des Mosaismus*, etc., Leipzig, 1854; Kreizenach, *Grundlehren des israelitischen Glaubens*, Geiger's *Zeitschrift f. jüd. Theologie* I, 39, 327; II, 68, 436; Dernberg, *Das Wesen des Judentums*, etc., *ibid.* IV, 12-18; Abraham Geiger, *ibid.* I, p. 278; L. Loew, *Die Grundlehren der Religion Israels*, *Ges. Schriften* I, 31-52; *Jüdische Dogmen*, *ibid.* 133-176; the answer of David Nieto Redivivus to the latter article, *ibid.*; Solomon Schechter, *The Dogmas of Judaism*, *The Jewish Quarterly Review* I, 1889, pp. 84 f., 115 f.; S. Maybaum, *Methodik des jüdischen Religionsunterrichts* I, 3, pp. 40-59; II, 3, 85-98; *Jewish Encyclopedia*, *Articles of Faith*; Margolis, *The Theological Aspect of Reform Judaism*.

Now, even if I had to admit that dogma in Judaism was lacking in all of these seven particular features which developed in Christianity and Islam, I would still insist that Judaism has dogmas as long as it insists on certain principles of religion. But I am far from admitting this. On the contrary, the following sketch of the *development* of the principles of Judaism in the course of the ages will show beyond a doubt that the most important of these seven features, namely 3-6, are as true of Judaism in its *formative stages* as of Christianity and Islam. But even the points 1, 2, and 7 are not entirely missing in Judaism. Of the question of *anathema* we can dispose right here: Judaism has never had, and has not at present, the institution of *real excommunication*, but it had the *Khareth*-institution in biblical times, and the "Ban" in later periods. As to *Fixed Formula* and *Recital* of such, it will be sufficient for the time being to mention the formula "HAY JHVH" (הי יהוה) in antiquity and "Sh'ma Yisroel" (שמע ישראל) in later periods. But these two points will be included in our *historical* sketch. The shortcoming of the entire discussion of the question by my predecessors is just this. Both, defenders and opponents of dogmas in Judaism, have treated the question and quoted the sources *sub specie aeternitatis*. What is necessary, however, is to treat the question *historically* and to examine the sources as to time and place and, notably, as to their *authoritative standing*, each in its time.

The great divides of the History of Dogmas in Judaism are:

I. The *Period of the Books of the Covenant*, when these, each one of the *three* (corresponding to *Sinai*, *Deuteronomy*, and *Esra-Covenant*) in its time, were the authoritative *Dogmatical Documents* of Judaism.

II. The *Period of the "Men of the Great Synod,"* when the entirety of "Readings, Prayers and Benedictions" represented the authoritative *Dogmatical Document*.

III. The *Period of the Mishnah*, when the *Mishnah* was the *Dogmatical Document*.

IV. The *Period of Literary Discussion*.

The Dogmas of Judaism are best divided into *essential and historical*:

THE ESSENTIAL DOGMAS:

1. The existence of *one spiritual* (incorporeal) *God*.
2. *Prophecy*, as the Revelation of the Divine Will to man.
3. *Freedom of man's will*, as the basis of religious and moral responsibility.

4. *Providence*, as *Retribution*.

Save a certain internal development, these four principles, as they follow, logically and psychologically, from the basic thought of ethical monotheism, are accredited as such in all dogmatical documents of Judaism.

5. The existence of *angels* as *intermediators* between God and the world.

This principle has been the subject of a *controversy*, beginning at the time of *Amos* and *Hosea*, and going on throughout the ages. But those who believe in angels consider it an essential dogma of Judaism. This controversy has maintained its *central position* clear through the entire development of thought in Judaism, varying its form according to times and conditions, but always remaining the driving power in all progress of religious and philosophic thought.

6. *Creation* of the world.

This principle is an essential dogma of Judaism; it forms a *logical* unity with the four undisputed essential dogmas; but *psychologically* it is well possible for this principle to be *screened* and hidden from sight, so to say, in an early state of intellectual development. It came to definite revelation in a more advanced phase of the religious development (*Jeremiah*), and may thus be designated as an *essential-historical* dogma of Judaism.

THE HISTORICAL DOGMAS:

1. *Bodily Resurrection*.
2. *Spiritual Immortality*, as *Retribution* in the *Hereafter*.
3. *Personal Messiah* as *Political Redeemer* of Israel.

4. "Torah from Heaven," or *literal inspiration* of the *Torah*.

5. *Oral Tradition*.

These dogmas are *historical*, not only because they have developed out of certain historical complications, but also because, save the dogma of spiritual immortality, they express beliefs in *definite historical occurrences*, in the past or in the future, which are not logically implied in the fundamental idea of ethical monotheism. And, then, too, the essential dogmas are all accredited in the most authoritative dogmatical documents of Judaism, the three Books of the Covenant, while the historical are accredited only in the latest two dogmatical documents, the "Order of the Day" (Readings, Benedictions, and Prayers) and the Mishnah. And that is why even spiritual immortality, which some consider a logical consequence of ethical monotheism, cannot be properly designated an essential dogma. The essential principles are the *written*, the historical the *oral* dogmas of Judaism, as it were.

Judaism has no *practical dogmas*. For even those who believe that *Sabbath* and *Circumcision* have a special standing among the practical commands, readily admit that their importance does not lie in the *opus operatum* (in the sense of the decision of the Council of Florence, 1439), but in *opus operantis*; the principles of *creation* and *unity*, respectively, being the important things about these institutions.

The order which we observed in the enumeration of the dogmas, both essential and historical, designates also the *chronological order* in which they attained *authoritative recognition* as principles in the course of the dogmatical history of Judaism. Of this the following sketch is a very much condensed review.

1. THE PERIOD OF THE BOOKS OF THE COVENANT.

The *First Book of the Covenant* (Ex. XX-XXIII, with some eliminations—this critical view is essentially shared by *Rabbi*, the redactor of the Mishnah, *Mechilta* Jithro, *Baho-*

desh 3) which was the basis of the *Sinai Covenant*, contains the *first Declaration* of the principles of Judaism. Taken in connection with the narrative JE which served it as *historical introduction* and frame, and thus shared its authoritative standing to a certain extent, and compared with *Assyro-Babylonian* literature, the following may be designated as the characteristic features of ethical monotheism as conceived by the early prophets, writers, and lawgivers of Israel and Juda:

1. *Holiness* is the *central attribute* in the *God-conception*. This means primarily the elimination of *sexuality* from the conception of God, the supreme being. This effected a radical reform in the *authoritative postulates* in worship and outlook. With the elimination of the *sexual motif*, *Moloch* and *Ishtar-worship* were forbidden. In *literature*, in the conception of the *past*, the sexual motif does not disappear entirely, but the sexual relation of the divine to the human is converted into providential relation of the divine to the national heroes and heroines in their sexual relations.

2. This led to the conception of *Incorporeality* of the divine, and to the prohibition of the *Massechah*, the image of God.

3. *Polytheism* did not disappear entirely, the gods were reduced to "Angels," the messengers of God. The bearer of the *Sinai Covenant* is *the Angel*. But even this angel had no *name* or *attribute* of his own. No angel has a name or an attribute of his own. Images of angels are not forbidden, although the angels, too, are exalted above sexual relation. God would not appear in human form, but angels would. This seems to be the authoritative status. Outside of the authoritative document, however, we do find angels involved in sexual relations with the "daughters of Adam," and God appearing in human form. The "other gods" admittedly do exist, ranking, perhaps, as angels, but the Israelites should not worship them, nor ascribe to them any name of attribute. This gives the God of Israel the character of *universality*,

without, however, overcoming entirely the *national* note. In Israel the belief in angels was probably stronger than in Juda. J eliminates the angel at the renewal of the covenant after the golden calf.

4. The *cosmological* feature is entirely *eliminated* from the God-conception. Prophets and lawgivers evidently did not see their way clear to use Babylonian cosmogony for their purposes. And as long as they believed in angels, or had not the courage to eliminate them entirely, the way to the *monotheistic* theory of creation was barred (angels were considered eternal beings alongside of God). So they kept silent about the cosmological aspect of the God-conception, so abundantly dwelt upon in contemporary religious literature of other nations. In this they seem to have been aided by the weakened interest of the people in cosmogonic legends.

5. In consequence of the preceding, all speculation about God concentrates itself in the *ethical* postulate of *Justice*. All literature, nearly exclusively historical, is spun around the question of the relation between divine *Justice* and divine *Mercy*. They attempt an ethical definition of God, but experience the difficulty of the contradiction between the postulates of justice and mercy:

E and J begin their historical accounts with the *patriarchs*, not caring to say anything about creation or the early history of the world. For the purpose of harmonizing the postulates of justice and mercy, both use what may be designated as the *evolutionary motif of attributes*: E begins the history of the patriarchs with the divine name *Elohim*, which stands for rigid justice. Then God reveals to Moses the temporary name of EHJH and gives him a *sign* of mercy. But after the great scene at Sinai, God reveals His Great Name: JHVH, and the *Formula of Thirteen Attributes* as whose *ideogram* it stands (Ex. XXXIV, 5-7). This is the *pure ethical definition* of God, compromising between the postulates of justice and mercy. From now on E. uses exclusively the name JHVH. Also J. has the evolutionary motif of attributes, but, according

to his conception of things, the name JHVH and the formula it stands for, were both revealed to *Abraham*. So J never uses *Elohim* as the absolute name of God. There is no absolute "Jahvist," as there is no absolute "Elohist"; it is only a question of the time *when* a writer introduces the name JHVH. This is true also of the later "sources" of the Torah. And in general, prophets and writers of all times have made use of the evolutionary motif in many ways, in that they use different names of God on certain historical situations, introducing (or, rather, re-introducing) the name JHVH on the proper solemn occasions as a sign of mercy and salvation.

Amos emphasizes the *holy name* of God, which is being shamelessly desecrated by the Ishtar-cult (II, 7; IV, 2), and all his meditations, especially the *five visions* (VII, 1-IX, 4), hinge around the question as to the extent to which the attributes of mercy will prevail. In the last three visions he sees no mercy, and he suggests the (temporary) discontinuance of the name JHVH, and introduces the temporary combination-name of JHVH ELOHEJ ZEBATH (VI, 8-14).

Hosea, the prophet of *mercy*, whose language is full of allusions to the Thirteen, lays emphasis on *holiness* as the distinctive feature between God and man (XI, 9), *protests* against the combination-name of Amos, insisting on the name JHVH, is impatient with the *angels* and the *woman stories* in the life of the patriarchs, and denies the Ba'alim names and attributes.

Isaiah likewise emphasizes *holiness* as the chief feature of the God-conception, coining the phrase "Holy One of Israel" as a designation of God. He enlarges the God-definition by the attributes of *Wisdom* and *Might*, and gives it thereby a more metaphysical color, as he is also the first to express the difference between God and man (cf. *Hosea*) as that between *spirit* and *flesh* (XXXI, 3). *Isaiah* designates the "other gods" as "Elilim" (nothings), but believes in angels, whom he mentions but once, eliminating them as mediators. He rejects some of the attributes of the Thirteen, especially that of *long-*

suffering, and proclaims a new combination-name expressing more rigid justice than JHVH. This name he introduces in the formula: "Holy, Holy, Holy, is JHVH ZEBAOTH-" in the *Mercabah*-vision in his prophecy of consecration. In general, Isaiah shows much inclination to express his ideas of God in *formulas* and *names*, indicating the *theocratic* principles in the names given to children and future rulers.

In Isaiah the *pre-Deuteronomic God-conception* reaches its zenith. Based generally on the authority of the first Book of the Covenant, the God-conception, and with it also the other principles of Judaism, have been deepened and spiritualized by the prophets:

Prophecy, in the older parts of the Bible, labors under a certain element of witchcraft and sorcery in which *angels* and *dreams* play an important rôle. Gradually, however, they come to realize the higher form of prophecy. In the reports on the revelation at Sinai the angel is generally eliminated, and of the prophecy of *Moses* we are told that it does not come to him in a dream. Isaiah, the prophet with the most sublime God-conception, is the last pre-Deuteronomic prophet in whose vision angels appear. Indeed, Isaiah seems to describe the higher form of prophecy as being a *voice* heard in the *ears* of the prophet. He denounces all lower mantic forms of prophecy, as does the first Book of the Covenant. King Solomon is the last pre-Deuteronomic biblical personality who is reported to have had a revelation in a dream. All of this progress is essentially the consequence of the higher conception of the *function* of prophecy emphasized by Amos, Hosea, and Isaiah: The prophet is the religious and moral teacher of the people.

Freedom of man's will is the general premise in the first Book of the Covenant, and especially emphasized in the *Thochaha* at the end. But in the stories about Abimelech, Laban, Pharaoh, Balaam, the sons of Eli, and others, we find certain restrictions of man's freedom, a tendency which disappears gradually under the influence of the prophets.

The principle of *retribution* has been treated in connection with the God-conception. Retribution in the sense of *Immortality* in the *Hereafter is prepared* to a certain extent by the idea of the *substantiality* of the *soul*, which is found in some early writings (cf. especially 1 Ki. XVII, 21, 22; Is. XXXI, 3; comp. II, 22 and XI, 2). Older sources mention the *Sheol* (15 times in pre-Deuteronomic literature), but the word evidently connotes merely "grave." In a *negative* way the first "Torah" and *Isaiah* take notice of the life hereafter in that they denounce *necromantical practices*.

So far the development of the principles of Judaism has been going on under the authority of the first Book of the Covenant, which was the "Torah" of its time, referred to by the prophets. We can understand Mendelssohn, if he, from his orthodox-traditional point of view, does not see the central position of dogma in Jewish antiquity. But if Geiger, himself a great worker in the field of biblical criticism, maintains, with Mendelssohn, that the Books of the Covenant had for their aim only the injunction of practical commandments, we have refuted this view in the preceding. For it is clear that the changes in ritual and moral laws insisted upon by the first Book of the Covenant and the prophets under its authority, were only the *consequences* of the new principles.

This becomes even more evident when we consider the circumstances which led up to the *Deuteronomic Covenant*. For we will see that the second covenant was nothing more than the *consummation* of the development going on under the authority of the first Book of the Covenant, when the latter became *too narrow* and *obsolete* in part. The *second Book of the Covenant* (Deuteronomy V-XXVI and XXVIII) is a *new declaration of principles* with corresponding changes in the ritual and moral law.

Historians and prophets leave no doubt that the Sinai Covenant was practically a complete failure. Writers and prophets referred to the authority of the (first) Book of the Covenant, they even improved on the principles embodied in

the "Torah" of their time, but the people in its masses remained almost untouched by the teachings and postulates of "Torah" and prophets. This was especially so in the time of king *Menasseh*. Prophets and leaders blamed the people, but a time came when they had to realize that it was not the people alone that was to be blamed.

At the time of King *Josiah*, when Ishtar-worship and other kinds of idolatry were openly practised "in the cities of Juda and in the streets of Jerusalem," the spiritual leaders (among them Zephaniah and young Jeremiah) came to a realization that the principles upon which the "Torah" was based, as well as the laws it enjoined, were only *half-heartedly* monotheistic. Why could they not worship Ba'al, Milcom and "other gods," and offer sacrifices on *Bamoth*, as long as there were angels alongside of God? Why could they not worship images, as long as there were the *Nehushthan* of Moses and the *Cherubs* in the Temple in Jerusalem, and the *Calves* in the Temples of Beth-El and Dan? Why reject Ishtar-worship altogether? Has not tradition a story about the angels having intercourse with the "daughters of Adam"? And what about Moloch? Has not tradition the story about the command to sacrifice Isaac? Evidently, in the worship of the gods things are permitted which are otherwise forbidden.

Hezekiah, indeed, started the reform movement; he removed the *Nehushthan* from the Temple: this shows that he tried to eliminate the angels as intermediators. But he could not go any further. To be consistent he would have had to remove the *Cherubs* and the Ark with which they were connected. This, however, could not be done. The difference between *Cherubs* and *Calves* was the *religious difference* between South and North. (The change in the *calendar* effected by *Jeroboam* possibly corresponds to this difference. *Jeroboam* accepted the *Hammurabi-calendar* which is based on the fact that in 2500 B.C. the sun receded from *gemini* [cherubs] to *taurus*). The ark with the *Cherubs* without and the *Tablets* within (in connection with other relics), was the witness of

the *Mosaic genuineness* of the system at Jerusalem (all of this was strenuously denied by the Israelitish writers, who declared their own relics, "Book of the Covenant" and "Stone of Testimony" to be genuinely Mosaic).

This greatest obstacle was removed with the destruction of the Northern Kingdom, when the remnant of Israel became, politically and religiously, dependent on Juda. And so the great Reform were carried out. The Ark with the Cherubs and all other relics was removed (forever) from the Temple,² the old "Torah," the first Book of the Covenant with its historical frame, was ousted from its place of authority, and a new Book of the Covenant, the book of *Deuteronomy*, was placed in authority in its stead.

Critics, in speaking of the Deuteronomic Reformation, usually dwell on the *centralization* of the sacrificial cult and other practical reforms as the aim of the entire reform-movement. But in the light of the preceding it is obvious that all practical reforms, centralization, removal of images, of Ishtar-worship, and of mantic institutions, from the Temple, as all other changes in ritual and law, were simply the practical *consequences* of the new theoretical principles:

Deuteronomy is a *systematically* arranged dogmatical document. It consists of two *historical introductions* (V–VIII and IX–XI), each of which explains and discusses the *four essential principles* of Judaism enumerated above: *God, Prophecy, Retribution, and Free Will*. Then follow the *Laws* (XII–XXVI), essentially an elaboration of the laws in the first Book of the Covenant, with changes corresponding to the improved principles. The laws are arranged in the *same order* as the principles in the introductions, a set of practical laws

² Cf. Jeremiah III, 16; VII, 4: *הַכְּרֻבִּים* may refer to the cherubs and be the first intimation that the cherubs have been removed (comp. Ez. X, 20–22, and XLI, 20–21); XI, 1–13; 2 Chr. XXXV, 3; Mishnah Shek. VI, 1–2; Yoma V, 2; Thos. Shek. II, 18; Yom hak-Kipp. III, 6–7; Jer. Tha'anith Hal. 1 and parallels; Bab. Yoma pp. 53–54; Hor. pp. 11–12; cf. Tholoth Ha'ikkarim I, ch. 3.

to each theoretical principle. It concludes with the *Thochaha* (XXVIII), which marks the book as a Book of the Covenant (corresponding to the *Thochaha* at the end of the first Book of the Covenant, Ex. XXIII).

In the elucidation of the principles Deuteronomy signifies the consummation and codification of the development intervening between the Sinai Covenant and the Deuteronomic Covenant. It denies the existence of angels not only by *elimination*, but almost by explicit statements. It eliminates the attribute of *long-suffering*, uses the name JHVH combined with *Elohim* in possessive status (but never *Elohim* as an absolute name), possibly in order to express its God-conception of more rigid justice. It introduces this combination name in the famous formula which later became expressive of the *Jewish Creed*: "Hear, O Israel, JHVH is our *Elohim*, (no *Elohim*—angels—beside Him), JHVH is One"—rigid monotheism, no angels beside Him. The discussion of the God-conception in Deuteronomy is more *argumentative* than in all preceding literature. It has nothing of the *cosmological* proof, but its arguments from *History* present a well developed *logical preformation* of the later cosmological proof.

To give strength to its higher and purer God-conception, Deuteronomy recasts the conception of early Jewish history. The historical introduction, based largely on JE, eliminates all traces of the sexual motif. It cuts off the entire pre-Egyptian history save the three names of the patriarchs, Abraham, Isaac, and *Jacob* (never *Israel*—on account of its origin in the story of an *angel*)! Notably all the *woman-figures* of the patriarchal history are eliminated entirely (Moses, according to Deuteronomy, as also according to P., evidently remained single).

In *Prophecy* Deuteronomy *codifies* the highest conception of it as developed by the prophets. The only ornament retained at the scene at Sinai, the *fire*, is expressly abrogated for the future. "I will place my words in his mouth" is the only legal form of prophecy. Not only the lower mantic forms, but also the *dream* as a means of prophecy, are

denounced. "Dream" and "Dreamer" in Deuteronomy are equivalent to false prophecy and false prophet, respectively (XIII, 2-6; XVIII, 9-22).

Free Will is particularly emphasized (V, 26; VIII, 11-6; XI, 26 f.; XXVIII), but most noteworthy is the story of Balaam: God did not interfere with his free will (as in JE), Balaam *did* curse, but God converted the curse into blessing (Deut. XXIII, 6).

Retribution is emphasized especially in the *Thochaha*, the special attitude of Deuteronomy expressing itself in the God-conception. In the question of *immortality* Deuteronomy retains the negative attitude of the first Book of the Covenant: it denounces and forbids all necromantic practices. Deuteronomy emphasizes the principle of *national retribution* so much that it can easily dispense with equalizing justice to the *individual* in the Hereafter.

The *second* Book of the Covenant, Deuteronomy, was called upon to have a lasting influence upon the shaping of Judaism, but not until the time of *Ezra*. The conditions of the time when Deuteronomy was the authoritative "Torah," were the most unfavorable for a real reform of life. Another reason why Deuteronomy remained mere theory at the time of its promulgation, suggests itself when we consider that the new contact with neo-Babylonian culture reawakened the interest of the people in *cosmogonic legends*. Judaism with its mere ethical God-conception was not able to cope with the well-developed cosmogony of Babylonian theology. And it is at this point where a new development sets in, one which was to lead up to the *Ezra-Covenant* and the declaration of a new, the *third*, Book of the Covenant.

Jeremiah, having overcome the doctrine of angels, and under the stimulus of the reawakened cosmological interest of the people, formulated the *monotheistic theory of creation*. In his *God-conception* he stands on Deuteronomic ground, he cannot reconcile himself to the attribute of *long-suffering* (XV, 15; XVIII, 23; XX, 12), but he translates the God-conception

from the ethical into the cosmological, and gives prominence to the attributes of *Wisdom* and *Might* not contained in the Thirteen. He adopts the combination-name *JHVH Zebaoth* to express the idea of creation (hosts of creation) and rigid justice. This cosmological outlook strengthens in him the postulate of *individual justice*, and he formulates, as none before him, the great question of the ages: Why is the way of the wicked prosperous? (XII, 1 f.) And also the principle of *free will* causes him more embarrassment than it caused his predecessors. But the source of his perplexities is at the same time the well-spring of his unshaken faith. He advances the first contours of the cosmological proof for the existence of God, (as also the first element of the *theory of ideas*, cf. below), and this steels him against all doubts and difficulties: The creator of all things brings everything into harmony: National justice and individual justice, individual responsibility and the determining disposition of man's soul, the contradicting realities of life—everything is in full harmony in the *wisdom* of the creator, which the human mind is too narrow to fathom (XXXII, 17–19).

Jeremiah has seen moral and religious backsliding as no prophet before him, and this strengthened him in his rigid attitude against all images and any *decorative art* in the worship of God. This may also account for the fact that *Jeremiah* is the first representative of Judaism of whom we know that he insisted on a *confession of faith*. All nations will pilgrim to Jerusalem, but they will have not only to abandon their idols, but also to offer a positive confession of faith: "Hail *JHVH*," in order to be admitted into the community of the Jewish people (III, 16, 17; XVI, 19; XII, 16, 17; comp. Ruth I, 16).

Ezekiel was the banner-bearer of the *conservative* leaders, who rejected the Deuteronomic Reformation on principle. They, too, wanted to reform the *life* of the people, but they wanted to do it on the ground of the old principles. They believed in angels, and considered the removal of the Ark and

the Cherubs as a great sin, which, in the view of Ezekiel, robbed the City and the land of the divine protection: *The Mercabah*, the divine *Throne* and *Court*, formed by angels, is the source from which emanates all divine powers in nature, providence, sanctuary, law and history. Corresponding to his belief in angels, Ezekiel shows great interest in early history. He is opposed to the monotheistic theory of creation, but displays Babylonian cosmogonic influence retouched with monotheistic colors. He returns to the God-conception of *holiness*, but is influenced by the preceding prophetic development in his attitude to the old ethical God-definition. He is opposed to the principle of national retribution embodied in the Thirteen. His book, more systematic than any biblical book preceding it, is built entirely in the evolutionary motif of attributes. Its central question is the "Ways of God" as expressed in the Thirteen. His contemporaries in the Golah, attack the principle of national retribution: "The ways of ADONAY are not good!" They even discard the name JHVH. And Ezekiel, while insisting that it is *their ways* which are not good, yields in the principle and insists one-sidedly on the principle of *individual retribution*. And even as to the name JHVH he admits that under the circumstances the principle of mercy for the remnant of Israel does not prevail, wherefore he introduces the combination name ADONAY JHVH (alongside of JHVH, using each 213 times). He sees God in the *Mercabah*, revealing Himself by the name SHADDAY. But on account of the removal of the Cherubs from the Temple, God leaves the City and the land, and in His stead comes the Mala'ch JHVH and reigns in rigid justice. SHADDAY indicates mercy for the *future*. The events, however, are going on under the name ADONAY JHVH. But the prophet looks into the bright future, sees the Temple restored, and in it he sees not only *two Cherubs*, but the whole *Mercabah*,—that is his *postulate* for the future. Then, and then only, will mercy reign supreme under *the Name*: "and the name of the city will be 'JHVH is There.'"

Corresponding to his God-conception and his belief in angels, Ezekiel, while having a high notion of the ethical and religious *functions* of the prophet, almost surpassing Isaiah and Jeremiah, shows the spirit of *reaction* in the *forms* of *prophecy*. Jeremiah stands on the ground of Deuteronomy, rejecting angels and *dreams* as a means of revelation. Ezekiel re-introduces angels and visions of an exciting nature. His oscillations in the principle of *free will* also remind of old Israelitish influences, and in the question of *immortality* he, at least, *prepares* the belief in *bodily resurrection*, in his vision of the *dry bones in the valley*; displaying at the same time the influence of Isaiah in contrasting *spirit* (Ru'ah) with *flesh*. (Ezekiel's discussion of the *Sheol* refers to the *Egyptian* point of view, as in the prophecies of Amos, Hosea, and, notably, Isaiah, who strongly denounces the necromantical "spirit of Egypt.")

Jeremiah and *Ezekiel* are now the representatives of two types of thought in Judaism. Jeremiah, the leader of the strong intellectual minority, is representative of Deuteronomic thought augmented by the cosmological feature in the God-conception. Ezekiel, the leader of the conservatives among the intellectuals, whom the masses of the people follow with enthusiasm, is representative of pre-Deuteronomic Judaism and the old traditional conception of history. As prominent representatives of the *Jeremian School* in biblical literature in the following time may be mentioned *Deutero-Isaiah* and the author of the book of *Job*. *Deutero-Isaiah* fights *Persian dualism*, which is a systematic view based on realities of life and history, and which is not as easily refuted as polytheism. And so this prophet deepens the cosmological God-conception, designating the "other gods" as "nothing" (דֵּם), and formulating the *cosmological proof*: "Lift up your eyes and look, who has created these?" The author of the book of *Job* discusses all problems of justice, including the idea of *immortality* as retribution, under the aspect of the *Thirteen*, to conclude with the *revelation in the storm*, which is an elaborate presentation of the *cos-*

mological proof as the only good foundation of faith. In the entire discussion the names SHADDAY and ELOHA are used; the name JHVH is introduced in the revelation in the storm. Neither of the two repudiates the God-definition of the Thirteen; they only deem it insufficient and add the cosmological feature. But there is no doubt that the Thirteen-definition continued to be the object of attack. We have two books in its defense, the book of *Jonah* and the book of *Ruth*. Jonah is represented as an adherent of the theory of creation and an extreme opponent of the attributes of mercy as expressed in the Thirteen. The author, who writes in defense of the Thirteen, reduces the prophet's attitude *ad absurdum*. The aim of the author of the book of Ruth is more composite, but the defense of the Thirteen is one of its prominent features.

The most radical wings of the two opposing schools, however, are represented by the *Priestly Code* (P) for the Jeremian, and the *Book of Holiness* (H) for the Ezekielian school. Each one of these two books was presented by its party with the claim to be made the *Book of the Covenant* in the *Ezra-Covenant*.

P bases Judaism on the cosmological God-conception, begins the historical introduction with the creation of the world, rewrites the history of the patriarchs so as to eliminate all stories in which there is the slightest trace of the sexual motif. It begins with the name *Elohim*, then comes the intermediate phase of the Covenant with *Noah* with the *Rainbow in the Cloud* as a distant *sign* of mercy, and the covenant with Abraham with the temporary name of SHADDAY and *Circumcision* as a *sign* of mercy. But the real mercy comes not until the *Khabod* (Rainbow) in the *Cloud* appears in the *Tabernacle* dedicated by *Moses* and *Aaron*, to whom God reveals the name JHVH with the formula of mercy for which it stands, the *Priestly Blessing*. P rejects the formula of the Thirteen attributes and replaces it by the *Priestly Blessing*. There is no mercy for *deliberate* sinners (except in the case of property, which may be made good), but even for unwilful

sins there is mercy only after expiation by the prescribed sacrifice and through the Priestly Blessing. *National retribution* works only in sins of national importance and only among the adults of the present generation, but then it works *immediately* through *Magguepha*. In all other cases of deliberate sin only the individual is punished by *Khareth* through the hands of God. The rejection of *angels* as *intermediators* (the Cherubs of the Tabernacle belong to H) is carried to the extreme in that also the intermediation of the human court in taking of life is rejected, P *abolishes capital punishment* except in the case of *murder*. And even in the case of murder the court is not to execute the murderer, or even to deliver him into the hands of the *blood-avenger* (as in *Deuteronomy*, where the opposition to capital punishment originates). The court only conducts the trial, and if the murderer is found guilty he is declared *free* for the blood-avenger. In all other principles P embodies the most advanced phases of the preceding development. P has no Thochaha, the story of monotheistic creation is sufficient foundation of the law.

H consists of a history of creation in which angels and *Cherubs* play an important rôle (the so-called "second account of creation," or J² in Gen. II–XI), the history of JE, a *Law-Code* (Lev. XVI–XXV, with some exceptions), and a Thochaha (Lev. XXVI). Its God-conception is again based on the idea of *holiness*, and in all principles its attitude is that of pre-Deuteronomic Judaism. It is the most extreme representative of the Ezekielian school, but differs from Ezekiel in the principle of retribution, in which it proves to be unreservedly representative of the Thirteen definition.

The outcome of this struggle was a *compromise*: the *Book of the Covenant* of the Ezra-Covenant was a *combination* of P and H, the *enlarged Priestly Code*, built on the *principles of the Jeremiah school*, but which embodied such parts of H as were not directly opposed to the principles. In practical law-questions the rigid monotheists had to give in. Some *contradictory* laws were left intact with a view to harmonizing them

by *interpretation* according to certain rules, some of which are indicated right in the text of the third Book of the Covenant. We touch here the *beginnings* of the principle of *Oral Tradition*.

The complexion of the third book of the Covenant (which is still ascertainable from certain passages in Bible and Mishnah), is the best proof that at the renewal of the Covenant under Ezra the *principles*, and not the practical laws, were all that mattered. The latter were compromised on, but not the former. The principles of the Jeremian school carried the day. Owing to the victory of the Jeremian principles the book of Deuteronomy was retained alongside of the Book of the Covenant, the "Torah," as "Repetition of the Torah." There was no real difference in principles between the second and third Books of the Covenant; the contradictions and discrepancies in the legal enactments were left to *interpretation* in the same way as those between Priestly Code and Book of Holiness.

2. THE PERIOD OF THE GREAT SYNOD

The new "Torah," consisting of the enlarged Priestly Code and Deuteronomy, enjoyed more authority and commanded more obedience among the masses of the people than did Deuteronomy when it alone was holding the authoritative position of "Torah." But the old literature was not ousted. The masses, and some spiritual leaders, were clinging to the old narratives and the ideas they expressed, with tenacious love and enthusiastic devotion. This and the movement, already essentially *Sopheric*, for the *popularization* of Judaism's Doctrine and Law, added to the deep-going influence of *Persian angelology*, enhanced the conservatives in their demand that the stories and beliefs dear to their hearts be given expression in the national document. And also the authoritative representatives of that time could afford to be less rigid against the belief in angels, now that the monotheistic theory of creation had become the established creed in the hearts of the people. And so a *new compromise* was brought about, the product of which was a *new*, the essentially final, *redaction of the Torah*.

The books JE with the first Book of the Covenant were combined with the enlarged Priestly Code, whose story of creation was combined with J² (from the introduction to the original Book of Holiness), and this was declared as the Torah, with Deuteronomy as Repetition of the Torah. The Jeremian principles were retained, but the angels were re-admitted into the national document, evidently with a view to *interpretation*. Nothing is said about the creation of angels, but we know that Tradition had no difficulty to find it indicated in the Torah.

However, the new Torah, brought about by the pressure of circumstances, was not at all to the liking of the authorities of that time (about a century after Ezra), and they took their measures to *neutralize* the influence of the Torah. The new Torah was never recognized in the Temple, where the "Torah" of the Ezra-Covenant had remained in authority. But more decisive was the (later) introduction of the institution of *Liturgy* as a *confession of faith*. This step suggested itself by prevailing currents of thought and conditions of religious life:

In the post-Ezra period *three lines* of development visibly differentiate: The continuation of the *biblical*, the new *Sopheric*, and, later the *Graeco-Jewish*, or *Alexandrian*, lines of thought. Representative of the Sopheric spirit is the old material in the talmudic sources, while Graeco-Jewish literature at large is representative of the Alexandrian line of thought. The biblical line of thought in this period is represented by the literary units of *Psalms*, *Proverbs*, *Chronicles*, *Daniel*, and *Kobelet*. But these late biblical books already mirror the incipient influences of the two other lines of development. All of these books treat the problem of justice; they discuss the arguments in defense of *justice* that had been advanced in earlier biblical literature, under the influence of *Plato*. This influence is visible in many ways: Of the *two* formulations of the question of justice in Plato (especially in the State), *What* is justice? and, *Which* life is the *happier*, that of the just or that of the unjust?, the latter is in the center of the discussion in Psalms (who is אשׁרֵי?). In connection with this

we find emphasis laid on the Platonic *Cardinal Virtues: Wisdom, Fortitude, Temperance, and Justice* (especially in Proverbs), as the core of the God-conception. The old biblical thought of "walking in the ways of God" enters a fusion with Plato's postulate of "Resembling God" (*homoiosis theos*): Individual and state shall be governed *theocratically*. This thought inspires the picture of the *ideal king* in Platonic fashion in Psalms and Proverbs, the latter showing a definite trend into the sphere of *political Sophia*. Also the general cosmological aspect of the predominating Priestly Code was a point of contact with Platonism. The biblical writers of this period harmonize the Thirteen-definition with the cosmological aspect of Priestly Code and Plato. But their ethical speculation is framed in cosmological meditations. This embraces even Plato's *Theory of Ideas*. This theory, Babylonian in origin, and elements of which entered Judaism with the monotheistic theory of creation as conceived by Jeremiah (with more definite traces in Ezekiel and Job), had been embodied in the new Book of the Covenant, in the doctrine of man in the image of God and the Tabernacle according to a heavenly pattern. Then, when they came in contact with Greek thought, the theory of ideas, philosophically reconceived by Plato, furnished a very attractive point of contact. The believers in angels had no difficulty in identifying angels and ideas (as, later, Philo and some Talmudists). But those opposed to angels could not go any farther than went the authoritative document, and so they compromised. They interpreted the Ideas as the ideas of God, and accepted them in their totality as the *Wisdom* of God, a concept legitimate in biblical thought, but rather personified. This led to the doctrine of the *cosmological Sophia* in Proverbs and in some later interpolations in Job. Wisdom again is gradually being identified with Torah (in Proverbs, and, less perfectly, in Psalms). In the spiritual fermentation brought about by the contact with Greek philosophy and culture, all the principles of Judaism, covered by the authority of the "Torah," were questioned again, and

the problem from the discussion of which these attacks developed, was the old central problem of justice. The *Hellenists* left no literature, unless *Kohleth* is a Hellenistic product. This book, which treats the question treated by Plato in *Philebos* (Which is best, *Hochmah* or *Holeluth*, Phronesis or Hedone?), does not deny the existence of God, but denies the reality of justice as generally understood, and refutes all arguments in "the defense of justice" advanced by biblical writers and by Plato. It refutes especially the argument of *eschatological justice* (bodily resurrection and spiritual immortality). But we learn the radical views of the Hellenists from the discussions of their opponents in Psalms, Proverbs, Daniel, and Graeco-Jewish literature. The *Hassideans* who were not opposed to Greek thought altogether, as generally believed, but who insisted on cultivating the influence of Platonic philosophy rather than those of Epicureanism and general pagan Greek levity, give us a comprehensive account of the radical views of the Hellenists. From the arguments advanced against them, we learn that they not only refused to believe in the new doctrines, such as eschatological justice and the divineness and eternity of the Torah, doctrines which were not covered by the authority of the Book of the Covenant, or even of older biblical writings, but they attacked the very essential principles of Judaism on which the Book of the Covenant rested, and which were recognized by all who honestly adhered to Judaism.

In this defense of justice and of the essential principles of Judaism against the radical heretics, the Psalms played a most prominent rôle. Almost all the Psalms which, with a very few exceptions, are the product of this period, discuss the question of justice and are built in the motif of attributes in the sense of the Thirteen. Not less than one hundred of the hundred and fifty Psalms of our collection are absolutely JHVH-Psalms. Twenty-seven are conceived in the *evolutionary motif*, using Elohim only in order to introduce JHVH at a suitable moment. Nine use both names, only the fourteen

remaining being Elohim-Psalms, a phenomenon easily accounted for by the situation (as times came when JHVH was *pronounced* and even written Elohim). By and by the Psalms became the most popular genre of literature, through which the hearts of the masses could be effectively reached. The *prayer-meetings* which came into being in the *Babylonian Golah* when there was no Temple and no sacrifice, were retained also after the restoration, especially in the Province, in places remote from Jerusalem. At these meetings for private worship Psalms were recited and sung. Now, the Psalms were defending the principles of Judaism, but at the same time they promoted doctrines and theories which the authorities would rather exclude from official recognition. Some Psalms advance the doctrine of Mercabah and angels, others indulge in eschatological hopes to an extent not encouraged by the then authoritative Judaism. The book of Daniel gives us an adequate idea of the exoteric doctrines then in vogue: The doctrines of Mercabah and angels reign supreme, angels have even *names* of their own. Prophecy returns to old, long ago discarded, forms of expression, eschatological hopes are indulged in the plainest matter-of-fact language.

This called for some authoritative counter-measure. This again coincided with the long felt need for a counter-measure to the Torah in its final redaction. And so the authorities consolidated the "Order of the Day," a sort of manual (officially oral, in fact, however, written), for daily and holy-day-worship. This contained *Readings* selected from the Ezra "Torah" (this oldest list is still preserved in the *Mishnah*, as against other, younger, lists in *Thosephtha* and *Gemara*, which contain readings also from the other parts of the Torah), *Benedictions* and short *Prayers*. This "Order of the Day," in its entirety a *Confession of Faith*, was introduced in the Temple and in the prayer-meetings in the Province. It expressed the ideas of *Unity* (*Shema*), *Prophecy* (*We-ohabhtha*), *Retribution* (*We-hayah*), and *Free-Will* (*Wa-yomer*), thus expressing the original four essential principles of Judaism.

To this was added the "Preceding Benediction" to express the principle of *Creation* (Yotser Or) and the *Thephillah* consisting of the "first three Benedictions," which describe God under the aspect of the Thirteen, and the "last three Benedictions," which describe God under the aspect of the Priestly Blessing (later "intermediary Benedictions" were added along the same lines of thought).

Thus the essential principles of Judaism found a clear expression in a veritable *Creed*, covered by authority and guarded against additions of doctrines not officially recognized. It may be assumed that in private places of worship Psalms and songs were added which contained doctrines excluded from official recognition, but then all knew that these were additions outside of the binding force of authority. And most decisive was the "Order of the Day" as practised in the Temple.

But this "Order of the Day," the *Fourth Dogmatical Document* of Judaism, was not the final word in fixing the authoritative Creed of Judaism. Political events strengthened those currents of thought outside the authoritative sphere, which were pressing the claim of some exoteric doctrines to be admitted into the Dogmatical Document, the "Order of the Day." From *Graeco-Jewish literature* we can see that in the Maccabean period it was especially *two* doctrines which were forcefully surging to the surface with the claim for recognition: the doctrine of *Mercabah and Angels* and that of *eschatological retribution*.

Graeco-Jewish literature may be conveniently divided into a *philosophic group* of writings with *Philo* as the most comprehensive representative, and an *historical group* of writings with *Josephus* as the most comprehensive representative. The philosophic group has as its aim to present the philosophy of Judaism so as to make it clear that it contains the best principles of Plato's philosophy, using historical reviews as illustrations. The historic group, on the other hand, develops Judaism's *philosophy of history* so as to show that the Torah is equal and superior to Plato's *Ideal Constitution*,

and that the course of history, of the world and of Judaism, bears out the doctrines of Jewish individual and political ethics. This division almost coincides with another division. The philosophic writings are largely built on the *theory of ideas*, while the historical writings largely cultivate the doctrine of *Mercabah* and angels. And still another coincident division: The historical group largely advocates *bodily resurrection*, while the philosophic group largely cherishes the hope of *spiritual immortality*. Considering the general trend of thought, the two groups are the continuation of the Jeremian and Ezekielian schools, respectively. Of the first pair of parallel doctrines, ideas and angels, the representatives of the former do not press their claims with any great force. All, except Philo, who properly belongs to the following period, accept the theory of ideas in the limited form we know from the Priestly Code. Certain revered things, *man and Tabernacle*, were created in heavenly images. Some Graeco-Jewish writers added other revered things, especially the *Torah*. But as yet there was no special reason to force this doctrine. Of the other pair of parallel doctrines, bodily resurrection and spiritual immortality, the former only gained recognition in this period. (The time for the latter, as also for the theory of ideas and for *political redemption, or Messiah*, came in the following period, while the doctrine of angels never got authoritative recognition, and even in the period of literary discussion there were only a few thinkers who considered the doctrine of angels as a dogma.)

This was due to a concatenation of circumstances and historical developments, both spiritual and political:

The sacrifices and the martyrdom demanded from the people by the political and spiritual leaders in the time of the Maccabean Wars forced the authorities to be less reticent in matters eschatological. They had to inspire the people with the definite hope for immortality, if they wanted to move them to great deeds of heroism. But of the two forms of eschatological hopes, the spiritual leaders preferred bodily

resurrection to spiritual immortality. Spiritual immortality means continuation of life right after death, a hope which opens the way to all kinds of necromantical and spiritistic rites, which were practised in those days under Greek influence (comp. the story of the amulet in 2 Macc.). The theory of bodily resurrection, on the other hand, meant in those days that the souls of the dead are in a state of sleep, awaiting the time of redemption and resurrection.

Indeed, this theory has wrought great miracles of inspiration and enthusiasm. And this fact came to great significance later, at the time of the controversies between *Pharisees* and *Sadducees* with the Hasmonean dynasty siding with the latter.

The view in vogue that the Sadducees denied the *principles* of *Tradition* and *Immortality* is erroneous. For aside from the fact that these principles had no dogmatical standing yet at the time when the controversies between Pharisees and Sadducees started, the latter never denied these principles in general (*Josephus*, the Pharisee, is to be taken *cum grano salis*). It was the Pharisees who were the innovators. The Sadducees clung to the old method of interpretation which developed out of the combinations of the different law-codes embodied in the Torah (augmented again by the final redaction of the Torah), while the Pharisees *enlarged* the rules and methods of interpretation by their own speculation. And it was only one of the *consequences* of this controversy that the belief in bodily resurrection has become a strong point in this controversy. This is best illustrated by the dogmatical relation of the three *real* Maccabean books (first, second, and fourth) to each other:

The first book of Maccabees, written by a Sadducee, while insisting on fidelity to the *national* religion, is as *secular* in its motifs as possible under the circumstances. And also the Platonic elements used are rather those of the "Laws" than those of the "State," the latter being much too *theological* for the purposes of the author. Especially careful is the author in avoiding all reference to the great part the doctrine of

resurrection played in bringing about the great inspiration and in helping in the great victories over the enemy. Everything is here credited to the fortitude, "*Andragathia*," of the Maccabean heroes. Of the tales of great martyrdom which were then current, especially of the old man *Eleazar* and the *Mother* with the *Seven Sons*, the author takes no cognizance. To this a Pharisee wrote an effective answer, the second book of the Maccabees. In this book he relates the story of Eleazar and the martyr-mother and presses the doctrine of bodily resurrection so much to the foreground as to make it clear that it was this doctrine, and not the andragathia of the Hasmoneans, which helped bringing about the great achievements. This led the Sadducees to oppose the doctrine of bodily resurrection, in reality because of its rivalry to the claims of the Hasmoneans, *incidentally*, however, they could conveniently point out that the idea of bodily resurrection has no backing in biblical literature (Daniel is a Pharisean book): To this a Sadducee wrote a *rejoinder*, the fourth book of Maccabees, in which he takes up the story of Eleazar and the martyr-mother, replacing, however, the doctrine of bodily resurrection by the more philosophic doctrine of spiritual immortality.

This controversy led to the *Declaration* of the doctrine of bodily resurrection as a *dogma* of Judaism through its embodiment in the fourth Dogmatical Document, the "Order of the Day," first in the Temple (in the time of John Hyrkan) and then in the Province (in the time of Salome Alexandra).

3. THE PERIOD OF THE MISHNAH

With the declaration of resurrection as a dogma of Judaism the dogmatical situation was defined. It meant that all other tendencies struggling for expression, such as Mercabah and angels, the theory of ideas, spiritual immortality, and the like, were excluded from dogmatical authority. As to spiritual immortality it cannot be said that the Pharisees have ever been opposed to the doctrine as such. On the contrary, it is clear from the sources that the general eschatological idea always

involved *three* distinct features, resurrection, spiritual immortality, and *political redemption*, and that the Pharisees, in their attitude to each one of these three doctrines, were guided by considerations suggested by the general dogmatical situation. They declared resurrection as a dogma "in order to drive it out from the hearts of the Sadducees," as the phrase goes. The doctrine of spiritual immortality was pressed now by the Sadducees, and so the Pharisees had another reason to move slowly, although they not only were not opposed to it, but rather believed in it, implicitly and explicitly. The third feature of the eschatological idea, however, the hope for *political redemption*, enters now a very complex phase of development in intimate interrelation with the doctrines of angels and ideas. The idea of political redemption, or the hope for *Messiah*, impresses its stamp upon the whole spiritual complexion of the age. The entire dogmatical precipitation of the period, as ultimately embodied in the Mishnah, must be grasped and presented under this central aspect:

The Pharisees, as the authoritative representatives of Judaism, were not openly hostile to the theory of Mercabah and angels, now that all of these beings were understood to have been *created*, but they kept the doctrine out of all authoritative recognition, excluding it from the "Order of the Day" in Temple and Province and denying the new Torah the place it could claim in the Temple. This attitude is mirrored in *Josephus*, who, giving himself as an official representative of Pharisaism, avoids the angels as much as he possibly can, and even suppresses the Thirteen as well, as the entire proceedings of Ex. XXXIII-XXXIV, which lead up to their revelation. There were, however, among the Pharisees such as clung to Mercabah and angels with sincere conviction, and who would not submit to the cold declining attitude of their party. They went with the party in all the points of difference between it and the Sadducees, but they emphasized Mercabah and angels and brought this doctrine in close connection with the new dogma of resurrection and with the *messianic hope*. The mes-

sianic hope was a legitimate biblical doctrine, and the sources permit the conclusion that the Pharisees proclaimed *political redemption* a dogma by embodying it into the "Order of the Day" decades before the Destruction of Jerusalem, when Roman oppression weighed heavily upon Judea (Benediction of "Geulah" before Thephillah). But the lovers of Mercabah and angels were not satisfied with this concession, and, under the name of *Essenes*, they banded together to a new party, a sort of an ultra-right wing of the Pharisees. This new party developed an elaborate mystical theory of Mercabah and angels in combination with the Messiah-idea and the doctrine of resurrection. They expected Messiah and resurrection in the near future and tried to bring it about by a prayer-cult built on an *extreme idea of mediation*. The *angels* whom they classified and *named*, were to help them bring about the *New Kingdom*. This party clamored for recognition.

Likewise, the Pharisees were not outspokenly hostile to the theory of ideas which in part was covered even by the "Torah" recognized in the Temple. But they would go no further than this. Man was created in the divine image, and the Tabernacle was erected according to a heavenly pattern, but they repressed as far as possible the general theory of ideas in the fashion of Plato. And in this they seem to have been successful to a certain degree. For, as mentioned, Graeco-Jewish writers at large only add some other things as having existed in the idea even before creation. Especially they press the doctrine of *Wisdom*, as identical with Torah, having existed in the idea before creation. But there also were such as accepted the Platonic theory of ideas in its entirety. The great force with which these thinkers have pressed their claims, we see in the precipitation of this trend of thought in the works of Philo. Philo recognized Jerusalem as the metropolis of the Diaspora, and one could not say that he was an outspoken Sadducean partisan. But his interpretation of the Torah leans appreciably towards the old Sadducean Halacha, he knows of no resurrection, but presses the claims of spiritual immortality,

and he *absorbs* the theory of *angels* in the theory of ideas: angels are ideas (cf. Matth. XXII, 23 f.: The Sadducees object to resurrection, and Jesus explains to them that men after resurrection shall be "as the angels of God in heaven"; Acts XXIII, 8). The theory of Wisdom as Torah condenses in the school represented by Philo, in the theory of the *Logos* with the two great divine attributes of *Dominion* and *Mercy* (corresponding to JHVH—Justice, and Elohim—Mercy), making up the *divine Trinity* which governs the world (cf., especially, Philo, *de deo* to Gen. XVIII, 1 f.).

These were the currents of thought surging on from different directions and clamoring for recognition. And this was a time when writers and thinkers of all schools were trying consciously to formulate the principles and most essential doctrines of Judaism (cf. Letter of Aristeas, 132–136. 207; Sibylline Books III, 629. 630; V. 497—500; Philo, *de opificio mundi*, at the end; and others).

These currents of thought which the Pharisees had to face, and which they tried to repress, have found their fulfillment in *Christianity*. Christianity in its older conception is based on the theory of *angels*: Jesus is an *Archangel* who came down in the flesh to redeem the world, and to establish the Kingdom of Heaven. In the later, *anti-nomistic*, phase of its development Christianity is based on the theory of ideas: Jesus is the *Arch-Image* of God, the *Logos*, the *Word*, the *Son of God* (all terminology taken from Philo), who came to abrogate the Torah, the word of God given through the *servant*, Moses.

This made it imperative for the Pharisees to condescend from their official authoritative aloofness, and to fight for the life of Judaism as they saw it. These theories had taken hold of the minds of the masses, and the only way they found practicable, was to fight Christianity on its own ground. And so the *Tannaim* of the first generation, Rabbi *Johanan ben Zaccai* and his disciples, developed *Ma'asseh Mercabah*, to fight the older phase of Christianity: The angels of the Mercabah, they declared, never leave their place, while the angels who

are mentioned in the Bible coming down in the form of human flesh, are *ephemeral beings*, with no names and no attributes of their own. They are being created according to need, and, as soon as they have carried out their function, they perish again. Later, however, when anti-nomistic Christology developed, *Rabbi 'Akiba* introduced the *Pardes-theory*, known under the name *Ma'asseh Bereshith*, which is essentially the theory of ideas. He and his followers fought Christianity by reviving the old doctrine of Wisdom-Torah. The Torah is the Logos, the Organ of Creation. All that anti-nomistic Christology said of Jesus, they said of the Torah, so as to offset the claim that Jesus had the power to abrogate the Torah, or even to repeal any of its laws.

"The fact that Christianity then went its own ways, by no means should prevent us from seeing that originally the whole movement was but a phenomenon in the spiritual life of Judaism. Only the sincere consideration of the realities of the *dogmatical evolution*, namely, that from of old there was in Judaism an undercurrent, consciously and deliberately repressed from all manifestations of religious life in word and ritual, but which under favorable circumstances would break through the surface so laboriously smoothed over—only the realization of this fact can plausibly account for the phenomenon that about the time in question we find among the authoritative representatives of Judaism elaborate mystical disciplines, which show much similarity to the very mystical doctrines they so strenuously fight. These disciplines are the very ones in which Christianity originated. The new feature in our period consists in the fact that the *authoritative* representatives of Judaism started paying attention to these mystical theories in order to fight the new doctrine on its own ground" (*Gesch. d. jüd. Philos.*, I, p. 106).

The dogmatical situation became critical and anxious. Rising Christianity, still an inner Jewish movement, with great force advanced *new formulations* of all principles, essential as well as historical, and added new ones. The principle of

Unity was reinterpreted so as to readmit the sexual motive in divinity involving duality or trinity. *Prophecy* was reinterpreted in the sense of the older phase of it in pre-Deuteronomic times. *Free-Will* and *Retribution* were affected by the reformulation of the principles of *Grace* at the expense of *Justice* in the sense of the pre-Jahvistic period covered by the name of EHJH. Also the two historical dogmas, Resurrection and Redemption, were reinterpreted, so as to cover the messianic mission and the resurrection of Jesus. In addition they insisted on restoring the doctrine of angels to the rank of a dogma, in the pre-Deuteronomic sense of it, which affected also the principle of creation. This especially in later, anti-nomistic, Christology, built on the logos-theory of Philo. Philo himself when he enumerates the principles of Judaism, drops all mystical doctrines, distinguishing so between principles and private views. But the new movement was more determined and more aggressive. Its promoters had to insist on the logos-theory more than Philo. Philo was a staunch defender of the practice of the law, his new followers, on the contrary, wanted the law repealed and abrogated. So the law was in danger.

And even the defense of authoritative Judaism in those troubled days brought new perplexities and new embarrassments. The promoters of Mercabah developed a theory of emanation of matter from God and of an eternal host of angels forming the Mercabah, thus affecting the principles unity, incorporeality and creation (*creatio ex nihilo* represented by the patriarch R. Gamaliel). The adherents of Bereshith developed the theory of ideas and eternal primary matter, and gave the Torah the same position as Christology gave to Jesus. Moreover, in the rivalry developed between the disciples of Jesus and the disciples of Moses (John I, 17; VI, 32 f.; IX, 28 [!]; Acts VI, 11 f.; 2 Corinth, 12 f.; Hebr. III, 5, 6, and parallels), some of the early Talmudists came to apply to Moses the title *Rabbenu* (corresponding to Kathagetes or Magister of Jesus), and the danger was near (as it actually

happened in later Midrashim) that Moses will be endowed with the same cosmological attributes as Jesus in anti-nomistic Christology.

This danger the talmudic authorities met by a more intense cultivation and purification of the Halacha, which tended to reduce the inclination toward mysticism, and, finally, by the completion and publication of the *Mishnah*, as the *Dogmatical Document of Judaism*.

The *Mishnah*, based on previous collections of that kind, emphasizes the law by explaining it in all of its details, and by establishing the authoritative *Halacha*. But the *Mishnah* emphasizes also the old principles of Judaism in their authoritative interpretation, refusing, by way of unmistakable references, the reinterpretations given them by the Christians. It refuses admission into the *Mishnah* anything that would tend to confirm Christian claims. The *Mishnah* never uses the title *Rabbenu* for Moses, neglects entirely the *personal* feature in the dogma of redemption, and, most important of all, eliminates the doctrine of *angels* by complete silence. In the *Mishnah* the conception of angels never occurs. Moreover, the *Mishnah* never quotes a scriptural passage, in which an angel is referred to. Many passages in the *Mishnah* are difficult on account of the elimination of references to angels (found in the parallels in other Tannaitic documents), and many *Halachas* (found in the parallels) are missing in the *Mishnah* because of references to angels. But also concessions were made: The *Mishnah* enacted and sanctioned new dogmas:

1. *The Torah from Heaven*, meaning literal inspiration of the text of the Torah, recognizing the Torah as the organ of creation, but with the understanding that the Torah itself was a, *premundane*, creation.

2. *Spiritual Immortality* on the basis of individual reward and punishment, so as to counteract the Christian teaching of absolute Grace.

3. *Oral Tradition*, this dogma was sanctioned incidentally to the dogma Torah from heaven: A close study of the reports

about differences between Jesus and the Pharisees in legal questions (Matth. XII, 1-5; XV, 1 f.; Mark VII, 1 f.; XX, 23-28; John III, 21-24; V, 9; VII, 21-24; XXII, 1-16, and others), reveals the fact that anti-nomism in its first stage was directed against certain oral interpretations of the law and new Sopheric institutions (such as Washing of the hands).

4. THE PERIOD OF LITERARY DISCUSSION

The Mishnah is the last authoritative document of Judaism. In post-Mishnaic literature there is nothing that ever enjoyed, or even claimed, dogmatical authority. Nevertheless, a brief survey of the literary discussion of the dogmatical problems of Judaism will add greatly to the right understanding of the dogmatical situation in Judaism, past and present:

Bereshith and Mercabah were the continuation of the schools of Jeremiah and Ezekiel, respectively, and they have remained the *types* of thought throughout the further development. The decisive change from the mystical to the relatively philosophical mode of thinking, as expressed by the Mishnah, was greatly aided by the logical training afforded by the Halacha. In the circles of the Palestinian *Amoraim*, disinclined as they were toward sharp dialectics in halachistic discussions, the mystical disciplines were cultivated rather intensely, under the restriction imposed by the theory of creation. Soon, however, the center of Judaism was transplanted to *Babylonia*. *Rabb*, the founder of this new center of Judaism (ab. 230) brought with him from Palestine a quite acceptable agadistic-philosophic conception of the theory of ideas. Some of the sayings of this contemporary of *Plotinus* are to be found almost literally in the writings of Philo on which also Plotinus drew so much. As compared with Mercabah, the theory of ideas, or Bereshith, is the more philosophic (as indeed since the days of Plato, every real new turn in philosophy was but a new interpretation of the theory of ideas; cf. Aristotle, Philo, Plotinus, Arabic Peripatetics, Gabirol, Maimuni, Spinoza, Kant,

Schopenhauer, Cohen and Neo-Kantianism, and Bergson). But even the reduced mysticism of Bereshith found no fertile soil in Babylonia, where all thinking men were given over to halachic dialectics and to a more sober, relatively philosophic, Agadah.

This prepared the Jews for the influence of *Aristotle*. After the final redaction of the Babylonian Talmud, in the Midraschic literature of the *Geonic* period, the schools of Mercabah and Bereshith continue their speculation, Mercabah chiefly in Palestine, and Bereshith chiefly in Babylonia. And on the border of the eighth and ninth centuries a finished product of the theory of ideas appears on the horizon, the "Book of Yecirah (Creation)." The book, evidently evolved out of the school of Rabh in Babylonia, became the starting point for both Philosophy and Cabbalah, the two medieval disciplines of thought corresponding to Bereshith and Mercabah in Talmudic times. And Philosophy again splits up in to the monistic *Saadya-Group*, basing on Aristotle's *Physics*, and the, more mystically inclined, dualistic *Gabirol-Group*, basing on Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, which in itself is but a modified theory of ideas, notably in the interpretation of Arabic Neo-Platonism.

Corresponding to the general trend of development also the discussion of the question of dogmas moves in the beaten track of biblical, Sopheric, and Tannaitic times.

As to post-Mishnaic talmudic literature, it was said at the beginning of this article, that the technical concept of dogma is rather undeveloped. Nevertheless, discussions of the question as to what constitutes the principles of Jewish religion occur in Talmudic literature in various forms, the Gemaras following up the suggestions of the Mishnah, notably in the Gemara to the chapter *Helek* in tractate Synhedrin, where the Mishnah, otherwise a very discreetly organized dogmatical document, declares expressly that the belief in certain dogmas is a condition for a "Share in the Future World." This form of expression is a novelty in authoritative

Jewish literature, and signifies a concession to that line of thought which condensed in the technical term of "Salvation" in Christian Theology.

And it was this Mishnah and the accompanying discussion of it in the Gemaras which helped the medieval Jewish philosophers introduce the discussion of the question of dogmas. The discussion of the question in Arabic schools of theology and philosophy awakened new interest in the question among the Jews, but it was the discussion of the question in Talmudic literature, which gave to the philosophic discussion the much desired touch of legitimacy and traditional standing.

The tendency to formulate dogmas is quite noticeable in the *Halachoth Gedoloth* (ab. 740), but the first post-talmudic authority to formulate dogmas was R. *Hananel Gaon* (ab. 890-950). He does not distinguish expressly between essential and non-essential dogmas, nor is his enumeration exhaustive. The one to begin formulation and discussion of the dogmas in real philosophic fashion, was *Saadya Gaon* (892 to 942). His book, "Dogmas and Beliefs," the first system of medieval Jewish philosophy, treats the dogmas in the following, on the whole traditional, order: God as Creator, God's Unity, Prophecy (Torah from Heaven), The Soul as a Substance, Resurrection, Messiah, and Immortality (Retribution in the Hereafter). Saadya follows the cosmological point of view, and, feeling that this is in connection with the theory of ideas, and that Christianity is based on this theory, he fights both in one discussion. Nevertheless, Christian literature appreciably influenced Saadya in his attitude in the question of *division of commandments*, discussed so much by the *M'utazilites* (also under Christian influence). Saadya deviates from the talmudic unity of commandments, and distinguishes between Commandments of Reason (moral) and Commandments of Revelation (ritual). He also recognizes that the dogmas of resurrection and redemption are not philosophical, his only claim being that they cannot be refuted by philosophic arguments. *Bahya* (ab. 1050), in his "Duties of the Heart," largely

follows Saadya in enumeration and formulation of dogmas. He emphasises the authoritative character of the *Mishnah*.

Jehuda Hallevi (1085–1140) is the first philosopher of the Gabirol-group to treat the question of dogmas. In his *Cusari* he introduces the representatives of philosophy and all three religions, Christianity, Islam, and Judaism, as formulating their *Creeds* to the King of the Chazars. Hallevi displays deep critical insight into the character of Judaism as a creed, when he declares that while Christianity and Islam put cosmological dogmas in the foreground, Judaism derived its God-conceptions originally rather from *ethico-historical experience*, and that it was only after the God-conception had been so established, that it came to the idea of God as creator. As an adherent of the dualistic group which believed in eternal primary matter, Hallevi shows some inclination to the theory of ideas, and in his mystical way of interpreting History, he declares the ritual laws to be of a higher order, to which the moral law is only preparatory. The ritual law is a continuation of the action of creation, inasmuch as the ritual law practiced by the Jews, brings about the *fifth kingdom* of nature, Israel, the Prophet. This discussion is conscious *polemics* against anti-nomistic Christianity. His view of Sabbath and Circumcision as “practical dogmas” is evidently the *concession* to which he felt constrained while fighting. Hallevi, going beyond Bahya, emphasizes the position of the “Order of the Day” and the *Mishnah* as authoritative dogmatical documents. In the *Cusari* also a *new dogma* appears on the horizon. We remember the efforts in Tannaitic times to dogmatize the position of *Moses*. In medieval philosophy Bahya, under Mohammedan influence, presses the figure of the “divine messenger” to the fore, but he does not emphasize the personality of Moses. Hallevi is the first to do this, although he does not yet really dogmatize the position of Moses.³ A step further toward the dogma-

³ Cf. below my essay, “Jehuda Hallevi’s Philosophy.”

tization of Moses is made by *Abraham Ibn-Daud* (1110–1180). Ibn-Daud is one of the deepest Jewish philosophers, and his sharp mind permitted him to anticipate the aspect revealed by critical methods of modern times. He insists that what was read at Sinai as Book of the Covenant is the short section designated there, as also that the belief in Torah from Heaven is “the later (historical) belief.” But, evidently while at work on his philosophic system, laid down in his book, “The Lofty Faith,” he got under the influence of Philo. He is the first philosopher to count the belief in *angels* as a dogma of Judaism, and he also retains some modification of the theory of ideas in vogue among Neo-Platonic Arabic philosophers. The Torah to him is “practical philosophy,” ritual law being a preparation for the moral, the law proper. The dogmas of Redemption and Resurrection are not mentioned at all.

Moses Maimuni (1135–1204) gives the most systematic expression to the efforts at dogmatization in Judaism. In his Introduction to *Perek Helek* (cf. above) he formulates *Thirteen Principles* as the *Creed* of Judaism: *Five* concerning the *God-conception*: 1. God’s Existence, 2. Unity, 3. Incorporality, 4. Eternity, 5. No Intermediation in Worship; *four* concerning *Prophecy*: 6. Prophecy in general, 7. Supremacy of the prophecy of Moses, 8. Torah from Heaven, 9. Eternal Validity of the Torah; *four* concerning *Retribution*: 10. Omniscient Providence (based on man’s Free Will), 11. Retribution (including hereafter), 12. Messiah, and 13. Resurrection.

Maimuni distinguishes between *philosophic* and *religious* principles, basing the former on logical proof, and the latter (7, 8, 12, 13) on faith and authority, with the addition that while they cannot be proven philosophically, they cannot be disproven, either. This distinction is identical with our distinction between essential and historical dogmas. And also the peculiar position of the dogma of creation which we found with the help of historical criticism, Maimuni found by logical analysis. He does not count creation among the dogmas, explaining that *creatio ex nihilo* cannot be strictly proven. In

his system creation is absorbed by the dogma of Existence and Eternity. God is the principle of being of everything else. Eternity of God means that He alone is necessary of existence, while all other forms of existence depend on the free will of God. The question whether there was a time when the world did not exist, is irrelevant, nay, has no meaning, as time itself is a creation. The ultimate meaning of creation in the system of Maimuni is that there is only one positive root of being: God, Spirit. Matter is the *negation* of being. The more of intellect a thing suggests, the more of true reality it contains. Man with his active intellect signifies the highest degree of reality in the sublunar world. In the superlunar world the angels, the spirits of the spheres, signify the highest degree of creatural reality, God alone being the true full reality. M. gives the angels a very high position as to their degree of reality, but he does not count the belief in angels among the dogmas. In his deep insight into the innermost relations of the principles of Judaism to each other he felt that this doctrine cannot claim the rank of a real dogma. In his interpretation angels are the spirits of the heavenly bodies and do not come down in human form, a point he strongly emphasizes against the traditional interpretation, which he felt gives aid to Christianity. And also his insistence on the supremacy of the Prophecy of Moses is clearly pointed against Jesus and Mohammed. He is very careful not to give to Moses too much of a special cosmological position, but he did not escape this danger entirely. Moses in his system has a distinguished position between angel and man. He was a little more successful in his formulation of the dogma Torah from Heaven. To counteract Christian and Mohammedan anti-nomism he emphasizes the authenticity of every word in the Torah, but in order to escape the theory of ideas in its mythological interpretation which he abhors, he insists that God dictated the Torah into Moses' pen.

Omitting the discussion of dogmas in the time between Maimuni and Crescas, we may designate the book of Crescas,

"The Light of God," not only as the most important literary product of the post-Maimunian period, but also as the primary source of the new dogmatical movement in the last century up to our own day;⁴

Crescas (1340-1410) distinguishes *three* classes of dogmas in addition to the "*Great Root*," the existence of God, His unity and incorporeality.

I. "*Principles of the Torah*": 1. God's Omnipotence, 2. Providence, 3. Omnipotence, 4. Prophecy, 5. *Man's free will*, 6. the *Last Aim* (Love of God).

II. "*True Beliefs*": (a) *Theoretical beliefs*: 1. Creation, 2. Immortality, 3. Retribution, 4. Resurrection, 5. Eternity of the Torah, 6. Supremacy of the prophecy of Moses, 7. Belief in the efficacy of Urim we-Thumim (Oracle), 8. Messiah. (b) *Practical Dogmas*: 1. Efficacy of Prayer and Priestly Blessing, 2. Repentance, 3. Day of Atonement and divine festivals.

III. "Opinions"—thirteen in number, which are discussed in an objective way that shows the arguments pro and contra, and leaves the decision to the individual: 1. Eternity of the world in the future, 2. Possibility of many worlds, 3. Are the Spheres living beings? 4. Have the heavenly bodies any influence upon human affairs? 5. Charms and amulets, 6. Demons, 7. Migration of the soul, 8. Immortality of undeveloped children, 9. Hell and Paradise, 10. Bereshith and Mercabah, 11. Unity of Thinking, Intellect and Thought, 12. Prime Mover, 13. Unknowability of the divine essence.

Crescas does not see clearly the difference between essential and historical dogmas, but his division comes close to it. Likewise he does not see the peculiar historical position of the dogma of creation, but he penetrates deeply into the logical relation of this dogma to the others in that he formulates the Principles on the basis of the conception of the True Belief,

⁴ To the following comp. below my essay, "*Crescas and Spinoza*."

creation. Crescas' concept of creation amounts to eternity and necessity of the world. Crescas is a *determinist*. Providence, Omnipotence, man's free will, and Retribution are theological in language only, but deterministic in their ultimate meaning. In this he, no doubt, was influenced by the philosophers, but there were other influences. Crescas, the sharp-minded thinker, was influenced by *Cabbalah*. But evidently he succumbed to the influence of *Cabbalah* on account of his position as *disputator* against Christianity. Like the early Tannaim, also Crescas, the recognized official representative of Judaism in imposed *Disputations*, fought Christianity on its own ground, and, again like the Tannaim in their time, made concessions. His Spanish text-book for Jewish disputators, "Refutation of the Dogmas of the Christians," makes it clear that this occupation brought him under the influence of the very doctrines he was to fight. Hence his Practical Dogmas, including Repentance, the stress he lays on *Circumcision*, on the *Sacrifice of Isaac*, the Priestly Blessing as an *opus operatum* of the duly ordained priest, regardless of his mental and moral qualities. Especially noteworthy is his contention, the Jews do not need the sacrifice of Jesus, as they have the vicarious atonement of Isaac (a parallel found also in the New Testament). The doctrine of vicarious atonement in general is sufficiently warranted in Bible and Talmud, but Crescas almost dogmatizes this doctrine in the particular Christological conception of it: Vicarious Atonement for sins to be committed in the *future*.

Of those who discussed the question of dogmas between Crescas and *Spinoza* may be mentioned another famous disputator, the disciple of Crescas, *R. Joseph Albo* (1480-1544), who in his book "'Ikkarim" establishes the use of the word "'Ikkar" in the technical meaning of dogma. Albo reduces the "Thirteen Principles" formulated by Maimuni to *three* "Essential Principles": God's Existence, His Revelation, and Retribution; overlooking that this had been done by Maimuni himself in his "Ma'amar ha-Yihud." But the real influence

of Crescas upon the later dogmatical development came through his late disciple, *Baruch Spinoza*.

Spinoza (1632-1677), in his "*Tractatus theologico-politicus*," counts *seven dogmas*.

Compared with those of Crescas, they contain all Principles and True Beliefs of Crescas, *except three*: One can believe that God is body, that the world is not created, and that man's will is not free, and still be a good religious man. These three omissions form the three basic principles of the System of Spinoza in his "*Ethics*." The *Tractatus* is built on the ground of Crescas' common-sense and biblical, the *Ethics* on that of his philosophical argumentation. Crescas' distinction between two kinds of argument led Spinoza to his distinction between *Theology* and *Philosophy*, so as to free the latter from the former and from the control of the State. The freedom Crescas claims for the "Opinions," Spinoza extends also to Principles and True Beliefs. And, in general, Crescas' great achievement, namely the realization that in the historical development there was room for honest differences of "Opinions," led Spinoza to the realization that this is the efficient point of view in the search of what is divine and what human in *Scriptures*. So Spinoza became the founder of *modern Biblical Criticism*. The influence of Crescas may be partly responsible even for Spinoza's frankly avowed leanings toward *Christian* ideas, notably evident in his anti-nomism, pantheism, and determinism. And much as we differ to-day from the views of Spinoza, it is to him that we owe the general aspect under which we considered the dogmatical development in Judaism. Spinoza simply neglects the cosmologico-metaphysical development of Judaism, and goes back to the pure ethical God-conception of pre-Jeremian times.

By this Spinoza started a new movement in Judaism—he differed materially, consciously, and avowedly, from some authoritatively and generally accepted essential dogmas. And just as the *Tractatus* is built on Crescas' "Or Adonoy," so is Mendelssohn's "Jerusalem" dependent on the *Tractatus*. It

is the same problem, the *separation* of Church and State, which leads them both to discuss the question of dogmas. And, in spite of Mendelssohn's orthodoxy, his sentence, "Judaism has no dogmas," is but a modification of Spinoza's statement that a man may deny some essential principles of Judaism and still be a good religious man. This started the *Reform Movement*, the *new dogmatical development*, in Judaism. The period of literary discussion is closed. It is not any more a question of *interpretation*, but one of conscious and avowed difference with the authorities of the past.

The appreciation of this new development lies not within the scope of this outline.

SAADYA'S PHILOSOPHY

SOURCES, CHARACTERISTICS AND PRINCIPLES

IT is not always that one finds himself in such a solemn mood when approaching the task of writing a review on a new book. I have published reviews of all important books on Jewish Philosophy for the last quarter of a century. But never have I read a new book touching on Jewish Philosophy with more interest for its contents or with more gratitude to its author, than in the case of the book which furnishes the occasion for the present essay. It is a book *sui generis*, a new departure in Jewish literature, a book for which every one interested in Jewish literature is indebted to its author and its publishers. It is not only the best work on *Saadya's Life and Works*,¹ but it is a *model* for all future works of its kind. Would that we had such works on every one of the great men in Israel's history. I, of course, am especially interested in the Jewish philosophers. The writing of the History of Jewish Philosophy would be helped in many ways, if we had books such as this on at least the more important of Judaism's great thinkers throughout the ages; the historian of Jewish philosophy would feel much more secure and have an open vista for circumspection and orientation. There would be less worry and hesitation, lest he overlook some important book, some valuable essay, hidden away in some forlorn old periodical. I personally owe a great debt of gratitude to this book for the

¹ Saadia Gaon His Life And Works by Henry Malter, Ph.D., Professor of Rabbinical Literature at the Dropsie College for Hebrew and Cognate Learning, Philadelphia. The Jewish Publication Society of America, 1921.

great help I received from it in my work. It helped me much in the revision of the *third* volume (II, 2) of my German History of Jewish Philosophy now going through the press, and it helped me even more in the preparation of the *second* volume of the same work in Hebrew, which I am about to complete. It is not here the place to point out the progress made in the Hebrew over the German edition of that work. But if in the Hebrew edition the literary orientation is more complete and more in evidence—it is due to the fact that Malter's book threw open all avenues and doors to the remotest and most inconspicuous sources of information.

The work consists of the following parts:

Introduction: Here the author emphasizes the thought that Jewish history "is a history of learning more than of living, of literature rather than of affairs." Accordingly, "the biography of Saadia should primarily be a record of his literary achievements and of his spiritual influence. Much space must therefore be devoted to the presentation of his teachings in the various departments of Jewish learning of which he was the founder. In the field of religious philosophy and ethics Saadia's theories are to be detached from all that is incidental . . . unessential so that . . . his basic system of religion may come out clearly." This statement refers, of course, to the plan of the book as finally adopted, the original plan having been "to leave the presentation of his literary activity for a separate volume" (Preface).

Part I, Life of Saadia Gaon, treats of Saadya's origin and family relations and of his early education. Here the author throws upon the screen interesting pictures of the general conditions in the Jewish community in Egypt, particularly in Fayyum in whose district was the village of Dilaz where Saadya was born in 892 (in a Postscriptum, however, Malter calls attention to the Genizah fragment published by *Jacob Mann*, according to which Saadya was born in 882). The major space of this part of the book is devoted to the most important events in Saadya's literary career, his emigration to the East,

his controversy with Ben-Meir over the Calendar, his appointment to the Gaonate, his controversy with the Exilarch, and the following reconciliation and reappointment. Here Malter clears up many an obscure point and corrects many mistakes current in books and articles on Saadya.

Part II, The Works of Saadia Gaon, presents an outline of Saadya's works on Philology (Grammar and Lexicography, Biblical Exegesis), Liturgy, Halakhah, Calendar, Chronology, Philosophy, Polemical works, Saadya's influence upon later generations, and legends about Saadya.

Part III, Bibliography, is devoted entirely to the works of and on Saadya, and represents a marvelous achievement in completeness and minuteness. Only devout, conscientious work of years can bring about such results. In size the sketch on Saadya's works is the largest section of the book (137-295), but the real great merit of the book is based on the Bibliography, next in point of size (305-419). It is the Bibliography which gives the book its unique position. Some points in the biographical section of the book may be disputed. But in the Bibliography you feel solid ground under your feet. Should somebody find a book or an article overlooked by Malter, this will hardly affect the high value of the first complete or near complete bibliography on Saadya. The sketch on Saadya's *philosophy*, the subject in which my interest centers, and due to which I felt so much attracted to this book, is the largest in point of space (174-260), in fact it takes about *eight elevenths* of the space allotted to the outline of Saadya's works. And I consider this book to be of so great importance, and of so great authority, that I deem it proper and fitting to take up the gauntlet and discuss with Malter the basic points in which he challenges me. In accepting the challenge I will have of course to touch also on some subordinate points, but I will try to confine myself, as far as possible, exclusively to the *three* large questions which are the essential problems in the presentation of any system of philosophy, to wit: *Sources, Characteristics, Principles*.

SOURCES

"A Greek thinker (Aristotle) enunciated the idea that doubt is the first step toward knowledge; it is through scepticism, and the refusal to accept things as they present themselves, that we arrive at a better understanding of their causes and a fuller comprehension of the universe. This doctrine, now the common property of all philosophers, is characteristic of the pagan conception of the origin of truth. For the heathen there is no ready-made truth, no pre-arranged system of thought to be relied upon in our conduct, or in our interpretation of nature. The Platonic ideas and a few mathematical axioms to the contrary notwithstanding, all knowledge is the product of our own mind, the fruit of our observation and experience. God himself is not a given entity, not a *a priori* truth, but merely an inference, something to be found by a logical process of demonstration. In striking contrast thereto is the doctrine of Judaism. God, to begin with the point mentioned last, is not an object of reasoning and argumentation; His existence is a matter of course, an absolute fact neither to be doubted nor proved. He, the Creator of the world, is the source of all Knowledge, the fountain of all truth. He revealed himself to His people, and gave them an eternal law, which was to make them live in accordance with His will, and He continued to guide them through his prophets and inspired teachers. In a system based on such principles there is no room for doubt or scepticism. If scepticism is the generator of philosophic truth, then Judaism, as a positive religion, could never become the bearer and promulgator of such truth. In fact, Judaism is not a system of philosophy, but a moral theology. It is not a scientific doctrine based on and developed by speculative thought. Leaving aside the legalistic elements, it is the immediate expression of religious feeling and emotion. Nor did Judaism ever produce philosophers on its own soil. It is only because of recent assertions to the contrary, that it becomes necessary to emphasize again the accepted fact, that

the comparatively few Jewish authors who have become known as philosophers were all inspired by foreign thought" (pp. 174-175).

Right at the beginning Malter complicates his position unnecessarily by two features which are not germane to his subject. He contrasts *pagan or heathen* thought with Judaism. If paganism leads to philosophy, then also our Biblical fathers are entitled to philosophy; they, too, were pagans.² Paganism is a *religious* concept, and should have been avoided here. Also pagan religion claims revelation as a source of truth, and declines philosophy: Socrates, the first real *teacher* of philosophy, drank the hemlock! If there is a difference between religion and philosophy, as there surely is, then it exists also between pagan religion and pagan philosophy. Then Malter indicates that the few mathematical axioms and the Platonic ideas contradict his assertion that pagan thought derives all principles from the human mind alone. If this is so, then there is something wrong in the previous statement. By saying "notwithstanding" one does not do away with the difficulty. Of course, this difficulty of Malter's does not exist at all. The mathematical axioms are the axioms of the human mind, and Plato came to his ideas through a *logical process* of reasoning. All reasoning must appeal to observation and experience. Axioms must combine with experience in order to lead to anything, and also experience is the property of the human mind. The problem whether axioms are *a priori*, has no place in this connection. But while Plato did so much for the development of the theory of Ideas, he was not the originator of this theory. Before him the Babylonians and the *Hebrews* had this theory. Theirs, of course, was *more* mythological than Plato's (as Plato did not get rid entirely of the mythological element in this theory), but nevertheless it was based on the "scientific" observation that individuals of one species have common characteristics. But Malter, by overlooking all this,

² Cf. Joshua XXIV, 2, 14 and Pessah-Haggadah: מתחלה עובדי עבודה זרה

היו אבותינו.

barred to himself the outlook into the real relation between philosophy and religion, pagan or otherwise. Religion and philosophy have certain problems and views in common. They differ in methods of reasoning, but also prophets may reason, and they do reason, they have to in order to persuade their people. A religion may develop high reasoning powers. The real difference between religion and philosophy is that religion takes certain positions which philosophy does not, because there are proofs against those positions, or, at least, none for them. And philosophic representatives of religions claim that their religion teaches nothing which can be disproved by logical argument, even though they admit that it teaches certain views which cannot be positively proved by reason. But this is also to be found with some representatives of philosophy. The Pythagoreans refer to some revelations, Socrates refers to the Daimonion, Plato leaves certain questions open for the decision by the god at Delphi, and introduces some views as revelations of *Diotima*, and such fine distinctions we find with many other philosophers, down to *Kant* and some of his modern followers. We will see later on that by ignoring this fact Malter was driven from one false step to another. We readily admit that there are decisive differences between Greek philosophy and Judaism as a system of thought and life. But there is need of some orientation in the matter:

The *traditional* view that the religion of Judaism originated in an *historical act* of revelation at Sinai, equipped with all necessary theoretical views and practical laws, has found *two* different *interpretations*. The *ultra-orthodox* interpretation maintains that there is no need to compare Judaism with philosophic and other systems of thought in order to strengthen the doctrines of the Torah through arguments of reason and to refute views conflicting with those of the Torah. As against this there is a wing of orthodox opinion which believes in the necessity of getting in touch with other views and systems in order to strengthen and to verify the doctrines of the Torah. Then we have the *critical* interpretation of

Judaism, according to which Judaism *developes* in an *historical process* of revelation which never ends. And also in this camp there are two wings. The one conceives of this historical process of revelation as of an *intellectual* development to which the prophets of Israel have contributed their share, and they try to find out the successive phases of this development by the study of Jewish literature in all of its branches, how the spirit of Judaism, in contact with the spirits of other nations, has brought to light thoughts and ideas which are distinct contributions of the Jewish spirit to world thought. The other wing consists of those who accept the critical interpretation of Judaism, but make a short cut of it by saying Jewish religion is "the immediate expression of religious feeling and emotion."

Now it is readily seen that the presentation given by Malter is an *eclectic compound* of the various conflicting views. His presentation does not fit any of the existing currents of thought in Judaism: Neither of the orthodox wings, nor the scientific critical wing, would admit that Judaism is the expression (immediate or otherwise) of feeling and emotion. To them Judaism was conceived in the *Divine Intellect* and is not subject to emotion. Nor will the ultra-orthodox admit that there is any truth in Malter's contention that Judaism is a "*moral theology*." To them the *ritual* law is as important as the moral. Among the adherents of the other orthodox wing this question went through a long and interesting development, some of them (Hallevi, e.g.) going so far as to declare the ritual law to be of a higher rank than the moral (Saadya does not belong to this group—see below). And neither the intellectuals, nor even all emotionalists of the critical school may be willing to admit that the moral law is the chief thing in Judaism.³ Thus Malter's "accepted fact" is really acceptable to nobody, his view being a composite of conflicting ideas,

³ Compare the "mystical stir" in the ranks of the Central Conference of American Rabbis.

their only common feature being the opposition to scientific research and to intellectual advancement of Judaism. The least represented in Malter's presentation is that group of orthodox intellectuals whose foremost representative is the man to whose Life and Works Malter's otherwise great book is devoted.

That the existence of God in Judaism is a matter of course is true in the sense that those who speak in the name of God are not in doubt as to his existence. But nothing permits us to think that the prophets of Israel, for instance, differ in this respect from Plato and Aristotle. These philosophers got their God-conception by tradition, they have improved on it and proved it. So did the prophets of Israel. Malter's "accepted fact" that there are no proofs and argumentation about God in the Bible is not a fact at all: *the contrary is a fact*. The traditional view in both of its wings has no need to deny literary facts, and surely not the scientific wing of the critical school. And even among the men of feeling and emotion there are only few who, fortified by their ignorance, are ready to deny the literary facts referred to here. You can bring proofs from emotional premises. First of all even signs and wonders are meant as proofs. And even according to the view of Maimuni that the miracles wrought by Moses after the exodus were not meant as credentials, the miracles in Egypt were meant as proofs (Yad, Hl. Yesode hat-Torah chapt. 8). Not only had Moses to prove to the Israelites that his message came from God, but he had to prove to Pharaoh, who *denied* it, the existence of JHVH (Ex. V, 2). When the Israelites tested God "Saying: Is JHVH among us, or is He not?" (ibid. XVII, 7), they may have doubted only God's providence or only his *mercy*, but the fact remains that they have doubted God in a sense that destroys the religious meaning and helpfulness of the God-conception. Such doubters need proof, and whatever they consider as proof is, in the decisive aspect, as much of a proof, as those of Plato and Aristotle. The *miracles* become *premises*, and the *conclusions* are strictly logical. For instance (Deut. IV, 32-35):

"For, do ask of former days which were before thee, since the day that God created man on the earth, and from the end of the heavens to the end of the heavens: Hath there happened such as this great thing, or hath there been heard any like it? Hath there ever a people heard the voice of God speaking from the midst of the fire, as thou hast heard, and hath lived? Or hath a God ever tried to come and to take for himself a people from the midst of a people by trials, by signs, and by wonders, and by war, and by a mighty hand, and by an outstretched arm, and by great terrors, like all that JHVH your God did for you in Egypt before thine eyes? Thou wast shown that thou mightest know that JHVH, He is *the* God; there being none more except He alone."

"*Thou wast shown*": The miracles *prove* the *unity* of God. This proof is not only capable of, but is clearly meant in this logical arrangement:

Major premise: The taking of a people from the midst of a people is the work of *the* one God.

Minor premise: In the case of Israel and Egypt a *people* has been taken from the midst of a *people*.

Conclusion: The exodus from Egypt was the work of *the* one God.

But the prophets of Israel bring proofs not only from miracles and historical facts, but also from *natural phenomena*: so *Jeremiah* (XXXI, 35, 36):

"Thus saith the Lord, Who giveth the sun for a light by day, and the ordinances of the moon and of the stars for a light by night, Who stirred up the sea, that the waves thereof roar, JHVH Zebaoth is His name. If these ordinances depart from before Me, saith JHVH, then the seed of Israel also shall cease from being a people before Me forever" (cf. *ibid.* 37; XXXIII, 20-26).

Arranged it reads:

Major premise: A God who is mighty enough to arrange the permanent order of the heavenly bodies, is reliable in his promises.

Minor premise: The world is arranged in permanent order by JHVH.

Conclusion: JHVH is reliable in his promises.

Jeremiah takes here his minor premise for granted, but *Isaiah* (II) proves this minor premise itself (XL, 26):

"Lift up your eyes on high, and see: who hath created these? He that bringeth out their host by number, He calleth them all by name; because He hath great might, and because he is strong in power, none of them is missing" (cf. *ibid.* 27, 28):

Major premise: If there is order and accurateness in the courses of the heavenly bodies, then the one that established and maintains the order is also the creator of these bodies, the world.

Minor premise: This order is visible, an established fact.

Conclusion: The planner and maintainer of this order is the creator of the world.

Only the order is taken for granted by *Isaiah*, because it is visible, a matter of *scientific* experience. God's title as creator is *not* taken for granted, this is proved from the generally conceded fact of the order in the courses of the heavenly bodies. This proof of *Isaiah's* is significant: It is easily brought into the form of a *hypothetical syllogism*, considered to be the best syllogistical form which Aristotle did not fully recognize.

Often the Biblical writers must fight against the deniers of the existence of God (Ps. XIV, 1): "The unworthy hath said in his heart: '*There is no God.*'" Further (Job XXI, 14, 15): "And they said unto God: 'Depart from us; the knowing of thy ways we do not desire. What is *Shadday*⁴ that we should worship (recognize as a reality) him, and what should we profit, if we pray unto him?'" And then (*ibid.* XXII, 13): "And thou sayest: 'What does God know? Can he judge through the dark cloud? Thick clouds are a covering to him

⁴ The name for God peculiar to the book of Job—which has it 31 times of the 41 times occurring in the entire Bible.

that he seeth not; and he walketh in the circuit of heaven.'” Against these views, directed against God’s existence by some, or against his interest in the world by others, and against his righteousness by others (the hero of the drama), the author of the book of Job (chapt. XXXVIII sq.) develops the grand conception of the cosmological proof for the existence of God to which he adds the most efficient argument for the justice of God by emphasizing the manifestation of divine love to all creatures, and especially to man whom he has distinguished by endowing him with the faculty of reason.⁵

Of course, there are differences in method and scope between the Biblical and the Greek thinkers, but in the *essentials* the arguments of Jeremiah, Isaiah, and the author of the book of Job, are of the same kind, *and are based on the same thought*, as the syllogisms of Plato and Aristotle: The *order in the movements of the heavenly bodies*, is the proof for the *existence* of God; as creator out of nothing and provider according to Jeremiah and Isaiah; as creator out of primary matter, first mover, and provider according to Plato; exclusively as first mover according to Aristotle. The postulates of existence, providence, and unbribable justice are developed and defended in Job in essentially the same way as in the tenth book of the Laws. Only that the cosmological proof in Job brings out clearly the idea of God’s love to his creatures, an idea hardly glanced at in the Laws, and, generally, in the philosophy of Plato.

It was necessary to quote these passages from the *Bible*. Our great scholars are too busy to be expected to read the Bible carefully, to say nothing of giving their valuable time to its study. But it is perhaps not necessary to quote passages from *Talmudic literature* which present proofs for the existence of God and the other postulates of the spiritual God-conception.⁶ This surely should not be necessary in the case of

⁵ For other arguments and dialogues of this kind in the Bible cf. my essay “Elements of Epistemology in the Bible” in *Hahekuphah*, vol. XI.

⁶ Cf. b. Synhedrin 38, and *Geschichte der jüd. Phil.* II, 2, pp. 67–68.

Malter of whom we expect one of these days a *model edition of Babli Tractate Ta'anith* (I had the privilege to see some of it in the manuscript, and I am sure this edition will call forth other editions in its image—for which Jewish scholarship will be greatly indebted to author and publishers). But one is tempted to ask of Malter one question found in Talmudic literature (Lam. R. I, 55) as a proof for the existence of God as creator and provider: "*Have you ever seen a no-man's World?*"⁷ A scholar with a great reputation to take care of, ought not to permit himself such sweeping statements before he has made himself sure of all details in the matter, tedious though they may be.

And on general principles: Why lay so much stress on a certain form of argument? Is it not true that even the *fetish-worshiper* has some *reason* why he believes in the power of his fetish? His premises may be wrong, but does he not move within the *laws of formal logic*? This must be admitted by all who believe in the reality of formal logic. They may explain that the fetishist is wrong in his premises and makes mistakes in the application of the words in their different shades of meaning. Now since it is not to be denied that the biblical writers *argue*—the book of Job being conceived of as a *Symposium on Justice*, so the only thing one can say against the idea of philosophic thought in the Bible would be that the arguments of these writers are of a low type. Is it this what Malter wants to say? Of course, one may deny formal logic as a canon of real laws, as some modern critics do, pointing out that the formal logical operation, *Deduction*, depends on *Induction*. But, then, our prophets and Biblical writers surpass in their method the great logician Aristotle. Theirs is really a deduction based not on mathematical axioms, but on facts of, outward and inward, experience. The real power of their argument lies in their inductively established premises, to which the conclusion really adds but a formal orientation. Malter also

⁷ וכי עולם של דמקר ראת?

overlooks the historical fact that *Kant* has (or believed he had) refuted all proofs for the existence of God and reduced the God-conception to an ethical postulate, exactly the method of the prophets of Israel! And even under this deplorable oversight one fails to see why Malter lays so much stress upon the proof. May there not be philosophic thoughts in the Bible, or thoughts preparatory to real, dialectical, philosophy, even without the syllogistical way of proving the existence of God? What about the *definition* of God in the formula of the *Thirteen Attributes* (Ex. XXXIV), and other definitions? Num. XXIII, 19: God is not man that he lie. Deut. X, 17-18: The God, the great, the mighty, the awe-inspiring, who regardeth not countenance, nor taketh bribe,⁸ executing judgment for orphan and widow, and loving the stranger. Is. XI, 2: And the spirit of JHVH shall rest upon him, the spirit of wisdom and understanding, the spirit of counsel and might, the spirit of knowledge and of the fear of JHVH; XXXI, 3: And the Egyptians are man and not God, and their horses flesh and not spirit; XLIV, 6: I am the first, and I am the last, and beside me there is no God; XLV, 7: former of light, and creator of darkness, maker of peace, and creator of evil. Jer. X, 10: But JHVH is the God of truth (reality, as against the *הבל* in v. 15, applied to the idols). He is the God of Life, and eternal King. Hos. XI, 9: For I am God, and not man, in thy midst (I am) a holy being (spirit). I do not come in a city.⁹ All these definitions (and others in the Bible) are of decisive philosophic value, and a good definition, even though based on induction, has syllogistic powers.

In my publications on the subject I never stated that in Bible and Talmud there is developed systematic philosophy of the type of Plato's and Aristotle's. What I claim is that there are in these literatures important thoughts which helped

⁸ Comp. the *three postulates* in Plato's *Laws*, Book X.

⁹ As against the Sodom [Admah] legend mentioned in v. 8, which is known in Homer and Plato as *θεοί ἐν πόλεσιν*. Cf. my *Geschichte der jüd. Phil.* II, 1, p. 61.

greatly in preparing Jewish thinkers for dialectical philosophy. Bible and Talmud must be considered as *sources* of Jewish philosophy, alongside of the other sources, which I have never denied. On the contrary, more than any of my predecessors in the field have I tried to define the relationship of Jewish Philosophy to these other sources, as to the *principles* involved. Malter speaks of the God-conception in Judaism as if the word admitted only one meaning. What is the God-conception of the Bible? *Corporeal* or *incorporeal*, spiritual, intellectual? As representative of ultra-orthodox Judaism (for such his presentation of Judaism *tends* to be, even though resulting in an involuntary mix up), Malter surely takes the incorporeal God-conception for granted. Moreover, according to this view the God-conception revealed to Moses must be at least as good as, if not better than, the best of the philosophers. The critical school, on the other hand, believes that there was progressive development in the God-conception as well as in *all* other things. Consequently, the God-conception in Biblical and Talmudical times according to Malter was more philosophic than according to the critical school.

And what about the important controversy about *Angels* in the Bible? Malter may deny this. But what about the *fact*, that the Mishnah never takes cognizance of the existence of angels, and never quotes a Biblical verse in which angels are mentioned? Would Malter deny this fact or the significance which I find in it? But *Kohler*, *Schechter*, and *Ginzberg* have accepted fact and significance in their works on Jewish theology and doctrine. So the "accepted fact" is on my side. Now this fact and its significance are of great philosophic import, are they not? That real dialectical philosophy in Judaism has not developed in Biblical times, and not even in the Graeco-Jewish school, but in post-Talmudic times, beginning with the second half of the ninth century, I emphasize and explain too often, and it needs no repetition here. But why deny Jewish literature its share as *sources* of Jewish Philosophy? Malter says: "leaving aside the legalistic elements, it (Judaism) is the

immediate expression of religious feeling and emotion." But there is nothing that entitles us to leave aside such an important trait of Judaism as is represented by its legal element, and try to characterize the rest of it. This is an unscientific, arbitrary way of considering a subject of such vast importance. The logical legal element of the Bible is characteristic of the spirit of the Bible in all its utterances. The controversy between the Priestly Code school and the Book of Holiness school over the question of *capital punishment* is bound up with the theoretical principles of the two opposing schools. Malter may deny all this, but *scientific method* forbids leaving aside any element on which the opponent bases its view. These elements must be fairly faced and explained. Leaving them aside is a confession of weakness, a signal of embarrassment. And what about *Talmudic* times? Can we characterize Talmudic theology and its influence as a *source* of Jewish thought in its development towards dialectical philosophy, while leaving the legal element aside? Malter's teacher, *Steinschneider*, does not think so.¹⁰ In my History of Jewish Philosophy I have developed this thought: A *thousand years of legal halakhic* development has prepared the Jewish mind for dialectic philosophy. This explains why in antiquity it was *Plato*, while in medieval times it was *Aristotle*, on whom Jewish thought oriented itself. Plato's method of reasoning is nearer the Biblical way of thinking. But the training of the Jewish mind in Halakhah has prepared it for the method of Aristotle. This I have developed and verified step by step throughout the entire Talmudic period and beyond, showing that the advancement of thought toward dialectical philosophy is bound up with periods and personalities prominent in the development of Halakhic dialectics. And in this, too, the "accepted fact" is on my side. In his Bibliography (p. 378) Malter says of my History of Jewish Philosophy: "Owing to the author's extremely dogmatic conception of the history and development

¹⁰ Cf. his Jüdische Literatur in Ersch und Gruber, beginning; Malter translated this work into Hebrew.

of Jewish philosophy, however, his conclusions will hardly find general acceptance." What does "general acceptance" mean in this case? The few experts who have expressed themselves on the subject, in private and public utterances, have accepted my conception of the history of Jewish philosophy in its essential features. And as to the influence of halakhic dialectics upon the development toward dialectical philosophy, as well as to the speculative elements in Talmudic theology, my views were accepted in another publication of the Society which published Malter's book.¹¹

Malter continues (p. 175): "Some of the devotees of the Torah who had imbibed the foreign spirit were alive to the contrast between the Jewish and the heathen conception of God and the universe, and they held on to both in order to keep themselves from slipping between the two stools. The whole of Jewish philosophy was a product of the *Galut*, and not indigenous Oriental Judaism. At the first collision between Jew and Greek on other than Palestinian soil, Philo, the Alexandrian, made a great effort to fuse the two opposing cultures into one. The artificial union was of comparatively short duration, and its effect on the subsequent development of the synagogue was of slight importance, except, perhaps, insofar as the Christian church may be considered an outgrowth thereof."

In the first of the quoted sentences Malter evidently speaks lightly of Graeco-Jewish literature. *First*, this literature is a product of the *Galuth*, not indigenous to Oriental Judaism. *Oriental Judaism!* This is to cover up a new embarrassment. The *Babylonian Talmud*—is it not a product of the *Galuth*? Yes, but this "accepted fact" is, at least, mitigated by the other important fact that Babylon is situated east of the Mediterranean. Philosophy, then, has "two to its disadvantage" (תרתי לרעה). Not only is it not indigenous, but it came about through an influence west of the Mediterranean. This idea is

¹¹ "Hellenism"—cf. my essay "Israel and Yawan" in "Hatoren," January 1922.

not new, *Hallevi* broached it in order to defend his thesis that Palestine is the exclusive land of prophecy, referring to Deut. I, 7 that the Euphrates in the easternmost boundary of Palestine, explaining it so as to include also Egypt, Sinai and Paran.¹² But Hallevi was a philosopher, and his view was that philosophy originated among the Semites, and it was through the Hebrews and the Jews that philosophy came to the Greeks.¹³ Malter's "accepted fact" again is a composite affair, acceptable to nobody. But what about Mishnah and Talmud that are full of *Roman* influence, especially in Talmudic *civil and penal law*? Nor is it true that the first contact between Greek philosophy and Judaism took place outside of Palestine. This contact started in Palestine more than two centuries before the birth of Philo, and more than a century before the development of a literary center in Alexandria, as explained and verified at length in my History of Jewish Philosophy (II, 1). And also the influence of Graeco-Jewish thought upon Talmudic theology and speculation was verified there (I), and will be more established in the following volumes of this work (II, 2, &c.). Moreover, I am not the only one, or even the first, to maintain this, I have quoted some of our great authorities (Graetz, M. Joel, &c.). And this view again was accepted in other publications of the Society ("Philo" and "Hellenism"). And what about *Bereshith* and *Mercabah* of which Talmudic literature abounds, and which found their continuation in Cabbalah? A very short influence, indeed. Further, Philo was the father of all kinds of *Neo-Platonism*, the influence of which on Jewish philosophy is so much of an "accepted fact" that it was greatly overestimated and exaggerated. Why, then, exclude Philo as one of the sources of Saadya's philosophy? Besides, we know that the works of Philo in an Arabic translation were in the hands of medieval Jewish philosophers, and also Saadya mentions him

¹² Cusari II, 14; ed. Hirschfeld, p. 79; cf. a different explanation IV, 3 last fourth, p. 243.

¹³ Ibid. I, 63; pp. 27-29.

(cf. JQR. XVI, p. 103; *ibid.* VII, pp. 65–66, and Malter, p. 264, and p. 553). Moreover, I believe that there is another, though indirect, relation between Saadya and Philo: Saadya concerns himself very much with the refutation of Hiwi Al-Balkhi's *Questions* against the Torah, and also of other questions against the Torah and the Bible, which Saadya does not quote in the name of Hiwi, but which nevertheless are found in Genizah fragments in his name.¹⁴ Now upon close investigation we find that Hiwi drew for many of his questions on Philo's work *Quaestiones and Solutiones*, often, of course, changing the scope of the questions in conformity with the difference of purpose between Philo and Hiwi: Philo asked the questions with the view to harmonizing, Hiwi, on the other hand, with the view to showing that the statements of the Torah are untenable or self-contradictory. Why then not admit Philo as one of the sources of Saadya's philosophy? This influence surely was there, first in a general way, for the method of investigation and interpretation, and secondly in some systematic views, as in the *psychological* aspect of the God-conception (which Malter saw in the Commentary to Jecirah, but overlooked in Emunoth—cf. below), and in the tenth chapter of Emunoth (which Malter likewise overlooked).

Malter continues (p. 175): "For several centuries during the post Alexandrian period, one looks in vain for a philosopher among Jewish scholars until under the dominion of the Arabs in the Orient, Hebrew culture for the second time collided with Greek philosophy in the garb of Mohammedan literature. This encounter soon played havoc in the ranks of oriental Jewry. The belief in the divine origin of the Torah was shaken, and the people took up with all sorts of religious vagaries then rampant in the Orient. Saadya was the first to enter into the breach."

To speak of "Jewish scholars" in the post-Alexandrian period is an inadequate way of expression. The question here

¹⁴ Cf. Isr. Davidson, *Saadya's Polemic against Hiwi Al-Balkhi*, New York 1915.

is: were the Talmudists influenced by Alexandrian thought? Have we any post-Talmudic literature that shows that influence? Both of these questions must be answered in the affirmative. Some Tannaim and Amoraim are represented by utterances of a highly speculative type. So R. *Hanina bar Hama*, the physician, and others (cf. Bacher's works on the Agada). Rabbi *Akiba* and *Rabb* are represented by utterances to which we find almost *literal parallels* in the writings of Philo. And in general, all of Talmudic literature is full of elements and influences of the Greek period, elements which flow not only from Alexandria, but also from the *older* Palestinian-Graeco-Jewish period, from *Ben Sirach* and others.¹⁵ That even the latest books of the Bible are full of these elements, is an almost generally conceded fact. In the period between the close of the Talmud and the beginnings of dialectical Jewish philosophy there is a flood of Midrashic literature full of Graeco-Jewish elements. There is hardly one important book in Graeco-Jewish literature to which we have not a *parallel* book in this literature, in some cases we have more than one parallel.¹⁶

Nor is it correct to speak of Saadya as the *first* Jewish philosopher. Before him was *Israeli* who in some instances penetrated deeper into the problems.¹⁷ Saadya, of course, was the first Jewish philosopher to build a *system* of Jewish philosophy, or, at any rate, he is the first whose systematic work has been preserved (for all we know, Israeli's lost work "The garden of Philosophy" may have contained a full system). It is not even the question whether Saadya was "the first to enter into the breach." Of course, Saadya was the foremost fighter for Rabbanite Judaism, but Israeli's works also served their purpose to strengthen Jewish doctrine.

¹⁵ Cf. my History of Dogmas (Hebrew), History of Philosophy (Hebrew and German), especially vol. II, 2; Philosophy of the Bible.

¹⁶ Cf. Jellinek, *Beth ham-Midrash*, and Eisenstein, *Ozar Midrashim*, and my *Geschichte der jüd. Phil.* II, 2, pp. 86-89.

¹⁷ Cf. *Geschichte der jüd. Phil.* I and II, in chapters "Israeli."

And even in the question of the breach, there is "more breach than substance" in Malter's presentation. The heterodox currents of thought did not affect "the people" (for this we have the testimony of Saadya himself—as we will see in the paragraph on Principles), but some *contemporary Jewish philosophers*. So there were Jewish philosophers before Saadya. Nor were Jewish philosophers an entirely new phenomenon in the time of Saadya. There were such before him, and they are easily traced to Alexandrian influences, which were continuing without appreciable interruption. We have mentioned Hiwi, but Saadya mentions many different *philosophic schools* among the *Jews* (cf. "Principles"). And among them are such as have adopted the theory of ideas in one form or another and verified it in the Bible (Emunoth I, II, III). This information Saadya could gather only from Graeco-Jewish literature or from (now lost) literature based on Graeco-Jewish literature (Malter's unacceptable presentation here is the consequence of his thorough misunderstanding of the polemical situation in the Commentary to Jecira and in Emunoth, as we will see in the discussion of Principles). Among the theories of contemporary Jewish thinkers against which Saadya fights his bitterest are those of eternal primary matter and the theory of Ideas, two heterodox views which Saadya tries to interpret away from the Book of Jecirah, the book which served as a vehicle to the development of Jewish dialectical philosophy. This book links up with *Philo*, *Rabbi Akiba* and *Rabb*. It is a product of the latter's school, all essential utterances of the book to be found in the utterances preserved in the name of this Babylonian authority who brought his wisdom from Palestine (cf. *Geschichte der jüd. Phil.* I). This fact alone is sufficient to establish the uninterrupted contact between Jewish and Greek thought from Ben-Sirach (and even further back) to Saadya.

The new, Arabic, influence is not to be denied, but determined and explained. I have established the following points (*Geschichte der jüd. Phil.* I): 1. Before there ever was any philo-

sophic movement among the Arabs,¹⁸ the Jewish thinkers were trained in philosophic, even though mostly theosophic, ways of speculation, partly influenced also by the Syrian church, another offspring of Graeco-Jewish thought. 2. The philosophic movement among the Jews was more based on sober logical reasoning than that within the Syrian church. Israeli, and Saadya in his commentary to Jecirah, show no, or very little, acquaintance with the Mu'tazila, the chief channel for the Arabic influence upon Jewish thought. 3. The Jewish philosophers were helped in a *technical* sense, in that they participated in the *educational facilities* created by the Arabs. 4. The dialectical character of Jewish philosophy cannot be explained by the Arabic influence, for Jewish philosophy is more logical and dialectical than the Arabic which is essentially mystical. 5. It is the Halakhic training of the Jews that brought about this result. 6. The immediate causes for the advancement were the study of Aristotle whom the Jews understood better than did the Arabs, and the *Karaitic movement*, the necessity to defend Talmudic theology and doctrine against the attacks of the Karaites. This necessity led Saadya to *ways and methods* of reasoning which are to be discussed in the following section: *Characteristics*.

CHARACTERISTICS

The deficiency in Malter's presentation of the sources of Jewish philosophy in general and of Saadya's in particular tells unmistakably in his presentation of the characteristics of Saadya's philosophy. This shows right in Malter's translation and interpretation of the *title* of the book in which Saadya presents his system. Kitab Al-Amânât wa'l-I'tiqâdât: כתאב אל־אמאנאת ואל־איתקאדאת, translated by Tibbon: ספר האמונות והדעות was translated by the writers on the subject: "Faith and Knowledge."¹⁸ Now this translation is surely wrong.

¹⁸ Glauben und Wissen; cf. Munk, *Mélanges*, p. 477; Guide I, 336; M. Wolff, ZDMG. XXXII, p. 694; A. Schmiedl, Saadia Al fajumi, Wien 1870, p. 3; Jacob Guttman, Die Religionsphilosophie des Saadia, Göttingen,

Saadya in Alam. p. 11 (Hebrew, ed. Josefow, p. 42) explains that אֱתֵקְאָר is the result of close logical investigation which produces *conviction*, no matter whether *others* recognize it as true or not. Tibbon translates there אֱמֻנָה, the word which in the title he used for אֱמֻנָה. He evidently did not assume any distinction between the two words. But Tibbon may not have paid much attention to our question. The facts, however, are against the above translation: אֱתֵקְאָר in Arabic (in this or other forms) is used for the designation of religious beliefs, dogmas (so Hallevi, Maimuni, and others). Also the word אֱמֻנָה (or אֱמֻנָה) is used in the sense of religious belief. Thus it is impossible to interpret the two words as if they aimed at the distinction between faith and knowledge, without considering the question whether they are true or false; which we would have to assume inasmuch as Saadya in his book mentions also non-Jewish religious beliefs. Now Malter, declaring the various translations as mistranslations, translates (193) himself: "Book of Philosophic Doctrines and Religious Beliefs." Malter gives no reason why he considers the other translation wrong, and on what he bases his own translation. But it is clear that he participates in the general mistake that Saadya aims at the distinction between faith and knowledge, only that he makes the two words change places: Knowledge and Religion.

Clearly, all these authors are in the dark as to the relationship between Philosophy and Religion, and it is their own mistaken notion which they try to carry into the title of Saadya's book. Saadya, however, had the right conception of the difference between Religion and Philosophy: Philosophy and Religion have some principles in common, to wit: religion teaches the same principles which also philosophy teaches (cf. above). But in addition to these principles, religion may teach others which philosophy does not confirm, but is unable

1882, p. 17; S. Horovitz, Die Psychologie Saadias, Jahresbericht, Breslau 1898, p. 2; from them it came to Hermann Cohen, Religion der Vernunft, &c., Leipzig 1919, p. 487.

to refute. To this *permanent* difference between philosophy and religion, which I consider as the best expression of the really determining relationship, Saadya (as accepted by other Jewish philosophers) defines one other, *quasi temporal* distinction between religion and philosophy: Religion *demand*s first the recognition of the revealed theoretical verities and rules of conduct on the ground of tradition which the prophets established and verified by signs and miracles, and then it *command*s to investigate by philosophic methods in order to verify the theoretical and practical verities of religion; in this investigation there being no difference in method between the philosopher and the religious thinker (we will have to revert to this question). It is clear, therefore, that if Saadya aimed at any distinction between these two words (and this seems to be the case), he could only aim at the distinction of *true* and *false*, and, indeed, the word אמת (as אמונה in Hebrew) designates preferably the faith of the speaker, while אמתקאר (as ערה in Hebrew) designates any opinion, false or true. So that in the title of the book the word אלאמתקארא means Opinions in general, religious and philosophic, true and false, while אלאמתאא designates the principles of Jewish Religion, both the philosophic and the purely religious.¹⁹ This expresses the *dogmatical motif* of Saadya's plan: The book is to treat the principles of Jewish philosophy and religion by discussing them in comparison with other opposing views, both philosophic and religious.

On this question Malter says (p. 175): "Saadia was, indeed, the first Jewish philosopher fully conscious of the basic difference between the Jewish and the philosophic conception of truth, and he gave especial emphasis to the fact that Judaism is primarily and essentially a religion based on historical experience; philosophic reflection being required only for the purpose of furnishing secondary evidence of the

¹⁹ Cf. Al-Am., p. 22, Em., p. 49, where Saadya uses אמתאא (דעת) in the sense of Jewish Religion; p. 140, I, 14, Em. III, 10, beg.: אמתאא, T. אמתאא; Œuvres I, Introduction to Pentateuch, p. 3: אמתאא.

genuineness and worth of its manifold teachings." He adds (p. 175, note 398): "This view is clearly stated by Saadia in his Introduction to the Kitâb Al-Amânât, pp. 22-26" (Heb. Slucki, pp. 11-13; Josefow, pp. 49-52). In that passage Saadya expounds the temporary distinction between religion and philosophy, but says nothing of reason being secondary evidence to revelation. On the contrary, he says that prophecy is the source of truth for women and children who are not able to investigate, and for those who are able to investigate, only temporarily, in order that they may not remain without truth and practical guidance before they carry out the task of philosophic investigation. But as a matter of fact, the issue must be clearly formulated: Not only does Saadya not say that Scripture is the primary and reason the secondary source of truth, but he means to say the *very opposite* of this: Reason is primary, Scripture and revelation secondary *in rank* as sources of truth, while in point of *time* the opposite relationship obtains. We will soon have to revert to this question.

It is, partly at least, due to Malter's general tendency to reduce the highly intellectual philosophy of Saadya to a sort of edifying theological talk, that permits him to find a striking resemblance between the systems of Saadya (in Jecirah) and *Schopenhauer* (p. 191). A little before (p. 180) he quotes Saadya as saying that "philosophy is one of the noblest creations of God," "and Scripture recognizes in philosophy, so to speak, one of the occupations of the Creator himself," but here he finds resemblances between Saadya and *Schopenhauer*. Of course, Malter sees some distinction: "According to *Schopenhauer* the will is a blind, unconscious power, working to no purpose and gaining consciousness only in the higher stages of existence, where it becomes mind, as in man." The case is misstated, also for *Schopenhauer*: According to *Schopenhauer* the mind is not a higher stage of development, but an *adulteration* of the will. *Schopenhauer* is a *voluntarist*, Saadya, perhaps, the strongest intellectualist in the history of philosophy. There is not the slightest possibility of comparison. The

term "Will" used by Saadya means something entirely different than the will in the system of Schopenhauer (cf. below to portal II of Emunoth).

In the paragraph on "General Characteristics" (of Emunoth) Malter says (pp. 195-196): "If, upon conscientious revision, we still feel convinced that the Biblical word is in conflict with experience or reason, then we are not only entitled, but in duty bound, to interpret the Scriptural passages in question allegorically (it should be 'figuratively,' as Malter himself uses most of the time), so as to bring it into harmony with the accepted truth." And to this Malter adds in a note (459): "See Am. p. 83, bottom, Em. p. 44 (II, 3): In general I say: any description of God or of His actions occurring in the Scriptures or in the words of others among us,²⁰ the monotheists, which is found to contradict what is demanded by sound reasoning, is undoubtedly a figure of speech." The same idea is expressed with more detail p. 212;²¹ ... so also Em. p. 133:²² "and any interpretation agreeing to what is in reason is the truth, but any (interpretation) that leads to something that is *at variance*²³ with reason is fallacious."

Malter feels that these passages are in contradiction with his above statement that reason furnishes only secondary evidence. Of course, Malter *could* say: In cases where we interpret Scripture to conform with reason we mean to say that Scripture interpreted by *human* reason only finds out *divine* reason, "for both reason and religion sprang from the same divine source" (p. 195), so that ultimately *religion*,

²⁰ There is no equivalent in the text for the words "others among us," it should be "in our *own*, the monotheists', words."

²¹ 109; VII, 2: Malter refers to the rule that any Scriptural passage that tends "to refute what is in reason" must not be taken in its plain meaning.

²² VII, 3 end; original p. 263.

²³ Here Malter, who quotes only in Hebrew, follows the Hebrew text, חולק; according to the original it should read חלוק.

revelation, even though not Scripture, is the primary source of truth. But Malter does not see this, or it did not suit him, and he is right. If not Scripture according to its plain meaning, but according to the enforced interpretation in conformity with human reason is the source of truth, then, in the last analysis, it is human reason that we consider to be the primary source of truth. Only that we maintain that human reason is divine, which is precious little for Malter's attitude, since it takes human reason to find out what the divine reason may declare as truth. Be this as it may, in his embarrassment, Malter identifies Scripture with the primary divine source of truth, and he says (196): "Even for our recognition of the senses and of reason as bearers of truth we get the authorization, as it were, from certain passages of the Bible (Am. p. 14, 11, 6 ff.; Em. pp. 7 f.—Josefow, p. 44). The teachings of the Bible, though named by Saadya in the fourth place, are actually recognized by him as the first and most reliable source of truth." This is surely contradictory to the rule that it is human reason which is the only reliable source for the interpretation of the Bible, thus for finding out what "the teachings of the Bible" are. Does Saadya contradict himself? No, surely not: The passage referred to by Malter quotes some passages of the Bible to show that the senses and reason are recognized as sources of truth. What Saadya wants to say is that the Bible is one of the *sources* of his philosophy, and he is right in this, especially with regard to the passages relating to the sense perceptions.²⁴ And not only does not the passage in question bear out Malter's contention, but it rather permits the *opposite* conclusion: Saadya quotes passages not only for the three general human sources of knowledge, sense-perception, innate ideas, and logical conclusions, but also such for the *fourth* source, tradition. Now Saadya cannot make the Bible confirm the Bible: Evidently, what he wants to show here is that the Bible is one of his sources for his classification

²⁴ Cf. my article, "The contribution of Jewish philosophy to the development of Critical Philosophy" in *Hathekuphah*, vol. XI.

of the sources of knowledge. In other words: Malter does not accept Saadya's own testimony that the Bible is one of the sources of his philosophy, and prefers to make him say something untenable in itself and contradictory to Saadya's clear-cut statements elsewhere. Moreover, the very passage referred to by Malter contains a warning against Malter's interpretation: "*And then He verified* (in Tibbon read: ואחר"כ אמת instead of: (וכאשר אמר) to us the datum of knowledge of the intellect ... and then He verified to us the datum of knowledge of logical necessity: That whatsoever leads to negate anything of the sense-perceptible or of the innate ideas is fallacious."

I have discussed these passages to show that even the passages Malter knew and treated, do not permit his mistaken interpretation, nor justify his error. But Saadya took care to forestall any attempt to interpret him the way Malter does. In a passage whose oversight by Malter is rather remarkable, in his Introduction to the translation of the Torah, Saadya says (Derenbourg, *Ceuvres* I, p. 3): "But know, you reader of this book, the Torah, that although its worth is precious and its rank high, and (although) the other books of prophecy do not compare with it, and although its clear language explains (even that part) of it which is obscure and hidden, it is not permissible for confessors that they believe that He, glorified and exalted, has no other proof upon (literally: *against*, to convince) them beside it (the Torah). Rather is it incumbent upon them that they know that He has upon them two other proofs.²⁵ One of them *preceding before it* (the Torah), and this is the *proof of reason* (אחרהמא מקדמה קבלה וזי חגה אלעקל) by which they know that all the notable visible things²⁶ and all the other (וכאשר) sense-perceptibles are created out of nothing, and that the one who created them out of nothing

²⁵ In Derenbourg read לו instead of להם.

²⁶ Heavenly bodies—this meaning missed by Derenbourg and Bacher, Winter and Wünsche, *Jüdische Literatur*, II, p. 250: where Bacher got his "Die mit dem Sinne *nicht* wahrnehmbaren," it is hard to say; perhaps he had before him a different version.

is eternal, was never non-existent, and shall never be non-existent; and that He is one; and that He does not resemble them (the created things), and that they do not resemble Him; and that he is wise, knowing what shall happen before its happening; and that He is the Creator who creates what He wants without (primary) matter; and that He is the Just who does not impose upon his servants what they cannot accomplish.²⁷ And (by that *first* proof they will also know) all else that the rational proofs bring out of the principles of beliefs, like the rational commandments, such as truth and justice (Emunoth III). And I will refrain from bringing anything of the proof for anything of that kind in this book, as I have not written it for this purpose. And the other proof is *following* after it (the Torah; מִכִּזְבֵּה בְעֵרָה), and this is the knowledge of the tradition of the prophets, &c."

To this passage Saadya *refers* in the above passage on the rules of interpretation (Em. II, 3) quoted by Malter (p. 196). And still, Malter, who properly insists that *all* works of Saadya be utilized in the presentation of his philosophy (p. 176), tries to make Saadya say that reason is the secondary source of truth, while Saadya in so conspicuous a place as the Introduction to the translation of the Torah takes pains to say in as many words that the proof of reason ranks *first before* the Torah.

Now Malter starts the outline of the book Emunoth by again presenting Saadya's ideas about the relationship between revelation and philosophy. Malter evidently feels the embarrassment he caused himself in this question, which continues to embarrass him throughout the entire sketch on Saadya's philosophy. (Why did he not gather all passages pertaining to this question, muster them and utilize them for all they were worth in a way harmonizing them into one coherent statement?) And so we are not surprised to find that also another question regarding the character of Saadya's philosophy

²⁷ Note: these are the proofs presented in Emunoth I and II.

is treated in a way as to again complicate it with the question of the relationship between religion and philosophy in the system of Saadya. The question is: Is Saadya an *eclectic*? *Guttmann* designates Saadya as an eclectic, *Horovitz* maintains that Saadya, even though he drew on many sources, was not an eclectic, as he often forms an independent opinion. As against both, *Guttmann* and *Horovitz*, I maintain that Saadya was not an eclectic, because the *principles* of his philosophy are different from those of each and all the secular sources on which he drew. Also *Israeli* came to the formulation of original principles of philosophy in his "Book of the Elements"; and therefore, as far as that book is concerned he is surely not an eclectic. But in other essays of his he treats subjects in the way of a compiler rather than a systematic philosopher. In these essays he indeed may be designated as an eclectic (cf. *Geschichte der jüd. Phil.* II, 2, chapt. "Israeli" where the situation is thoroughly discussed and explained). But Saadya, the most consistent intellectualist, who built his system on solid foundations of reason, and who does not shrink back from disagreeing with the Talmudists (so in refuting the doctrine of the pre-existence of the Torah and of ideas, both of which have some backing in Talmudic literature) and even with Scripture (which, however, he "treats" by interpretation); Saadya, who never mentions an opposing view or a doctrine without discussing and refuting it, can by no means be designated as an eclectic. *Malter* says (pp. 198-199): "Whether an idea originated with Plato or Aristotle or in the mind of some Muhammedan thinker was immaterial, so long as it could stand the test of reason or experience, and was *ipso facto* consonant with the teachings of the Bible (here *Malter* overlooks that the Bible must be *interpreted* in order to be consonant with reason—thus not *ipso facto*). Saadya's method in this work was thus that of an eclectic. This is not to be taken, however, in the technical sense of the term (why, then, use it—because *Guttmann* said so?). For he did not aim at eclecticism as such, but was concerned only in the interpretation and sys-

tematization of the Jewish religion. Any idea that lent itself to that purpose and helped to establish the religious truth was welcome material. However, the question whether or not Saadya should be designated as an eclectic is mere quibbling over words, since it is generally admitted that in his philosophic works he drew upon a variety of systems, which on the points in question, do not agree with one another." No, it is not a mere quibbling over words. But Malter tries to say yes and no in one breath. Drawing upon opposing systems does not make a philosopher or a writer an eclectic as long as the principles he adopts are not contradictory to each other. Were this not so, then also Plato and Aristotle, Kant and others were eclectics. That it does make a difference Malter proves himself in the immediately following statement: "Saadia's merit in the field of philosophy is not to be sought in any originality of his as an inventor and propagator of new philosophic doctrines, but in the extraordinary skill with which he was able to bring a vast amount of foreign thought into subservience to the great religious *Weltanschauung*, which he was about to build up for the benefit of his people." But the *opposite* is true: As a philosopher Saadya has succeeded to build up a system new in its principles and important in its contribution to the general advancement of human thought. Saadya had great influence upon all later Jewish philosophers, who through their influence upon scholastic philosophy and the renaissance have contributed much to the development of critical philosophy (I treat this subject in *Hathekupha*). In the dogmatical part of Judaism, on the other hand, Saadya has the merit of having established the method, while he hardly succeeded in reconciling philosophy and resurrection, or even to prove in any way the necessity of Messiah. He succeeded partly in the question of immortality, this being to a certain extent a part of philosophic Judaism.

There are other questions in the treatment of which Malter involves himself in the problem of the relationship between religion and philosophy (and at times also in the question

of sources), but these are too closely bound up with the principles of Saadya's philosophy to which we are now ready to proceed.

PRINCIPLES

In outlining the first portal of the Emunoth Malter omits the presentation of the principles of Saadya's philosophy, because "space forbids" (p. 204). To the first portal, the largest of the Emunoth, Malter devotes less than two and a half pages, to the second portal, one of the largest of the book, a little more than that, while to the last portal which treats of practical virtues, thirteen and a half. The more detailed outline of the tenth portal (which according to Lambert's acceptable view does not belong to the Emunoth proper) may be justified by its worth as a practical ethical guide. But considering the other nine portals among themselves, it is significant that Malter devotes to the *seventh* portal (resurrection) much more space ($6\frac{1}{2}$ pages) than to the first two portals, the most important in point of principles, combined. And considering that of the *eight* pages allotted to the *sixth* portal (on soul and hereafter) about three and a half are devoted to eschatological questions, and further that portals *eight* (Messiah—4 pages) and *nine* (retribution in the end of days—6 pages) are also of eschatological contents, we find that Malter devoted to Saadya's eschatology four times as much space as to the first two portals where the foundations of the system have been laid. Of course, in the first part of the portal on the soul, and partly also in portals *three* (free will) and *four* (retribution in this world), and especially in his outline of the Commentary to Jecirah, Malter touches upon the principles of Saadya's philosophy. But this strange disposition of the space allotted to an outline of Saadya's philosophy points unmistakably in one direction, and falls in line with other remarkable features of this outline, such as have been, and such as shall be mentioned: The highly intellectual philosophy of Saadya is to be leveled down to a prevalently dogmatical discourse.

The little space allotted to the first portal of the Emunoth is devoted almost exclusively to the question of the relation of the enumeration of the different views and systems in Emunoth to that in the Commentary to Jecirah. Malter's, purely *literary*, way of discussing this question, suggests the question for what class of readers he prepared the outline of Saadya's philosophy. People to whom one may present the first portal of Saadya's Emunoth minus the principles, while treating them liberally to his eschatological niceties, are surely not interested in mere literary questions, treated so as to *screen* the real problems. However, the problem of principles *is* involved in this literary question, and the chief task of this section will be to develop it so as to bring out clearly the principles of Saadya's philosophy which Malter missed:

The question of the relation between the two series of views in the two different works of Saadya's has been treated before. *Guttmann* presumes that the list in Emunoth is more complete, because in the time intervening between the Commentary and the Emunoth Saadya had enlarged his knowledge in history of philosophy. As against this *Lambert* suggests that the difference between the lists explains itself readily out of the different scopes of the two works. In the Commentary Saadya is concerned only with the different views about the origin of the world even among those who generally admit the creation of the world. He, therefore, contracts all the views opposing creation into one, quoting only those who believe in the eternity of the world. In Emunoth, on the other hand, Saadya's object is to *prove* creation, wherefore he had to quote all the different views of those who deny creation, in order to refute them (p. VIII; pp. 14-15, note). And, in general, this view is acceptable. But in order to bring out the issues involved, a detailed presentation of the list in the Commentary is necessary:

Having set forth that prophecy does not preclude philosophic speculation, and that, on the contrary, it is a duty to investigate into the origins of things (cf. above), Saadya pro-

ceeds to the task of presenting the view of the author of the book of Jecirah and of determining his position in the history of the question of creation. With this object in view, Saadya first divides all views into *two* classes, those who believe in creation, and those who maintain that the world, in its entire upper and lower order of things, is eternal (p. 2; Fr. p. 15): "And I say that these nine, there is none of them that does not posit a beginning to the existing things, except one." Then he divides the remaining eight views again into two classes: The one, while believing in creation, maintains that God created the world from *eternal primary matter*, this view being quoted *second* in the list. The second class is represented by all other views mentioned, from *third* to *ninth*, all of which believe in *creatio ex nihilo*. Now the two views heading the list here, in the Commentary, are entirely opposed to the Jewish doctrine on the question, as Judaism (in Saadya's interpretation) teaches *creatio ex nihilo*, pure and simple. And although in Emunoth (I, 3), in his argument against the *sixth* view, he mentions *coreligionists* (אנשים מעמנו) who believed in the eternity of *water* and *air*, supporting their view by a corresponding interpretation of Scripture, Saadya does not mention them here; because here his aim is not to refute those *Jews* who deny creation out of nothing, but to explain the differences between the believers in creation out of nothing *within the Jewish camp*, in order to arrive at the point where the view of the book of Jecirah has its historical place.²⁸ Saadya, of course, cannot help refuting the two non-Jewish theories, but he cuts the discussion short. He neither mentions all particular views, nor does he take cognizance of the Jewish believers in eternal matter and of their corresponding inter-

²⁸ This removes the contradiction felt by Guttmann p. 50 and Lambert p. 24, note 3: In Emunoth, in discussing the *sixth* view, Saadya says he has not found any one among the Jews who believed in *fire* as *eternal primary matter*; while the *sixth* view here only maintains that *fire* was the *first creation* out of which everything else was created. There is no contradiction at all.

pretations of Scripture. He confines himself here to the refutation of *the three principles* underlying all views of the Emunoth list:²⁹ *Eternity of the World, eternal primary matter, theory of Ideas*. Saadya's first proof against eternal primary matter is directed against its *dualistic* element, while his refutation of the theory of Ideas is presented later, in the discussion against the *seventh* view (where it is shown that even *created* Ideas are against the postulates of reason). The list of views proper begins here with the *third* view. Also these seven Jewish views which have the belief in *creatio ex nihilo* in common, divide into *two* classes. The *third* is a class by itself, it differs from the other six in one very important point (p. 6; Fr. p. 20): "And the *third* view is the assertion of him who posits a beginning to all existing things, only that he forbids the investigation into what was prior to that beginning. And this is the assertion of the entirety of the sages of the Children of Israel (יהו קול גמור עלמא בני אסראל)." As against this the remaining six views not only admit philosophic investigation about the beginnings, but they consider it a duty. And these six, again, divide into two classes: The first three believe that one of the *four elements* was the primary matter creation: *water, air, fire*, respectively; while the last three deny this. These three views again divide into two classes: *Seventh* and *eighth* believe that the first source-creation was a *non-composite* entity; according to the *seventh* view *number*, in the sense of *Idea*, a *non-material* being, was the first source-creation, while according to the *eighth* God first created a fine and sublime, but material being (אצור שגא אצור בהור), and *then* he created *in* it the ten numbers and the twenty-two letters, non-material entities, which ethereal matter then, as a composite, was used by the creator as the primary matter of creation. This view is that of the author of the book of Jecirah according to the interpretation of Saadya. The *ninth* view is that of Saadya himself. According to this view there

²⁹ Cf. there in the Introduction, and my *Geschichte der jüd. Phil.* I, chapt. Saadya.

was a first source-creation, but it was a *composite*: God has created the *Or Bahir*, or the *Second Air*, composed of matter and form-principle, containing all the matter and all the form-principles contained in creation, and this creature God then used as primary matter for the creation of the world of the particular beings. Saadya designates this view of his as a combination of the *seventh* and the *eighth*. At each but one of the last six views which have the common distinction from the third that they all indulge in philosophy over the *mode* in which creation out of nothing took place, Saadya mentions that they base their views on proofs from reason and Scripture. In their proofs from reason the views believing in one of the elements as primary matter creation follow the reasoning of *Thales*, *Anaximenes*, and *Heraklitos*, respectively, while the *seventh* follows the thought of *Pythagoras* in the formulation of *Plato* in combination with his theory of Ideas (cf. below). It is this theory where Saadya omits to mention that it bases itself on Scripture. The reason for this omission is, perhaps, to be found in the fact that in this respect the seventh view does not differ from the eighth where Scriptural passages are quoted. As for his own view Saadya relies on what he wrote, or was about to write, in his Commentary to Scripture and in other works.

Now we will be able to appreciate Malter's statement on the subject (pp. 180-181): "Having thus prepared the way for a philosophic investigation, he gives an historical account of the various Greek theories of the origin of the world, and refutes them one by one. It is Saadia's habit, observable in all his works, not to mention the names of authors whose views he opposes, a custom departed from in but a few instances. He follows here his common practice. The theories he discusses are, however, readily traceable to their respective authors. The first, affirming the eternity of the world, is that of the so-called *Dabriyya* (Eternalists), which differs from that of Aristotle insofar as it eliminates the idea of a prime mover; the second, which he subdivides into three somewhat similar

branches, seems to be a combination of the doctrines of Plato and of the Greek atomists Leucippus (500 b. c. e.) and Demokritus (460); the fourth which postulates water as the prime matter, is the theory of the oldest known Greek philosopher, Thales of Miletus (640); while the fifth and the sixth theories are those of Anaximenes (550) and Heraclitus (500) respectively. To these is added, as the seventh theory, the teaching of Pythagoras (586–506), that all existence originates through numbers. It is obvious that Saadia did not follow chronology in thus disposing of the Greek thinkers. He seems to have arranged the theories in the order of his valuation of them, putting the least probable first, and proceeding by degrees to the most plausible. This will explain why he interrupted the order by inserting in the third place a theory which he evidently attributes to some unnamed Jewish authors, who maintain that the world was created, but, basing their inference upon an erroneous interpretation of a Mishnah (Hagigah II, 1), forbid the study of how and by what means the creation was effected. Naturally, such restriction of the right to philosophize did not appeal to Saadia, and he put the theory where he thought it belonged. Having rejected, as to the origin of the universe, the seven views cited, Saadia turns to the theory of the *Sefer Yezirah*, which, according to him, differs from that of Pythagoras only insofar as, in addition to the ten numerals, it postulates also the twenty-two letters of the Hebrew alphabet as the creative mechanism and the essence of all creation. Saadya devotes much space here and elsewhere in his Commentary to the elucidation of this fantastic theory, which, together with that of Pythagoras, he endeavors to harmonize with the teachings of Judaism. The author of the *Sefer Yezirah*, he asserts, did not mean to say that the numbers and letters pre-existed as separate entities, out of which the world was created, but only that they constituted an important factor in the process of the world's formation as the underlying principles of order and symmetry in all nature."

In Pumbadithan parlance: Malter wrote this outline "while napping" (כר ניים ושכיב):

1. Saadya did *not* aim at an historical account of Greek schools, but at the enumeration of *Jewish* schools existing in his time.

2. The stricture upon Saadya's faulty chronology is due to Malter's own lack of orientation. Saadya keeps the chronological order within each class united by one common view. Saadya counts here the Eternalists before the adherents of the Atom-Idea theory, because this theory forms a class by itself, as Saadya expressly emphasizes, in that it denies creation altogether. And also because according to Saadya's interpretation here and elsewhere there were eternalists in Biblical times, and Scripture argues with them (cf. below).

3. Malter says, "he (Saadya) seems to have arranged the theories . . . the least probable first, and proceeding by degrees to the most plausible." This conjecture has backing in Saadya's words only regarding the first *two* views in their relation to the other views, because this point of view here necessarily coincides with the principle of subdivision indicated above. But there is not the slightest support for such a classification regarding the theories *three to eight*, and most especially regarding the theories *three to six*. The relation of the theories as to their tenability can be found out, easily enough, only through the discussion of the principles underlying them. Let us begin this discussion with the *third* view, the first *Jewish* theory:

4. The *third* view constitutes according to Malter an interruption of the order, and is that of "some unnamed Jewish authors." It is astonishing how Malter could write down these words in the face of Saadya's words "and this is the statement of the entirety (the bulk) of the sages of the children of Israel," to which he then adds: "and this is a true assertion" (ודא קול צחיה). It is clear that the *third* view *per se* is not opposed to Saadya's own view. And although he himself belongs to those who consider philosophic investigation a religious duty, Saadya

is candid enough to admit that the bulk of the sages of Israel of his time is opposed to philosophic research as an aid to establishing or confirming religious truth. Malter is again caught, unawares, in his own net: The class of scholars of whom Malter speaks here in such a light humorous vein, is the very one whom he volunteered to represent in his presentation of the relationship between religion and philosophy discussed above (Sources). It is the party which maintains that there was no philosophic reasoning either in Biblical or Talmudic Judaism, the party of Malter's "accepted fact." This party maintains that philosophic reasoning in Judaism is not only superfluous, but even forbidden by the authoritative Talmudic document, the Mishnah. It is against this party, which admittedly comprised the large majority of Jewish scholars, to say nothing of the common people, that Saadya tries, in all of his works, to establish the fact that the Biblical writers were advancing philosophic arguments against the fallacious philosophic and religious views of their time. And we know that Solomen ben Jeruhom, the Karaite, attacked Saadya specifically for this position of his,³⁰ maintaining stoutly that reason is entirely superfluous for the interpretation of the Torah. And, also this: Saadya generally cares little to interpret Talmudic literature when discussing deep philosophic problems; perhaps because he wanted to make his book acceptable also to the Karaites (Malter, p. 197). But this question he deems so important that he hastens to interpret this Mishnah in a way as to remove from it the prohibition of philosophy: The Mishnah does not mean to forbid philosophy but the *impetuosity* of the immature mind to trespass the boundary with the question how is it possible for reason to comprehend that there is a supreme being exalted above time and space, or by ascribing materializing and pluralizing attributes to God (cf. the striking parallel in Emunoth II Introduction and chapt. 4). And so important was this question to him that he reverts to

³⁰ Cf. S. Posnansky in ZfhB., 3-4, p. 172.

and expatiates on it in Emunoth (Introduction, pp. 20–22; Tibbon, pp. 47–49): “And now, whenever we want to establish the truth of the necessary (logical) datum of knowledge (in Tibbon read *המדע*), we will guard it against these five points which render it fallacious. Namely: (1) That the truly verified sense-perception shall not decide otherwise. (2) That the truth of the *innate idea* (in Tibbon read *המושכל*, instead of *הידוע*) shall not decide otherwise. (3) Nor shall it vitiate any other (established) truth. (4) That one part of it shall not contradict another part of it. (5) Especially that it shall not involve in (a view) worse than that which it escaped. And this way, after (6) heeding the sense-perception and the innate idea with the habituation, which we have mentioned, so that there will be seven features, by adding (7) the patience at the work of investigation up to its completion, the clear (in T. to add *הברורה*) truth will result to us. And when anybody else will try to bring us a proof by the necessary (logical) datum of knowledge, we will test his statement by these seven (features), and if after having been tested by examination and weighed on scales it will still (*נ״כ* — *איצא*) prove true, acceptable, then we will use (adopt) it (in T. read: *נשתמש בהם. וכן*, the word *וכן* belonging to the following sentence. It also seems to me that *נסתעמלרא* is to be amended in *נסתעמלה*, and, consequently, in T. *בהם. בוי*, and its antecedent *דברוי* in *דברוי*, corresponding to *קולה*). And likewise in matters of accredited tradition, to say: the books of the prophets. But this is not the place to explain their (the books’—in T. eliminate *כל*) methods; besides, some of it I have explained at some length in the Introduction to the *Commentary* to the Torah (cf. above. Saadya evidently refers to the same discourse which we know as Introduction to the *Translation* of the Torah). But should we ask: How shall we adjudicate the (duty of) investigation into the data of knowledge and their exact details (in T. read *ודקדוקיהם*), so that we are convinced of them (only) insofar as they are deduced *more geometrico* (*ההנהגה*) and are verified? Why, the people reject this art, and in their opinion (philosophic) investigation

(in T. eliminate **בה**) leads to unbelief, and results in heresy. We will answer that this is only the opinion of the purblind (ignorant—**עוֹאֵם**) among them. As you see the ignorant of this *land* believing (Tibbon's translation rather free) that everyone who travels to the land of India, gets rich; and as it is being said of some of the ignorant of our *nation* (in T. read **שבאומותנו** instead of **שבעירנו**) that they believe that something resembling the Dragon swallows the moon, wherefore it is eclipsed. And of some of the ignorant of Arabia (it is being said), that they are believing that he whose camel is not slaughtered on his grave, will assemble on the day of judgment afoot (in T. read **שלא** instead of **ולא** **שמת מדרם**); and many (other things) like that which are to be laughed at. But should he say (in T. eliminate **אומר**): Why, the leading (in T. insert **ראשי**) sages of the children of Israel (in T. insert **בני**) have forbidden this, and especially the investigation into the beginnings of time and the beginnings of space, *by* (in T. read **באמרם**) saying (Hagigah II): Whoever investigates into four things, had better not to have come to the world: What (is) *above*, what (is) *beneath*, what (was) *before* and what (will be) *hereafter*. Then we will say, being helped by the Merciful, that the sound investigation, it is not possible that they should keep *us* away (in T. read **שימנענו**) from *it*, since our creator, indeed, ordained it *to us* (in T. read **ציי**) together with the accredited tradition, as He says (Is. XL): "Know ye not? Hear ye not? Hath it not been told you from (= about) the beginning, have ye not investigated the foundations of the earth?" And the pious ones said to each other (Job XXXIV): "Judgment let us choose for ourselves, let us know (find out) among ourselves what is good"; as, indeed, on this subject there abound among this quintet, I mean Job, Eliphaz, Bildad, Zophar, and Elihu (T. has **אויב וחבריו**), *brilliant* (in T. read **נרהבים**) speeches. Rather, they (only) forbade the pushing aside of the Scriptures, and the reliance upon what will result to each one of us from his own agreeable aspect (**מן ראי נפסה**), in his pondering in his mind over the beginnings of space and time.

For the one who investigates in this wise, may find and may miss, and until he finds he will be in a religion-less state. And even if he does find religion and settles on it, he is not immune against *its escaping from him* (different T.) by doubt that will arise and vitiate his conviction. Now we all agree upon the sinfulness of one who does that, even in the case of a thinker. But we, the congregation of the children of Israel, we investigate and speculate in a way different from that, and that is what I am going to mention and to explain under the help of God: Know, o reader of this book, may God guide you, that we investigate into and speculate over matters of our religion for two objects. *One* of them is that it may be verified to us in actuality what we learned from the prophets of God by instruction. And the *second* is that we may refute any one who will argue against us in any of the matters of our religion."

This passage is in itself very interesting. It shows us how determined Saadya was in his day to fight against the "purblind" in Israel, in order to defend his view that the principles of Judaism are based on philosophic insight. To be sure, he went too far, interpreted into the Bible many thoughts which the Biblical writers had not reached. But in general Saadya saw well, that the arguments of Isaiah (II) and the book of Job are of eminent philosophic character and diction. The book of Job, indeed, is the oldest philosophic Symposium in world literature.

Contrasting these two parallel passages with each other, we are led to instructive results regarding the development of Saadya in his attitude towards the opponents of Jewish Philosophy. Guttman and Lambert found the two interpretations of the Mishnah Hagigah different from each other. And Lambert (pp. IX and 20) explains the difference by the suggestion that in Emunoth Saadya applies himself to the defence of Philosophy in Judaism in a more comprehensive sense than in his Commentary to Jecirah. As a matter of fact, the difference between the two interpretations is not much of a difficulty, but Lambert's suggestion as to the wider scope in Emunoth

is important in itself. In the interpretation of the Mishnah Saadya, here as there, reduces the apprehension of those opposed to philosophy to the problems of *time and space*. So the interpretation proper is essentially the same. The thing that needs explanation most is the different attitude of Saadya to his opponents in this matter. In the Commentary he handles them much more reverently than in Emunoth. There they are the multitude of the sages of Israel, here the superstitious and the ignorant. The difference seems to be due to this: In the Commentary Saadya had only *theoretical* experience in the question of the position of philosophy in Judaism. But his *practical* experience with the opponents of Jewish Philosophy led him to a more emphatic attitude and to a polemical tone less charming in manner and more vigorous in argument. And if there is a difference in the two interpretations, it is not one of contradiction, but one of additional vigor and enlargement of scope in Emunoth. Here Saadya not only refuses to take the Mishnah as a prohibition of philosophy, but he lays on it an interpretation which makes it a *critical canon* for improving the *method* of philosophic investigation. In the Commentary he explains that the Mishnah restricts philosophy in questions of time and space and divine attributes. In the Emunoth, on the other hand, he says that the Mishnah warns the philosophers in Judaism not to abandon prophetic instruction and rely altogether on the results of human investigation. And the reason given for this is that the *problem of time and space* is always waylaying in the rear to puncture all results of philosophy with doubt and criticism. In a word, Saadya carries here into the Mishnah his own advanced thoughts by which he contributed much to the development of critical philosophy (cf. Emunoth II, and below): The Mishnah gives us a *canon* and warns us that the elusive problem of time and space makes it necessary to continue relying upon the instruction of the prophets, based on their philosophic arguments as these came from the *divine Intellect*. Only after much patient study and investigation and ample circumspection, especially in the pro-

vince of the problem of time and space, shall the Jewish philosopher rely upon his reason so as to use it as an instrument for the interpretation of the word of God. This is the meaning of Saadya's reference here to his Introduction to the Torah (cf. above).

5. Regarding the views *fourth to eighth* there can be no doubt that the *seventh* view, to begin with, in the opinion of Saadya, is the most fallacious among those who stand on the common Jewish ground of *creatio ex nihilo*. Saadya's philosophy is based on *two principles*: 1. *Everything beside God is created by him out of nothing.* 2. *There is no pure spirit beside God.* Everything created, including angels and the human soul, is composed of matter and form.³¹ The material element may be of a very subtile and ethereal nature, *second air*, or *Or Bahir*, but it is material nevertheless. In judging the seventh view we must be (as Malter was not) aware of the fact that Saadya presents here this theory as the combination-theory *Number-Idea* of Plato in the tradition of Aristotle (in many places, especially in the last two books of the *Metaphysics*). We see this at once by simply reading the succinct presentation of Saadya (p. 9; Fr. p. 25): "And the *seventh* view is the statement of him who posits the things created out of nothing, only that he thought that the first thing in creation (are) the *Numbers*. And this inasmuch as by them the *substances* and the parts differentiate from each other, and that through them there is geometry and (there are) extensive forms, since everything that was brought to existence cannot be without some form, and the pattern precedes the patterned in rank. And since it was said (by the adherents of this theory) that the form-principle precedes the patterned in rank, it is clear that (in their view) that (= the form-principle) is matter to it (the patterned)."

Let us pause here to explain the difference between the theory of Ideas of Plato *per se*, and the Number-Idea theory.

³¹ To this, as to the entire discussion of the relation between Commentary and Emunoth, cf. *Gesch. d. jüd. Phil.* I, pp. 186-189, 456-457, 536-551.

The former is a *dualistic* theory. The Ideas serve as *patterns* according to which the things are formed out of eternal primary matter. The Number-Idea theory, on the other hand, some, following Pythagoras in substituting number for *substance*, formulate as a *monistic* theory, the Number-Idea being both substance and pattern of the physical thing. This is what Saadya explains in the sentence quoted last: The adherents of this view really consider the Number-Idea the *matter* (= substance) of the patterned (physical) thing, in addition to its being its pattern.³² Saadya continues:

"Now, this statement, may God be merciful to you, if the intention of its author by it were the precedence of the number to the numbered *potentially* (as a logical concept), and not *actually* (as a separately existing entity), then it would be a correct, irrefutable statement. For we ourselves (too) maintain that the number potentially precedes the numbered, and the form-principle precedes the form-endowed, and the pattern precedes the patterned, and geometry precedes the geometrically calculated, and composition is an underlying (principle) preceding the composed. But all this only potentially, not actually: But if the meaning is (as Saadya presumes it to be) their egression into actuality, so that there be separate Numbers, and separate Composition, and separate geometrical Entities (according to Plato geometrical, or generally, mathematical entities are between Ideas and physical beings), surely, this is of the (class of the) impossible. From two aspects: The *first*: That it would necessarily follow that beside active principle and passive object there be a *third thing*, which they might call *Act*, and beside the formed and the form-giver another entity, called *Forming*, and beside the created out of nothing and the creator out of nothing another substance (עין—entity), namely *Creating out of nothing*; which is a fallacy.

³² The *language* used by Saadya: צורה and מודעה, instead of the Mu'tazilitic (and general Kalamist) נומר and ערך, as also מעל and קוף which Saadya uses so seldom that one uninformed writer said that he does not know them at all—shows conclusively that we are here on Aristotelian ground.

The *second* aspect: That the statement of that author who posits a separate Composing and a separate Geometry, is a self-contradictory statement, inasmuch as Composing, and Geometry, and the like, posit at least *two* things, or (in other words) something which is higher than they in number (namely: *two*)."

Saadya advances against this view the two strictures which are the most decisive among those advanced by Aristotle: the argument of τρίτος ἄνθρωπος and that of the *self-contradiction* involved in this theory.³³ The difference in the formulation corresponds to the difference in the objects of the arguments: Saadya argues against the Number-Idea theory of a *Jewish* school of thought which combines with this theory the doctrine of *creatio ex nihilo*. Therefore he does not say that this theory leads to a "third man," or "third horse," as Aristotle says, but to a "third thing" which they might call *Act*: The act of *creation* would have to be conceived of as an actually existent separate entity. We have here another instance of how Saadya uses his sources in an independent way to establish the principles of his philosophy. Saadya rejects this view, because the existence of a pure non-material and non-composite entity beside God is against the second basic principle of his philosophy.

6. Views *four* to *six* which maintain that one of the *mobile* elements, water, air, and fire, respectively, was the first primary matter creation, do not conflict at all with the above-mentioned principles of Saadya's philosophy. On the contrary, they are at one with him in the scientific basis of his system, that the first creation was a composite consisting of matter and form, in the sense of Aristotle's *metaxy*. Indeed, Aristotle himself mentions these three elements as having been considered by some as (eternal) primary matter, respectively.³⁴

³³ Plato, *Parmenides*, pp. 132 c-134 c; Arist., *Metaphysics* I, 9, 3; cf. also VI, 6, 12 and its parallel in *de sophisticis elenchis* 22, 15; *Metaphysics* X, 1, 7, and *Geschichte der jüd. Phil.* according to Register.

³⁴ Cf. *Physics* I, chapters 5-7, and *Geschichte der jüd. Phil.*, chapt. Aristotle, beginning.

Saadya's objections to these views are entirely technical. He does not admit that any one of these three elements is of a purer and subtler nature than the other three elements, as claimed by the adherents of these theories. So these three theories, although preceding the *seventh*, are acceptable to Saadya in principle, while this latter militates against one of his most basic principles.

7. The *eighth* view is likewise based on the Number-Idea theory. And as a matter of fact there is a difference in principles between it and the *seventh*: According to the *seventh* God has created the Number-Ideas and from them he has created matter, while according to the *real* view of the book of Jecirah primary matter is *eternal*, as also the Number-Ideas, while the creative activity of God was only that of combination. Saadya saw this well, but interpreted the book so as to eliminate the feature of eternity, and also the creation of Number-Ideas as separate entities. According to this interpretation the *eighth* view teaches that God has first created the *second* air, the *Or Bahir*, and then he created in this primary matter creation which was void of all form-principle, the *thirty-two paths*, the Number-Ideas, the form-principle.³⁵ But even so there remains one feature which makes this theory unacceptable to Saadya, it militates against his *metaxy*-theory: The existence of matter *per se* is perhaps not as objectionable as the existence of form without matter, but objectionable nevertheless. The polemics here proceeds thus in the same way as in Emunoth, at least with respect to this question. Saadya refutes first the theories teaching the existence of form without matter, and then those that teach the existence of matter without form.³⁶ For the ultimate meaning of the *metaxy* doctrine in the conception of Saadya is this: If you admit the existence of matter without form, you cannot escape admitting in the end the existence of form without matter, and so you vitiate the idea of real divine unity and uniqueness.

³⁵ Cf. Geschichte der jüd. Phil. I, pp. 112 f.; 186 f.

³⁶ Ibid., p. 466.

Malter, then, is right in his contention that the seventh theory is less acceptable to Saadya than the eighth, but his statement that the theory of Jecirah in Saadya's interpretation "differs from that of Pythagoras only insofar as, in addition to the ten numerals, it postulates also the twenty-two letters of the Hebrew alphabet," shows that he missed the point. Why should Saadya not object to the letters of the Hebrew alphabet even more than to the numbers, since they increase the number of separate entities? Due to this misapprehension Malter dismisses Saadya with an entirely unsatisfactory mark as to the question: "Whether or not Saadia succeeded in unravelling the mysteries of *Sefer Yezirah*." He says: "let it be said distinctly that he did not." But Malter is surely wrong. Saadya understood the book better than some of the moderns who tried to interpret it. He saw what in the book *needed* interpretation. He eliminated by interpretation the two most objectionable features: eternal primary matter and the theory of Ideas,³⁷ and left only one feature to which he was opposed, the transient existence of matter without form. As to details, it must be said that Saadya's *second-air* interpretation has much in its favor. Other details are not important. On the whole Saadya deserved a much better mark than he received from Malter (By the way, it would be interesting to learn what interpretation of Jecirah Malter thought of when he so "distinctly" rejected the pretty much acceptable interpretation of Saadya—except of course for his attempt to eliminate eternity of matter and Ideas by interpretation which, however, shows that he understood the book well).

8. The *ninth* view, his *own*, Saadya designates as a combination of the seventh and the eighth. Not that Saadya assents to numbers or any other kind of separate non-material, or even material entities. Saadya is very clear on this point in all of his writings, and also here. The combination rather expresses the very principle of his philosophy. The seventh

³⁷ And also the theory of *emanation* from the interpolation.—Cf. *Geschichte der jüd. Phil.* I, pp. 112 f.

view teaches that God created first *form* without matter, the eighth teaches that God created first matter without form, and Saadya combines the two, and teaches that God created first *matter and form together*, the *second air*, the *Or Bahir*, a composite thing that contained *all* form-principles, and then developed from it all the other creatures.

9. Malter's presentation of Saadya's own view suffers first under the strange fact that it does not bring out clearly that he counts his own view as a separate, the *ninth*, theory, as if Saadya sank his view in the interpretation of the eighth, "which together with that of Pythagoras, he endeavors to harmonize with the teachings of Judaism." The following, the last, sentence of Malter's statement quoted above is almost the only correct one in the entire presentation. He sees that what Saadya objects to is the pre-existence of numbers and letters "as separate entities," but having missed the difference between the seventh and the eighth theories, and having annexed Saadya's view into the interpretation of the book of Jecirah, Malter shows much unclearness and embarrassment in his attempt to define the attitude of Saadya to the book of Jecirah, as interpreted by him. Malter devoted to the book of Jecirah much space (18 pages), half of which, at least, is devoted to questions which touch upon the principles of Saadya's philosophy. It may be said that here, in favorable contrast with his treatment of the first two portals of Emunoth, Malter made an earnest attempt to define the position of Saadya on principles:

He says (p. 178): "It is characteristic of Saadya's attitude toward the book that he does not accept what he presents as its basic theory of creation. He substitutes another theory, which, he says, is that of the Torah." Here Malter refers to the *ninth* theory which evidently escaped his memory when writing the above criticized statement (p. 181). Then (182): "But Saadia does not accept all the views of the Sefer Yezirah. According to him there was no gradual process of formation such as described in that work, but, as taught in the book of

Genesis, the four elements, fire, air, water, and earth, with all their compositions, combinations, and formations, were created by God (*ex nihilo*) at one stroke, just as the flesh, bones, veins, skin, and all that forms itself thereof originate all at once in the embryo, &c." Then (p. 188): "As pointed out before (pp. 178, 182) Saadia does not accept this theory in full. According to him there were no prior and posterior stages in the process of creation, but all sprang into potential existence at once, and the Biblical account of six days' duration refers only to the gradual development into reality. But he seems to have admitted the differentiation between the ethereal substance and the atmospheric air, which he imputes to the author of the *Sefer Yezirah*." Finally (p. 204): "Though he did not identify himself with the doctrine of the *Sefer Yezirah*, he certainly considered it more acceptable than any of those here (Emunoth) rejected. Its omission is due to the fact that in this work (Emunoth) he deals with the one theory which in his opinion was positively true and with those which were positively wrong. The theory of the *Sefer Yezirah*, on the other hand, was recognized as tolerable, by way of a special exegesis which brought it essentially into harmony with the true Biblical theory. Thus, it was covered in the exposition of the Biblical theory, making further discussion of it superfluous. Moreover, the Commentary is referred to by Saadia in another passage in this first chapter of the *Kitâb al-'Amânât*."

10. It is very gratifying that Malter accepts my view (as against Guttman's), that Saadya retains in Emunoth in addition to the principles defended there, also the Or-Bahir theory.³⁸ But one could not say that Malter succeeded in giving the reader a clear cut statement of the difference between Saadya and the *Sefer Jecirah*. The following observations will make my complaint clear:

On p. 172 Malter knows that the attitude of the Torah is different even from the interpreted *Jecirah*; on p. 204, on the other hand, he *identifies* the interpreted *Jecirah* with the Bible,

³⁸ Cf. *Geschichte der jüd. Phil.*, pp. 538 f.

as he did on p. 181 (cf. above). On p. 182 "there was (according to Saadya) no gradual process of formation," but all creation came into being "at one stroke," but on p. 188 "all sprang into potential existence at once, and the Biblical account refers only to the gradual development into reality." What, then, is the *difference in principle* between Saadya and the book of Jecirah? As a matter of fact, it is difficult to see even a *technical* difference between them. Here Malter continues: "But he *seems* (!) to have *admitted* (!) the differentiation between the ethereal substance and the atmospheric air," while on p. 204 Malter apodictically *identifies* the interpreted Jecirah with the Biblical theory. And what does Saadya's *admission* mean? Is it only a question of *creation-technique*?

All these contradictions and embarrassments are due to the one oversight, that the difference between Saadya and Jecirah is expressed in Saadya's *metaxy-theory*: Jecirah, in Saadya's interpretation, teaches the creation of form-less matter in which *then*, after a transient existence *per se*, the form-principles were created, while Saadya teaches the creation of the metaxy composed of matter and form. Otherwise Saadya accepts the *world picture* and the order of creation from the interpreted Jecirah with the exception of the differentiation of numbers and letters, Saadya preferring to eliminate this to him mythological feature and to speak generally of form-principles, as he has done right in the explanation of the *seventh* view in the Commentary to Jecirah.³⁹

11. It is of this, his own, view, that Saadya says, it is the best of all preceding. But nothing indicates that he has presented all views in order of their remoteness from or nearness to his own view. If we wish to classify the views quoted, it is according to their remoteness from or nearness to the *metaxy-theory*, no matter which place they occupy in the order of the enumeration:

³⁹ And, of course, there are other *technical* details in the description of creation in Jecirah, for which Saadya does not care; cf. Kitâb ma'âni al-nafs chapt. III and the corresponding sections of my book.

Thus: The *first* teaches the eternity of the world—the farthest from Saadya's; the *second* teaches the eternity of matter—the next farthest; the *third*, identical with Saadya's own view, except that it declines investigation, and, consequently, may not go into the niceties of the metaxy-theory, but, by the same token, does not deny it; *fourth*, *fifth*, and *sixth*, identical with Saadya's, except for the second-air theory, and other questions of technique of creation; the *seventh*—the *farthest* from Saadya's among the believers in creation out of nothing, because it teaches the transient existence of form without matter; the *eighth*, a little nearer than the preceding, because it teaches only the transient existence of matter without form. Thus, once we know the principles involved, the exposition and classification of the views enumerated may be compressed into a statement, as clear cut as it is short.

12. We come now to Malter's *literary* observations in his outline of the first portal of Emunoth (p. 103): "In the arrangement of these theories Saadya reversed the order he had adopted for the enumeration of the nine theories of the world's creation in his Commentary on the *Sefer Yezirah*. There, as we have seen, he begins with the theory that he considers the most objectionable of the nine, namely, the doctrine of the Eternalists (Dahriyya), who, asserting that the world is eternal, deny creation altogether. He then proceeds according to the respective degrees of unacceptability from the least to the most probable, rejecting all theories until he reaches the last, which is his own." Here Malter again has the fact in evidence that Saadya's own theory is the *ninth*, and that he differs from the book *Jecirah*, even as interpreted by him. But here Malter forgot that Saadya says *nothing* about the order in which he enumerated the Jewish schools. There Malter says "seems," here he states an *established* fact, "as we have seen."

Malter continues: "In the *Kitâb al-'Amânât*, on the contrary, he states first his own view, which he bases on the Bible, and then arranges the following twelve theories on the principle of the least objectionable first, followed in turn by the

others in the order of their probability." To this the note (474): "This is not mere conjecture, but is indicated clearly enough by Saadia himself, who at the beginning of each refuted theory repeats the stereotyped phrase, 'and the adherents of this theory are still more ignorant than those of the preceding theory' (e. g. Am. p. 49, l. 4: *והראוי אנהל מן אלהילין*—it is not there; but a similar phrase l. 8). This remark is missing only at the beginning of the eighth theory, probably by oversight." From this note as from the passage to be presently quoted it would appear that Malter thinks it is necessary to call attention to a fact overlooked. As against this, I deem it proper and useful to quote from my presentation of the subject (*Geschichte der jüd. Phil.* I, p. 456): "Saadja hat seine Polemik so eingerichtet, daß jede folgende Theorie von seiner eigenen Ansicht immer mehr entfernt ist. Er sagt denn auch von jeder neueingeführten Theorie (mit Ausnahme der achten, s. w. u.), daß sie noch absurder ist als alle vorangegangenen. Die Abstufung ist klar: die zweite Theorie nimmt einen *einheitlichen Schöpfer außerhalb* der Dinge an, sie leugnet bloß die Schöpfung aus dem Nichts, die dritte trägt das Werden in Gott hinein, die vierte vereinigt die Unzulänglichkeiten der beiden vorhergegangenen in sich, die fünfte trägt ebenfalls das Werden in Gott hinein, ist aber dazu noch dualistisch. Diese *vier* Theorien stehen mit Saadja *theologisch* auf *einem* Boden, sie suchen alle, wenn auch in noch so unzulänglicher Weise, die Wirkung eines göttlichen Prinzips bei der *Entstehung* der Dinge nachzuweisen. Und nur um diese Frage *allein* ist es Saadja hier zu tun, *nicht* um das *Dasein Gottes schlechthin*. Mit der sechsten eröffnet nun Saadja die Polemik gegen jene Theorien, die bei der Erklärung der Entstehung (oder des Seins nach der Ewigkeitstheorie) kein göttliches Prinzip zu Hilfe nehmen, mögen sie sonst ein solches setzen oder auch es beim *Werden* beteiligt sein lassen."

Malter continues: "The result is that the theory (a combination of atomism and Platonism) which in the Commentary on the *Sefer Yezirah* was rated as being next to the most

unreasonable, appears here as next to the most reasonable. In both books it is put in the second place! The explanation lies in the fact that aside from the Biblical theory (*creatio ex nihilo*), which, as is to be expected, occupies first place in the one arrangement and last in the other, only two of the other eight theories discussed in the *Sefer Yezirah* are taken up also in the *Kitâb al-‘Amânât*. For the six theories in the former work, ten entirely different ones are given in the latter.”

How inadequate: It is impossible to contrast the Biblical view of *creatio ex nihilo* with the six views *third* to *eighth* in the Commentary. All these views stand on Biblical ground. Nor is it correct to identify the Biblical view as presented by Saadya in *Emunoth* with Saadya's view in the Commentary: The common ground of both views is, of course, *creatio ex nihilo*, but the question of the *technique* of creation is a topic specific to the Commentary, in which the polemics in *Emunoth* is not interested at all. *This* is the reason why Saadya does not mention here the views *third* to *ninth* of the Commentary. For it must be noted that also his own view of the Commentary is omitted here by Saadya, although he utilizes it in the course of the presentation of his full system, as mentioned above.

Then Malter says (p. 204): “The principles upon which Saadia built up his standard for the valuation of the theories cannot be set forth here. It would involve a detailed presentation of all his arguments against the theories themselves, which space forbids. But it has been necessary to present the facts, since they have been heretofore overlooked. It should also be pointed out in particular that the doctrine of the author of the *Sefer Yezirah*, for the elucidation of which Saadia has composed his Commentary on that work, is entirely disregarded in his present enumeration of theories of creation.”

Against this it must be pointed out: 1. My presentation quoted above occupies much less space than the *literary* observations in Malter's book. If space was to be economized, the outline of Saadya's eschatology ought to have been condensed a little. 2. What facts were overlooked? The order in *Emunoth*

was fully explained in my book. The order in the Commentary was not within the scope of a systematic presentation of Saadya's philosophy. Only the principle were taken account of, and Malter, by ignoring these, made his presentation unacceptable, even as literary observations. 3. Saadya did not quote the view of Jecirah in Emunoth, because he was not interested in this question in the polemics here. He omitted also his own view, as mentioned.

There is, in Malter's outline of the first portal, one more literary observation which deserves to be taken up here. It will bring out some interesting points in characteristics and principles of Saadya's philosophy:

Above (p. 180, and note 412 b) and here (p. 204, note 475) Malter decides against my interpretation of the *eighth* and the *tenth* views in Emunoth, as regards their meaning as well as their authors, in favor of that of Horovitz, and, partly at least, also in favor of that of Guttmann, whose views I have refuted.⁴⁰ Malter does not give his reasons, he just *decides*, as usual. Let us, then, discuss this question with the authors mentioned, especially with Horovitz, the last to have written on the subject:

The situation in question is this:

Guttmann ascribes the *eighth* view to *Aristotle*. Of course, he knows that Aristotle nowhere teaches that physical matter was created by the heavenly bodies. But he calms his literary conscience by the suggestion that Saadya, being an *eclectic* (cf. above), did not mind a little trimming of Aristotle to make him say something which he did not say, in order to refute him. As against this I ascribe this view to *Alfarâbi*, who expressly teaches this doctrine, a fact overlooked by Guttmann. Of the *tenth* view, that the world is eternal, with all its upper and lower order, Guttmann says it was not a philosophic view at all. As against this I point out that this is the real view of Aristotle, at any rate of Aristotle as interpreted by all

⁴⁰ Geschichte der jüd. Phil., chapt. Saadja.

Arabic and Jewish medieval philosophers. Now *Horovitz*, in his essay: *Über die Bekanntschaft Saadias mit der griechischen Skepsis*, in *Festschrift Cohen*, *Judaica* (p. 244, and note) agrees with Guttman, negatively at least, that the *tenth* view is not that of Aristotle. He himself ascribes this view to the *Dahriyya*. Of course, Horovitz is not unaware of the fact that this would mean that Saadya entirely omitted the Peripatetic view. He therefore accepts Guttman's view as to the *eighth* theory, ascribing it to Aristotle or the Peripatetics, and formulates the distinction between the two theories that the *eighth* theory believes in a *prime mover* (God), while the *tenth*, the *Dahriyya*, does not admit a prime mover.

This interpretation is surely untenable:

1. If there is this difference between the two views, then it is very strange, indeed, that Saadya does *not* mention it. Neither in the Commentary nor here is the question of prime mover involved in the discussion of opposing views. And this is quite natural. Saadya aims at the verification of God as creator, and the question of prime mover does not interest him at all (cf. above, the German quotation). Of course, he differs in this question with Aristotle. According to the latter the spheres move because of their *longing* for God, the concession of Aristotle to the *psychological God-conception*. Saadya, on the other hand, in *his* concession to the psychological God-conception (cf. below), does not go quite so far. To him it is simply the *command* of God in the execution of which the spheres move (*Emunoth* II, 8). But this difference, while a consequence of the principles established in the polemics, is not discussed there.

2. My objection to Guttman's classification of the eighth view stands: The doctrine of the creative activity of the heavenly bodies is not found in Aristotle, and is found in Alfarâbi: The explanation offered by Guttman is inadmissible even for discussion and refutation. Moreover, the way Saadya addresses himself to the author of the eighth theory makes it highly plausible that he addresses a contemporary: "Do you

not see that *this man* (הַאִישׁ הַזֶּה — הָרֹא אֶלְאִנְשָׁן) on account of this insignificant apprehension, finds himself constrained to the assertion of a *fifth thing* (quintessence) which is not warranted by the intellect?"

3. Saadya introduces the tenth view as being "the famous doctrine of eternity." This fits the theory of Aristotle in all of its special formulations, but none of the latter.

4. In the view of Horovitz, Saadya, by introducing this view into the polemics does not aim so much at the doctrine of eternity, as at its *scepticism*, and he finds this interpretation verified in the following sentence: "And the strangest of their arguments *in this* (in T. add בְּזוֹה) is that they do not believe except in what their *sense* (חֲשָׁהֶם, better than T.'s רִאיוֹתָם, following the version אֱלֵצִיאַן) falls on, and their senses have not perceived either a beginning or an end to these bodies." To this we object: 1. If Saadya is not concerned here chiefly with the view of eternity, why does he mention here that the view of eternity has found many formulations (מִרְכַּבַּת מַצְלָעִית)? The proper place for this is the *eighth* view where, according to Horovitz, Peripateticism in general is spoken of. 2. In the formulation of the *eighth* view Saadya does not mention the eternity of the world, but only the eternity of the heavenly bodies, and even this only as an explanation of the theory of the creation of physical matter by the heavenly bodies. It is clear that Saadya understands the *eighth* theory as believing in the eternity of the heavenly bodies only, while the sublunar bodies are created by the former. In fact, Saadya's arguments here are not directed against the idea of eternity in general at all. 3. The sentence quoted by no means designates the *tenth* view as that of scepticism. Saadya applies the same argument also against the *eighth* view: "So that this is indeed astonishing of the view, that he makes the established doubtful (leaving out מִתְאֵלָה, following Tibbon), and he makes the doubtful established, certain (here, perhaps, is the right place of מִתְאֵלָה = מְפֹרֵשׁ = well explained), and flees from something coming out from nothing, because he has not seen

like it, but believes in a fifth nature, although he has not seen like it." Moreover, Saadya uses this argument against *all views* (Introduction to first portal): "And not only we have made up our mind to admit (the existence of) something at the *beginning* (in T. add בתחלה), the like of which we have never seen (in T. eliminate בתחלה), but all thinkers and those who bring proofs, have made up their minds about this..... The *Eternalists*..... the *Dualists*, and the adherents of *eternal (primary) matter*..... and the same *all the rest of the views*, as I am going to explain." It is clear, Saadya does not mean to say that the representatives of all the views really admit that they posit a thing which they have never perceived, but that they, in refusing to admit *creatio ex nihilo* for this reason, *contradict* themselves, since as a matter of fact they do posit, by *logical inference*, things which sense perception *per se* does not convey. Thus Saadya says here expressly that the Dahriyya does recognize logical conclusions on the ground of sense perceptions; contending, however, that their logical operations are faulty, and insisting and explaining that the right logical operations on the ground of sense perception lead up to the establishment of *creatio ex nihilo* as a datum of knowledge of the third source (syllogism). As for the *twelfth* and *thirteenth* views which really are sceptical views, Saadya may *not* have included them (and perhaps even not the *eleventh*, that of the Sophists) in the phrase "and likewise all the other views," as these views do not bear *directly* on the question of creation, and are quoted by Saadya only as a means to show that his conclusions in favor of *creatio ex nihilo* are based on sound epistemology—an explanation which cannot be applied to the *Dahriyya*, whom Saadya *expressly* includes in his argument that they *do* apply syllogism in support of their view (in fact Saadya mentions this argument against creation out of nothing generally in the name of all views bearing directly on this question; cf. also II, Introduction).

4. Horovitz himself observes that the view of the Dahriyya, in his own interpretation, is not different from the *twelfth*

view, and he tries hard to straighten out this difficulty—unsuccessfully (pp. 246–247). Why, then, insist on an interpretation which breeds difficulties and discrepancies? The parallel which Horovitz found in Theaitetos 184 to Saadya's argument against the Dahriyya, does not necessitate the conclusion that he considers them a sceptical school. Saadya avails himself of the Platonic argument against the *inconsistency* of all parties that deny creation out of nothing on the ground of a false syllogism from sense perception (cf. Emunoth, II, Introduction). Besides, there is no cogent reason to insist that Saadya's argument from the *unity of soul* to which Horovitz refers (p. 240, notes 1–3), is taken from Plato's argument against Pythagoras. It is much more likely that he drew here on Aristotle's *De Anima*.⁴¹

5. For all of these oversights Malter incurred responsibility by adoption only. But there is one thing which he should not have overlooked. We mean the question of the *order* of the views to which Malter devoted so much attention and space. If the Dahriyya's is not a sceptical view, it is mentioned in its right place, before *all* sceptical views, inasmuch as Saadya often emphasizes that he considers scepticism, for its opposition to the sources of knowledge, a very low sort of philosophy. But if the Dahriyya's is a sceptical view then its place was not *before*, but *after*, the *eleventh*, the *Sophistic* view, inasmuch as according to the Sophists the doctrine of *creatio ex nihilo* has an equal chance to be true as any other theory. And it should not be overlooked that to a certain extent, insofar as the argument for and against eternity of the world is concerned, this is also the standpoint of *Maimuni* who, *anticipating Kant*, designates this problem as a "dilemma of reason."⁴²

6. And also the ubiquitous *crux* of Malter's presentation shows here. Saadya fights scepticism with Aristotelian argu-

⁴¹ Cf. Hathekupha XIV–XV: Aristotle's Epistemology.

⁴² MN. I, 71: עקל מוקף שכלי = מעמד שכלי; Maimuni depends here on *Hallevi*, Cusari I, 65 f.

ments, because he stands on the scientific ground of Aristotle's Physics. His scientific principles are *metaxy* and *steresis*, his arguments are carried on through the discussion of the subsidiary problems of: *definition*, *possibility of becoming*, and *possibility of science*.⁴³ In any, ever so condensed, presentation of Saadya's philosophy, these questions of principle and method cannot be eliminated with impunity. Whoever wants to say anything whatsoever about Saadya's philosophy, must show how Saadya adopted Aristotle's scientific principles and methods in the establishing of a theory diametrically opposed to his metaphysical principles. Only remissness in these vital questions of principle and method, and the general tendency to obliterate the highly intellectual character of Saadya's philosophy led to this oversight: To Saadya scepticism means the disabling of the human mind in its task of establishing the truth by the proper methodical investigation, in order thus to be enabled to find out, from the word of God, by the right interpretation, what the *Divine Intellect* teaches those who worship Him. Scepticism, therefore, is farther away from the truth than Sophistry, especially in the problem of creation or eternity of the world, where there really is an *antinomy of reason* according to some great philosophers. This surely was not unknown to Saadya, and he could not in consistency consider any sceptical view preferable to any view not outspokenly sceptical, even the Sophistical view, which he, of course, rejects.

In his outline of the *second portal* (pp. 204–207) Malter does not come up to expectations. This portal treats of the *unity* of God, and Saadya presents here his epistemological principles with profound philosophic acumen: Malter misses many of the finest points. Here also was to be shown the relation of Saadya's God-conception to those of Plato and Aristotle. So Malter *omits* (p. 206) Saadya's explanation of the God-conception by the parallel conception of soul (chapt. 8, beginning). Malter paid no attention to this chapter, or he

⁴³ Cf. Geschichte der jüd. Phil. I and II, 2, and, Hebrew, II.

would not have said (p. 180) that, except for one passage in the Commentary to Jecirah, Saadya never avails himself of the parallel of Mikrokosmos and Makrokosmos. The essential meaning of this parallel is that God is the soul of the world, just as the soul is the divine principle guiding and governing the body.⁴⁴ More attention to this chapter would also have brought out the relationship of *Intellectualism* and *Voluntarism* in Saadya's God-conception. And this would have led to due appreciation of the following sentence (chapt. 5): "But the meaning of the Scriptures in their saying the creator created the things by His command, or by His Word, or by His *Wish*, or by His *Will* (בְּחַפְצוֹ אוֹ בְּרִצּוֹנוֹ בְּמַרְאָה אוֹ בְּמִשְׁאֵתָהּ) is that he created them with an *intention of His* (קִצְרָא מִנָּה; in T. read בְּכוּוּנָה מִמֶּנּוּ). The Will, then, according to Saadya is a certain form of thinking. With these important points in evidence Malter surely could not have parallelized Saadya with *Schopenhauer* (cf. above). So again we hit upon the *παῦτον ψεῦδος* regarding the characteristics of Saadya's philosophy. Also another misapprehension is most likely traceable to this general tendency of lowering the intellectual level of Saadya's philosophy: In the outline of the Introduction to the second portal Malter says (p. 205): "There is, however, a natural limit to such intellectual progress. Man being finite, his thinking capacity must be limited. A point is reached at which the ideas become so subtle and abstract that they are beyond man's grasp. The God-idea is of the utmost subtlety, and hence past human comprehension." In the passage outlined Saadya says nothing of the kind, but the very opposite. In proving the *second* epistemological principle Saadya says: "And I have said that man ascends from datum of knowledge to datum of knowledge *until he arrives at a datum of knowledge* (in T. add: עַד שִׁיגִיעַ אֶל יְדִיעַת) beyond which there is no datum of

⁴⁴ Cf. Cuzari IV, 3; Hirschfeld, pp. 240-243, evidently following Saadya. By the way: In the formulation of this thought by Saadya there is evidence of the influence of the *Talmudic* formulation of this thought. —Cf. Berakhoth p. 10 and parallels.

knowledge, for *three* reasons. One of them, that man, inasmuch as his body is limited, *finite* (in T. add: בעל תכלית), it is necessary that all his faculties be finite, and the faculty of knowledge is one of them, as I also said of the heavens that the *energy* (following T. קוֹץ instead of וְקַת of the original) of their endurance (in motion?) necessarily *is* finite (following Tibbon's interpretation: לו; the passage refers to portal I, 1, *first* proof, and is rather difficult). And the *second*, that science is comprehensible to man only because it is finite, but if it is considered that it is infinite, then its comprehension by him would be impossible, and if this be impossible, then it would also be impossible that any one know it. And the *third*, that the root from which originate all sciences, namely, the sense, is indubitably finite, and it is impossible that what originates therefrom be infinite, so that the branch be different from the root." Saadya, then, says here that because human knowledge cannot comprehend an *infinite number* of data of knowledge, therefore, when he arrives at the satisfactory God-conception, he does not have to worry any more perhaps there is another being above God, as there must be an end to the number of beings we may find in our regressus for the search of the causes higher up. It is not the *qualitative*, but the *quantitative* finiteness of human knowledge which Saadya asserts here. To assert the qualitative finiteness of human knowledge would mean to refute the principle which Saadya means to defend here: that man *does* reach the ultimate datum of knowledge. Of course, we could say that although man reaches a satisfactory God-conception, he may not be able to comprehend the *essence* of God, or at least not fully. But aside from the fact that Saadya does not state it *here*, it is wrong to ascribe such a view to Saadya. Malter may have followed Kaufmann who misunderstood a passage (in II, 10) and from it came to a misconception of Saadya's theory of attributes.⁴⁵ Our passage is, indeed, one of the proofs that Kaufmann's interpretation is

⁴⁵ Cf. my Geschichte der jüd. Phil. II, 2.

wrong. Closely before the passage quoted above, in explaining the *first* epistemological principle, that the beginnings of the data of knowledge are coarse, while their ultimates are the most subtle, Saadya says: "And in this wise he does not cease arriving and continuing, and he is progressing with his understanding and his power of distinction, until he reaches the last (thing) which he *comprehends* (עַד שִׁגִּיעַ אֶל סוֹף [אַחֲרֵי] מֵה שִׁשְׁגֵּהוּ)." Thus Saadya says expressly that man does comprehend the last datum of knowledge, God.

Saadya mentions only two things which the human mind cannot comprehend: the *how* of *creatio ex nihilo*, and the *ethereal world* in the hereafter, when physical matter, space, and time, will go out of existence, and all human beings will live as ethereal beings in the *Or Bahir*, or *Metaxy*. Malter, following the text he outlines, continues the above quoted passage: "But as we have seen, the finer and subtler an idea is, the more truth and reality it is bound to contain. The transcending subtlety of the God-idea is therefore in itself an irrefutable proof of its verity. God is the necessary postulate of our reason, the ultimate truth, *the sum total of all reality*." These sentences clearly contradict the statement that "the God-idea is of the utmost subtlety, and hence past human comprehension." And also in the outline of the decisive passage on God's essence (p. 206 to Em. II, 4), Malter says: "The idea of a creator necessarily implies life, power, and knowledge," so the God-idea is not "past human comprehension." Had Malter paid attention to the fact that Saadya counts *six* distinct principles, and had he *counted* them in rendering the contents of this important passage, instead of levelling them into one general statement, he could not have formulated it into a statement the latter part of which contradicts its first part. This again is a model of an *eclectic* statement.

Of Malter's outline of the *third* portal the "general reader" will *not* learn even the general idea of the distinction Saadya makes between "Commandments of reason" and "Commandments of revelation," or *moral* commandments and *ritual*

commandments. And yet, Saadya's reasons for the moral laws are very important and lend themselves easily to a *popular* presentation (Has Malter written his outline for scholars?). Indeed, Saadya's formulation of the subject *anticipates Kant's maxim* of the *general applicability* of a rule of conduct as a postulate of its validity and worthiness. In outlining one interesting chapter in this portal (chapt. 8, beginning) Malter says (pp. 209–210): "If a miracle-worker, claiming prophetic inspiration, asks us to accept what our reason considers positively wrong (such as the Christian dogmas of the Trinity, Incarnation, &c.), we refuse to heed his miracles." *First*, the illustration chosen by Malter is in no wise warranted by the text in question. Saadya speaks of prophets who by miracles want to persuade us to transgress ethical laws, such as theft and adultery, trying to bring out the idea that the *binding power* of God's commandments does not lie in the fact of their having been revealed and verified by miracles, but in their being postulates of reason. A little before Malter does say that the prophecy of Moses "is based on the intrinsical ethical value of the message he carried." This is rather too much emphasis on the *ethical* side of the message. Saadya insists on the theoretical and philosophic part of the message just as much. At any rate Malter failed to bring out the idea stressed here by Saadya that the binding power of the laws of reason is, in the *first line*, *reason*, and not revelation. Here again Malter involves himself in the difficult situation he created for himself in his wrong characterization of Saadya's philosophy. This is even more evident from the fact that Malter omits from his outline following passage (Em. II, 10, beginning): "And I will say: Perhaps some people fall short in the keeping of this book (the Torah), because the interpretation of *many of* (in T. add הרבה מן) the commandments is not *explained* (following T.'s reading מבינה instead of מבינה in L.'s edition). And I will say that it (the Torah) is not the only source of our religion, but that we have in addition to it two other sources. One of these precedes it (לפניו — קבלה), and this is the

well of reason (מבוע השכל — יבוע אלעקל), and the other follows after it (אחריו — בערה), *and this is* (in T. add: והוא) the well of tradition." Without any further consideration there is no justification for the elimination of this passage from any, ever so short, outline. But there is here a special aggravation. We have quoted above ("Characteristics") the parallel passage from Saadya's Introduction to the translation of the Torah, a passage likewise overlooked by Malter. Now, for us here these two parallel passages are of first line importance, because in them Saadya emphasizes his attitude that in both, creed and conduct, *reason ranks first*, as the primary source of knowledge, and as the primary power of obligation, respectively. But these parallel passages are of importance also from the point of view of the primary object of Malter's book, even according to its original plan. These two passages compared with each other tell us something about *plan* and *chronology* of Saadya's works. The passage in the Introduction gives a short outline, as it were, of the problems treated in the *first three portals* of Emunoth, to which outline Saadya adds that he will not treat them there. It is clear, that Saadya by the time of that writing had already, at least, conceived the *plan* of writing a systematic book of Jewish philosophy, or perhaps had it already in a short sketch which he worked out later, or on which he was working through the decades of his wanderings, until he finished it in his enforced retirement in Bagdad.⁴⁶

In his outline of the *fourth* portal Malter is more liberal, and he even does not hesitate to present Saadya's enthusiastic hymn on man's *reason* (p. 213), but when it comes to the presentation of the real subject-matter of this portal, *free will*, Malter fails us completely. He says (p. 215): "That we actually possess free will the author proves by Scriptural verses and lengthy philosophic arguments, which cannot here be reproduced." As a matter of fact, Saadya presents here his philosophic argument in one very short statement. This is clear to

⁴⁶ It also should be remarked that Saadya does not discuss the "credibility" (p. 208), but the *credentials* of prophecy.

any one who reads the statements with attention with due consideration of the original. It reads (IV, 4, beginning): "And I have for this *proofs* (following T.) by way of the *sense*, and by way of *reason*, and from what is in Scripture, and from what is in (Talmudic) *tradition*. Now from the *sense perceptions*, in that I found man realizing by himself, that he has the power (choice) to speak, and he has the power to keep silent, and that he has the power to seize, and he has the power to let alone (or: loose), while he does not realize any other power that would prevent him from his desire at all. And there is therein nothing (in T. read ואין ברבר but that he governs his nature by his reason, and if he follows it (in -T. read: ישמע לזה instead of יעשה בן), he is sensible, but if not, he is ignorant."⁴⁷ It is clear that Malter took here the phrases מדרך המוחש and מדרך השכל in their *usual* meaning, and therefore he made it out at a glance that also the following *five* proofs are logical proofs in the *usual* sense. Tibbon translated מן טריק אלהם ומן טריק אלקל literally, and so also the words מן אלמחוסם. But from the following sentence: ישער מן נפסה it is clear that the words מוחש and אלמחוסם are *not* used here in their *usual* meaning of *sense perception*, but in that of *immediate realization*. Thus אלהם here represents really the *one* philosophic argument in favor of free will, as it is also evident to every reader that מן טריק אלקל here does not refer to absolute philosophic proofs, but to *formally* logical proofs drawn from *religious premises*. The real philosophic proof could have been presented in one short sentence. And this short sentence is of special importance. In it Saadya explains that *free will* is *identical* with *reason* (cf. above, the psychological element in the God-conception). This principle of Saadya's philosophy, important in itself, is also decisive in the question of characteristics of Saadya's philosophy in which Malter continuously involves himself.

⁴⁷ Cf. Œuvres VI, Introduction to Proverbs.

Malter continues: "The main difficulty in the way of this assumption is its apparent incompatibility with the idea of God's omniscience." He skips the question of the contradiction between man's free will and God's omnipotence. Why? Is it not a serious problem? Malter, indeed, indicates (p. 216) that the problem of the contradiction between God's omniscience and man's free will was "a dilemma which baffled the minds of all the philosophers of the Middle Ages," as if there were no such problem today. Malter would have obliged many seekers of truth, if he had taken some of the space from Saadya's eschatology, and had shared with them his knowledge on the subject. This would have been more in place than the following criticism of Saadya's solution: "Saadia tries to do away with the difficulty by declaring that God's knowledge of what will occur does not necessitate its actual coming into existence This is about as satisfactory a disposition of the question as the hitching of two horses to a wagon, each one pulling in a different direction, and thus neither one bringing the load forward. Later philosophers, indeed, refused to accept this solution, but Saadia himself does not seem to have suspected the inadequacy of his argument." The merits of Saadya's solution do not interest us here, and, in general, appreciation and criticism are in place in the presentation of opinions of others, even of great authorities. But the way Malter expresses himself about Saadya calls for serious protest. Malter is here again the victim of an "accepted fact." That is the way some recent writers condescend to speak of Saadya and other Jewish philosophers.⁴⁸ Saadya knew his Aristotle better than many an "Aristotelian" of our modern day, who does not understand Saadya, just because he does not know enough of Aristotle. Malter's statement that the later philo-

⁴⁸ Saadya did not know Aristotle, one such writer oracles, because he does not use the conceptions of Potentiality and Actuality; as if he could avoid meeting these expressions in the Encyclopedia of the Faithful Brethren. Saadya does use these expressions in the Exposition of the *seventh* view in the Commentary to Jecirah, and Emunoth I, Introduction.

sophers "refused to accept this solution," is simply *astounding* in sight of the fact that it was accepted by *Hallevi*, *RABD* (Yad, Hl. Theshubah, 5), *Maimuni* (MN.), and others.⁴⁹

Also in Malter's outlines of the other portals there are important points to be discussed. So in the *sixth* portal where the discussion of the different views on soul parallels that of the views on creation. Further in portals *eight* and *nine* the discussion involves Saadya's *metaxy-theory*. But inasmuch as the principles involved have already been discussed, we may defer the discussion of additional points to another occasion.⁵⁰ But we will conclude our essay with a brief discussion of Malter's outline of the *tenth* portal. Here again Malter treats Saadya from an altitude of superiority which is wholly unjustified and unjustifiable: Saadya discusses the virtues, or rather the spheres of life's activities, under *thirteen* aspects. It is quite possible that Saadya stretched a point to get *thirteen*, perhaps as corresponding to thirteen attributes of God. But Saadya leaves no doubt that his aim is to encompass all spheres of activity of man, and to show that in all of them there must be proportion, since the excessive cultivation of one at the expense of the others will lead to disastrous results. He works out this plan before he proceeds to the discussion of life's activities (X, 2): He refers to what he said above (VI, 3) that the soul has three different faculties: the *appetitive*, the *competitive*, and the *cognitive* (following Plato, but differing from him, in refusing to recognize *three different principles* of soul, positing instead *one* soul possessed of three different faculties): "And I have already said above (in T. eliminate:

⁴⁹ Malter's reference to Guttman p. 170, n. 1 does not bear out his statement. Guttman refers only to *Albo* as opposing this solution; Malter evidently took the reference to Ibn Daud as to an opponent; but Ibn Daud does *not solve* this problem, he avoids it by denying the foreknowledge of God in things which are *possible* by their nature.

⁵⁰ As to the *metaxy-theory* in portals *eighth* and *ninth* cf. *Geschichte der jüd. Phil.* I, chapt. 10; Hebrew II, chapt. 3.

הקדם זה) that the soul has three faculties: *Passion, Anger, and Cognition*.⁵¹ Now the faculty of passion is the one that makes man crave for food and drink and sexual intercourse, and find beautiful the beautiful forms and the good aroma and the fine *clothes* (in T. read והמלבושים, instead of: והמשושים).⁵² The faculty of anger, again, is the one which leads man to being courageous, and *ambitious for power*,⁵³ *opiniated* (ואלתעצב) revengeful, and *boasting* (ואלסלה), and the like. But as for the faculty of understanding, it is the one that *puts the strap on the two lower faculties*,⁵⁴ *by justice*.⁵⁵ And *whichever of them or* (following the addition in T.) *any of its "manes" gets excited, then the power of understanding begins considering and examining it*,⁵⁶ and if it finds its *beginning* (in T. read: ראשיתו, instead of: אחריתו) and its end safe, it recommends it, especially if it *foresees* (in T. read: אם יראה, instead of: שתהיה) its end to be good. But if it sees *on its fringe or on one of its fringes* (Saadya keeps up the simile; in T. add: בצד או) some affliction, it counsels its abandonment. And any man who obeys this method, and makes his understanding put a check on his passion and his anger,⁵⁷ he will be *most devout* (אדינא; in T.

⁵¹ Plato's ἐπιθυμία, θυμός, νοῦς.

⁵² Plato's *three passions*; cf. Em. III, 4. 10; Am. pp. 121-122. 140 where Saadya uses the same Platonic classification of human passions; p. 121 Saadya uses: תוויג, p. 140 גשיאן, while here תלקיף, doubted by the editor; Tibbon translated in III, 4 זיוג (eliminate the preceding: תג, ולא תנעם טג), while III, 10 and here תשגל; and it seems that תוויג and גשיאן (Hebr. ביאה, גישה, Ex. XIX, 15) designate lawful, while תלקיף indiscriminate intercourse, as here intended.

⁵³ In T. read והשורה והשורה לאחרים, instead of: והשורה והשורה לאחרים.

⁵⁴ T.: תחכם עלי ידיו [בצדק] על [שני] הכחות האחרים: תחכם here alludes to Plato's simile of the *horses held in check* by the driver, the *guide*, of the carriage.

⁵⁵ The fact, that this word, בצדק, is missing in T. suggests that it is a later interpolation in the original from the aspect of T.'s translation, to complete the phrase ידיו בצדק justice; however, "to bridle by justice" is a good Platonic phrase.

⁵⁶ Tibbon, having missed the point, renders by ענה by סרע, and gives the general meaning of the passage in a free translation.

⁵⁷ Here also T. has: ויפסיל, which shows that also above where the first conjugation is used, with קוף אלחמיו as subject, תחכם is not used in the sense of judging, but in that of *putting a check*.

add: נאמן מאד) in the discipline of the wise ones ..., but any man who makes his passion or (in T. add: א) his anger check his understanding, will not be devout" (T. translates here freely).

Thus Saadya explained *all* the faculties of the human soul, and *all* the life-activities resulting from them, saying that while the *excitements* coming from the two lower faculties of soul have their place in the economy of life, material and spiritual, still man should subject them first to consideration and examination by the cognitive faculty of soul whose *vocation* it is (in the meaning of Plato's doctrine of *unity of vocation*, but, as we will see, in a restricted measure of validity) to rule and to check the lower faculties of soul. And after having thus formulated the *roots* of all activities of human life Saadya proceeds to present these spheres of activity under *thirteen headings*, first those in the sphere of activity of the *lowest* faculty of the soul: 1. *Asceticism* (זהר); 2. *Eating and Drinking*; 3. *Sexual life*; ⁵⁸ 4. *Homosexual love*; then the activities within the sphere of the *second* faculty of soul; 5. *Acquisition of possessions*; ⁵⁹ 6. *Children*; 7. *Civic activities* (אלעמארד); 8. *Longevity*; 9. *Ambition for power*; 10. *Revenge*; then the activities in the sphere of the *third* faculty of soul; 11. *Wisdom*; 12. *Worship*; 13. *Quietude* (Serenity). Within the sphere of activity of the cognitive power Saadya counts also worship, because the worship of God is *practical wisdom*. As to *quietude* he seems to aim at the *Apathy* of the *Stoic Sage* (Zeno reduced all virtues to *ἀρρόνησις*, which already Plato uses sometimes instead of *σοφία*). It is clear that Saadya aims here not so much at *schools of thought*, but at different types of men; although some of the activities and views mentioned really are represented by schools, as in the case of *ascetism*, *homosexual love* (cf. below), and *quietude*.

⁵⁸ Here again: אלינשיאן, because also the lawful sexual life is included.

⁵⁹ *Connecting link* between the lowest and the intermediate faculties of soul; cf. Geschichte der jüd. Phil. II, 1, chapt. Plato, Second Evidence.

In discussing these thirteen classes of life activity, Saadya makes it his task to show that while there is some good in each one of them, in different degrees (perhaps with the exception of 4—cf. below), onesidedness is to be avoided in all of them, even in the search for wisdom, and in the worship of God. The life of man should be arranged so as to satisfy all justified claims of the various faculties of soul, in different proportion, according to the particular conditions of life of the individual.⁶⁰

Now *Guttmann*, although he outlines the above passage in which Saadya develops his plan, and although he refers to Plato as the source (p. 261, and note 1), and although even *Tibbon's* translation clearly suggests that it is the principle of *division* which is worked out here—somehow or other misses the point, and speculates about the question whether these thirteen “*Lebensrichtungen*” were really *historical schools* or just *made up* (fingiert) by Saadya for the sake of polemics (pp. 258, 263). *Malter*, however, goes further than *Guttmann* whom he generally follows. While *Guttmann* speaks of “ways of living” (*Lebensrichtungen*) *Malter* introduces each one of the activities of life as “doctrine” and really lectures Saadya as follows (p. 249): “From among the many schools of living adhered to by the majority of people, the author selects thirteen for careful consideration, A cursory persual of these thirteen doctrines of life as presented by the author, makes it at once doubtful whether they had all come to his knowledge from personal observation. Some of them, as we shall see, are of such a nature that while they may at all times find here and there an individual advocate, they would hardly ever or anywhere become the common view of a larger, organized section of a people, and thus deserve to be raised to the dignity of a doctrine, as is here proposed by

⁶⁰ Cf. *Cusari* III, 5 beg. where *Hallevi* pictures the *Pious*, the Jewish equivalent of the Stoic Sage, evidently using Saadya, using the same verse, Proverbs XVII, 1 and the same picture: *יָסֵד עַל הַיָּדָא*.

the author. Doubtless, Saadia has here again fallen under the spell of his peculiar fondness for numbers" (cf. pp. 257 to 258).

The superior tone in which Malter speaks here of Saadya, would surely not have been used, had he given the chapter under discussion a little more than "a cursory reading" in the Hebrew text:

1. Malter devotes *thirteen* pages to the tenth chapter, but omits the above quoted statement in which Saadya develops his *plan*, and blames him for speaking of *doctrines* where Saadya gives a plan of activities of life. Malter could not possibly have missed this plan had he read the original and become aware of the differences between it and Tibbon's translation.

2. Malter's failure to see Saadya's plan made it possible for him to make other mistakes in his presentation which with the knowledge of Saadya's plan he *could not* have made. He says "from among the *many* methods of living.... the author *selects* thirteen," while Saadya in his plan took pains to show that he is embracing *all* activities of life. The passage on which Malter bases this interpretation reads in Tibbon: ועלה ברעתי, יישירך אלהים, לקבץ משרשי אלה האהבות שלשה עשר. Even in this version it is evident that it means *all* preferences of life. To what does אלה refer? Between this chapter (4) and the one (2) in which he develops his plan, Saadya quotes and explains passages in Koheleth in which *only three* activities of life are mentioned, and he explains why Koheleth has not mentioned *all* activities of life. Read for themselves, however, the words of Tibbon in the beginning of the fourth chapter could, if *necessary*, be forced to mean what Malter found in them. Not so the version accepted by Landauer: עניא :אני אנמע מן הדא אלאבואב י"ג עינא that I present as a *summary* of *these* (the afore-mentioned: אלה האהבות) *thirteen* distinctly (one by one). אנמע does not mean to gather some of many, but to *summarize*, to encompass *all* of the things referred to.

3. Number *four* is interpreted by Guttmann and Malter to embrace heterosexual love and *also homosexual* (boy love). It seems to me that Saadya aimed here *only* at homosexual love, and not exactly at "the abomination of sodomy," as Malter has it (252), but to that ethicized *Eros cult* which Plato is ready to condone and under certain conditions (refraining from "the abomination of sodomy") even to recommend. Saadya would not be the first Jew to protest against this Platonic slip, *Pseudo-Phokylides* preceded him in this.⁶¹ But it must be admitted that there are arguments in favor of Guttmann's interpretation. It would take too much space to refute these arguments, and, the matter not being very important, we may leave this point to a later occasion.

4. The *twelfth* "doctrine" Malter designates as "penance" and the *thirteenth* as "idleness." But אֵלֶּעבָאֲרָה — אֵלֶּעבָאֲרָה does not mean penance, but *worship*, and אֵלֶּרְאָהָה — אֵלֶּרְאָהָה does not mean idleness, but *quietude*. Guttmann has both right, and it is puzzling what induced Malter to this strange translation. As to the *twelfth* it seems that Malter followed too far a clue suggested by Guttmann who calls attention (p. 281, 3) to the *ascetic* note in Saadya's presentation of worship. He, therefore, suggests that in the *first* mode of life Saadya treats of asceticism in its relation to the world, while here in its relation to God. This, of course, is unacceptable: Saadya would not treat the same mode of life twice. As a matter of fact, there is no difficulty: The ascetic note in the *twelfth* mode of life is incidental to worship. In starting his classification of life's activities with asceticism Saadya intended to lay down the principle that the *necessaries of life* (cf. Plato) must be attended to. In treating of worship Saadya wants to show that, though not intended directly, it will incidentally lead up to asceticism. Possibly Saadya thought here of that form of *Sūfism* which was later generally adopted among the educated Muhammedans, pointing out that even this milder form leads to

⁶¹ Cf. Geschichte der jüd. Phil. II, 1.

asceticism.⁶² The same is true of *Quietude*: Saadya wants to show that the Stoic apathy is bound to lead to idleness. But Malter *could not* have made these mistakes, had he paid attention to Saadya's own plan: The last three are activities within the sphere of the *cognitive* faculty of soul.

5. Malter again implicates himself in the question of *characteristics*. The important passage disregarded by Malter is a *parallel* to Saadya's *definition of free will* (IV, 4), that *reason* is freedom, and that man must submit his "nature" to the cognitive faculty of his soul which he declares (III, 10) to be the first binding power for the laws of reason, to which latter passage there is a parallel in Saadya's Introduction to the Torah (cf. above). Malter omitted them all.

6. Also the question of *sources* is involved here. Saadya depends here on Plato and Aristotle, and an *extensive* presentation like Malter's should have made this point clear. Saadya, while adopting the theory of Plato, modifies it not only in that he adheres to unity of soul distinguishing only different faculties (to this Malter attended in portal VI, p. 225, and in a special essay to be published, *ibid.* note 505), but also by refuting the note of onesidedness in Plato's theory of *unity of vocation*, an *attitude* in which another Jew, the author of the *Book of the Wisdom of Solomon*,⁶³ preceded him. *Nahmanides* mentions this book, and, surely, also Saadya had seen it. On the other hand, *Ben Sirach* follows here closely the theory of unity of vocation as formulated by Plato. So much so that he really advocates *leisure* for those who study the Torah and want to be leaders of men. Saadya may have thought also of Ben Sirach while writing against Stoic quietude. This is the more plausible, as there are other parallels in Ben Sirach in this tenth portal, referred to by Guttman (p. 269, 1-3), but passed over by Malter. *Sirach* is a *Palestinian* Jew, preceding the entire Alexandrian movement. Moreover, Saadya is not the first Jew to adopt Plato's theory of soul (with or

⁶² Cf. Yahuda Al-Hidâja, p. 59.

⁶³ Cf. Geschichte der jüd. Phil. II, 1.

without modification), not only because Israeli, late Midrashic literature, and Talmudic literature preceded him, but also because Ben Sirach preceded them all. And also in the *literary motif* chosen here by Saadya, the presentation of the different activities of life under the aspect of the three principles of soul, Saadya was not the first, nor the last. The *first* was Ben Sirach (*ibid.*), and this literary *motif* continued in Jewish literature deep down into the Middle Ages.⁶⁴ In the tenth portal Saadya is representative of a literary motif in ethical literature which starts with Ben Sirach and continues to the time of *Immanuel of Rome*.

To sum up: Malter's book is a unique contribution and an efficient help to those who cultivate the different branches to which Saadya contributed so much. And also the outline of Saadya's philosophy presented in this book, while unacceptable as an adequate formulation of its sources, characteristics, and principles, has the undoubted merit to have brought to the fore a number of interesting problems in Saadya's philosophy which heretofore were either entirely neglected, or hardly touched upon. I believe I am right in my contentions against Malter. But should he take up the discussion again, and refute some or all of my arguments—the thorough discussion of so many important questions in the History of Jewish Philosophy will surely be of help to students of this vital branch of Jewish learning.

⁶⁴ Cf. Geschichte der jüd. Phil. II, 1, Foreword; II, 2, pp. 84–86.

JEHUDA HALLEVI'S PHILOSOPHY IN ITS PRINCIPLES

PREFACE

THIS treatise, as far as I know, the *first* which deals with *philosophy* of Hallevi, intends to supply a lacuna in the modern monographic literature about Jewish philosophy of the Middle Ages. To be sure, there is a great number of essays about Hallevi and his standard-work, the Book of Al-Khazari. Yet, since it was generally accepted as an axiom that Hallevi was an opponent of philosophy at large, none did care for a presentation of his *philosophic* principles. This lacuna I felt especially during my preparatory work for my "Geschichte der jüdischen Philosophie des Mittelalters" the first volume of which was issued in the year past.* Certainly, with regard to other Jewish philosophers, too, I had to revise many a view about the principles of their relative systems; which holds true especially of *Gabirol* and *Maimuni*. But while with regard to others, the task in hand was how to *interpret* their philosophy, here the question whether, or not, we have to deal with a philosophic system at all was to be discussed first. To this task we devoted the *first chapter* of this treatise. What we have to add thereto, is that this treatise, although representing one of the preparatory essays for the second volume of my German work, was projected, and is to be accepted, as an independent whole. In the volume just mentioned which will appear, I hope, in the coming year, Hallevi's philosophy will be presented as a link in the chain of the grand systems built up by the Jewish spirit in the Middle Ages. Nevertheless,

* 1907.

I trust that this treatise will not be considered as a mere interim work of temporary value. It goes without saying that a thorough understanding of Hallevi's philosophy, in our reconstruction of the same, cannot be gained except in its wider connection as set forth in said work, as such is the case with all other systems. Still, in the present essay it is my object to present Hallevi's philosophy in broad outlines which will enable the reader to get a fair conception of it, regardless of its relation to the history of Jewish philosophy in general. Only the relation between Hallevi and his predecessors shall be pointed out, especially in annotations, so as to enable the reader to get a comparatively comprehensive conception of the system we deal with. Special attention will be paid to the relation Hallevi bears to the philosophy of Gabirol from which he had started out, and from which he departed, in order to go his own way. For the same purpose of completing the picture by a few final touches, I herewith preface my essay by the following brief biographic sketch taken from the Jewish Encyclopedia VII, p. 346 f., which, by the way, contains on p. 315 f. remarks about Hallevi's philosophy, which are, perhaps, the best illustration of the superficial manner in which this subject has ever been treated.

Jehuda Hallevi (Arabic, Abu al-Hassan al-Lavi) Spanish philosopher and Hebrew poet; born at Toledo, Southern Castile, in the last quarter of the eleventh century; died in the Orient after 1140. If his birth is correctly assigned to 1085 or 1086 (Rapoport, in "Kerem Hemed," VII, 265), it occurred about the time of the eventful conquest of Toledo (May 24, 1085) by the Christian king Alfonso VI. It is probably that Jehuda's father, Samuel "The Castilian," sent Jehuda, who was his only son, to Lucena to be educated in the various branches of Jewish learning at the school of Isaac Alfasi. On the death of his master, Jehuda composed an elegy (Brody, "Diwan des Abul-Hassan Jehuda ha-Levi," II, No. 14, p. 100). It was probably in Lucena, too, that Jehuda won the friendship of Alfasi's most prominent pupils, Joseph ibn Migas and

Baruch Albalia. Jehuda chose medicine as his profession; but he early evinced a love for poetry and showed marked poetic talent. He was well acquainted with the productions of the Arabic and the Castilian poets; yet the muse spoke to him in the old and sacred language of the Bible, in which "he sang for all times and places, soon becoming the favorite of the people" (Zunz, "Literaturgeschichte," p. 203). He became deeply versed in Graeco-Arabic philosophy also. The early ripening of his poetic talent aroused the admiration of his friend and senior, the poet Moses ibn-Ezra, who accorded him enthusiastic praise (see Luzzatto in "Kerem Hemed," IV, 86; Dukes, "Moses ibn Ezra," p. 987; Geiger, "Diwan des Castiliens Abu 'l-Hassan," pp. 15, 120).

After completing his studies, which he, being in easy circumstances, had been able to pursue deliberately, Jehuda returned to Toledo, where he soon acquired so large a practice that he complained in a letter to his friend David Narboni (Brody, l. c. I, 224, 225) of lack of tranquility and leisure. He married in Toledo; and from allusions in some of his poems it is evident that his only child was a daughter, through whom he had a grandson, also named Jehuda.

Jehuda Hallevi does not seem to have been contented in Toledo; for he removed to the Mohammedan city of Cordova. Even here he did not feel at ease. Though personally he occupied an honored position as a physician, he felt the intolerance of the Almoravid fanatics toward his coreligionists. He had long yearned for a new, or rather for the old, home—for the Holy Land. This yearning was deepened by his intense application to his religio-philosophical work and by his resulting clearer insight into Judaism; and at length he decided to set out on a journey to Palestine. For himself at least, he wished "to do away with the contradiction of daily confessing a longing and of never attempting to realize it" (Kaufmann, "Jehuda Halevi"), and therefore, on the death of his wife, he bade farewell to daughter, grandson, pupils, friends, rank, and affluence. There was only one image in his heart—Jerusalem—

"O city of the world, most chastely fair,
In the far West, behold I sigh for thee.

Oh! had I eagle's wings, I'd fly to thee,
And with my falling tears make moist thine earth."

(*Brody, l. c. II, 167; version in Lady Magnus' "Jewish Portraits."*)

After a stormy passage he arrived in Alexandria, where he was enthusiastically greeted by friends and admirers. At Damietta he had to struggle against the prompting of his own heart and the pleading of his friend Halfon Halevi that he remain in Egypt, which also was Jewish soil, and free from intolerant oppression. He, however, resisted the temptation to remain there, and started on the tedious land route trodden of old by the Israelitish wanderers in the desert. Again he is met with, worn out, with broken heart and whitened hair, in Tyre and Damascus. Here authentic records fail; but Jewish legend has taken up the broken threads of history and woven them further. It is related that as he came near Jerusalem, overpowered by the sight of the Holy City, he sang his most beautiful elegy, the celebrated "Zionide," "Zion halo Tish'ali." At that instant he was ridden down and killed by an Arab, who dashed forth from a gate (Gedalia ibn-Yahya, "Shal-shelet ha-Kabbalah." Ed. Venice, p. 40 b).

I. HALLEVI'S ATTITUDE TOWARDS PHILOSOPHY

It is a deep-rooted error met with in all recent works or treatises concerning Hallevi, either as a poet or as philosopher, that he was unfavorably inclined towards philosophy at large, that he was an antagonist of all metaphysical speculation, and, consequently, that he himself did not build up any metaphysical system at all. It is considered as a matter of course that Hallevi in his book *Al-Khazari* presents *only* a *philosophy of history*, not having any special metaphysical basis, nay, being in strong opposition to, and in apparent contempt of all

metaphysical speculation. It was declared to be the greatest merit of Hallevi that he had set aside chiefly the metaphysical views of Aristotle, and it was, therefore, considered all the more striking and something to be justified, that there could be found a philosophic view about the *Attributes of God*, "a philosophic *Attributenlehre*."

This view which I am about to refute, is based on certain passages in the book of Al-Khazari, in which, I admit, Hallevi often seems to take a hostile attitude towards philosophy. These passages afforded indeed a welcome pretext for escaping the obligation of finding out the *metaphysical principle* that underlies Hallevi's historical conception of Judaism. Also the question of the *relationship between Hallevi and Gabirol* suffered under this extremely superficial manner of treating one of the most interesting and most originally-moulded metaphysical systems in Jewish philosophy. Only the most palpable point of contact, such as the term "Will," was considered worth while to be discussed, and at best also the part pertaining to the presentation of the metaphysical views of the Philosophers (Traktat V). Indeed, of what avail would it have been to ask such a question as whether or not, and how far Hallevi is dependent on the metaphysical views of Gabirol, since it was known beyond doubt that "the spirit dominating in the Khazari is so entirely opposed to Gabirol's metaphysical speculations." (Munk, *Mélanges*, pp. 267-268; tout à fait opposé.)

This view concerning the attitude of Hallevi toward philosophy must be abandoned, after the book has been tested thoroughly without prejudice, and without regard to generally accepted premises:

True, in many passages of his book Hallevi seems hostile to philosophy and Philosophers. Between the Philosophers, he says, there is no agreement as regards any deed or any opinion.¹ The Philosophers came to false conclusions as to the

¹ Al-Khazari, ed. Hirschfeld, Leipzig, 1887, I, 13; English translation, London, 1906.

remoteness of God from man, and as to the eternity of the world. Especially in the fifth dialogue, while developing briefly an outline of the metaphysical views of the Philosophers, he presents some instances in order to show that one cannot reach sufficiently accredited truth by means of logical proofs, that one might spend his life in vain research, without gaining any definite result (V, 14).

Yet, in contrast to utterances of that kind there are many others full of regard for the Philosophers and philosophy. He would excuse the Philosophers for their coming to the conclusion of the eternity of the world, on the ground that they had no tradition about this subject, and human understanding alone had no means to decide this problem in an absolute manner; neither the creation nor the eternity of the world could be realized as provable statements. This concerns especially *Aristotle*, "The Philosopher." Had he had a national tradition in the opposite sense, that is to say, a tradition reaching back to the early times of the first generation, "the witnesses of the creation," he would have undoubtedly endeavored to strengthen this accredited tradition by a logical proof, although it would be a very hard task to find one (I, 65; III, 3, pp. 244-245). The "Divine Thing" (אלאמר) — הענין האלהי — is looking out, as it were, for worthy ones to attach itself to, such as the prophets and the pious ones, similarly the understanding, in its most perfect degree, is looking out, as it were, for those whose character is perfect, and whose souls are in the right ethical balance, such as the Philosophers (II, 14 at the end). They only desire the society of disciples who stimulate their research and retentiveness. Such a degree is that of Socrates and those like him. There is no one nowadays who feels tempted to strive for such a degree, but while the Divine Presence was still in the Holy Land among the people capable of prophecy, some few persons lived an ascetic life in desert places and associated with people of the same frame of mind. These were the disciples of prophets

(III, 1; English, pp. 135-136). Reciting the benediction of Holiness the Pious Man intends to realize in his mind all that the Philosophers attributed to God of sublimity and holiness (III, 17 toward the end). The learning of the Philosophers is nearer to Judaism than that of the Christians and the Moslems. The former, though denying Providence and Creation, are to be pardoned, for they gained of the cognition of God as much as the human understanding of itself, without being aided by Revelation and Tradition, is capable of reaching. In fact, Socrates concedes that he pretends to have but human wisdom, being far from denying the Divine wisdom the people speak of (IV, 13-16). God as the Ruler and Organizer of the world (in the meaning of Natural Law, not in that of Creation and Providence) can be found and recognized even on the ground of logical conclusions alone, as the best of which we have to consider the manner of proving followed by the Philosophers.²

It is out of question that a writer who uses such expressions regarding philosophy and philosophers could be considered as an unconditioned antagonist of philosophy. This is still more apparent when we take into consideration Hallevi's view about *the origin of philosophy* (and the other sciences): The first philosopher was, according to his view, none else than *Adam*. From him came philosophy, through a chain of fit persons, to *Noah*, from him to *Shem*, in whose tribe philosophy remained an heirloom from generation to generation, always possessed of the most pious, and, therefore, most dignified members, down to *Abraham*. It was in the spirit of this philosophy that Abraham composed "The Book of Yetsirah (Creation)." At that time Abraham was already distinguished by *Revelation* which, however, in its true nature is nothing else than the *highest degree of philosophy*. Philosophy is confined

² IV, 15, cf. also I, 97: Even if there had been philosophers who would have proved to the Israelites the Oneness and Sovereignty of God, they would not have refrained from making the golden calf; this even according to the reading of Caspi; see Hirschfeld A. 92.

to the proofs of the human understanding, while Revelation affords new means of proving, as we will see later on. But Abraham was not the only heir of philosophy in the Semitic tribe; the Chaldeans, too, shared in this heirloom, without, however, enjoying the privilege of completing it later through revelation. From these philosophy went over to the Persians, and from them to the Greeks (cp. I, 64 with II, 66, and IV, 17 and 25). And even after the Revelation at Sinai philosophy was a substantial part of the Israelitish national Tradition, in the same manner as were all the other branches of human science cultivated by the members of the Synhedrin and the scholars eligible into that high body. There was also quite a literature about these subjects, but in times of national distress, persecution, exile, and wandering, the leaders of Judaism did not care for this literature with the same attention as for the practical, legal, and historical parts of the national tradition, necessary for the guidance of the people in its daily conduct, both moral and religious. So it happened that the philosophic and scientific part of national Jewish literature was gone, except for a very small remainder, as The Book of Yetsirah, and the like (cp. II, 15-64; III, 39-40 a). Hallevi lays special stress upon the fact that the whole Greek wisdom was drawn from books translated from Hebrew, the original source, into Greek and Latin; according to the view of Hallevi, this is a fact of literary history, sunk into deep oblivion (II, 66).

This view of Hallevi about the origin of philosophy, wide spread in the literature of the Middle Ages (cf. f. i. *Maimuni*, M. N. I, 71, II, 11; Engl. Transl. of M. Friedlander, 1885, II, p. 56), is an effective instance against the supposition of a determined disinclination towards philosophy in the mind of Hallevi. It was only the insufficiency of the *philosophic method*, the logico-notional conclusion, which Hallevi took as a general viewpoint for the presentation of his own philo-

sophic system.³ And even this is said only with reference to certain problems as Creation, Providence, the soul as an individual substance which may have an existence outside of the body, and the like. Concerning these problems the human understanding needed the aid of Revelation, while in others it could and did find the truth through means and forces of its own; nay, even as regards the cognition of God as Ruler and Organizer of the world, the human understanding, philosophy, is, as we have seen, a reliable source of knowledge. In some of his objections against the Philosophers, probably under the literary influence of Ḡazālī, Hallevi is going too far, farther perhaps than he wanted to, at any rate farther than his own standpoint would allow him. But to say on the strength of this that the work of Hallevi "in its general attitude and in its principle thoughts" calls to mind Ḡazālī's "Tahāphot," or to speak of Hallevi as a man "who in reality seems to aim at banishing speculation completely out of the province of Religion, and who resistlessly surrendered himself to the influence of a work that does not allow the Philosophers to state anything about God, neither to affirm, nor to deny"—that is a misleading exaggeration, resulting from an absolute misunderstanding of the leading thoughts of the work of Hallevi.⁴ So is also the endeavor to demonstrate that in spite of his disgust with philosophy Hallevi recurred to a philosophic *Attributenlehre*, "claiming the use of logical means for religious speculation," futile inasmuch as it was just the logic, the logical manner of proving, which Hallevi declares insufficient.⁵ What does it matter, when Hallevi (V at the beginning) says that philosophy, harmful for the true believer,

³ I, 13. הוא הדת ההקשית המנהיגית, מביא אליה הענין; Arabic: هو الدين اלקوامي السوامي; מדוי אליה אלנפר.

וואס גמשיד דרכי ההגיון, לקיים הדעות בם ולבטלם, יכלו החיים בלעדי תולדה; V, 14, pp. 325-326; Arab.: ואן תתבעה טרוק אלמנטק לאתבאת אלארא סיה ולאחאלתהא. This we find with *Saadya* too; Emunoth, introduction toward the end: Arab., ed. Landauer, Leiden, 1880, pp. 24-25.

⁴ Cf. Kaufmann, *Attributenlehre*, pp. 128-134.

⁵ Ibid., p. 135.

has some value only for him who is already wavering in his faith? He says the same about his own views which are alleged to be merely historical, free from all metaphysics. Does Hallevi refer to any tradition concerning them, I wonder? On the contrary, he declares repeatedly that he is presenting his own views only, without claiming any traditional authority, and that they are the result of his own speculation which had better not been entered into.⁶ Does Hallevi refute his own philosophy of history, too? And yet, that would be the indispensable consequence!

Remarks of that kind that their works are not composed for him who is firm in his faith, only for him who, having tasted some philosophy, has been shaken and thrown out of his religious balance—are found in almost all the prefaces to the works of all Jewish philosophers. True, Hallevi overdoes in this respect, but it is sufficient to call to mind that even *Maimuni*, who is universally recognized as a philosopher, insists upon the incompetency of philosophy concerning the problems of Creation and Providence. Moreover, Maimuni with his proof as to the probability of Creation did nothing else than carry out the hint given by Hallevi: As one who had a national Tradition about the Creation, he considered himself obliged to strengthen this tradition by a logical proof. And Hallevi himself accentuated this even more, when he endeavored to solve the problem of the contradiction between man's free will and Providence by dialectical means (V, 20). Neither can the statement of the insufficiency of the human reason in finding out the fitting details in religious, and, to a certain extent, even in moral law, often repeated by Hallevi, be claimed in favor of the opinion that he assumed an antagonistic attitude towards philosophy.⁷ For the first who introduced this thought into

⁶ I, 91, II, 26 at the end, 49, 56, 60; III, 23, 37, 49, 65, pp. 212–213; IV, 31 at the end.

⁷ So Kaufmann, *Attributenlehre*, p. 122 f. Concerning p. 137, 54, with reference to II, 26, I would also remark, that the subject spoken

Jewish philosophy, was none else than *Saadya*, the uncontradicted "first" Jewish philosopher, who, indeed, was the greatest epistemological *dogmatist*, unshaken in his faith in the absolute power of human understanding, in its unlimited capability of solving every problem, always and forever. Less weight than all that has preceded, has the fact that Hallevi obviously disagrees with certain systematic statements of the philosophers, to prove his disinclination toward philosophy. Such disagreements we find with all Jewish philosophers; moreover: in the very substance those disagreements concern the same questions as with Hallevi.

Especial attention must be paid to Hallevi's attitude towards *Aristotle*; and with this consideration we enter already the more particular characteristic of Hallevi's philosophy.

First of all there is the gross misconception to be refuted, which has found expression in sentences such as the following: "The thinkers have not found the truth, and Jehuda Hallevi ventures against the head of the philosophers, the idol of the Middle Ages, Aristotle, called 'the divine,' the *bold word* that even He is not deserving of our confidence in his science (I, 64-65). It is thinking distrusting itself, it is the self-realization of Faith, *forcefully* refusing all connection with philosophy, that is expressed in this utterance" (Attributenlehre, p. 122). Here the fact is ignored that among Jewish philosophers throughout the Middle Ages there is no one who had not ventured "that bold word" against Aristotle with regard to the erroneousness of many of the peripatetic metaphysical views. Most strikingly was this done, as we know, by *Maimuni*, the accredited Jewish Aristotelian, and not, as one might suppose, by his sharp-minded critic, *Crescas*, who is said to take equal rank with Hallevi in forcefully refuting philosophy. On the contrary, in the decisive questions of

of is not, as K. apparently supposed, "philosophy" in general, but the speculation of Hallevi himself, that metaphysical speculation which underlies his own world-view, and which is maintained to be non-philosophic, in any case non-metaphysical.

Creation and Providence, *Crescas* failed in his endeavor to escape peripateticism. Therefore we have no right to suppose that Hallevi refuted philosophy, at least as long as we are not willing to do so in regard to Maimuni as well. If we test the book of Al-Khazari without any preconceived notion, without an especial interest to find in it just what was found with Gazālī or elsewhere, we find that to Hallevi Aristotle was "the philosopher" in the true meaning of this term. Moreover, we find this in the very passage in which "that bold word" occurs (compare also I, 73). Hallevi is well acquainted with the works of Aristotle (viz. V, 2, 8 a). *It is the spirit of peripateticism* which underlies his interpretation of the Book of Yetsirah (IV, 25). The mere term "philosophy" in the language of Hallevi means the philosophy of the Arabic Aristotelians (I, 1-4, V, 2 ff.). But most important and most decisive is the evidence that the philosophic system of Hallevi is built upon the metaphysics of Aristotle.⁸ The neo-platonic elements annexed to the system of Hallevi, are there more secondary even than in the system of Gabirol. The same is to be said of the Platonic theory of Ideas toward which Hallevi displays an obvious inclination. The Ideas do not upset at all the main viewpoint that form is the principle of becoming immanent in bodily beings—a viewpoint which we recognized as the very distinction between the Platonic theory of Ideas and the Aristotelian theory of matter and form.⁹ Besides, Hallevi does not hesitate at all to emphasize the superfluity of Ideas in the well-established divine order of Creation.

⁸ About the difference between the Physics and the Metaphysics of Aristotle as well as about the corresponding two groups in Jewish philosophy, the *Saadya-Group*, on the ground of the Physics, and the *Gabirol-Group*, on the ground of the Metaphysics, compare my "Geschichte der jüdischen Philosophie des Mittelalters," Georg Reimer, Berlin, 1907, pp. 160, 178, 474, 500, 511 f., 566, 590, especially pp. 319 f., 503, 522, 525 a. Hallevi belongs to the Gabirol-Group, compare there pp. 166, 510, 561; in general concerning Hallevi, pp. 5, 47, 159, 165, 183, 245, 281, 308, 479, 572, 575, 592 a.

⁹ Ibid., p. 349 f.

Hallevi's main sources are: Jewish literature in its widest extent, and the works of Aristotle. The central standpoint from which Hallevi interprets Jewish literature is that of Aristotle in his *Metaphysics*. But if we inquire into the *immediate* source which furnished the particular shade of peripateticism as presented in the system of Hallevi, we can betake ourselves neither to the "Encyclopedia" of the "Pure Brethren" nor to other neo-platonic works. The slight reminiscences usually considered in support of the neo-platonic attitude of Hallevi, indicate merely that Hallevi, as we are always willing to concede, had known those works, read them, and took from them some conceptions, phrases, figures, and thought-combinations. But as to the basic thoughts of his system as well as regards his manner of presentation, *the system of Gabirol* is the only one to be referred to.

II. THE CENTRAL PROBLEM AND THE STRUCTURE OF THE BOOK OF AL-KHAZARI

The Jewish philosophers of the Gabirol-Group to which Hallevi belongs, while they do not yield to the philosophers of the Saadya-Group in emphasizing the oneness of God, are not able to realize the conception of the *uniqueness* of God in Being in such a strict and absolute meaning as the latter. The independent being of the hyle in potentiality means the existence of a principle of being besides God, even if we reduce this other being to the lowest degree of that term by depriving it of every capability of entering the consciousness of a perceiving mind. The philosophers of the Gabirol-Group could not overlook that to establish a primitive material principle means a shifting of the center of gravity from the pure and simple uniqueness of God in existence to the uniqueness in a certain *criterion* of being. And, indeed, these philosophers do not hesitate to declare God to be only the principle of being in actuality, in other terms, they declare God to be the *principle of becoming*, in a farther reaching meaning, however,

than Aristotle does. The being of matter, of the material principle, is lacking in the most realizing criterion of existence, in the actuality, in the possibility to come to light. This light the hyle receives from God whose being is unique in actuality. The most thoroughgoing difference between our two groups roots therefore in the conception of the uniqueness. According to the Saadya-Group this conception is not complete, unless it is perceived in the extreme sense of existence in whatever kind of being, while the Gabirol-Group desists from drawing this strong logical consequence, and contents itself with the uniqueness in the actual existence, and with the superiority of being the only *principle of form*. And, as if to compensate for this lack, the philosophers of the Gabirol-Group endeavored to deepen and widen the thought of God as the principle of becoming, as the principle of form. Gabirol and his closer adherents did so in developing the principle of form in a metaphysical superstructure of a world rich in spiritual substances, built upon the foundation of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*. They transcended the natural matter, the only matter of Aristotle, and supposed a continuation of it in a Higher World. Hallevi does not belong to the closer adherents of Gabirol in this sense. He endeavored therefore to reach the same goal, viz., the enrichment of the form-principle, by means of an *historical superstructure* upon the basis of the natural matter of Aristotle. This parallel in the structure, however, is not the only one which points to the influence of Gabirol's system upon Hallevi. The whole construction of the system, to mention for the present only the outward parallels, the whole manner of presenting it, puts it beyond doubt that the standard-work of Gabirol, *Fons vitae*, was Hallevi's pattern for moulding his *Al-Khazari*. The dialogue form; the manner of questioning; the discussion leaping from one problem to another; the habit of introducing questions the solution of which must be deferred; the interruption of the main thread of the discussion in order to treat preliminary problems more fully than the principal problems themselves;

the anticipation of statements that are to be deducted only in a later, more developed, phase of the discussion; and, in consequence of this, the necessity of repeating the same thoughts; the beginning with the principal problem which can be solved only at the end of the main discussion; and, finally, the most important outward criterion of his treatment upon the discussion of which we are about to enter—all this together indicates the dependence of Hallevi on Gabirol. Of course, of ultimate decisive value in this regard is the fact that Hallevi starts from the same principal problem, and, although developing and formulating it anew and in a different manner, he solves it on the ground of the same metaphysical principle as Gabirol. Hallevi belongs to those Jewish philosophers who present their system within the frame of the *problem of attributes*. We will show elsewhere the importance to be ascribed to the fact which is in the first place interesting as a bit of literary history, namely, that many Jewish philosophers of both groups based their philosophic standard-works on the problem of attributes as a leading motive.¹⁰ Since for the present it is sufficient to show that Hallevi, too, belongs to this group, and that the principal problem of the Al-Khazari is nothing else than that of the Attributes. This problem, accordingly, is the central point of crystalization in the composition of the book of Al-Khazari:

The philosopher, who is the first person introduced in the discussion with the King of Khazars, starts out, at the very beginning of his answer, from the problem of attributes. His first statement refers to the sublimity of God, and to his remoteness from every relation to man, and, in general, from all being whatsoever. The exaltedness of God above all referability to anything outside of his own essence is the very source of the whole philosophic world-conception. Especially the two main questions in which the opposition of Hallevi to

¹⁰ Cf. my *Geschichte der jüdischen Philosophie*, pp. 479, 490, 493, 495, 500 a. Naturally the subject is treated there in broad outlines only. The proper treatment of this question is to be presented in the second volume of said work.

the philosophers is condensed, such as Creation and Providence, are decided by the philosophers out of this viewpoint. The philosophers deny the creation, because it means to put God in a certain mutual relation to another being, apart from the question whether the latter is a creature of his, or not (cf. also Maimuni, M. N. II, 13, 3). Instead of the creation in its usual meaning, the philosopher puts the neo-platonico-peripatetic conception of it, the theory of emanation after the fashion of the *theory of spheres* (I, 1). It is known that the theory of emanation is the very solution of the problem of relation in its metaphysical sense, gained by Plotin as the result of his endeavor to escape the necessity of perceiving God as the Creator in relation to some other being as creature; overlooking, however, that this theory does not save the oneness of God except at the expense of His *simplicity*. For emanation involves a multiplicity in the very substance; a consideration which afforded to the Jewish philosophers the main point of attack upon this theory.¹¹

Opening the discussion with the problem of relation in its most general meaning, embracing the metaphysical as well as the ethical problem in all its aspects which we will learn in the following (besides the other aspects of this problem which we learn in the clearest manner in the philosophy of Maimuni), Hallevi, however, does not intend to engage our attention just for this part of the problem. The metaphysical problem of relation formed the center in Saadya's view about the attributes, and in the whole philosophic system of Gabirol. But as to Hallevi we will see later on that he considers this problem as *solved*. It is, therefore, only the ethical side of this problem which Hallevi is drawing in the foreground of the discussion in its very beginning. The King of Khazars points to the contradiction between the principles of Christianity and Islam and those of the philosophers. The dogmas of Creation and Prophecy (the latter understood as

¹¹ Cf. about this subject my *Geschichte der jüdischen Philosophie*, pp. 151, 167, 394, 406, and, especially, p. 533 ff.

the most inclusive term for Providence) in those two religions contradict entirely the extreme philosophic conception of God and his exaltedness above all relation. And after introducing the Christian Scholastic who posits metaphysical and practical (prophetical and ethical) attributes of every kind (4, 5), without making any effective objection to this creed (probably for the well known reason), Hallevi begins the critique of the Islamitic creed, formulated by the Doctor, with the all embracing practical question, namely, with that of the relation involved in prophecy. The Doctor lays stress upon two dogmas, that of Creation and that of Prophecy, but Hallevi *neglecting* the first, devotes all his attention to the problem of relation offered by the dogma of Prophecy. The possibility "that God speaks to man," the belief "that God has intercourse with man," that is the problem which Hallevi puts at once in the center of the following discussion.¹² This question which contains the whole problem of relation involved in the conception of the ethical divine order in the world, as it is the starting point of the dialogue, so it does not cease to keep this important position throughout the whole book in all its complicated turns. The discussion of this problem and its solution are the essential theme of the four first parts of the book, while the results gained there are the ground for the critique of the peripatetic theory of emanation on one hand, and afford the view for the solution of the problem of man's free will on the other hand (part V). Hallevi does not return any more to the metaphysical problem of relation, he rather supposes the metaphysical relation of God to another being as admitted, and discusses the ethical problem of relation on the ground of the conception of creation based upon this view. God created the world means that God, as the form-principle, moulded matter which in its potential being is a

¹² I, 6: אמר לו המדע: מי שרוצין ליישר אותו בדבר האלהים, כי האלהים מדבר עם בשר ודם: (אן אללה יפלא אלבשר), והוא מדחיק זה, צריך לברר אצלו דברים מסודרים, שאין מדחה להם: אמר המדע: אין הדעת נוחה להורות, שיש לבורא חברה עם בשר ודם (אן אלאלאה מתצל: I, 8: במדע: cf. also I, 68, 87 at the beginning; II, 51 a.....

self-sufficient eternal principle, independent of God. This is the evident intention of the Rabbi, the representative of Judaism in its amplifications from the very beginning.

The distinction between the two meanings of the problem of relation reaches back, at least in its objective effectiveness, to aboriginal biblical times. Elsewhere we have shown that the prophetic world-view is formed from a pure ethical viewpoint, without any attitude at all towards the cosmological question, and further that, nevertheless, the ethical view of the prophets tended to complete itself by disclosing the cosmological aspect of the question, and to become an ethico-cosmological world-conception. The Dogma of Creation although developed and formulated in a later phase of the Jewish religion, becomes afterwards, it was shown, the central viewpoint in the discussion of the most important thoughts, and in the formulation of the fundamental principles of Judaism.¹³

In this light we have to understand the standpoint of the Rabbi in this matter:

The Rabbi refers in the first place to the marvellous events in the history of Israel, such as the exodus from Egypt and the like, and to the prophecy of Moses and the prophets. These significant happenings by which Israel was distinguished, and not the creation of the world, is claimed by the Rabbi to be the basis of Jewish creed. The reference to the creation as the foremost underlying teaching of religious truths, he says in answer to the question of the king, is the method of proof used by a religion based on logical speculation, and, therefore, liable to many doubts. Judaism, too, bases its belief in the existence of God on a proof, he says, but in the first place on the evidence (הראיה אלעין) which requires no other arguments (11-15). And having been allowed to continue his speech, the Rabbi starts also from the problem of attributes,

¹³ Cf. my article "Ikkarim" in "Otsar ha-Yahaduth." Ed. "Achiasaf," Warsaw, 1906.

or, better, he reveals that his first reference to historical events was formulated from this point of view: If thou wert told, he asks the king, that the people of India was guided in a righteous and virtuous manner, would this bind thee to revere the King of India as a righteous and virtuous man? And as the king hesitates to bind himself to reverence of a person the existence of whom he has to suppose on the ground of mere hear-say, the Rabbi continues: But if his messenger came to thee bringing presents procurable only in India, just in the royal palace there, and a benevolent message in a special letter, would this make thee obedient to him? Now the King concedes the existence of the King of India, and the Rabbi induces him to take a stand in regard to the mentioned attributes: How wouldst thou, then, if asked, describe him? The king answers: By attributes which became evident to me by sight, and to these I could add others which were *at first* rather doubtful, but became evident by these later ones (15-24). That is to say: The attributes "righteous" and "virtuous" were the first data about the King of India which reached the King of Khazars. But he had no reason to suppose the existence of a king of India, and how much less to believe him possessed of the mentioned attributes, for there was a possibility that the Indian people was righteous and virtuous due to its own *nature*, without any king. But after having entered a personal relation with the King of India by the presents and the message received from him, there is no doubt about the existence of a king in India; more than this, the King of Khazars is now compelled to describe the King of India with attributes resulting from his own relation to him, such as "*my* benefactor" which is evident *to him* by the sight of his eyes. But now the King of Khazars has a good reason to acknowledge also the attributes "righteous" and "virtuous" which were doubtful before. A benefactor must be not only existing but also "righteous" and

"virtuous."¹⁴ In this way the Rabbi justifies the beginning of the Ten Commandments with ethico-historical evidences instead of the cosmological view of creation: Reference to the creation of the world and the marvellous order in it would not be sufficient, since there would be yet a possibility that all this is the result of mere *nature*. But after they were distinguished by a special divine benevolence, especially by prophecy, by the attachment of the "Divine Thing" to them, the Israelites had a good reason to believe in the existence of God and to describe him by the attribute "Creator," which embraces all the others, as we will see later on. The parallel between the instance of the King of India and the central problem in discussion is clear and throws a light upon the subject: The very essential qualities of the King of India from which all the others are to be derived, are those of righteousness and virtuousness. The attributes "righteous" and "virtuous" are, then, the *ratio essendi* of the attribute "my benefactor," while this latter and all of that kind are the *ratio cognoscendi* of the existence of the King of India and his essential qualities. Likewise, the essential attributes of God are those which are involved in the *primitive attribute* "Creator," they are, therefore, the *ratio essendi* of the ethical attributes expressed in the divine guidance of the Israelites. The essential attributes for themselves, however, are not per-

¹⁴ I, 24: אמר הכוזב בתארים, אשר התבררו אצלי לעין, ואחבר אליהם אשר היו ספק אצלי והתבררו: באלה האחרונים.

קאל אלכווי באלצמאת אלתי צהת ענדי עינאז חם אִתְּבַעְחָא באלתי כאנת משכוכה ותכִּינִת בהרה אלואאכר.

Compare Hirschfeld's edition, p. xxii, ann. 33, to the Hebrew text. The difficulty which this passage afforded to the interpreters, is to be ascribed to the fact that the special stress laid here by Hallevi upon the viewpoint of attributes was overlooked. According to our interpretation there is no more difficulty. In the Arabic text there is a reading משהוּרָא "known," instead of מִשְׁכּוּכָה "doubtful." According to our interpretation this reading is intelligible enough; the essential attributes "righteous" and "virtuous" were known before, since they were the first data, but they could not be verified except by the later data. And this was the reason for the Rabbi to begin with the later data at once.

ceptible except by indications given in the ethical attributes, thus the latter are the ratio cognoscendi of the essential attributes.¹⁵

With this statement Hallevi reaches that viewpoint which is to become the center in the development of his thoughts. At once the King of the Khazars became aware that Judaism does not claim at all to be a *universal religion*. For historical evidences, the ratio cognoscendi for the perception of God in Judaism, concern exclusively the Jews; the other nations, in accordance with this statement, were not obliged to revere the *Jewish God*, nor to accept Jewish religion, and also not called upon to. Hallevi does not think so, his aim is to show the intention of Judaism to become a universal religion (as we will see in the following). But as for the present Hallevi puts the idea of the exclusiveness in the foreground, because it affords him the desired opportunity of introducing the central viewpoint of his philosophy. Yes, answers the Rabbi, that is so.¹⁶ To justify this, the Rabbi explains his view of the different degrees of being in the world the last intention of which is to establish *a new one*. The usual view of *four* degrees: Inorganic, plant, animal, and man, is to be revised. Even the most developed individuals, the great scholars and philosophers who represent the distinguishing feature of mankind, the understanding, in its highest degree, have not reached yet the highest degree of being in this world. For there is another sort of being in this world the distinction of which from the other beings below is not a mere matter of degree but of kind, of species. The prophet, and generally he who is possessed of the "Divine Thing," represents a new

¹⁵ This subject, to be largely discussed in the second volume of my work mentioned above, will be made clearer in chapter IV of this sketch.

¹⁶ The Rabbi adds (I, 27), but any individual (that is the meaning of *בְּיָחִיד*, not "unconditionally" or "ausschließlich," as in Hirschfeld's translations; Cassel has it right: "jeder Einzelne") of the Gentiles who joins us, shares our good fortune, without, however, being quite equal to us. We will see in the following that this is understood only in regard to *pre-messianic* times.

species in the scale of being. Instead of *four* we have to posit *five* kingdoms of nature the highest of which is that sort of man who is distinguished by the attachment to him of the Divine Thing, in its many shades of intensity; from Moses, the great prophet who represented the highest rank in this most perfect species of being, to the last fellow-Jew, representing the lowest rank of it.¹⁷

These, the virtues and deeds and miracles resulting from the attachment of the Divine Thing, are "some of the attributes" of the prophet which were the ratio cognoscendi to the people for the recognition of the ethical attributes of God represented in the historical evidences, and from this recognition they came to that of the essential attributes involved in the dogma of Creation (43). Now we see Hallevi taking pains to explain his *conception of Creation*. Like a current coin does the opinion go through all the commentaries of Hallevi's book and philosophy that Hallevi was an adherent of the creation out of nothing in its traditional sense. This opinion must be rejected. A deeper consideration of the passage under discussion, and others, teaches us beyond doubt that Hallevi stands here on the ground of the Gabirol-Group; besides, it results from his metaphysical principle we are about to present in the next chapter. What Hallevi wants to establish as a Jewish dogma is only the tradition that *this world* is created. In the apology of the dogma of creation Hallevi starts from the question of the *Jewish era* (44). This world, the world we live in, is the only subject of the Jewish tradition. To justify this belief is the only aim toward which all the disquisitions of the Rabbi about this subject, the era, the differentiation of the languages, the week, and the like,

¹⁷ I, 25-42, especially 39: אשר החבר: איני רוצה לושר אלא טעלה תפוד את בעליה:

פירוש עצמית, כחפד הצטח מן היום, וחפד האדם מן הבהמה.....

קאל אלחבר לם איד אלא רחב תפוד תפוד צחבתהא טפוד נהרית כטפוד אלנבאת ללנמאר וטפוד אלנמאר ללנמאר.....

In the following, it will be seen, Hallevi emphasizes this thought in a more expressive manner.

are to lead (44-67). Hallevi says this clearly and expressively enough: "If, after all, a believer in the Torah finds himself compelled to admit an *eternal hyle* and the existence of many worlds prior to *this* world, this would not injure his belief that *this* world was created a certain time ago, and that Adam and Noah were (sc. in *this* world) the first human beings." Here and elsewhere Hallevi leaves no room to doubt that he is an adherent of the eternal hylic principle which in its potential being is self-sufficient and independent of God.¹⁸ With the statement of the potential hyle as an eternal material principle, and admitting that Creation means only a moulding of the potential hyle by God, the form-principle, Hallevi declares the metaphysical relation of God to another being admissible, and he formulates anew the problem of the most extensive ethical relation, namely, that of the prophetic relation. The king returns to his starting point: "Now take up the thread of thy *earlier exposition*, how the great conviction became fixed, that the Creator of body and mind, of

¹⁸ I, 67: ואם היה מצטרף בעל התורה להאמין ולהודות בחומר קדמון ועולמים רבים קודם העולם: [הזהיר], לא היה בזה פגם באמונתו, כי העולם הזה הוא חדש מוזן ידוע, ותחלת האדם אדם ונח. ובעד אן ילנא אלמתישרע אלי אלחסלים ואלאקראר בהיולי קרימא ועואלם כתיירא קבל הדיא אלעאלם לם [יכן] מי דלך משען מי אעתקאדה אן היה אלעאלם הארת מנף פדא מחצלן ואיל נאסא אדם ונח.

Kaufmann, *Attributenlehre*, pp. 138-156, finds this utterance "incomprehensible" in the mouth of Hallevi, and he quotes, therefore, the Arabic text without giving any decision about its meaning. But the Arabic text is here more decisive than the Hebrew. ילנא is more expressive than מצטרף. The believer cannot be "compelled" by other means than *logical ones*. And besides, our passage is not the only one of that kind in Al-Khazari as apparently supposed by Kaufmann. In IV, 25 (pp. 278-279), Hallevi quotes the interpretation that "Water" in the account of the Creation means the formless hyle moulded to receive qualities by the Will of God, and he finds this interpretation "very proper"; cf. also V, 2, and Abraham ibn Ezra to Gen. 1, 2. An inkling of this interpretation we can find in I, 95, too. In V, 14, Hallevi refutes only the theory of the "four elements." This is the theory of Aristotle, which Hallevi finds in Yetsirah (IV, 25, pp. 270-271), returning soon after to his own view (IV, 26-28). In III, 53, the four qualities are spoken of, which Hallevi admits.

soul, intellect and angels—He who is too high, holy, and exalted to be grasped by the mind, to say nothing of the senses; that He *holds intercourse* with this creature, low and contemptible in its *matter*, although wonderful in its *form* (as the smallest worm shows the wonders of His wisdom in a manner beyond the human mind)?”¹⁹ Replying to this question, the Rabbi launches a large discussion against *Aristotle's* definition of *Nature*. We will understand this better by a more careful glance upon this definition.

Aristotle gets his definition of nature out of the contrast to *Art* (téchne). “The beings because of nature altogether, Aristotle says, seem to have their principle of motion and rest in themselves. Some of them in regard of place, others in regard of growth and decay, and others in regard of change; while a sedan-chair or a coat, and whatever of this kind, each of which is named by such a special (generic) term, and as far as they are products of art, have no moving force dwelling in them. And if such (artificial) things are accidentally composed of stone or earth, or combined of both, they have, then (a moving force in themselves), but only as far as there is some indwelling principle and cause of motion and rest by its original nature, for itself, not accidentally.”²⁰

¹⁹ I, 68: שיחיה לבורא חבור עם הבריאה הזאת הנכונה הטובה בהטרה, ואם היא נכלאה בצורתה.

Hirschfeld, Engl. translation, p. 54 (and similarly in his German translation, p. 21): “that He holds intercourse (more proper in the German: ‘Beziehung,’ relation) with *creatures made* of low and contemptible *material*, wonderful *as this may seem*.” But this is not the only place that Hirschfeld, in his free translation, obliterates, and even destroys, the pregnant thought of the original. And yet our translation is imperatively demanded by Arabic text, too: בהוא אלזלך אלחקיר אלדמים פי טארתה ואן פי צורתה עינא. Also Cassel's translation of this passage, p. 34, is unclear and misleading.

²⁰ Physics (Didot, Paris, 1878, II) II, 1, 1–2: Tà mén gâr physei ónta pánta phaínetai échonta en heautois archên kinéseōs kai staseōs, tà mén katà tópon, tà dè kat' auxēsín kai phthysin, tà dè kat' alloiōsin. Klínē dè kai himátion, kai eí ti toioúton állon génos estín hē mén tetychēke tēs katēgorias hekástēs kai kath' hóson estín apò téchnēs, oudemían hormèn échei metabolēs émphyton,

Aristotle, who anywhere else is in the habit of supporting his statements about natural things by examples taken from products of art, defines here his conception of nature in a manner quite in accordance with his view we recognized elsewhere. A real form-principle is to be ascribed only to natural beings, while that of artificial things has a reality only as a mere logical category.²¹ This view of Aristotle's—one of those which, although formulated originally in the *Physics*, do not appear in their whole systematic importance but only in their consequences in the *Metaphysics*—had to be first overcome by Hallevi when on the point of establishing his metaphysical principle and his central viewpoint. On the one hand Hallevi, standing on the ground of Aristotle, must point out his view that only the material principle is to be separated from God as self-sufficient in its potential being, and on the other hand he has a good reason to contradict the inferiority of the artificial form-principle posited by Aristotle. These two features are of very great importance for the world-conception of Hallevi. As to the first we must remember that according to Aristotle in the *Metaphysics* there are *two* principles independent in their pure being from God, that of matter and that of form. Gabirol, the first Jewish philosopher who tried to build up a metaphysical system on the basis of the *Metaphysics* of Aristotle, struggles with this *trinity* the root of which we have to seek in the Platonic theory of God moulding matter after the pattern of the Ideas.²² The "Will" in the system of Gabirol is partly the result of a compromise between the *duality* in the spiritual principle with Aristotle and the absolute oneness aspired to. Hence the undetermined position of the Will in the philo-

hē dē symbēbēken autois einai lithinois ē gēinois ē mixtois ek touton, échei, kai katà tosoūton, hōs ousēs tēs physeōs archēs tinōs kai aitiās toū kineistai kai ēremein en hō hypárchei prōtōs kath' hautō, kai mē katà symbebekós.

²¹ Cf. my *Geschichte der jüdischen Philosophie*, Book II, chapters 2 a. 3, especially p. 305 f.

²² Cf. my *Geschichte der jüdischen Philosophie*, pp. 381–382.

sophy of Gabirol, wavering between identity with God and separateness from Him. Hallevi, more consistent in this respect than Gabirol, rejects the duality of the spiritual principle in determined and clear words. There are no "two natures" (dyo physeis) besides God, as Aristotle says,²³ for the other principle, the spiritual one, is but *God himself*. As to the second feature Hallevi can not admit that the artificial form-principle is a mere logical shadow without reality. In the next chapter we will see this more particularly and more expressively, as for the present it is sufficient to recall to mind that Hallevi is about to build up a new kingdom of beings on the ground of the natural matter. This new kingdom, being an *historic* one, can not be established except on an artificial form-principle.

Corresponding to the first question the Rabbi says that the term nature is misleading unless understood in its application to natural qualities. For the very form-principle which causes the organic formation, is to be identified with God. "All I can see, the King says, is that they (the philosophers) have misled us by these names, and caused us to place another being on a par with God, if we say that *Nature* is wise and active. Speaking in their sense, we might say: 'possessed of intelligence'" (that is to say a spiritual principle besides God). "Certainly," answers the Rabbi, "but the elements, the sun, the moon and the stars have powers such as warming, cooling, moistening, drying, &c., yet they do not merit that wisdom should be ascribed to them, or to be reckoned more than a function; while *forming, measuring, producing*, and all that shows an intention, can only be ascribed to the *All-wise* and *All-mighty*. There is no harm in calling the force which arranges matter by means of heat and cold 'Nature,' provided one refuses to ascribe to it wisdom. For instance the faculty of *creating* the embryo must be denied to man and woman, because they but aid

²³ Cf. *Ibid.*, p. 307.

the *matter* in receiving the *form of man* from the *wise moulder*. Thou must not deem it strange that exalted divine traces should be visible in the world below, *whenever this matter is disposed to receive them. And this is the root of faith and the root of disobedience.*"²⁴

The problem of relation, presented by prophecy, so we have to understand the answer of the Rabbi, is to be solved from the viewpoint of the right definition of Nature. Nature is not a spiritual principle along side of God, for He is the only form-principle as far as we intend to convey by this term a spiritual principle. This is not yet the proper solution of the problem, but Hallevi gained here the central viewpoint of his philosophy: the *disposition of matter to receive a certain form*. The conviction that God alone is able to endow this disposition, that is to say, that God alone is able to determine the conditions and the measures in the combination of differently constituted parts of matter, which would enable it to receive a certain form—this conviction and the rule of conduct based upon it, is the root of faith. Likewise, the opposite opinion which ascribes to man the power to find the right way of worship by means of his own, namely, by a moral life according to exclusively human laws, and especially, by religious exercises on the ground of human speculation, is the root of disobedience. This thought is the transition from the first of the two features mentioned above to the second. To the king's question, how the root of faith can be also the root of disobedience, the Rabbi answers: "The means which cause the disposition for receiving this divine trace, do not lie within the reach of man, and he is not able to determine their quantity and quality, and even were they to know their substance (the proper material), they do not know the right time, the right place, the right

²⁴ I, 69-77: וזהו שרש האמונה ושרש הכפירה — והוא זה אצל אטליסאן ואצל אלעזראן. This formula is the key to the whole book of Al-Khazari, and of great influence upon the standard-works of the Kabbala; cf. my *Geschichte der jüdischen Philosophie*, p. 202, 1.

manner of composition and the right arrangement. For this purpose one needs a perfect and entirely detailed instruction from God. He who has gained this message, and complies with it in all its terms and conditions with a devoted mind, is a believer. But he who strives to get this instruction by means of speculation and deductions, and by taking in consideration what is to be found in the writings of astrologers, or manufacturing talismans, such a man is a disbeliever. For he brings offering and burns incense according to his own deduction and opinion, whilst he is in reality ignorant of what is necessary (concerning the substance), how much, of which quality, in which place, at what time, by whom (of the different classes) of men, in which manner it should be done, and many other details the enumeration of which would lead too far." (79)

In a word, the Rabbi emphasizes his standpoint that, on the one hand, the possibility of preparing to receive the "Divine Thing" in this world underlies no doubt; and that, on the other hand, this preparation can not be had in the right manner, unless done according to an expressive and detailed instruction through revelation, written and oral. It results from Hallevi's attitude toward the definition of Nature given by Aristotle. There is no self-existing spiritual principle dwelling in the bodily beings, for every step behind the body leads us immediately into the sphere of the only spiritual form-principle, into the sphere of God. The universal essence is exhausted by the two only principles of being. There is nothing else in existence than the form-principle, or God, and the material principle in its potential existence. The emanation of a form into a matter, disposed to receive it, is always an *immediate one* (cf. below).

The becoming of a natural being is in each and every case a new creation. It is, therefore, understood that there can not be any difference in principle between a natural and an artificial combination of materials having certain qualities. Of course, such an artificial combination must take

place according to divine wisdom, the only source of the natural form-principle, too. We see, the difference between Aristotle and Hallevi concerning the second feature is important and thoroughgoing. According to the view of Aristotle there is no possibility for a *continuation of the natural becoming in history*, for the historical becoming is always an artificial one. There is no place for creating a new kingdom of beings on the ground of natural matter. The different principles of form which dwell in matter are fixed, and all changes performed by art can not be but of accidental importance. There is no way for supposing certain ceremonial and ritual exercises to have the power of causing a substantial becoming in nature which interferes in the course of historical events, in order to make of both, nature and history, one higher unity, one higher system of being and becoming. And yet, all these impossibilities according to the view of Aristotle, are just that new world which Hallevi is about to build up. We understand now why the Rabbi prefaces his answer to the question of how God can be supposed to have intercourse with man, by the discussion of Aristotle's definition of Nature. For only after this definition has been refuted, could Hallevi establish his leading viewpoint out of which the solution proper of the problem was to be undertaken and accomplished.

And now we are able to control the entire structure of the book of Al-Khazari, however complex and complicated it may seem to be:

The *central problem* of the book is that of attributes with the whole train of problems implicated in it. The starting point is the ethical problem of relation in its chief aspect, namely the prophetic relation. The discussion of this problem proceeds in the first dialogue, as we have seen, step by step, in a strictly systematic manner, until the principle viewpoint Hallevi has chosen for the presentation of his metaphysico-historical conception of Judaism, is arrived at; the viewpoint that all becoming in Nature and History results ultimately from changes in the disposition of natural matter

for receiving the form-principle in its manifold and generically different manifestations. This viewpoint shall be called henceforth "the viewpoint of disposition." Now it might be expected that Hallevi would take up the interrupted thread of the discussion of the problem of attributes, of "the first problem," as it is pointed out by the King of Khazars after his conversion to Judaism.²⁵ But Hallevi does not do so. He considers the territory as not yet sufficiently prepared for the solution proper of the problem, he inserts, therefore, a series of subsidiary researches. The subjects of these questions certainly occupied his mind because of their own special importance in the view of Hallevi; apart from this, however, the purpose is apparent to prepare the mind of the reader for the discussion and solution of the chief problem. These subsidiary questions concern: 1. The manner in which Judaism has developed, grown, and become established; whether and how far it did take place in a natural way, little by little, or at once, suddenly, by properly disposing the believers for a higher form-principle, and by emanation of it (I, 80–87). 2. The incorporeality of God and the attitude of Judaism toward idolatry; and in this connection Hallevi explains all about the golden calf from the viewpoint of the common root of faith and disobedience (I, 88–97). 3. Hallevi goes back directly to the viewpoint of disposition in order to show that the artificial, religious disposing act for a higher form-principle is a sensitive one, and therefore as easily annihilated by every change in the conditions as is the same process in natural becoming (I, 98–103). In connection with this, Hallevi takes pains to show that the reception of the "Divine Thing" is the highest spiritual joy we can imagine. And that is why the Thora does not make any promise in regard to the life hereafter. The gross pleasures and enjoyments promised by other

²⁵ II, 1: סאל טא סאלה—סאל יתברך אל הבורא יתברך—סאל טא סאלה. ותרלת כה ששאל אותו על השמות והמדות השיוחסות אל הבורא יתברך. ען אלסמא ואלסמא אלסמא ואלסמא אלסמא אלסמא.

"The first of these questions referred to the *names and attributes* ascribed to God."

religions are inferior to this singular advantage enjoyed by every true adherent of Judaism (I, 104-117). At the beginning of the second dialogue Hallevi returns, then, to "the first problem," to that of attributes in its *general meaning* (II, 2-7). Now it would be the time to differentiale the problem of the prophetic relation from the other aspects of this general problem, and to take up the interrupted thread of its discussion. But Hallevi does not do so. Instead of continuing the direct discussion of the problem, he engages our attention for detailed questions in regard to the most perfect disposition for the Divine Thing. The main condition, the proper people, was discussed above (I, 98-103), and now Hallevi points out the others, such as the proper land, Palestine (II, 8-24), the temple in Jerusalem, and again the people (II, 25-28, 29-44), the proper religious ceremonial, and the proper conduct in all manifestations of life, according to the proper ethical and ritual laws (II, 45-66), and finally, the Hebrew language (II, 67-81).

The habit of repeating and taking up again questions which had already been sufficiently discussed, or which, at least, could be sufficiently treated and dismissed, there and then, as they were introduced into the discussion, is a peculiarity of Hallevi's manner of presentation. Partly, however, we can justify this by taking into consideration, that between the first and the second discussion, Hallevi puts forward the most decisive thought in the solution of the problem proper (II, 26; comp. below). The discussion about these subjects preceding the formulation of said thought prepares and disposes the mind of the reader for the same; while the discussion following it rounds it out and gives it a final finish. Likewise the *third dialogue* is to be understood in a similar manner. To illustrate the common root of worship and disobedience in all its aspects, Hallevi sketches, after the model of the *Stoic Sage*, the life and worship of the Pious Israelite, "the Servant of God," and this sketch affords him a convenient opportunity for elucidating a series of important questions, from the viewpoint of disposition (III, 1-23). The

true servant of God strives for the "Divine Thing" in the right way by means pointed out in the written and *oral* law. For it holds true not only of the principal laws for getting the disposition, that man can not find them by speculation of his own, but also of their explanations given in the Holy Scriptures; especially in the Pentateuch; for even these are not sure and reliable unless based on the *accredited tradition*. Hence the great failure of the *Karaites*. The root of faith became to them the root of disobedience. For endeavoring to worship God on the ground of their own interpretations of the written law, they strayed from the right way and disturbed the harmonious disposition for the Divine Thing guaranteed by the written law in its traditional interpretation (III, 23-74). Now Hallevi returns to the chief problem and brings its discussion to a finish, adding many after-thoughts concerning the different aspects of disposition, such as the people, the land and the like (IV, 1-23). With the solution of the chief problem the systematic aim of the book is reached; the rest is given, and is to be taken, as an appendix containing several subjects which are not integral parts of the presentation itself, although the discussion of them throws often a new light upon the systematic view gained hitherto, and although one of the most important systematic problems, that of man's *free will*, is solved but in the fifth dialogue. (We can say also that the appendix indicates the *sources* of Hallevi's philosophy, and reveals the arguments of his discussion with the Arabic Aristotelians.) The first of these subjects is an interpretation of the Book of Yetsirah based upon the Metaphysics of Aristotle (IV, 24-27), and, as the philosophy of the Book of Yetsirah was introduced as a branch of the *Hebrew science* of old, Hallevi takes also a survey of the other branches of science cultivated by the old Jews in biblical and talmudical times, as this was commanded by the law in order to enable the religious leaders of the people to find the proper means and the right way for getting the disposition looked for (IV, 28-31). The last dialogue, the fifth, outlines the

philosophy of the Arabic Aristotelians, and Hallevi's objections to it (V, 1-14); further the proof of the Kalâm for the dogma of creation (V, 15-18), and Hallevi's theory of man's free will, the summing up of which is, anyhow, but a recapitulation of the principles of Hallevi's philosophy (V, 19-20); and he closes the discussion of the subject matter with a demarcation of the limits of the human understanding, since, according to the principles of Hallevi's philosophy, most of the questions embraced by the *problem of theodicy* are beyond all human grasp (V, 21). Finally, it is in accordance with the very spirit of the book, that the Rabbi, after he has got through with all his supplements, expresses his personal desire to kiss the dust of the holy soil, in the holy city of Jerusalem which, according to his conviction is, even to-day, the only proper place for getting the most perfect disposition for the Divine Thing (V, 22-28).

For our presentation we have selected the most decisive passages spread all over the book and united them in the following chapters.

III. THE METAPHYSICO-HISTORICAL WORLD-CONCEPTION

It is the idea of the *plan of solution* manifested in the history of Israel, traced by the prophets (beginning with Jeremiah) and by the Talmudists back to the very beginnings of the world, and still further, which we have to consider as the underlying traditional element of Hallevi's world-conception. The new frame within which Hallevi moulds this ancient thought, generally by enlarging and deepening the philosophic elements thereof, might be characterized as the *continuity of Nature and History*. Philosophers and theologians agreed that the course of history has nothing to do with the circling of matter through the kingdom of forms. It is this agreement which Hallevi breaks up, pointing out that the circling of matter is not confined to the natural becoming alone, but is to be followed up from here into the course of

history. The movents of history, like those of natural becoming, result from the varying dispositions of the material elements to receive a certain spiritual form-principle. Of course, we have to pass beyond the form-principle usually supposed to be the highest matter is capable of receiving. We have to cease to consider the most perfectly developed human understanding as the highest form matter ever received. A new, a higher rung must be added to the known scale of forms, namely the *Divine Thing*. But the cognition that the special historical form is of a higher kind, does not alter the *new view of matter being the common substratum of both, Nature and History*. Nature and History form one continuity, and their common movent is the circuit of matter through the, now increased, kingdom of forms. All historical events are in connection with the appearance of the Divine Thing on earth, and this Divine Thing is, in its chief aspect, nothing else than the highest kind in the kingdom of forms. By this highest form-principle the natural becoming interferes with the course of history, or more exactly, in this highest stage of becoming Nature *becomes* History. It is, rather, a mere point of language, when we distinguish this part of becoming by the name of History. There is only *one* becoming, one circuit of matter through the kingdom of forms whose highest is the Divine Thing. And further: History in its original meaning reaches back to the beginning of natural becoming. For the Divine Thing was never absent in the world. Its appearance dates from the *first man* on earth, and since it has never ceased to be present. The different degrees in which the Divine Thing appears, the ebb and flow thereof on earth, determine the course of history. There is no difference between the Divine Thing and other forms in regard to their relation to the eternal matter. Both, the so-called natural form and the divine form, are alike dependent on the disposition of matter, and this is to be said concerning the degree, the intensity of their appearance, too. The form of a plant, of an animal, or that of man, can not appear

unless a certain part of matter has reached the disposition for it, but it *must* appear whensoever and wheresoever the necessary disposition is gotten. The same is the case as regards the divine form, too. It can not appear as long as the disposition for it is not gotten, but it must appear on every part of matter prepared and disposed for it. And as there has never been a condition of being on earth in which matter has been bare of all form-principle, the same holds true concerning the divine form, too. We will soon understand this, when we take into consideration that a particle of matter disposed for a certain form means that it had gotten already all the forms below this new one it is to get now. The appearance of the form "man" e.g. presupposes matter which had gone through the three kingdoms of nature below him, the "last matter" in the language of Aristotle.²⁶ Once we have recognized this, we can not but proceed to perceive the form-principle in its very lowest manifestation as determined by the intention to force matter through the entire scale of forms until it will reach the highest. This is what is meant by the "general steresis" (deprivation) in the philosophy of Aristotle. Human understanding is the final aim of Becoming according to the view of Aristotle, but this highest aim is indicated in the very lowest form that has ever appeared in matter.²⁷ It is the same as regards the divine form, representing the new, the fifth, kingdom of being. Its appearance presupposes the existence of men gifted with understanding, this latter completing the disposition of matter, and qualifying it as the "last matter" for the divine form. The last matter for the Divine Thing, then, must be possessed of the whole scale of forms represented by the four lower kingdoms of nature. It is understood, therefore, that the general steresis in its extension, according to the view of Hallevi, which

²⁶ Cf. my *Geschichte der jüdischen Philosophie*, p. 342.

²⁷ About Steresis comp. my *Geschichte*, &c., pp. 305 ff., 309, 354 ff., 363 (especially), 375, 377, 471, 517, 522 a.

On the lower grades of becoming *blind* nature itself performs the disposition, i.e., the movement of matter from one form to another, a higher one. But after this movement has reached that point of becoming in which the new form appears as a self-moving principle, we see how living nature interferes in the process of becoming. Animals which are increasing because of copulation, aid matter in getting the disposition of receiving higher forms, thus they share actually in the process of becoming. About the conditions of the disposition, however, the quantity and quality of the particular ingredients, especially about the inmost principle of the chemical mixing the result of which we know in the phenomenon: life, escape the knowledge of even the highest animal, man. And Hallevi is convinced that the searching human understanding will never get behind the secret of the principle of life, even as it failed to do so in the past. This view which is recognized also by many modern thinkers, Hallevi argues out by emphasizing the chief principle of his philosophy that God is the only form-principle, and therefore, he alone and none else, is able to perceive the organizing principle; the complex combination of differently constituted elements which precede and prepare it; the subtle

With this passage comp. *Gabirol* "Fons vitae" ed. *Baeumker*, 319, 20-320, 24; Hebrew הבקשה לשועל הראשון: V. 51 (in Munk, *Mélanges*, &c., Paris, 1857): יתברך וההליכה אצלו מתפשטת בכל, אלא שהוא מתחלפת בהתחלף הקרוב והרחוק. ודמיון זה, כי החסר הפרטי ישתוקק אל הצורה הפרטית, כחסר הצטח ובעלי חיים, המתנועעים בהירה, לקבל צורת הצטח ובעלי חיים, והם נפעלים לצורה הפרטית, והצורה הפרטית פועלת בהם. וכן הנפש החיונית תשתוקק אל הצורה, הנאותה לה, כלומר הטוחשת. וכן המדברת תשתוקק אל הצורות המושכלות. והה, כי הנפש הפרטית, והיא הנקראת: השכל הראשון, היא בתחלה כחסר הטקבל לצורה, הוא השכל השלישי, יצא לשועל, ויקרא השכל השני....

The Hebrew השתוקק in *Fons vitae* is the translation of the Arabic الشوق used here by Hallevi. The "longing" of a disposed matter for a higher form is the general steresis in the *Metaphysics* of Aristotle. It is evident that Al-Khazari, V, 10, is based on *Fons vitae* V, 52. *Gabirol*, speaking about the *particular* matter, stops at human understanding, as the last stage, and does not touch his metaphysical superstructure which lies in the sphere of *universal matter*; whilst Hallevi continues the chain into his metaphysico-historical superstructure which is built, like the natural system of beings, on the particular, natural, matter.

interplay of increasing and diminishing of widely differentiated molecules whose vibrations, so sensitive yet so intensive, produce life. True, human understanding found out so many a mechanical, nay, dynamical condition in the development of the organizing principle of life, but it is just the most decisive step, the last impulsion, in the disclosing of which our reason falls short, and must continue to do so forever. And the same is to be said of every new form-principle that matter has to get in its course through the scale of forms, whatever it may be. For this last impulsion which alone decided the surging up of a new being to the surface of becoming matter, is the very secret of mixing, the eternal mystery guarded by Him whose essence we dare to grasp by means of the conception of a matter-moulding form-principle. However, living nature, first of all man, however insufficient his capacity may be in grasping the very secret of mixing, is called upon to co-operate in the natural becoming, at least in preparing the outward conditions, by furnishing and transforming the material elements, and by gathering them to a certain center of organization.

We are, therefore, justified in saying that nature on every level, even on the lowest, has the power, the "*might*," to co-operate in lifting up a lowly disposed matter to its own height. Even the faint capability of movement of plants contributes to the transformation of an inorganic matter into an organic one. More apparent than this is the co-action of living nature in bestowing the disposition upon matter of lower qualities, such as the inorganic bodies and the plants. Sometimes we see even in this blind natural power the first ray of *sensibility*, the forerunner of *consciousness*. The color sense of the butterfly is something like a sensual perception of beautiful form, and the co-operation of this insect in the fructification of the (papili-onaceons) flower is to be considered as the beginning of the interference of creatural "wisdom" in the disposition of matter for higher forms. And the higher we ascend on the ladder of beings, the stronger and the more evident becomes

this co-operation of the creature in the natural becoming. More developed animals have a dim consciousness of the form-principle, and finally, man co-operates in the becoming of new beings in the full consciousness of what he does, inspired and compelled by his cognition of the importance of the form-principle, and by the emphatic delight which certain forms cause to him. The "attributes of the creatures," in the language of *Gabirol*, emanated from the "attributes of the Creator" are co-operating in the continuation of the creation. That was the divine plan of creation. As creation, that is to say, the moulding of potential matter, is an emanation from God's essential attributes "Mighty" and "Wise," also the "traces" of these attributes, the attributes of the creatures, are co-operating; especially man, as being created in the divine image, he in whom those traces appear most evidently. And yet, even this most prominent co-worker can not get behind the mystery of the right disposition, even he does not know the hidden conditions of the life which he himself produces. His knowledge is large and rich, he has gotten several means by which he is enabled to influence the disposition of matter, such as cross- and inter-breeding of plants and animals, and even of different races of mankind. Thus man finds out the outward circumstances and conditions the result of which is the disposition of matter for forms below him, and for those of his own, too. And more than this, man is able to find out the outward aspects which condition the disposition of matter for the natural form-principle in its highest intensity, the most highly developed *capability of logical thinking*. For man is able to find out and to formulate the ethical views by which mankind should be guided, and the ethical deeds are the continuation of those outward proceedings which determine the disposition. *The moral deeds of a man influence the last chemical composition of matter*. A man of a highly developed mind, both ethically and spiritually, has a different matter, too: his body, especially his *blood*, is *possessed of other chemical qualities*, of higher, finer, more sensitive ones than

those of his fellowmen below him. This means, therefore, the highest degree of co-operation in which human understanding is engaged. Thus they, who by means of their own speculation had found the ethical laws, have reached the highest title possible, that of co-worker in the divine creation on the highest level accessible to the influence of the attributes of the creatures.

We understand now the deeper meaning of Hallevi's statement that human understanding can not find the right means for accomplishing the proper disposition of a matter in order to evoke on it the appearance of the Divine Thing. This statement was supposed to be merely an expression of religious modesty, moreover, it was considered an evidence of Hallevi's hostile attitude toward philosophy at large. And yet, now we see that it follows just from the *metaphysical view* of Hallevi's system. Man has no knowledge of the secret of the chemical mixing ultimately conditioning the appearance of the form-principle, for no creature's capacity reaches beyond its own level. While we have seen human understanding co-operating in the outward conditions in all stages of becoming below it, and even in that of its own, we can not ascribe to it the same capacity as regards a form which is higher than it. Had the latter the knowledge of *how* to comply with the last composition needed for the appearance of *any* new form, that is to say, had human understanding an insight into the *reason why* a certain aggregation of qualitatively determined molecules compels a new form to appear, it would then, certainly, find the conditions for the divine form, too. For there is in reality only *one* form-principle which appears in different manifestations, although these different manifestations mean different genera and different species. The secret of mixing, consequently, is also *one*, so that he to whom this mystery would be disclosed in *one* case, would know it in *all cases*, from the lowest natural quality to the divine form. And as this is not so, as the very secret of form-principle is hidden forever, even to Moses, the prince of the prophets, who reached

the highest possible degree of the divine form; since the knowledge of the creature, be it a man or an angel, is confined to the outward conditions—there is no possibility for human understanding to find those conditions for the divine form. It is as if we were to try to realize the idea of an animal which knows the outward material conditions for the appearance of human form.

It is, then, the plain consequence of this theory that as the outward conditions of the human form can not be grasped by any creature below it, those of the divine form can not be recognized by any creature below itself, either. If human understanding in its lower degree is able to find the ethical laws by which it is enabled to evoke a higher degree of human intelligence, the reason for this is understood that the movement to a higher degree does not pass beyond the limits of the genus; whilst the difference between the highest degree of human understanding and the lowest of the divine form is a *generic* one. Human understanding, therefore, even in its highest degree, although it is able to find the ethical laws, has no way to divine the right way of worship, to conjecture any ceremonial or ritual laws, "the commandments of revelation," serving the purpose. For as does the conduct according to the ethical laws, so does that according to the ceremonial and ritual laws, too, *cause a new, generically different chemical composition of the body, especially of the blood.* The lofty spiritual habitus of a man gifted with the divine form is the necessary result of the higher chemical composition of the body, even as any natural form is the result of the disposition of its "last matter." The last matter for the divine form is human body chemically re-melted and refined by the purifying and sanctifying ritual, by the "Thou shalt" and the "Thou shalt not." *The natural, ethical and ritual, or religious becoming of matter is one continuity*, the lowest of which is the becoming in the sphere of the early natural qualities, and as the highest of which we could, then, perhaps, consider the burning up of incense by the High-priest

in the Holy of Holies on the Day of Atonement, a ceremony the right manner of which was the subject of a controversy between Pharisees and Sadducees through centuries.

Seen in this light, the question of the limits of man's knowledge of the ceremonial and ritual laws concerns the metaphysical basis of Hallevi's system. To understand this fully, we must refer to Hallevi's attitude in *the problem of the criterion* between creator and creature in connection with the "*theory of spheres*." The criterion of non-divineness, according to the view of Hallevi, is *composition*. To be a creature means to be composed of matter and form; hence to be a creator means to be a pure form. God alone is a pure form, while in all other beings, be it a stone or an angel, or an Idea in the Platonic sense—if we have to concede the existence of such beings at all—the form-principle is encumbered with potential matter.²⁹ In connection with the problem of attributes, it is to be understood that the emanation of the form-principle into matter can not but imprint in it traces of the essential divine attributes. To know the secret of mixing means to be a pure form-principle. Engaged in the passive rôle of being composed, the creature can not look behind this composition to grasp its mystery.³⁰

²⁹ Comp. my *Geschichte der jüdischen Philosophie*, pp. 561–565, where Hallevi's standpoint as regards this problem is thoroughly discussed.

³⁰ About this whole discussion cf. I, 42, but this passage is based on the viewpoint applied to the *miracles*, cf. below.

אבל יש ליסודות ולשמש ולירח ולכוכבים וכלם על דרך החסום והקירור וההרעבה I, 69–77
והיובש, והתלויים בהם, מפלי שניהם לחם הכמה רק עבודה (מן גיר אן ינסב אליהא הכמה בל סכרה). אבל
הציור השיעור וההרעה, וכל אשר יש בו הכמה לכונה, לא יתוהם כי אם לחכם הכול, המשער. ומי שקורין
אלה שמתקנין החומר (אלתי תצלה אלמאדה) בהסום ובקרור: טבע, לא יזיק, כשמתחיק סהם ההכמה:
כאשר ירחיק מהאיש והאשה יצירת הולר בהתחברם, אך הם עוזרים לחומר (המא מן אעיאן אלמאדה) המקבל
צורת האדם טאח הציור ההכם.

The contrast of *הכמה* and *עבודה* in Hebrew does not fully correspond with that of *הכמה* and *סכרה* in Arabic. *סכרה* means "base servitude," Hebrew עבודת־טם, that is to say, a mechanical function devoid of any influence upon the *plan*, or even any perception of it. In contrast to mere power, "might," of nature, Hallevi lays stress upon the two essential

Such is the *metaphysical foundation* of the system of Hallevi. Its historical superstructure Hallevi erects in the following exposition:

attributes of God: "Mighty" and "Wise." In the following (79) Hallevi sets forth that it is impossible for man to find the right manner of disposing matter for the Divine Thing (cf. above). He does not say here that even the outward conditions for the Divine Thing are hidden from man, but he does so elsewhere, cf. IV, 7, 13, 14 a, and in the light of these passages we feel this also here in the words ... ועל הדרך הזה היו בני אדם קודם משה... For this is the opinion of Hallevi: The outward conditions for the Divine Thing were revealed to Adam, from whom they came down in their exact form only to a few chosen ones of the later generations, while the multitude got only an obscure and confused knowledge of this tradition, and the result of this confused knowledge was an ill-conceived worship, idolatry. This is the deeper historical meaning of the identity of the root of faith and the root of disobedience.

אמר החבר: לא יקום ויגדל על הדרך הזה, אלא הניסוחים השכליים, אשר התחלם בן האדם. I, 81;

I, 99; of the sacrifices: כלם בניאור טהא האלחים, שלא יחסר מהם דבר קטן, ויפסד הכל. כמו ההיות השבעיות, אשר הם מתחברים ביחסים דקים, לא תשיגם התחשבה לדקותם: אשר אם יארע מכשול ביחסים ההם, היתה נפסדת ההויה ההוא, ולא היתה הצטח ההוא, או החי ההוא... ואין בעבודת האל סברא, ולא הקשר, ולא התחבטות....

אמר החבר: כן, הרס זה, שאתם אוסרים, שסעליה בן הכרם. אלו לא היו גומעים בו הנמים: II, 12, ועיבדים האדמה הראמה להם, לא היה עושה ענבים.

Cf. II, 48-50; III, 7: המעשים המנהגיים והחוקים השכליים הם הירועים, אבל האלהיים, אינם ידועים, עד שיבואו טאעלו סודשים ומחולקים. הנוספים עליהם, לחול באומות אל חי שינהיגנה, אינם ידועים, עד שיבואו טאעלו סודשים ומחולקים.

Thus the ceremonial and ritual law can by no means be divined by man, not even within the limits of the outward conditions which he does divine with regard to the scale of beings, including himself.

כשיחישב בנפש צדיק ברא החיים ומנהגם בחכמתו, ושארן הרעות משיגות: III, pp. 158-159; פרישה, אבל משיגות כללה, במה שהם רואות ספקן הבריאה בהם, ומה שכלל מחסילאות, המורות על כונת הכם והסין, יודע ויכול....

Ibid. 17, pp. 164-165: שחכמתו ונהגתו ביצירת הנפלה והדבורה איננה מקצרת מחכמתו: והנהגתו לשמש וללגלג (Comp. I, 68) ואך מיטני החכמה וההשגחה יותר דקה ונפלאה בנפלה ובדבורה, ובאשר נשע בהם מהנחות והכלים" (למא וזע היהא בן אלקוה ואלאלאת) עם קטנותם.

The contrast between *חכמה* and *מיטני החכמה* is the contrast between "attributes of the Creator" and "attributes of the creatures"; we completed the Hebrew text according to the Arabic.

Ibid. 23; from: ולא נחכם אנהנו במרה: until: וכבר דמיתי לך:

Comp. ibid. 50 with reference to the Karaites, and 53, where the parallelism between the natural and the ritual disposition is discussed at large.

IV, 25, pp. 268-269; from: על הציווי השכלי: until: ואלו היינו יכולים:

In general Hallevi expatiates on these thoughts in his commentary to the Book of Yetsira. The *sum* of them we find in V, 20, 2-4.

The right disposition for the divine form was bequeathed by Adam to the best and most selected of his posterity as far down as *Abraham*, and by the latter, in the way of a rigid selection, to Jacob, numberless collateral lines being excluded. The tribe of Jacob was the first from which there was no necessity to exclude any lines, for it was in all its parts and branches well qualified and worthy to be the vessel by which the divine form interferes in the course of natural becoming in order to lift it up to the height of historical becoming. But even within the house of Jacob there were differently disposed tribes, the highest of them being represented by the tribe of *Levi*, amongst it being the most distinguished, on the one hand, the *family* of the High-priest *Aaron*, and, on the other hand, an only individual, *Moses*, the prince of the prophets, who at once embodied the highest manifestation of the divine form possible, for ever and aye, for man to ascend to. Besides this disposition on the ground of birth-right, there was also a special way for the members of this people to reach a higher degree of the divine form, the way of a proper and befitting *education* as it was afforded by the "School of Prophets."

It is, we see, a special *physiological* disposition which underlies the idea of Selection of Israel in the system of Hallevi. "Israel amidst the nations is like the heart amidst the organs of the body" (II, 36). When Hallevi says so, it does not mean a mere picture, it is rather to be taken in the full physiological sense of the word. The blood of Israel, *blood* literally, achieves the most subtle chemical composition; Israel, therefore, is the best disposed people for the appearance of the Divine Thing on earth. Israel is the center of the blood-circulation of mankind. And, consequently, the condition of this people is a sensitive graduator in the entire vacillating course of history. The more the intensity of the Divine Thing on earth is diminished, the more Israel is disturbed in accomplishing its central function in the world, and is subjected to sufferings of all kind.

That is one aspect in the special disposition of Israel, its racial peculiarity. To this come others, important and decisive alike: The *Land: Palestine*. The special disposition of Israel can not perform its true function except in the right land, "the air of which makes wise." This is, in a manner of speaking, a *chemical* postulate. With the exception of Mount Sinai which was destined to become the place of appearance for the highest degree of the divine form manifested in the halo on the countenance of Moses, there is no place on earth the climate of which is as fitted to produce and preserve the necessary disposition as the climate of Palestine, the land of prophecy, "the land the *eyes of God* are always looking upon." All prophecy has taken place in Palestine or, at least, had reference to it. The most proper place in this land is, of course, the holy city of *Jerusalem*, the center of which, the *Sanctuary*, was hiding in its midst the most sensitive and fittest place on earth, the *Holy of Holies*. Then the *Language*. The language is the emanation of the national spirit of a people; it is its effect, yet at the same time also its cause. The language moulds the thought and the spiritual habitus of the nation. Similarly all other languages mould the minds of their respective nations, in order to enable them to reach the highest intellectual capacity; yet none of them is capable of giving the last disposition for prophecy, for the divine form. The Hebrew language is the only one the use of which would dispose the sense-organs of man to be vessels for the Divine Word. The qualities of this language, its *physiological peculiarities* (Hallevi enters here into the merits of the grammatical phenomena of the Hebrew language) correspond with the physiological demands of the right disposition for the divine form. To these general conditions is to be added the "right deed," the very aim of the instruction the King of Khazars asked for. The right deed, according to the right instruction, in the right place, at the right time, performed on the right material as substratum, in subtle and sensitive proportions of extensity and intensity—all these aspects together are indispensable, if natural becoming is to be trans-

ferred to its highest degree, to that natural becoming we are accustomed to call History.³¹ Betwixt the two aspects of the parallelism *Macrocosmos* and *Microcosmos* Hallevi intercalates a third, an *intermediate one*. In his system the parallelism consists of three links: Israel with its sanctuary and its national service is a true image of the Cosmos on the one hand, and a true image of man on the other.³²

In this way nature and history become united in one continuity. For it was the appearance of the divine form which inspired the mind and caused man to perform those deeds the entirety of which we distinguish by the name of History. And it was at the time Israel entered the arena of History that this inspiration by, and efficiency of the divine form reached the height of their importance and evidence. And at that time, the time of the highest development of Israel's historical power, as it was the aim of the past, so it became the impetus for the historical movement in all future. It is the proportion to the state of affairs at that time which we have to fix as a standard in order to appreciate the historical dignity of the general world-conditions at a given time. And, just as in ancient time, it is Israel whose condition we have to inquire into, when we are about to find out that proportion. For even to-day, in the days of suffering and oppression, Israel did not cease to be the heart of the nations, the center of History. True, many conditions favorable to the full appearance of the Divine Thing are missing in Israel of to-day, and even those which are not entirely absent, are not in their necessary integrity. But, after all, it is Israel alone to which we have to appeal as the true bearer of the Divine Thing. Israel of to-day is "the nation poor (weak) in matter and strong in form," because it is the bearer of the highest form on earth.³³ Even to-day, as in days of old, Israel is the center of the his-

³¹ These thoughts are to be found in the passages quoted above in the analysis of the book of Al-Khazari.

³² Cf. II, 26; IV, 3, pp. 240-243; 25, pp. 275-276 a.

³³ II, 64: (אלמשה אלצניסה אלסאר" אלקיה אלצורה) אושה הדלת ההושה, החוקת הצורה

torical movement. For the last goal of history is nothing else than *to lift up all mankind to the height of Israel's disposition*. To be sure, to the superficial observer it might seem that Israel is adapting itself to the Gentiles, giving up and, therefore, diminishing and losing its own disposition. Likewise it seems that the Gentiles are getting farther and farther away from Judaism. But in reality that is not so: "Besides, God has a secret and wise design concerning us, which should be compared to the wisdom manifested in (the phenomenon of) the seed which falls into the ground, where it undergoes, seemingly, a transformation into earth, water and dirt, without leaving a trace perceptible to the senses, as far as he can see, who looks at it. It is, however, the seed itself that transforms earth and water into its own substance, carries it from one stage to another, until it refines the elements and transfers them into something like itself, casting off husks, leaves and what-not, until the core becomes purified and capable of bearing the Divine Thing (for every natural principle is the forerunner of the Divine Thing; cf. above and below), the form of the original seed having made the tree bear fruit resembling that from which its seed had come. Even so is the religion of Moses: Everyone who follows it will finally be converted to it in sincerity; although he seemingly refuses it. These nations, consequently, are as a preparation to and as forerunners of the expected Messiah who is the fruition, and they all will become his fruit. And when they will acknowledge Him, *the Tree will be rendered One*. Then they will also revere the root which they had disregarded." ²⁴

IV. THE DOCTRINE OF ATTRIBUTES

It was, we have seen, Aristotle's doctrine of disposition on the ground of which Hallevi had gained the principle of his philosophy, and it was this principle which had led Hallevi

²⁴ IV, 23; from: עקם סה שיש לאלהים until: אלהים אחד.

up to his most subtle metaphysico-historical conclusions. Now it is time for us to return to Hallevi's initial problem of how God can have intercourse with man. The final solution of this problem we have not gotten in our presentation as yet, but it is already well prepared and near at hand. The way we have to go, leads us to the consideration of the relation between Hallevi and *Gabirol*. The four intellectual substances of *Gabirol's* Higher-World: *Nature*, *Soul*, *Intelligence*, and *Pure Form*, are drawn by Hallevi into the sphere of Aristotle's natural matter. In this regard, then, Hallevi is a truer Aristotelian than *Gabirol*. But even in his divergence from *Gabirol*, Hallevi depends on the principle of *Gabirol's* philosophy. Hallevi belongs to the *Gabirol-group*, he builds his system on the doctrine of the eternal potential matter. This he has in common with the other philosophers of this group. The particular relation we have in mind is this: Among the Jewish philosophers who, unlike Moses ibn Ezra, do not accept the general world-picture of *Gabirol's* philosophy, Hallevi is the only one who adopts its *conception of form* in its most decisive aspect. In the question of the emanation of matter from God, Hallevi stands on the ground common to all Jewish philosophers. Like *Israeli* and *Saadya* before him, Hallevi, too, refutes this theory from the general viewpoint of attributes. Emanation of matter from God contradicts the postulate of absolute *simplicity* in the substance of God. Emanation of matter from God means unavoidably a *process of becoming* in His substance.³⁵ But there is a special viewpoint in Hallevi's manner of proving, and this is the viewpoint of *Gabirol* that the "divine light" (that is *Gabirol's* expression for the emanation of the form-principle from the divine source) can not

³⁵ On this question cf. my *Geschichte der jüdischen Philosophie*, pp. 48, 76, 79, 81, 142, 154, 163, 198, 385, 399, 450, 495, 520 f., 527, 537, 555 (especially), 562, 574 f., 586 f., 596 f. (esp.). We see, Hallevi is not the first in refusing this theory, and not even "in der jüdisch-mittelalterlichen Literatur zuerst," as *Kaufmann*, warily enough, says in his *Attributenlehre*, p. 130.

be diminished, weakened or coarsened in itself.³⁶ Hallevi refuses to posit any gradation in the Higher-World, as Gabirol does, because he is more consistent in this respect than his master. Or, let us rather say, Gabirol, positing the existence of ranks in the world of spiritual substances, is dependent on the language peculiar to neo-platonism from which he took his external world-picture. It is only the strict logic of Gabirol's own thought which led Hallevi to the denial of any gradual difference between the beings of the Higher-World. This thought, the main pillar in the systems of Gabirol and Hallevi, involves the very solution of the problem from which Hallevi starts out, and *this solution is taken from Gabirol's "Fons vitae," both concerning its substance and its conception.* The divine light in itself is never changeable, it is always the same in every respect. The lowest natural form in its substance is the same as that of the highest degree, human understanding, and even as that of the Divine Thing. All differences in the form-principle within the beings of this world are reduced to the difference in the disposition of matter. For, like Gabirol, Hallevi, too, states a *difference in the general steresis* attached to different parts.³⁷

³⁶ Cf. IV, 25 at the end, V, 14 at the end; V, 20, 4, 21, pp. 354-355, and my *Geschichte der jüdischen Philosophie*, pp. 563-565. As to the expression "light" for "form," cf. I, 104, II, 2, pp. 72-73, IV, 3, 7, 9, 15 a.

³⁷ As to the thought that the form-principle in its substance is to be identified with the Divine Thing, cf. IV, 24, p. 267 (quoted above) where the plant form is called: *הענין האלהי*. The main passage for this thought, the scarlet thread through the whole book, is II, 26, pp. 94-95: *והתעלה הענין האלהי: טהשניז אותו שניז או הספר (ויתננה אלאמר אלאלהי ען אן ידרכה ללאל או אכלאל).*

Then also IV, 3, pp. 236-237: *ורבו הסדות, והעצם אחד*.

Also the differentiation in the early disposition of the hyle in its different parts is understood in the whole discussion, as it is evident in the quoted passages, too. But Hallevi says this expressly in IV, 25, pp. 270-271: *עדים נאמנים על אחדותו* until: *ואם הנמצאות מתחלשות* from:

In this sense we have to understand III, 17, pp. 164-165, too. Ibid. pp. 274-275; *והענין האלהי אחד, והחלוק ביניהם אינו כי אם בהתחלשות היוולים*, the words *הענין האלהי* being applied here to the natural form in general; cf. also pp. 278-279, and I, 102-103, V, 2, at the end: *אמנם הוא הפין האלהים ורצונו הנעשים בכל חלקי היוולי*.

These remarks anticipate to a certain extent Hallevi's doctrine of attributes, even as they are prefacing it. But the reason why we could do so, and why, moreover, we were compelled thereto, is the simple fact that the thoughts developed in these remarks are the very basis of Hallevi's doctrine of attributes which involves these basic ideas within the frame of the general problem of attributes, just as, on the other hand, it will be the thorough presentation of this doctrine which will clear up these principal thoughts in their true meaning. This results from the different methodological condition we face as regards the doctrine of attributes. The principal thoughts on which Hallevi bases his doctrine of attributes are scattered all over the book, and we must gather them together and find out their unity, while the doctrine itself is presented by Hallevi himself in a fairly systematic manner which we can follow without any considerable alteration. This state of affairs is in accordance with the fact emphasized above that Hallevi's whole philosophy is framed within the problem of attributes. And we have seen that in the introduction, too, that deals with the formulation of this problem, Hallevi is developing his thoughts in quite a systematic manner. The same we will soon see in the very doctrine of attributes we now are going to present, almost in Hallevi's own manner.

Hallevi, it was shown, neglects the metaphysical problem of relation. If we perceive God, as does Hallevi, as the principle of form moulding the eternal material principle, the latter being in its potential existence entirely independent, then the

The stress laid here upon "in all parts of the hyle," indicates evidently the differentiation in the early disposition of the hyle. *Munk* and others found in this passage the doctrine of the *Will* in the sense of *Gabirol*. After our presentation it is clear enough that in the system of Hallevi there is no place for such a personification in the Higher-World, and that all these terms intend but to express the oneness of the form-principle, cf. II, 6, where Hallevi says this quite expressly. This will become more clear when compared with what is said about it in my *Geschichte der jüdischen Philosophie*, pp. 561-565.

conception *relation* to another being *is inseparably inherent in the conception of God*. While Gabirol is still wrestling with the difficulty involved in this God-conception; while Gabirol is still endeavoring to escape the grave consequences that the very essence of God is conditioned by the existence of something else, Hallevi leaves all these scruples out of the sphere of reflection. And this is one more reason why Hallevi desists from conceiving the Will as a separate being. The lack of determination in the function of the Will in the system of Gabirol was, to a great extent, caused by the endeavor to escape the necessity of admitting the immediate relation of God to something else. Instead of all those metaphysical intermediate beings by which Gabirol intends to overcome this difficulty, neglecting the ethical world altogether, Hallevi lays all stress upon the ethical problem. The reason for this attitude is apparent. Intending to build up an ethico-historical superstructure on a metaphysical ground, Hallevi felt the metaphysical relation to be an indication of how we have to understand the ethico-religious world, rather than a difficulty. For, notwithstanding the fact that the interpreters erred in supposing Hallevi to have been disinclined toward metaphysics in general, we do not hesitate to concede that Hallevi's proper aim was to base the ethico-historical system of Judaism on metaphysical principles; even as, this is to be said, withal, of all Jewish philosophers. In the God-conception which caused to Gabirol so great a trouble, Hallevi found at once the solution of the ethical problem. For if we see aright, and the presentation of the doctrine of attributes with Hallevi does not permit the slightest doubt that we do—if, then, we see aright, the very solution of the problem by Hallevi is this: *The ethical relation is reduced to the metaphysical*. The Divine Thing is the highest *natural form*; it is the same divine form which appears in the natural qualities and forms as well as in the prophetic mind, the difference in the manifestation being conditioned only by the diversity of the material disposition. *Thus there is no separate ethical problem of relation*. He who conceives

God as the form-giving principle, not only admitting, but even demanding, the metaphysical relation as the only true conception of God, escapes all difficulties by emphasizing that *Revelation* means nothing else than moulding matter by impressing upon it form in its most pregnant manifestation.

This solution, while easy to apply to the chief problem of relation, that of prophecy, demands, however, certain amplifications and explanations, when we try to apply it to all those *practical relations* of God to world and man which are maintained by Judaism. God as a being which is moved to pity and vindictiveness, now good and merciful, now angered and irate, as a being which rewards the good and punishes the bad deeds; a God who guides the world and interferes in all those petty tasks of man's daily life; who takes care of all human desires and controls the ebb and flow of man's feeling—such a God-conception is a hard problem for a philosopher standing on the ground of the Metaphysics of Aristotle. It is not so easy to say how these atomized relations can be reduced to the metaphysical. And it is significant of Hallevi's manner of presentation that he deals with the solution of this question before that of the prophetic problem. While we anticipated the solution of the chief problem, in order to lay bare the decisive aspect of the discussion, and its general trend, Hallevi is bound for the opposite direction: In the first part of his book, Hallevi, it was seen, prepares the solution of the chief problem by disclosing the very core of the same. But when he comes to take up the interrupted thread of the discussion, he begins with the problem of the graver practical relations only, introducing afterwards the decisive thought for the solution of the chief problem (II, 26). And since we know the reason why Hallevi divides his doctrine of attributes into two sections (cf. above), and since in the foregoing chapter we have sufficiently discussed all those particular questions by the treatment of which Hallevi interrupts his presentation of the doctrine of attributes, we may now exhaust at once both sections which deal with the problem of attributes in its general

sense (II, 2-7, and IV, 1-16). They are separated from each other by intermediate inquiries, yet they belong together.

Hallevi frames his doctrine of attributes within his theory of the *Names of God*, and he is going farther than his contemporaries, the Ibn Esras, Moses and Abraham, inasmuch as he conceives *all* attributes as names, and as he presents the whole subject out of this viewpoint. This medium of treatment, although in the first place only of methodological importance, puts the problem of attributes in such an original light that it seems advisable to follow Hallevi on this way. At the very beginning of the discussion, Hallevi is starting from this viewpoint, when he divides the attributes into two sections, one of which is represented by the *Tetragrammaton*, and the other by the other Names of God. As regards the principle, this division is not a new one, except that Hallevi is more consistent in pursuing its philosophic consequences concerning the conception of God. Elsewhere (in the second volume of my *Geschichte der jüdischen Philosophie*) we shall see that the cognition that "Wise" and "Mighty" are the very attributes of God, dates back to older Jewish philosophers, among them Bachya, and, especially Gabirol: The "primary attributes": Being, Eternal, and One, are *knowable*, for they are only *formal*, answering simply to the question of *whether*, or not, there is a transcendental principle existing over and above the bodies; whilst just the "secondary attributes": "Wise and Mighty," are unknowable, for they are the attributes of essence, designating the substance of God, his *What*. The *Whether-attributes* are the *source of being* of the *What-attributes*, the latter being the *source of knowledge* which led us to the cognition of the former. By the *traces* manifested in the attributes of creatures, human mind is led to grasp that there is a spiritual principle above the bodies from which the traces are to be derived. The traces indicate, in the first place, a source of Wisdom and Might; these two attributes are, therefore, the first data in our cognition of God. It is but after this first stage, and by the same, that human mind is lifted

up to the higher stage of cognition that the conception of that principle of Wisdom and Might cannot be realized unless we conceive it to be Being (personally), Eternal and One. On this higher stage of knowledge, then, we become at once aware that Eternity and Oneness in Being are the very source of the attributes of essence. We can express this briefly by saying that the relation between the primary and the secondary attributes is the same as that between the latter and the "traces." The primary attributes are the *ratio essendi* of the secondary, while the secondary are the *ratio cognoscendi* of the primary. And as we found this relation between the traces and the attributes of wisdom and might among the basic thoughts of Hallevi's philosophy, we shall understand how the thought, just developed, is the foundation Hallevi builds upon. Besides, we have seen that the attributes of wisdom and might are the components of the primitive attribute—principle of form.³⁸

With these thoughts in view, Hallevi draws the consequences from them in advance, right at the division of the attributes. In Jewish philosophy prior to Hallevi the main division of the attributes was into attributes of *essence* and attributes of *action*. To the former belong: Being, Eternal, One, Wise and Mighty, to the latter such as Good, Merciful and the like, along the line of the "Thirteen Attributes." The division of the attributes of essence into primary and secondary, although it is evident enough, especially in the philosophy of Gabirol, was not sufficiently emphasized in its importance for the classification of the attributes according to the grades of their knowableness. And yet, this point touches the center of Jewish philosophy at large. For it is the problem of the limits of the God-conception human understanding is capable to grasp, that we discuss when we inquire into the knowableness of a certain kind of attributes. This is what Hallevi has in mind to complete by his division of attributes. He insists, in all seriousness, upon the thought that the primary attributes

³⁸ Besides the passages quoted above, cf., especially I, 67, 77, 95; III, 17, 23; IV, 25, pp. 270-271, below; V, 4, 10, 20, 1, 21, p. 355 a.

and those of action belong somehow together, because of their common trait of being knowable. The attributes of action belong to the "traces" which are the first data by which man is led up to the cognition of God. There is, of course, a considerable difference between these two kinds of traces. The traces in their appearance as attributes of the creatures are *subjective* and, therefore, the most immediate *datum* for the creature, while those in the attributes of action are *objective*, and recognized but by way of analogy, and deduction. But this difference does not upset the fact of their both being knowable. Seen in this light the primary attributes, also, share this common trait. For these highest attributes do not differ, either, from the attributes of creatures but in the manner man gets to know them. True, we say that man can not grasp the Being, the Eternity and the Oneness of God. But we must not forget that the cognition that God's Being, Oneness and His mode of duration are beyond man's comprehension, exhausts all possibilities of knowledge in this matter. He who has recognized that God is One, Being and Eternal in a manner surpassing all human imagination and conception of these attributes, has gotten all there is to know. God Himself knows these attributes better than any creature, but this Plus concerns by no means these attributes in themselves. God knows his formal attributes better than man, only because He knows their contents, the very substance of His wisdom and might. Thus again we hit upon the essential, or rather *substantial* (for the primary attributes, too, are essential, although only formal) attributes, as the only ones that are unknowable.

This is the explanation of the *double division* the misunderstanding of which has led to a very deplorable mistake in the interpretation of Hallevi's doctrine of attributes at large (cf. the closing annotation). Hallevi accepting, on the one hand, the old division into essential attributes and such of action is compelled, on the other hand, to engage our attention for a new division which is to be had alongside of the old one, namely, the division into *knowable and unknowable attributes*.

The first division intends to prepare the solution of the problem of how to reduce the ethical conception of relation involved in the attributes of action to the metaphysical conception of relation. In this division we find, therefore, the primary and secondary attributes on one line; because both are metaphysical. The second division tends to determine the limits of how far human understanding can get in the knowledge of God, in a word, the limits of our God-conception; and, in addition, to do justice to the *principle of interpretation*. This principle which dates back to the Mu'tazilites and which was introduced into Jewish philosophy by Saadya, means that we can not interpret Holy Scripture in a way which would suppose it to have transgressed the limits of the God-conception established by philosophy. In this division the primary attributes, as knowable ones, are separated from the secondary, the unknowable ones.

To understand this better we have also to consider this:

The three groups of attributes, when compared with each other from the viewpoint of Hallevi, present the following series: The substantial attributes "Wise" and "Mighty," the unity of which appears in the term principle of form, do not cause any difficulty, either in *material* nor in *exegetical* regard. The metaphysical relation is admitted, nay, required. If we predicate God "Wise" and "Mighty" because of His being form-principle, Creator, we need have no fear that we are ascribing to Him something unworthy. The danger of *assimilation*, that is to say, that one could perceive those attributes in the sense of human wisdom and human might, is not a great one. For everybody knows that he himself is not capable of creating a world by moulding a potential matter. If, therefore, we want to prevent such error as is at any rate possible, we do not have to take recourse to the explanation as if the terms Wise and Mighty in reference to God were used simply *metaphorically*. On the contrary, the best way to prevent that error, is to say that those terms are used in their original sense only when applied to God. For "His is

the Wisdom and His the Might"; whilst wisdom and might whenever used in reference to creatures, are always to be understood in a metaphorical sense. The language of the Bible affords, therefore, no problem when applying those terms to the creatorship of God. For these attributes represent the *very substance* of God. God *is* Wisdom and Might; or in the language of Gabirol accepted by Hallevi, *God is Wisdom*. This expression is in the strictest conformity with the *positive God-conception of Judaism*. (Gabirol reduces Might to Wisdom.) The next member in this series is the group of primary attributes. They are like the former inasmuch as there is no real difficulty involved in their conception, nay, they are a philosophic postulate. But in exegetical regard there is a greater difficulty to overcome than in the secondary attributes. For we do not demand of any believer that he should recognize the Wisdom and Might of God in their very substance; on the contrary, we warn against the mistake as if man were capable of penetrating into the divine What; whilst we do demand this vigorously with regard to the primary attributes. Hence the possibility to fall into the error of imagining God as being one and the first and the last (as that is the term of the Scripture for the conception of eternity) in the same sense as we understand this with reference to man. Finally, the ethical attributes of action represent the most difficult ones, both really and exegetically. In material regard it is very hard to suppose God to be subject to pathological feelings, such as Mercifulness, Wrathfulness and the like. The danger of assimilation is not the only one we have to avoid in this direction. Were this so, we could escape it very easily. We would say: God alone is *the* mercifulness, *the* goodness, and the like, and then, of course, we should be compelled to say even God alone is *the* anger, *the* wrath, *the* resentment, and the like—while the same terms in their application to man are meant merely metaphorically. But we can not say this, for we have to remove from our God-conception every feeling, both good and bad; because every feeling involves a *relation*,

and every relation, even the slightest, involves changeability—becoming—in the substance of God. There is no way of escaping this difficulty unless we reduce the ethical to the metaphysical relation which alone is admissible, since it constitutes no change in the divine substance. (The explanation why the metaphysical relation is admissible we have discussed above by way of anticipation: the *constant* metaphysical relation does not establish any change in the substance of God, but Hallevi himself develops this thought after having reduced the ethical relation to the metaphysical.) And besides this real difficulty there is an exegetical difficulty, too, and a great one at that. The Holy Scripture in using about God terms which indicate his ethico-practical relations to *man* and the world at large, *demand*s from the believer that he should acknowledge, and, therefore, *recognize*, *perceive*, and know these relations, that he should *feel* them.

We know, then, the intermediate position of the primary attributes, and their resemblance to the secondary ones on the one hand, and to those of action on the other hand; and now we shall understand the chief development of Hallevi's doctrine of attributes (II, 2–7).

“All names of God except the Tetragrammaton are *relative predicates and attributes* (attributes of action are at the same time relative, too, and this is the core of the real problem in discussion) derived from the way His creatures are affected by His decrees and measures. He is called ‘*merciful*’ when He improves the lot of him whom people pity for his bad condition. They apply, then, to God the relation of mercy and compassion the very meaning of which according to our experience is weakness of soul and excitement of nature. This can not be applied to the true nature of God. For, on the contrary, he is a just Judge, deciding the poverty of one man, and the wealth of another, *without suffering any change in His substance*, for He has no sympathy with the one, nor wrath against the other. We see the same in human judges when they are engaged in law questions. They decide according

to law, some people becoming happy and others miserable. He seems to us, as we observe His *traces*, to become now 'a merciful and compassionate God,' and now 'a jealous and vengeful God,' though He never changes from one attribute to the other. (Thus far as regards the real difficulty in the attributes of action; in the following Hallevi turns to the exegetic aspect of the question, and hence the new division.) The entirety of the attributes, except the Tetragrammaton, is to be divided into three classes: those of *traces* (which as attributes of action are, of course, *relative*, the same as in the first division), *relative* (which indicate no action), and *negative*. As regards the attributes of traces, they are *derived* from *acts* emanating from Him through natural media, such as 'making poor and rich,' 'casting down and exalting,' 'merciful and compassionate,' 'jealous and vengeful,' 'strong and all-mighty,' and the like. *Relative attributes* are such as 'blessed, praised, glorified, holy, exalted, and extolled,' they are derived from the reverence shown Him by mankind. These, however numerous they may be, do not ascribe to Him any plurality, and draw Him by no means out of oneness. As regards the *negative attributes*, such as 'Living (Being), One, First and Last,' He was described by them with a view of keeping their opposites away from Him, and not in order to establish them in the sense we understand them." For it is our own experience by the light of which we understand the positive contents of these attributes. When we say "Living" we think rather of movement and feeling than of absolute being. Likewise when we say "One" we think rather of an unity which may be composed of several elements than of an absolute oneness. And, finally, when we say "First" and "Last," we think rather of a thing which had its being before all others, and will continue but also cease to be after all others, than of an absolute eternal being without commencement or end. Therefore, we should never forget that Scripture uses these attributes only in contrast to the idols which are deprived of them even in their human sense. When reading or using

these terms we have to bear in mind that in their application to God they have a higher, exclusive meaning, in keeping with our philosophic cognition that God is an absolute, spiritual being of absolute oneness and eternity.

"All these attributes are not attached to the *substance* (of God), and (therefore) He is not made complex by them. But the attributes which are connected with the Tetragrammaton, are creative (indicating His creative power) without any natural intermediaries, such as 'Former,' 'Creator,' and 'He who alone doeth great wonders,' which means (that He creates) by His direct intention and will, without using any intermediate cause. (To the passage we are omitting here, we will return soon after.) And we designate Him 'wise of heart' because He is the *substance of intelligence*, He is intelligence, *intelligence (therefore) is no attribute to Him*. But 'strong of power' belongs to the *attributes of traces*."

At first blush it seems that the two divisions contradict each other. According to the first, *all* (בְּלִים-יִמִּיעַ) attributes except the Tetragrammaton are relative, derived from the way His creatures are affected by His decrees and measures, in a word: all attributes besides those which are attached to the Name YHWH, are such of action, and, therefore, relative. Consequently, the Tetragrammaton embraces all attributes which are not of action or traces, such as the negative which are neither relative nor of action or traces, and such as the relative which are only relative, without being of action or traces; whilst in the second division the latter two classes are excepted from the contents of the Tetragrammaton. But we will understand this soon, once we remember the intermediate position of the primary attributes, and once, in addition to this, we take into consideration what was said of Hallevi's different purposes in the two different divisions. In the division which tends toward the solution of the real core of the problem, Hallevi does not care for the particular shades of attributes which are neither substantial nor of action. He lays stress only upon the difference between the substantial

attributes and those of action, the former affording no problem, and the latter being the most difficult part of the whole problem of attributes. By saying "all" Hallevi aims at all those attributes which matter somewhat in the real problem in discussion. In this regard the primary attributes are equal to the substantial (secondary), and Hallevi has no reason for engaging our special attention to them. The same is to be said of the other new aspect in the second division, that is to say, the distinction between relative attributes which are at the same time of action or traces, and those which are only relative.³⁹ These attributes are equal to the primary ones as far as they belong to the problem only as a matter of exegesis. This is in conformity with the formulation of the problem by the King of Khazars (II, 1 at the end): "The first of these questions referred to the names and attributes ascribed to God and to the anthropomorphism which appears in *some* of them, although they are objectionable *both to reason and to the Thora*." It is the answer whose reflex we see in the above question: Only *some* of the attributes demand a deeper solution, and this solution is to be performed in two aspects, according to *reason*, the *real* aspect, and according to the *Thora*, the *exegetical* aspect. Seen in this light the inner arrangement of the quoted discussion is apparent and sufficiently justified: Hallevi begins with the solution of those attributes to which he alludes by the word "some," they being the most difficult, without paying attention to the rest. By the division into attributes of Tetragrammaton and such of action Hallevi exhausts the whole contents of the problem in its philosophic aspect. The contrast between the former which present no problem, and the latter which alone offer the problem according to reason, discloses at once the proper view point for the solution; the latter are to be reduced to the former. Now

³⁹ We will see in the second volume of my *Geschichte der jüdischen Philosophie* that this distinction is the beginning of a far-reaching development the greatest importance of which appears in Maimuni's doctrine of attributes.

we could expect that Hallevi after he has shown the core of the problem concerning the attributes of action and solved it by reducing these attributes to the substantial ones (cf. below), will continue the contrast by explaining how the attributes of the Tetragrammaton have no share in the real problem. But as Hallevi intends to show that the substantial attributes do not cause *any* difficulty, that is to say, neither really nor exegetically, he postpones this explanation, and turns immediately to the exegetical question. Therefore, he forms a new contrast, between the attributes of the Tetragrammaton and *all* the others, the wider extension of the new group being indicated by the term "In the entirety" (וכלליו של דבר-יובאל:מלה) which is more comprehensive than "all" (כולם-ימינע). And it is not until he has evolved and solved the exegetical problem, too, that Hallevi comes to the explanation of the attributes of the Tetragrammaton, in order to show that there is no difficulty about them.

This manner of presentation, although strictly systematical, is not clear enough. To be sure. For him, however, who knows the development of the problem of attributes in the Jewish philosophy prior to Hallevi, and penetrates into the intention of the passage in discussion, there can be no doubt that this is the true meaning of the double division. Besides, it is one of the characteristics of Hallevi's manner of presentation that he develops his thought succinctly yet not quite clearly in the opening discussion of a problem, relying, for the amplification of the same, upon the part to come. Applied to our case, we must take into consideration what Hallevi says about this problem in the supplementary discussion (IV, 1-15) to which he himself refers (II, 4). Our interpretation as regards the external disposition of this opening discussion is based, for the greater part, on the exposition in the second discussion. And we will grant this connection more willingly when, entering into the merits of the solution of the chief problem, we shall soon become aware that we cannot realize this solution unless we supplement the short and concise

remarks of the first discussion by their amplification in the second. And even then we cannot fully understand the intention of Hallevi unless we keep in evidence all that has been said about Hallevi's metaphysico-historical world-conception.

In the quoted passage Hallevi solves the problem of the attributes of action by his simple *statement* that the substance of God does not suffer any change by the diversity of the actions emanated from Him. In the second discussion Hallevi explains this out of the viewpoint of disposition: "Although the substance is only one, the attributes are many because of the variety in the places which receive (the Divine Thing); even as the rays (of the sun) are diverse while the sun itself is one. This simile is not quite apt unless we suppose the sun beyond (human) grasp, the rays being (visibly) existing, while their cause (the sun) can be perceived but by way of logical conclusion" (IV, 3, pp. 236-237). This example is used here in explanation of certain expressions by which God appears attached to certain places, such as Jerusalem, Zion, and the like. But Hallevi returns to the same (IV, 15) and enlarges it in its most general meaning: The substance of God, attached to the Tetragrammaton is the original pure light which is absolutely unchangeable, while the practical relation between God and the world are the rays, the reflected light; this, however, is changeable according to the different disposition of the individuals by whom these relations enter into historical appearance. The course of history is determined by the intensity of the light that appears, and by the manner how it is diffused, refracted, and reflected. This is to be understood in the intention of Hallevi's general world-conception, and especially in the light thrown upon it in the discussion of the problem of the free will (V, 20). The fate of every man is the result of his own deeds in combination with the happenings in the world around, both natural and historical. But the influence which natural and historical conditions exert upon the fate of a nation or individual, are dependent on how the Divine Thing manifests itself in that

nation or individual. People in whom the Divine Thing appears only in the shape of natural form (if there are such people at all), are fully subdued to the course of natural law, while man who has gotten the highest degree of the divine form, is almost above the power of natural law. Between these two extremes there are innumerable intermediate stages, the wide play-ground for the ebb and flow of the divine form on earth the result of which is a manifold and many-shaded direct divine interference with the course of natural law. And as in reality the divine form is indicated even in the lowest natural form, we can formulate this thought in a more general fashion: The fate of man, nation, or individual, depends on the intensity the divine form appears in him. The problem of the practical relations of God to the world in man's daily life is reduced to the chief ethical problem, that of prophecy. And as the latter is solved by being reduced to the metaphysical problem, the former is solved, too: There is no distinction between metaphysical and ethical relation, all relations of God to something else are metaphysical.

To understand this better, we must return to the after-thought Hallevi intercalates in his explanation of the attributes that are attached to the Tetragrammaton. The attributes connected with the Tetragrammaton indicate the *Primitive Attribute*, such as "Former," "Creator," and "He who alone doeth great wonders" (Ps. 136, 4), each of which expresses the thought that God is principle of form. Thus there is no difficulty, no problem, because this is the true positive content of the God-conception in Judaism. And if we find that God is styled "*Wise of heart and strong of power*" (Job, 9, 4), there is, also, no difficulty. For the former which ascribes *wisdom* to God, is the true substantial attribute which is properly no attribute, because it is the term for the *substance* of God, the source of His being form-principle. God is wisdom, and therefore, form-principle. As to the attribute "strong of power," it belongs to the attributes of traces, the problem of which was just solved. Hallevi could explain

the attribute "strong of power," also in the sense of "mighty," with reference to the might of creation, so that "strong of power" would mean form-principle, especially since in the following God is spoken of as Creator and doer of wonders. Hallevi does not do so, probably for two reasons. The first seems to be simply exegetical. According to the whole intention of the chapter in discussion, the words "wise of heart and strong of power" express the idea: (God is) wise of heart (as the creator of the world), and, therefore, strong of power (as the *guide* who determined the course of events *in* the world)—who dared to be obstinate with Him, and was safe? But it is undoubtedly the other reason on the strength of which Hallevi prefers to interpret "strong of power" in the sense of attributes of traces: Like Gabirol, Hallevi also reduces the two substantial attributes to one source: *Wisdom*.⁴⁰ This is the new aspect: If we style God by *two* substantial attributes, there is a very great danger of *dualism* in our God-conception. Therefore, these two attributes must be conceived as rooting in one source. This escape is very near at hand, and, in general, it is also the only one proper. But if we had to understand this as if the attributes were to be derived from a substance *entirely* unknown and unknowable, we should fall from the frying pan into the fire. For if dualism is *bad*, *emptiness* of the God-conception is *worse*. To believe in a God, not having *the least idea* of His substance, means a very dangerous state of mind. A survey of the historical development teaches us that this doctrine would lead either to a confusion of spirit and matter, or to a denial of God as personal being. The first aspect is that of the neo-platonic *theory of the emanation* of matter from God, the other that of *pantheism*. Our modern interpreters of Jewish philosophy boast greatly of the supposed fact that almost all Jewish philosophers teach the *absolute unknowableness* of the divine substance. Else-

⁴⁰ As to Gabirol this will be shown in the second volume of my *Geschichte der jüdischen Philosophie*.

where (in the second volume of my *Geschichte der jüdischen Philosophie*) we will see that this interpretation is a *gross error*, based on a very deplorable misunderstanding of the principal thoughts and the final intention of Jewish philosophy at large. As to Hallevi, we see him leaving aside the said escape which in reality is more dangerous than the danger to be avoided, and following the tracks beaten by his predecessors in Jewish philosophy: As to the substantial *attributes* "mighty" and "wise," they are two aspects of the substance of God, presenting God's metaphysical relation in the manner in which we find their *traces* in the *attributes* of creatures. In the lowest stage of Nature where we find only "might" (see above), the dualistic aspect is necessary. But the higher we ascend on the ladder of nature, and the more we find wisdom attached to the natural forces, the more evident becomes the intrinsic connection between these two attributes, and we see the clearer that the attribute "mighty" is to be *derived* from "wise." Thus we see that this thought is one of the chief views in Hallevi's world-conception, but the passage at hand is the chief place for the development of the same in its highest sense, in its application to the God-conception. Hallevi lays stress upon the distinction between the substantial attributes that are synonymous expressions with the term "form-principle," and that of "wise of heart." The former are substantial because they express the *function* of the divine substance, its *creative* force, whilst the latter is substantial in such strict a sense that properly we cannot speak any more of an attribute: For the substance of God *is* Wisdom! Wisdom not as an attribute, but wisdom in the sense of *intelligence*. Of course no man, nay, no being besides God himself, is capable of grasping the substance in its *full* content and intensity. Moreover, our own intelligence is so far from the majestic divine intelligence that we must establish a *generic* difference between them. Also the natural genera and species are ultimately the results of *one* form-principle, and in spite of this they are generically different from each other. How much

more is this the case with this form-principle itself, with God, who is the *pure* form without that material substrate which *all* creatures have in common. But after all, we know undoubtedly *what* we worship as our God. We worship *The Intelligence*. It was, then, Hallevi's endeavor to express this decisive thought which has caused him to interpret "strong of power," in the sense of attributes of traces. It is the absolute oneness in the very substance of God that Hallevi assures by this way of interpretation.

Now we come to the passage omitted above. With the attributes that style God as form-principle ranks also that of "He who alone doeth great *wonders*." Hallevi, relying upon the discussion of this subject in many passages of his book, does not say here why this attribute is on the same line as the very creative ones. He intercalates a mere *exegetical* remark, as an annotation of the kind we are in the habit of giving as a foot-note. Yet to us this passage furnishes a very apt starting-point for the presentation of this special thought which at the same time will put the solution of the chief problem in a new light.

After he has stated that the wonders, the miracles, are the immediate work of God like Creation, Hallevi adds: "This is perhaps meant in the words of the Bible: And I appeared unto Abraham, Isaak, and Jacob by (the Name) *El-Shaddai* (Exodus 6, 3), that is to say, by the way of *power* and *dominion*, as is said: 'He allowed no man to do them wrong, and he reprov'd kings for their sake' (Ps. 105, 14), not having produced any miracle for them (the patriarchs) as He did for Moses. And saying (in the second half-verse, Exodus 6, 3): 'but *my Name* YHWH was I not known to them' (patriarchs), he means: *by my Name* YHWH, as the *beth* in *beél shaddai* refers to it (us'mi), too. He did wonders for Moses and the Israelites, so that there was no room for doubt in their souls that it was the *Creator of the world* who created these things, purposely as a new creation, such as the plagues of Egypt, the division of the Red Sea, the manna, the

pillar of cloud, and the like (while for the patriarchs He did nothing like that). Not because they ranked higher than the patriarchs, but because they were a multitude, and there was doubt in their souls, whilst the patriarchs were of utmost faith and purity of mind, so that even if they had all their lives been pursued by misfortune, their faith in God would not have been shaken. Therefore they did not need this" (miracles).

Hallevi cannot admit that the patriarchs had not known the name YHWH, which would mean that they did not recognize God as Creator. Had this Name not been revealed to Adam? Had the Divine Thing not been attached to him and to the best of his posterity even to the patriarchs and their posterity in the line Isaac-Jacob? Therefore Hallevi refers this to the *manner* in which the efficiency of the divine form *manifested* itself in the lives of the patriarchs. To be sure, God interfered in the lives of the patriarchs and guided them to their best. The lives of the patriarchs certainly were not given over to blind natural law. Had this been the case, the attachment to them of the Divine Thing would be in vain (cf. above). The difference between the patriarchs and the Israelites in this regard concerns but the manner *how* God interfered with the efficiency of the natural law. God guided the lives of the patriarchs above natural law. He allowed no man to do them wrong, and He even reproved kings for their sake, but He did so "by the way of power and dominion," by the way of the *attributes of traces*. *The connection of natural course was not interrupted or disturbed*. A superficial observer might perceive the fate of the patriarchs, both their successes and their misfortunes, as results, merely, of the natural course of events. But to him who penetrates into the spirit manifested in these events, for him who knows how to combine the letters and to read the signs—to him it is clear beyond doubt that it is the future of the great chosen nation which was prepared and pre-formed in the lives of these great patriarchs and prophets. And the patriarchs themselves? *They*

have seen well that it is the Divine Thing which rules their fate, they have seen the finger of God, his immediate interference amidst the connection of natural course, and, therefore, they have been convinced of the primitive attribute of God, of His Creatorship, of His being form-principle of the world. Not so the Israelites. In so great a multitude there were many ill-minded people. Their eyes were not sharp enough to see the efficiency of the Divine Thing, the interference of God with the natural course, unless this was demonstrated to them by visible, nay, palpable instances. They had to see how God moulded matter; how He changed water into blood, and the like of the plagues of Egypt; how He moulded the waters of the Red Sea into two walls on their right and their left; how He moulded the air into manna, air and water into a pillar of cloud; they had to see with their own eyes of flesh how "the air and other bodies were becoming by His Will and moulded by His Word" (II, 4); how God "moulded the air to yield the figures (of the letters) of the Ten Commandments, and formed the writing engraved in the Tablets" (II, 6). Only after they had seen those great miracles which altogether were nothing else than the manifestation of God as form-principle moulding matter, they recognized the substantial attributes of God, and, in consequence, also His primitive attribute: Creator of the world, moulding the same out of potential matter.⁴¹

Thus, the patriarchs were on a higher plane than the Israelites at the time of exodus. And this has its value in general. The fate of him who is possessed of the Divine Thing is guided by a combination of determinism (in the sense of natural law) and free divine interference with and above the same, no matter whether, or not, said interference manifests itself by an interruption of the natural connection of events. On the contrary, such an interruption would take place only in exceptional cases, when God intends once more to show to

⁴¹ II, 34. Comp. also: I, 8. Ibid. 84-91. II, 50. Ibid. 50 at the end.

the inhabitants of the earth His Glory in order to have them recognize His substantial attributes, that He is the Creator of the world, that is to say, the form-principle of the potential hyle. In the daily course of the world this immediate interference is hidden within the succession of natural causes, the effect of the divine form being adapted to the former, and entering in their turn as links in the chain. And since there is no man, nay, no being in which the divine form is not present at all, the fates of all men, are results of effects of natural causes interfered with by that of the divine form. The chief ethical problem, that of the practical relation of God to the world in the daily life of nations and individuals, and its solution, are, then, to be *formulated anew*.

Were there no influence of the divine form in the world, that is to say, were there no *Providence* in the world, there would be no problem at all. The course of events would be perceived (in the sense of strict determinism) as the simple result of natural law. The latter, being the result of the early Creation, affords no problem: *The natural law is the effect of God's metaphysical relation to the hylic principle*. It is the apparent interference of God with the course of this natural law which proposes unto us that great riddle to solve which man has endeavored for millenia, and which Hallevi frames within the problem of attributes. This divine interference was supposed to be a force *opposed* to the divine metaphysical relation the effect of which we have before us in natural law. Hence that problem, hence that riddle. If *Providence destroys* natural law, the metaphysical relation of God appears interrupted, and, consequently, God himself appears as a changeable being. For a being which brings forth different effects cannot do so unless it "be changing from one attribute to another." Such changeability we find in every deviation from natural law, it makes no difference whether the case in discussion concerns a great miracle, such as the division of the Red Sea, or an everyday incident, such as the recovery of one gravely sick who had been given up by the physicians. The

difference between these two cases, however, is this: In the latter, the physicians may get afterwards the wisdom they failed in before, and find out that their art is quite infallible, and that the patient had undoubtedly had to die, had there not been some incident, unforeseen and beyond all probability. The physicians, then, bring said incident into the chain of natural causes, and thus restore the interrupted course of nature; whilst the believer sees in this incident, that happened just in the right time and in the right place, the finger of God, a miracle equal to that of the Red Sea which no true scientist, provided he admits the fact, would try seriously to explain from the viewpoint of natural law. Now by this distinction we got in the direction in which the new formulation of the solution is to be performed: As we have seen that the great miracles, the most visible interruption of the course of nature are nothing else than a change in the disposition of certain parts of matter (thus one of nature's phenomena, and, therefore, no interruption of nature), it is to be understood that the incidents introduced into the succession of natural causes by Providence are, similarly, nothing else than results of changes in the disposition of certain parts of matter, and just as concerning the miracles we cannot speak of a change in the divine activity, because it is always *the same manner of activity* we have to deal with, namely, that of moulding matter, in the same manner, as while doing miracles or creating the world—divine activity interferes in the course of events always in the same manner, as while doing miracles or creating the world—by bringing about certain changes in the disposition of matter. There is no event, no accident or incident in the vast reaches of Nature and History which cannot, nay, which should not be reduced to a change in the disposition of matter, whether the respective part of matter be a tree in the wilderness or a spring in the desert, or the blood in the heart, and the brain in the head of man. Whether these changes can be inserted into the succession of natural causes, or not, they are all alike results of God's activity as principle of form.

From this viewpoint we get a deeper understanding of the conception of Providence in Hallevi's philosophy. Providence is the continuation of the divine creative activity within the course of Nature. Providence, therefore, be it manifested in miracles or in seeming connexion with natural causes, does not destroy or interrupt the efficiency of the divine metaphysical relation. There is no change in the manner of the divine activity. In a word: *Providence is Creation*. Only for a man who does not participate in the divine form at all, the creation is an action finished and brought to a close in the *past* (and even such a man, if there is one, experiences Providence in his relations to his fellowmen). For the pious ones—nations and individuals—the creation was not concluded in the past. The appearance of the Divine Thing on earth means *a perpetual creative activity*, a perpetual moulding and forming of matter by giving it different dispositions. By these means God guides the world for the best of his chosen-ones by whom in the days to come the whole mankind will be lifted up to the disposition of Israel, and the perpetual creation will concern all, without any exception. That will be the time of Unity of Nature and History. *Nature and History will be One*. Here is the precise point at which Hallevi's historical world-conception springs from his conception of the problem of attributes and its solution.

True, Providence, especially that which is manifested in great miracles indicates the divine *Will*, and to the conception of Will there is attached the other of movement and change. But Hallevi insists that there is no difference between the modes of activity in Creation and Providence. The philosopher who admits that there is a being which created the world—an admission to which he might be compelled by the proof from the perpetual movement of the heavenly bodies—cannot escape the logical consequence that this same principle is able to continue its activity of moulding matter while doing miracles. The same principle which has moulded matter at the time of creation, has moulded also the air to yield the

figures of the Ten Commandments, and formed the writing engraved on the Tablets. One may call this being Will, Word, or what not, the name matters nothing as long as that being is recognized as the form-principle in Nature and History (II, 6).

In the foregoing presentation we exhausted by one stroke the metaphysical elements in the second discussion of the problem of attributes, at least in so far as they belong to the strictly philosophic aspect of the problem, the rest belonging rather to Hallevi's special *doctrine of prophecy*. As to Hallevi's exegetical remarks about the different names of God we mention the one which (though not completely original with him) reveals his metaphysical principle in a very clear manner. To the Tetragrammaton which, when completed out of the Name AHYH (the Name אהיה belongs, according to Hallevi, to the sphere of the Tetragrammaton, and likewise יה) contains four letters: AHWY (אחוי), Hallevi remarks (IV, 3, p. 230): "Its secret is hidden, but the loftiness of its distinguished letters reveals it (somewhat). For it is the letters א.ה.ו.י that cause all consonants to appear (to be sounded), as no letter can be pronounced as long as there is not present the force of these four, viz., *a* by א and ה; *u* by ו, and *i* by י. *They* (these four letters) are *quasi the spirit*, while the other letters are *quasi the bodies*." The relation of the divine substance to matter is that of the *vowels* to the *consonants*, the latter being the *amorphous matter* moulded by the former, the form-principle.

We close our presentation of Hallevi's philosophic principles, by pointing out that we have to consider the strict formulation and solution of the problem of attributes in its ethical aspect as the greatest contribution of Hallevi to the development of Jewish philosophy. It is the greatest service the Gabirol-group ever rendered to the discussion of this problem. The philosophers of the Saadya-group devoted all their attention to the problem of metaphysical relation, neglecting to some extent the ethical aspect of the problem.

Gabirol, too, wrestled almost exclusively with the metaphysical problem; but Hallevi drew the last consequences of Gabirol's standpoint, and, eliminating the metaphysical relation from the discussion, engaged all our attention for the ethical problem at large. Of the Saadya-group it was but *Maimuni* who took up anew the problem of metaphysical relation, as it had not been solved by his predecessors, and, after he had solved it, he found the right formulation of the ethical problem, and its solution, from the viewpoint adopted by his group.

ANNOTATION

Kaufmann in his presentation of Hallevi's doctrine of attributes (*Geschichte der Attributenlehre*) failed just in the main points so thoroughly that a detailed discussion of his interpretation would take more time and space than the result could justify. It is sufficient to mention the fact that in the extensive opus of 134 pages about Hallevi's doctrine of attributes we do not find any allusion to the basic thought of Hallevi's philosophy, of God as form-principle; or to the chief viewpoint, that of disposition. It is a veritable riddle how it was possible to overlook this. But this is not the only riddle K.'s presentation of Hallevi's doctrine of attributes proposes unto us. Greater than this is the enigma we face when we try to find out the viewpoint guided by which K. dismembered Hallevi's own systematic presentation, and threw its single sentences pell-mell out of all context, in order to distribute them betwixt *two kinds* of doctrine of attributes. That is to say, K. believes to have found in almost all systems of the Jewish philosophers that they have two kinds of doctrines of attributes, namely, a "philosophic" one and a "non-philosophic" one (*Kaufmann*, p. 166, has no specific term for this other kind). This fictitious distinction lacks foundation in regard to any of the philosophers in question, but the arbitrariness of this manner of treatment is nowhere so evident and so fatal in its consequences as with Hallevi's doctrine of attributes which, we have seen, Hallevi himself endeavors to present in strict coherence. It is only partly that we can explain this capital error in K.'s presentation by his deplorable mishap of the discovery of the *relation between Hallevi and Gazali*. The influence of this latter upon Hallevi was mentioned already by *Schlesinger*, in his introduction to *Ikkarim*, p. xxviii, and it would have been in full accordance with the general characteristic of K.'s

book, if this remark would have been enlarged upon, in some fashion or other, in a foot-note. Never and nowhere has it been K.'s forte to penetrate into the core of the problems in hand; yet in the book of Hallevi the philosophic principle is formulated and set forth in so clear a manner that K. (the first to attempt to present a systematic outline of this book) would not have overlooked it, had he not been misled by Schlesinger's observation that some passages in the book of Hallevi are similar to certain utterances in Gazáli's Taháfot. If this discovery is to be of some value, K. apparently concluded, then it must be the "leading thoughts" that Hallevi had taken from Gazáli. And since, in reality, there is no trace of Hallevi's leading thoughts to be found in the works of Gazáli, the latter got as a barrier between Kaufmann and Hallevi. The open vista was cut off and K. could see but through the glasses stained by this supposed relation. There *could not be* found with Hallevi whatever was not in Gazáli. We have here to deal with one of the worst examples of the kind so numerous in recent literature on Jewish philosophy. Instead of penetrating into the spirit of the philosopher in question, they undertake downright hunts upon "discoveries" of "sources." To be sure, it is very important to know the sources from which a philosopher took the elements for his system. But in our recent literature this was done in so mechanical a mode that mostly the discoveries of the sources led to deplorable deviations and mistakes. A thought, an idea, a figure, nay, simply a linguistic phrase, though they be of the oldest, genuine Jewish coinage—they are not satisfied until they find its "source" in some Arabic book. To find everything in an *Arabic* book is the up-to-date "scientific" postulate. The slightest allusion in an Arabic source has got more value and scientific dignity than the most expressive sentence in ancient Jewish literature. Perhaps the worst of that kind we find in the following exaggeration: "Were not this manner of thinking which is similar to (that of) Gazáli we should have to expect that Hallevi in his unconditional reverence for the word of the Bible, would not keep away even the corporeal terms from God . . . But the expressive prohibition in the Ten Commandments and the judgment of reason speak too loudly against such a belief" (Attributenlehre, pp. 138-139). It is hard to realize. The expressive prohibition in the Bible, and, in addition, the clear judgment of reason—all that is not sufficient, it must be just Gazáli from whom Hallevi received the insight to keep away anthropomorphisms from God! Not very different from this example is another: "To have confidence in the prophets is what is taught by the *Pure Brethren*, too." Prophecy is one of the most essential dogmas of Judaism. Jewish authorities in days of old have coined a special benediction: *הַבוֹרֵךְ בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל טוֹבִים וְרָצָה בְּדִבְרֵיהֶם הַנֶּאֱמָרִים בְּאַמֶּת*, and still Hallevi must learn this just from the "Pure Brethren"! Likewise it must be just Gazáli from whom Hallevi learned that man cannot find out

the deeper meaning of religious ceremonies by speculation of his own. What boots it if this thought is emphasized in many and many passages of Jewish literature? (Cf. e.g. Babli, Ber. 33 b, R. H., 16 a, Yoma, 67 a, Synh., 21 b, a. By the way: We must distinguish between *טעמי תורה*, as used in Synh., 21 b, and *טעמי תורה*, as used in Babli Pesachim, 119 a, where it is reckoned as a great merit to disclose *טעמי תורה*. In the former passages the reason of the *Commandments*: *טעמי מצות* are spoken of, while in the latter of "Torah" at large. "Reasons of Torah" in this latter sense mean the *Midrash* by which the *Halakhoth* [or agadistic thoughts] are to be derived from the biblical word. In Yoma, 42 a, and passim: *רבי שמעון דרש טעמא דקרא*, however, *טעמא דקרא* is to be taken in the sense of *טעמי מצות*, too. But the controversy whether *דורשין טעמא דקרא*, or not, refers only to cases where Scripture itself offers the reason, and the matter of controversy is but the question whether we are allowed to draw *some conclusions* of the given reason with regard to *similar* cases, or not.)

And the reason why K. seeks such imaginative points of contact between Hallevi and Gazáli is very clear and simple: *Kaufmann could not find any view of some consequence which Gazáli and Hallevi have in common.* And this holds true not only of the real principal ideas of Hallevi's philosophy, as explained in our presentation, but even of that faint shadow of them which Kaufmann himself believed to be the ideas of Hallevi. K. *quotes not a single passage* from the works of Gazáli as a parallel to any *systematic view* of Hallevi. For, after all, the attitude toward philosophy is but a methodological not a systematic aspect. I say "not a single passage"; yet K. himself believed to have quoted *one*, namely, the one about the *merely relative attributes* which are not at the same time attributes of action, too (p. 143, 66). But even if we are willing to leave out of consideration that Gazáli in said passage *reports* only the view of the Philosophers, we cannot admit that we have here to deal with a point of contact of any consequence for Hallevi's system. And again we leave out of consideration that the systematic importance of this distinction is very slight. Instead of this we prefer to call attention to the real contents of the passage quoted from Gazáli's "The Intentions of the Philosophers." As far as the merely relative attributes are concerned, those with Gazáli are of a kind entirely different from those with Hallevi. In the conception of the latter the purely relative attributes are quasi *attributes of distance*. If man feels the exaltedness of God he does not as yet establish any *mutual* relation between God and himself; while in the example offered by Gazáli, that of A. who has changed his place in relation to B, going from his right to his left, there is still a mutuality, because B is now at the right of A after he has been previously at his left. For B, although he has not changed his place, is subject to the conception of space and to the relations attached to it as well as A. It seems that K.

himself felt afterwards (p. 154, 94). Now there is one question more, and an important one. In the passage in hand we read:

הרביעי: המטיב, והוא ישוב אל צירוף העצם אל פעל יגיע טאחו. וזה אמנם, אפשר לקיימו בראשון, ואפשר להרבות התארים בו בצדדים מתחלפים אל הפעולות המנישיות (המניעות) טאחו, וזה לא יחייב רבוי בעצמותו כי לא ישוב אל תאר בעצמות.

This division undoubtedly means that into *attributes of essence and such of action*. This division, we have seen, is an important aspect in Hallevi's doctrine of attributes, too. Of course, this point of contact does not prove anything as to Hallevi's dependence on Gazáli, because this division was formulated for centuries before Gazáli, who is but reporting "the intentions of the philosophers." But Kaufmann, we know, does not pay attention to this state of affairs, and quotes the passage as an instance of Hallevi's dependence on Gazáli—why, then, does he not point out this apparent point of contact between Hallevi and his supposed main source? The answer to this question is plain and simple. According to the utmost arbitrary scheme of K., Hallevi *should not* teach this division. Now, if we bear in mind that the quoted passage is the only one of some importance which K. is able to refer to, and that the same concerns the division of the attributes which K. considers Hallevi's special forte, we cannot but express our astonishment how K. could so consistently insist upon his prejudice that Hallevi's views are to be derived from Gazáli. Thus, we arrived, after all, at the merits of Hallevi's doctrine of attributes:

In the face of this absolute lack of insight into the real principles of Hallevi's philosophy on the part of Kaufmann, we cannot expect that he had found the right way to interpret Hallevi's doctrine of attributes. First of all, K. has not the least idea of the problem of attributes as the philosophic and *literary motive* of many standard-works in Jewish philosophy. As to the division of the attributes, the alleged forte of Hallevi, there was one more screen between K. and the right understanding of Hallevi's doctrine of attributes. K. did not see the distinction between primary and secondary attributes, therefore he heaped up mistake upon mistake in the interpretation of the doctrine of attributes of *Bahya* and *Gabirol* on which Hallevi based his own. Hence that incredible mistake K. falls into right at the beginning of his presentation. The division into three groups, the relative attributes which are at the same time of action, the mere relative and the primary attributes, K. considers as "a division that embraces the *entirety* of the divine attributes" (p. 148). And what about the attributes "Wise" and "Mighty," which are not embraced by this division—do they not belong to the divine attributes? Besides, the main division was into attributes attached to the Tetragrammaton and the others which are not attached to the same, the latter being identical with the three groups in discussion. Consequently these latter cannot represent the entirety of the divine attributes. K., however, found a peculiar way to

escape from this difficulty. The second section of the passage in hand (II, 2, beginning with: *אצל המדות החליות*)—according to this arbitrary dismembering of this systematically well-rounded passage—does not belong to the “philosophic” doctrine of attributes at all (cf. above). And even that “odd exception,” the attribute “wise of heart,” at the end of the paragraph did not suffice to convince K. that he is far removed from the right way (cf. p. 152, 91). An attentive reader of K.’s works at large cannot overlook that the *foot-notes* mostly are written *afterwards* as a sort of “gelehrte Noten,” being out of all systematic connection with the presentation-proper. (So e.g. in the *posthumous* work “Studien über Gabirol,” there are almost entirely missing annotations referring to the complete edition of *Fons vitae*, which undoubtedly were to be added.) Also here we have to deal with such an after-thought: Annotation, p. 152, 91, when compared with the apparently *additional* remark in the text itself, pp. 163–164, together with the annotations, 117 and 118, indicates beyond all doubt that K. had already finished this whole section when the closing sentence of II, 2, so badly neglected in the presentation itself, reappeared on his horizon and disturbed his scheme. It was then that he found the right interpretation in *Muscato* and in *Stoekl* that wisdom “is to be conceived as a *substantial* predication”; yet being, apparently, already too far removed from the subject in order to see that these remarks mean nothing more nor less than a decisive disavowal of his own presentation. Also the *double division* which K., like his predecessors, could not overcome (cf. p. 157, 101), would have led him toward the right way, had he had the courage to abandon his unfounded interpretation, instead of supporting it by admitting an “odd exception,” and the like.

Like K.’s conception of Hallevi’s division of attributes in general, so his presentation of its details is unsustainable, too. K. considers the division of attributes as Hallevi’s greatest forte, and comes to the conclusion that Hallevi surpasses his predecessors in *three* respects (pp. 152–154): *First*, that man cannot posit anything about God by means of logical speculation. K. himself admits that “odd exception” (annot. 91), God’s wisdom. But just here he admits more than he is compelled to. Wisdom is but another term for the primitive attribute; principle of form, a cognition toward which, according to the view of Hallevi, the philosophers cannot find the right and *sure* way. On the other hand it cannot be said that Hallevi denies the competency of philosophy to posit anything about God, since he admits that God as *Elohim*, as the Ruler of natural law, was recognized by philosophy through means of its own. *Secondly*, K. believes Hallevi “to have been the first in Jewish religious philosophy of Middle Ages who has entirely done away with the essential attributes.” But, also as regards this question, that “odd exception” is an instance against this statement, and besides, the passages in question do

not leave any doubt that Hallevi accepted the old division of attributes into essential ones and such of action.

II, 1: שמות הבורא כולם, חוץ מהמפורש, הם מדות ותבניות מופלגות, נלקחת מהפעולות הברואים לה; כפי גזרתיו ומעשיו.... וכל המדות האלה אינם דבקות אל עצם כבודו, ולא מתרבה בהם. אבל המדות התלויות בשם המפורש יתברך, הם היצירות מבלי מצועים מבעיים....

IV, 1 at the end: ואיך אודיע בשם מה שאין עליו דמיון, אך הראיה עליו מטיעושי? King of Khazars asks: whereupon the

V, 21: אם כן נבחר בפעליו יתברך, ונעמוד בפני עצמו, כי אלו חיינו משיגים אמתה, היה זה הפרק בו....

The division into attributes of essence and of action is expressed in these passages beyond doubt. And if K. finds that Hallevi surpasses Bahya in so far as the latter considers the essential attributes more dignified than those of action, it is just one instance more showing how badly K. was mistaken in his conception of the problem of attributes. This question is to be treated in connection with the *third*, allegedly new, achievement of Hallevi's. According to the view of K., Hallevi is going beyond and against Bahya by taking the negative attributes more seriously, "seeing in them terms above which God is exalted both as regards their positive content and their negative contrast." How are we to realize this strange sentence? Surely, Hallevi insists that existence, oneness, and being the first and the last, attributed to God, do not mean the same as when ascribed to man or other beings. But, is it really necessary to say that no Jewish philosopher can be supposed to contradict this, or even to insist upon it less emphatically? And what is meant by "and their negative contrast"? Is it the exaltedness of God above "dead," "composed," and "finite," which deserves so strong an emphasis? But we know well what these empty words aim at. They are to express what K. offers later on in more intelligible words. Hallevi is said to insist more seriously than all his predecessors upon the *unknowableness* of God. K. traced the problem of attributes from Saadya down to Maimuni, discussed it in a book of nearly 600 pages, without having realized what this problem really means. Consequently, he could not see the phases this problem in its development was going through. All he knew was that there must be phases marking some progress in the discussion of the problem. This was a title for him to construe controversies between the Jewish philosophers about questions in regard to which there *cannot be* any controversy or any development. What K. intends to do is nothing more nor less than to say that according to Hallevi man has *absolutely* no knowledge about God. It is the absolute unknowableness of God, the *real emptiness of our God-conception*, that K. considered a lofty achievement to boast of. We are to return to this question. But taking this mistaken view for granted, I cannot see how Hallevi was the "first" in denying the division into attributes of essence and of action. Was it not *Gabirol* to whom K. himself assigned once the priority in this dubious achievement? Or is it now Hallevi, and no longer

Gabirol, because "they," i. e., the interpreters K. himself believed to have refuted, "believed to have found an indication thereof even with Gabirol"? And as to the supposed difference between Bahya and Hallevi concerning the higher rank of the essential attributes, K.'s mistake is to be considered the consequence of his neglect to gain a survey of the development of the problem of attributes in *Arabic philosophy*. (We will discuss the double direction of said division soon after its first appearance with the Kalam; in the second volume of my *Geschichte der jüdischen Philosophie*.)

Looking aside from all these impossibilities, we do not see any aspect to which K. himself was pointing as being of some significance. What does it matter if Hallevi distinguishes between relative attributes of action and plainly relative? or if he does but discover that all positive attributes are meant metaphorically? According to our presentation this new division, the distinction between relative attributes of action and mere relative, becomes necessary, because only the former can be reduced to the metaphysical relation, and not the latter. Were it not so, that whole distinction would have at best the importance of an exercise in Logic. And as to the metaphoric sense of the attributes, K., as a haphazard *translator*, disavows himself (p. 209): "But if we reflect upon the attributes we are compelled to ascribe to God, both in original and metaphorical sense, such as living, wise, mighty, willing, guiding, regulating, and the like—" thus we must ascribe to God some attributes in their original sense! In an annotation (187) to this passage, K. himself says: "These attributes we must ascribe to God, whether we understand them in the way intimated in II, 2, as attributes of action, relation, and negation, thus at any rate as metaphoric designations, or (we understand them) as *determinations-proper*, which really concern God, in a way, however, which does not violate His oneness." Thus K. admits, after all that emphasis, that there are attributes-proper which really concern God, alongside of those used metaphorically which are discussed in II, 2, thus that division (the second according to our presentation) does no longer embrace "the entirety of the attributes"! K. feels that he disavows himself, and seeks to escape the trouble by adding: "This, namely, that God is *ה' עולם קארי טאעל*, that at least in the imagination of His believers among the people! He must be equipped with the attributes of life, wisdom, might, and action—this is admitted even by Maimuni, Moreh, I, c. 46; Guide, I, p. 158." If, as it seems, K. wants to say that Hallevi, too, refers here to the popular imagination, he cannot do so except in open contradiction with the clear words of Hallevi. What else does *על דרך ההעברה* mean, if not the popular imagination? Consequently, *על דרך האמת* means the contrast to the popular imagination, and means the attributes-proper. (By the way, K. admits again more than necessary. According to Hallevi's own explanation in II, 2, *ה'* belongs to the metaphoric attributes; as to Maimuni we will see,

in the second volume of my *Geschichte der jüdischen Philosophie*, that K. is altogether mistaken concerning his attitude, too.) That great achievement, then, represented in the division of attributes of Hallevi, goes up in vapour in the face of the *מיוחד על דרך האמת*; for what else can be meant by *אֵלֶּסֶתּוֹת חֻקִּים* than essential attributes? All these contradictions and self-disavowals are but the natural consequence of the lack of understanding what the problem of attributes really means. Look aside from the problem of relation in its metaphysical and ethical aspect of which K. (and, like him, I. Guttman, in his monographies about Saadya, Gabirol, and Ibn-Daud), does not betray the slightest idea—look aside from this very core of the problem, and the whole dispute about the problem of attributes is but a jingle of words.

Another important question concerning which K. failed in consequence of his lack of understanding as regards the basic thoughts of Hallevi's philosophy, is the question treated by Hallevi in connection with his exegetical view about the *Tetragrammaton*. According to K., Hallevi does not acknowledge any essential attributes of God. Yet this concerns only his *philosophic* doctrine of attributes; while in the alleged *non-philosophic* section of the same Hallevi is allowed to posit a "peculiar criterion" of God, that of interrupting the course of Nature by *doing miracles*; comp. pp. 166, 176, 179, 180, 181, 215, 228, 237 a. In our presentation we have taken this error into full account, and, on the ground of many passages, we have shown that "doing miracles" means an essential criterion of God only in so far as all miracles are to be conceived but as giving form to matter, *like the creation*; that, consequently, it is the primitive attribute, form-principle which is represented by miracles. It is, therefore, not necessary, however interesting it would be, to go through the details in order to show how K. forces his mistake into many passages which emphasize rather the strict opposite of what he would like to find in them. Still we cannot desist from quoting at least one passage where K. is compelled to disavow himself once more. K.'s very free translation of Hallevi's remark intercalated in II, 2 at the end, reads as follows: "But at the time when it was intended to intimate the knowledge of the idea of God to the whole people of Israel, there was a need for miracles which contained the proof that the creator of the world is able to perform a new creation every time he intends to . . . , while the patriarchs in their unshaken faithfulness, were quite able to perceive continually the Name and the conception of God, without having need of being convinced by obvious miracles in which *the criteria* of this conception find their best confirmation" (pp. 181-182). We look aside from the fact that this interpretation can by no means be even *forced* into the text. It is sufficient to realize that, according to this interpretation, the purpose of the miracles was to prove that God has the

power to do miracles: The miracles had nothing to accredit except themselves! And further: The patriarchs had never seen miracles, and still they perceived very well the conception of God. Here one must ask: If the very criterion of God is to do miracles how *could* the patriarchs perceive the right God-conception, since they never had seen miracles, that is to say, an interruption of natural course? Indeed, K. does but continue to disavow himself, when he admits here that the *criteria* of the conception of God find their best *confirmation* in the miracles; while the miracles are the confirmation of *those criteria* (Plural!), the latter themselves, certainly, are anything rather than "doing miracles." And again we call attention to the extremely strange tardiness in treating the closing remarks of the paragraph in hand (II, 2; cf. above). As to the merits Hallevi does not cease to emphasize at every opportunity that the miracles are of importance only as *indications* that he who has the power to perform wonders by giving form to matter, has the power of creation, too; since it is the same activity in both; giving form. Adam recognized God in his activity attached to the Tetragrammaton, because he witnessed the creation of Eve (cf. especially II, 54). Surely, the creation of Eve was no interruption of natural course, but Adam had the opportunity to perceive God as a moulder and former of matter. God arranged this so that the last work of creation, the creation of woman, be witnessed by man in order to intimate the conception of God at least to the male half of the highest creature on earth.

And again, K. disavows himself; going from mistake to mistake, he is compelled to posit another criterion of God, that of "maintainer of the world" (pp. 156, 168, 180, 188). But maintaining the world and interrupting the natural course—are these not extremes? Besides "maintaining the world" means an attribute of action.

Finally, K. puts this latter God-conception of Hallevi in relation to that of the philosophers: "The philosophic God-conception *which is derived from the fact of creation of the world*, is indicated by attributes which contain only the terms of creative activities, and the relations connected therewith" (pp. 168–169). Was it not just the conception of God as creator which Hallevi denied to be grasped by philosophy?

CRESCAS AND SPINOZA

*A Memorial Paper in Honor of the Five Hundredth Anniversary
of the "Or Adonoi"*

INTRODUCTION

IT was in the past generation that Jewish scholars recognized that *Spinoza* is dependent on Jewish literature, mostly on *Crescas*. It was M. Joël who emphasized this dependence and showed in a conclusive manner that the basic thoughts of Spinoza's system were taken from the book "Or Adonoi" of Crescas, and that even the new thoughts in Spinoza's "Ethics" are to be derived rather from his attitude towards the philosophy of Crescas than from that towards the philosophy of *Descartes* (cf. *Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie, Crescas*). However, it is not this question with which we have to deal in the present essay. Not the relation between Spinoza's "Ethics" and the philosophy of Crescas do I intend to make the subject of a new investigation, although many a new view may be unfolded also on this old question. I hope to take up this task at another time and in another connection. For the present I aim to point out a new feature in Spinoza's dependence on Crescas, in addition to that discovered by Joël and others. The thesis I have to set forth and to defend in the following chapters concerns the relations between Spinoza's "*Tractatus theologico-politicus*" and the book "Or Adonoi"; a question which, besides its material importance, is of great significance as a bit of *literary history*, one of the chief viewpoints of this treatise, and as an evidence of the influence of the book of this prominent Jewish philosopher of the Middle

Ages on Jewish literature, and the literature of the world. (Joël in his exposition of the *Tractatus theologico-politicus*, cf. *Beiträge*, points chiefly to the elements taken from *Maimuni*, mentioning Crescas only in some subsidiary questions, not seeing the close relation between the two works.)

And as it is well known that the book "Or Adonoi" is framed within the *theory of dogmas*, it is advisable to look also at the *Tractatus* from this viewpoint. We shall see that the conception of the *Tractatus* as an exposition of a *theory of dogmas* is not only justified, but that, moreover, this viewpoint is the only one from which this book can be successfully analyzed and adequately understood. Therefore my task is a *double* one. I have to present the theory of Crescas as to dogmas, paying special attention to those aspects of this theory from which Spinoza started out, and departed in some principal points from his master, and on which he built up his own theory of Dogmas. Such is the subject of the *first chapter* of this treatise. The *second chapter* is devoted to the second part of our theme, viz.: the presentation of the *Tractatus* from the viewpoint of Dogmas; an exposition which discloses the most decisive features in the dependence of this book, both in its principal ideas and in its literary form, on "Or Adonoi."

Having found that Spinoza in his *first* great work is influenced and guided by a Jewish philosopher of the character and the prominence of Crescas, we shall see in a new light also his philosophy developed in his second great work, in the "Ethices," as far as its relation to Judaism in general and especially to the philosophy of Crescas is concerned. We shall see that the spiritual protoplasts from which the system of Spinoza has sprung forth in order to grow and develop and to become a potent movent in philosophy and culture, are rooted deeply in the *last great work* of Jewish philosophy of the Middle Ages. The book "Or Adonoi," the quinqu centenarian jubilee of which we celebrate by this Memorial Paper, serves as the bridge from Jewish philosophy of the Middle Ages to the New Philosophy. Nor is the prominence

of this book in its historical consequences confined to its influence upon Spinoza as a philosopher and as a representative of the demand of freedom for science and philosophy and their teachings. We shall see that Spinoza as the first modern *Biblical critic*, too, was influenced greatly by the book of Crescas.¹

I. CHISDAI CRESCAS²

Crescas in his book "Or Adonoi" (אור אדוני) introduced a new aspect into the discussion of the question of dogmas; new at least as to the conscious consistency in the exposition of the whole doctrine of dogmas from this viewpoint. For as to the matter itself it was Philo (and others) who emphasized the dogma as the *basis of the Torah* (as shown in my History of Jewish Dogmas). Yet, while his predecessors in this aspect counted only those dogmas which they considered the basis of the Torah, Crescas differentiates between three classes, or, rather, degrees of dogmas.

Crescas distinguishes between "Principles of the Torah" (פניית תורות) "with which the Torah stands and falls" (II tr., introd., p. 20a); "True beliefs" (אמונות אמיתיות) "the denier of one of which is to be called a heretic" (III tr., introd., p. 44c), or "Roots which, although their truth is beyond doubt, are not Principles of the Torah without which it (the Torah)

¹ Dr. Neumark's "Excursus on Urim ve-Thummim," which formed the third part of this essay, is omitted because of lack of space.—Editor.

² Crescas was born about 1340, and died about 1410. His philosophic standard work "Or Adonoi" was written in the last year of his life. According to the closing remark of the book it was finished in the month Zive (Eyar) 5170—May 1410; but the second chapter of tractate III, section 5, was written in the year 1337 after the Destruction (as pointed out by Crescas himself), that is 5165 (the old Jewish scholars dated the Destruction two years earlier), 1405. It is impossible to suppose Crescas to have worked on the last few pages of the book five years. At any rate the book was finished between the years 1405–1410, the latter being, perhaps, the year of the edition. The *editio princeps* of the book Ferrara 1555 (5315) according to the "improved" reprint of which (Johannisburg, Prussia) I am quoting. [See Graetz, *Gesch. d. Juden VIII*, 414.—Editor]

could not exist" (ibid. 1 part, chapt. 3 at the beg., p. 62 *b*); and, finally, "Opinions" (סברות) "toward which the reason is inclined on the ground of Tradition" (IV tr., introd.), "still, he who does not believe in them is not to be called a heretic." (Premise, at the end.)

Thus we can omit the Opinions from the number of the dogmas in the doctrine of Crescas, and take them into consideration only as far as they are of some consequence for the explanation of Crescas' system in general.

The principles of the Torah are:

1. God's Omniscience. 2. Providence. 3. Omnipotence. 4. Prophecy. 5. Man's free will. 6. The Purpose (of the Torah which is the Purpose of the Universe).

The "True Beliefs" are divided by Crescas into "Beliefs attached to special commandments" and "Beliefs which are not attached to special commandments."

Of the first kind there are *eight*: 1. Creation. 2. The eternal life of man's soul. 3. Reward and Punishment. 4. Resurrection. 5. The eternity of the Torah (no abrogation). 6. Moses, and the exclusiveness of his prophecy. 7. The belief that the Highpriest was answered (every time) through the Urim ve-Thummim. 8. Messiah.

Of the second kind there are *three*: 1. The Beliefs attached to the Prayer and the Benediction of the priest. 2. The Belief attached to Repentance. 3. The Beliefs attached to the Day of Atonement and the four seasons for the divine festivals.

Of "Opinions" there are *thirteen* (cf. below).

In this enumeration we miss the dogma of the existence of God. The reason why Crescas does not count this dogma is to be sought in the confusion of *dogmas* and *commandments* by Crescas. He opposes Maimuni for counting the belief in the existence of God as a particular commandment, insisting that the conception of commandment supposes at the same time the commander, so that the belief in the existence of God cannot be considered a particular commandment. Crescas,

therefore, does not count the existence of God a particular dogma (cf. "Premise" in the beginning of the book), distinguishing it by the name of "The great Root." This conclusion of Crescas is not intelligible enough, since, after all, the existence of God is a particular dogma, though it is not a particular commandment. Moreover, the decisive criterion of the Principles of the Torah demands imperatively to regard the existence of God a particular dogma, for the reason that there can be no commandment without a commander. Indeed, Crescas does not insist upon this his view (cf. III, 1 part, introd., p. 45 a). And still, Crescas could not emancipate himself completely from the confusion of dogma with commandment, as we see in the special emphasis of beliefs which are attached to commandments. But we will show later on that this attitude of Crescas indicates another important aspect in his dogmatics.

To understand the motive in the division of the dogmas by Crescas we refer to our own division in our History of Jewish Dogmas. There we divided the Jewish dogmas into *essential* and *historical* ones.

The essential are:

1. The *existence* of God, as eternal, spiritual, and unique.
 2. *Prophecy*. 3. Man's *free will*. 4. *Retribution*. To these *four primary* essential dogmas, that is to say, to these four dogmas which were accepted and acknowledged in the authoritative document of Judaism from the earliest time of its appearance in history, are to be added two others, each of them being of a special kind. 5. The *existence* of *angels*. This dogma, while strongly emphasized by the first Book of the Covenant, was rejected by the second and the third, and likewise by the later authoritative documents of Judaism. We refer to the Benedictions, Prayers, and Torah-Readings selected and introduced at the end of the fourth or the beginning of the third century before the new era (if not earlier), recitations, the entirety of which we consider the *fourth*

dogmatical document of Judaism, and, finally, the *fifth* dogmatical document: the *Mishna*. 6. *Creation*. This dogma notwithstanding its being a strict logical consequence of the basic thought of Judaism, the ethical monotheism, we do not find it in the two first Books of the Covenant, even as in general in all parts of biblical literature prior to *Jeremiah*. We distinguish, therefore, this dogma by the particular designation *essential-historical dogma*, corresponding to its peculiar position in the development of Judaism from an *ethical theory*, confined within the limits of a *life-conception*, into an *ethico-cosmological theory*, a comprehensive *world-view*, composed of a conception of life and a conception of the world.

The historical are:

1. *Resurrection*. 2. *The World-hereafter*, in the sense of *spiritual retribution* of the soul while being outside of the body. 3. *Messiah*. 4. *Torah from the Heaven*, in the sense that the Torah is *eternally existent*. 5. *Oral Tradition* (cf. my article "Ikkarim" in *אוצר היידיש* p. 5, and *passim*).

Now, if we compare the division of Crescas with our division, we find that the six Principles of the Torah, together with the Great Root are identical with our four primary essential dogmas, excepting the dogma of Retribution, *instead of which* Crescas counts the dogma of the Purpose of the Torah. Likewise our historical dogmas are contained in Crescas' *True Beliefs*, and partly in his *Opinions*. Of course, Crescas' Beliefs and Opinions contain more than our historical dogmas. However, not the additional beliefs and superstitions of Crescas are the subject to which we have to pay attention. As to these it will be sufficient to discover the source from which they flowed to Crescas. The difference as to the principle between our division and that of Crescas concerns chiefly the dogmas of *Retribution* and *Creation* which with us are essential, Principles of the Torah, whereas Crescas counts them among the dogmas of the second degree. True it is that also with us the dogma of Creation is, to a certain extent at least,

an historical one, and we shall see that Crescas felt the peculiar position of this dogma in Judaism. Nevertheless it is just this dogma which bears out the difference by which we will come to a justified appreciation of Crescas' doctrine of dogmas, and to a thorough understanding of the relationship of Spinoza to Crescas.

As to Crescas' methodology it presents a combination of *three methods*, the significance of which we learn in the history of Jewish philosophy, namely that of *Saadya*, that of *Jehuda Hallevi*, and that of *Maimuni*. Like Saadya Crescas sometimes inserts logical premises into aggadistic-mythological conceptions, and makes the combination of both a matter of philosophic investigation and discussion, without being aware that it is only the *frame* of the investigation which receives a philosophic touch whilst the matter itself is pending in the realm of the Aggada, not having any root in the solid ground of logic; like Hallevi he endeavors, seemingly, to escape the many stranded network of the peripatetic philosophy, while he in reality is caught therein, and, moreover, strives to grasp cognitions in spheres beyond the limits of philosophy by means of a *theosophic enthusiasm*, scaling upwards; and, finally, like Maimuni he penetrates deeply into the very core of the subtlest problems, and discloses their inmost logical relations. And as his method so is also the *system* of Crescas. The philosophic system of Crescas consists of clearly and profoundly thought out sentences, on the one hand, and of striking superstitions, on the other, both being connected by the intermediate link of true beliefs. And although the true beliefs we tend to are not all identical with the True Beliefs enumerated by Crescas—the latter containing some beliefs which we consider superstition—it is this *three-fold influence* flowing from the classical period of Jewish philosophy to which we have to refer as the decisive motive in the composition of the book "Or Adonoi." While the first of the *four Tractates* of which the book consists, presents itself as a strong attack upon the premises of peripateticism, the three following

tractates which correspond to the three degrees of dogmas are caught partly in the net-work of the peripatetic philosophy, and partly in that of mysticism; the former especially in the second and (to a smaller extent) the third tractate, but the latter especially in the fourth tractate.

As to the superstitions we shall see that they interfere even in the most philosophic portions of the system. For the present it is sufficient to remark that these strange inclinations in the mind of Crescas are the result of his position as a *Disputant* with Christian theologians. In his "Or Adonoi" Crescas does not dispute expressly with Christian theology (cf., however, III tr., 1 part, sect. 8, pp. 61-62, concerning the dogma of Messiah). But if we compare his standard-work with his tractate: "Refutation of the Christian Dogmas" we soon become aware that the source of all the superstitions we find in Crescas, is to be traced to the influence of his occupation with Disputations. He who handles colors cannot expect to remain entirely clean, without having caught a stain or two on his hands. And this is true especially of our fathers in the talmudical and the philosophic literature who had so many a view in common with Christian theology.

We now come to our subject-proper, the philosophic conception of the dogmas in the system of Crescas:

The philosophy of Crescas is one of *absolute determinism*. *Necessity* is the last root of all being and all becoming. True, *Necessity* with Crescas is not blind necessity like the old Greek *Ananke* (*Fatum*) to which even the necessity of the world with Aristotle is to be ultimately traced. In the *Necessity* of Crescas there is left room for the Will as a living movent in all being and becoming; there is room for a certain conception of Creation. But this Will and this creation do not mean more than an *intellectual consciousness* concomitant with all activities in the Universe. It is this divine consciousness of which Crescas states that it "distributes existence to the creatures, and issues the *law of their existence*," that is to say the law of their being and becoming: *natural law*. Some writers put Crescas at the

side of Hallevi in refuting philosophy, and present the system of Crescas as one which restores the old Jewish tradition of Creation and other dogmas. As to Hallevi I refer to my treatise: Jehuda Hallevi's Philosophy in its Principles where I have shown that this interpretation of the book of Al-Khazari is a gross mistake. Still greater is the mistake with regard to Crescas. It is hard to realize how it was possible to change the clear words of this profound philosopher into their opposite (Joël saw the true state of affairs, but he is rather inclined to suppress the clear formulation of these striking thoughts in Jewish philosophy). Crescas discusses at large and refutes the statement of *Gersonides* that the Creation took place on the ground of an eternal hylic principle which in its potential being is entirely independent of God. And he shows that this theory and its arguments are unsustainable: "There is nothing necessary in being because of itself except God, and everything else, *created or eternal*, is possible in being because of itself; and has *issued from Him*. Now, this issue was necessarily *either by necessity* or by Will. It does not matter whether we say "(Created) out of Nothing," which means that it (the world) entered existence after its non-existence, and that there was no bearer existing previously; or we say *that both* (matter and form) *issued by necessity*, since by this (latter statement), too, we intend to say nothing else than that they had no previous bearer, since both matter and form, issued after non-existence (thus they could not have any previous bearer), and that their entire being issued from Him."

To begin with the latter sentence: Between these two statements, for that is what Crescas means, there is no difference in the principle: "Created out of Nothing," or "after non-existence," in both we deny only the existence of a bearer, a material principle independent in its being of God; but in both we state that all beings besides God issued from Him. If we say, then, "out of nothing," we can neglect the addition:

“after non-existence,” because not the absence of existence is the point we have to lay stress upon, but the absence of an existence independent of God. Consequently, should there be a possibility of a previous existence of the kind that does not include the existence of an independent previous bearer, there would be no objection thereto: and this is the case when we posit the existence of the world as an *eternal issue* from God. Because, this is the sense of the former sentence, it makes no difference whether we say the world is created, or we say it is eternal. For not the eternity is the decisive aspect of the question under discussion, but the “necessity because of itself.” We perfectly comply with the only justified demand of the conception of creation, if we only deprive the world of the necessity in being because of itself, and mark it by the possibility of being because of itself as a *creature*. Moreover, we have to lay stress upon the addition “because of itself.” For the possibility because of itself is not the only mark of the creatural nature; the *necessity because of God* is another mark. Once we have conceded that all being besides God issued from Him, we must be consistent enough to conceive this issue concomitant with the existence of God, thus necessary because of Him, because of His necessity in being. Of course, the world necessary because of God is an eternal one, as God is eternal. Indeed, this is the imperative demand of the true God-conception. To posit a non-eternal issue from God would mean to posit a finiteness of His Might, and to carry changeability into His essence. “It is beyond doubt,” for thus Crescas continues the passage quoted above, “that the difference between these two statements (‘created,’ or ‘eternal’) concerns but (the question of) *God’s might*. When we suppose it (the world) to be eternal, it indicates a (divine) *Might non-confined in time*, while if we suppose it to be created, it indicates a *Might confined in time*. Besides (there is one more reason for which) we had to suppose it *eternal*, since from the *relation* between the Creator and the creature, having to be *at every time the same*, unavoidably

follows its everlasting (*constant*) issue from Him, and its necessity, even as it was supposed. For there is no special time in which the issue had to take place, so that the (demanded) Ever would be (begin) *after* this issue.

Now, from this our supposition, that is to say, *from the everlasting issue of being by necessity*, follows the positing of a (divine) Might non-confined (in time), being constantly engaged in activity. And the reason for this is that the (active) force (might) is confined only when there is a *mutual relation* between the active force and that which suffers the action, whilst where there is no (such) relation, *there the active force is unavoidably non-confined.*"

Crescas endeavors to save the Will, and it is very interesting to see *how* he does this. While in the passage quoted above he takes into consideration *two* eventualities: the issue of the world from God can be conceived *either* in the way of necessity, *or* in the way of free Will—he is now going to show that in reality the way of necessity *implies* the free Will. "Further I am going to state," so reads the continuation of the passage just quoted, "that from this our supposition, that is to say (from that of), the necessity of (the issue of) the Universe from Him, follows logically that it takes place (but) *in the way of (free) Will*. And this, namely, for two reasons. The first: From our supposition of the necessity (of the issue) of the Universe from an *intelligent principle* follows that it takes place in the way of *conception*, and that it (the intelligent principle) distributes existence (to the beings of the Universe) in the way of the perfect conception, that is to say (in the way of) a conception of the *law* of the beings, and (of) the conception (consciousness) thereof that it (the intelligent principle) is distributing existence of the law and that of the beings themselves, in their entirety, and individually, as well; that is to say, that there is no thing which would not acquire the existence and the essence from the conception of that intelligent principle. And since it is an intelligent principle, surely *it does will what it conceives*. Indeed, *Will*

does not mean anything else but this, i.e. to be conceived: that it (the intelligent principle) is willing and (therefore) distributing (existence and essence of the beings) by the way of thinking and conceiving their existence (and essence). And since that is so, it is now evident that from our supposition of the necessity (of the issue) of the Universe from Him follows that it takes place in the way of Will, and, according to our previous exposition, it follows further *that this Will is a constant one.*"

The necessity of the Universe by a constant Will! This means the Universe, while being possible because of itself, is in reality a necessary and eternal being because of its *necessity and constant issue* from God.

True, Crescas does not forget that it is always only a "supposition," (היחזק) spoken of, and towards the end of this discussion he adds: "In this way the Torah and the miracles mentioned therein are imaginable *even if we would believe* the necessity (of the issue) of the Universe from Him in the way of goodness (free Will); but the *perfect truth* is as it came down by Tradition, namely, *that God created and originated it (the world) in a given time*, as we are told in the first chapter of Genesis." Yet, he soon continues: "There remains, however, the question: Why God originated it (the world) in a given time; since the relation to the time is in every part of it the same, both as regards the Creator as well as the creature?" To this question Crescas presents two answers. The first: The divine wisdom has chosen a given time, just because every moment of the eternal time was equally fit for the task of Creation. The second: "Or we allow ourselves (to accept) what is to be found in some sentences of our sages quoted by Maimuni, and not (to read וְיִבְרָא , instead of וַיִּבְרָא) contradicted by any one, namely the sentence: It indicates that God was constructing worlds and destroying them; or such as: It indicates that there was an order of times before that. The intention of these sentences is, apparently, the *constant Creation*. And this is aimed at in the coinage

of the Benedictions: He (God) is creating every day, constantly, the work of the early Creation; for the Creation of the Universe in its entirety out of Nothing is *a constant one*" (cf. to this whole discussion III tr., 1 sect., 5 chapt.).

As to the *philosophic* conviction of Crescas there cannot be any doubt that he conceives the world as an eternal necessary issue from God.

And this will become definitely clear to us, when we turn to the dogmas of *Omniscience*, *Providence* and *Might*.

Crescas discusses largely the dogma of the divine knowledge, stating that this is going into the *details*. But as he reduces the conception of the divine knowledge ultimately to the conclusion which is to be gained in the discussion of the dogma of Creation: "that those which are embraced by the knowledge of God acquired their existence from His knowledge, His consciously conceived Will" (II tr., 1 sect., 4 chapt., p. 23 *b*), we know how we have to understand this. Likewise Crescas endeavors to establish the *Providence in details*, while in the very result of the discussion of this question the field of Providence is an extremely limited one: The general natural Providence attached to the species is *fixed and determined*, and has no reference to the (ethical and religious) perfection of those taken care of. The individual Providence is of a double kind: One of them is completely referred to the perfection of those taken care of, namely the retribution of the soul in the world hereafter; of this Crescas says: "It is evident that this Providence is *fixed and determined by His eternal Will*." The second is the retribution in *this* world, "fixed and determined, but not completely referred to the perfection of those taken care of," since there are in this world "just ones who suffer and sinners who enjoy" (ibid., 2 sect., 1 chapt., p. 25). And here, too, Crescas emphasizes that his view in this question is based on the outcome of the future discussion on the dogma of Creation (ibid., chapt. 5, p. 28 *a*).

Still greater is the evidence in the discussion on the dogma of *Might*: The "*supposition*" of that discussion presents itself

here as the *real conviction* of Crescas: The Might of God is infinite not only in *intensity*, but also in *time* (ibid., 3 sect., 1 chapt. at the beg., p. 29*b*). The definite conclusion of this discussion reads: "It is clear, then, that it is the *dogma of Creation*, according to Torah and Tradition, which has enlightened our eyes in this matter. It is this: It will be shown in the *third tractate* in a manner beyond doubt that the Universe in its entirety is created by God absolutely in the way of the *Will*, although there was nothing previously. It is, therefore, evident that the Creator is working without (mutual) relation between Him and the creature... (always in the style of the 'supposition'). And, surely, from the foregoing follows necessarily that the (Might) non-confined in intensity and in time cannot be *a mere potential one* which would become the more actual the farther it is going in the Ever (in the eternal time); on the contrary, it follows necessarily that there is a Might (as a source) of being *non-confined in intensity, being an actual one*" (ibid., 2 chapt.).

Thus in full accord with his *cosmological* determinism Crescas is an *ethical* determinist, too. This attitude, intimated already in his teaching of Providence, comes to full manifestation in the discussion of the dogma of *man's free will*. Also here Crescas endeavors to save the word "free will." Yet, the word is deprived of its real content. To formulate Crescas' attitude exactly: The actions of man are *possible because of themselves*, but *necessary because of their motives and the knowledge of God*: "The sum of the matter," so Crescas closes the exposition of this question, "is this: These material things of possible being, inasmuch as the free will is applicable to them (i.e. inasmuch as the deeds of man are concerned), taken for granted that it is the very nature of will to will or not to will without any forcing cause from without, which is the right way according to the Torah, are to be considered *possible because of (their motives and)*

themselves, yet necessary because of [their (inner) motives and] the knowledge of God.”³

Crescas believed to have saved the dogmas according to the Torah, but in reality he saved the contents of the traditional belief only in the dogmas of the existence of God as a Spiritual Being, and of His knowledge, whilst in the dogmas of Creation, Providence, Might, and man's free will he saved only the *theological language*. The ultimate meaning of free will in the system of Crescas is, according to his own confession, the *pleasure and the joy* one feels while doing something good or bad. Yet, even with regard to pleasure and joy there is no room for free choice. Besides, in *matters of creed*, even according to the true adherents of man's free will, there is no room for free choice as to pleasure and joy or sorrow concomitant with a certain opinion gained by reason or tradition. The "detailed Providence" in the system of Crescas is fixed and determined from eternity, and necessary in all its details. Reward and punishment are *inherent* in the deeds themselves (cf. below). And the deeds of man themselves are, no doubt, possible, yet this only because of themselves. That is to say: It is well possible that *some man* would do *in some case* good or evil. Yet man's deeds are necessary because of their motives and the knowledge of God about them. That is to say: If we have to deal with a *known* individual in an *actual case*, then we cannot conceive the man in relation to his deeds otherwise than necessitated. And likewise the *products* of man's deeds are necessitated. Reward and punishment are inherent in man's actions like the healing or

³ Ibid., 5 sect., 3 chapt., p. 36 a; it is beyond doubt that the text of this passage is corrupt: compared with the foregoing passage: ולזה היה האמת הגמור כפי מה שחתייבוהו התורה והעיון, ששבע האפשרים נמצא בדברים בבחינת עצמם, לא בבחינת החיות, וזהו שכתבנו, אלא שהאפשרים הזה מוקד למוקד, and with the following at the beginning of chapt. 5: ואם היה שומעים מה ההפסי בין החיוב אשר בבחינת הסבות בולת הרגש אונם והכרח... it is evident that the passage is to be restored into: ואפשרים בבחינת עצמם ומחויבים בבחינת החיות, instead of: ואפשרים בבחינת סבותם ועצמם ומחויבים בבחינת ידיעת השם; or we have to understand the words ועצמם סבותם here as a *pleonasm* and to translate: "because of themselves."

destructive efficiency in the medicines: "As to the second objection (to the determinism), taken from (the dogma of) reward and punishment, namely, that the opinion of man being necessitated in his actions would mean to make reward and punishment an injustice on the part of God, it seems, indeed, to be a strong objection, able to refute all determinism. But if we think it over, we find that its solution is not difficult at all. It is this: Suppose that reward and punishment follow necessarily from worship and disobedience *as the effects follow from their causes*, there is no way to say that they (reward and punishment) are an injustice; just as it is not an injustice if one burns himself when he comes in contact with fire, even if this coming in contact took place *independently of his will*" (ibid., p. 35 c). According to this statement it is clear that ethical responsibility has no room in the system of Crescas. Responsibility is mere *reference*: "Reward and punishment are referred to the fulfilling of a commandment or to the transgression of a prohibition" (III tr., 3 sect., 1 chapt., p. 54 a). Instead of Retribution Crescas counts the *Purpose*, the *Love of God*, as a Principle of the Torah. Crescas himself justifies this by the statement that the purpose of the Torah is the *worship out of Love*, not such because of retribution. But we have seen that the dogma of Retribution in its meaning in the philosophy of Crescas has no force to sustain the imperatives of the Torah.

Now we understand the attitude of Crescas in the division of dogmas.

Crescas did not see clearly the difference between essential and historical dogmas, yet in his division he came close to this difference. He did not see clearly the peculiar historical position of the dogma of Creation, yet he penetrated profoundly into the logical relations of this dogma to the others. He quotes the known sentence of Rabbi Jitschok (quoted by *Rashi* to Genesis I, 1) that the Torah had to begin with the legal portion (Ex. 12), and thus justifies why he did not count the dogma of Creation as a Principle of the Torah. And

still he reduces the conception of the Principles to the outcome of the discussion on Creation. This is in accordance with the historical development of the dogmas in Judaism: The dogma of Creation, though formulated in a later time, became afterwards the center of gravity of all spiritual movement in Judaism, as shown in my History of Dogmas in Judaism. We have seen that the dogmas of Providence, Might and man's free will received their deterministic character out of the conception of Creation, and we perceive now from a new viewpoint why the dogma of retribution lost its principle-character in the system of Crescas. In accordance with the conception of Creation, man's actions are possible only because of themselves, being necessary because of their motives and the knowledge of God; and, in consequence of this, reward and punishment are inherent in the deeds themselves, their *effects*. This is the essential difference between the dogmas of Providence, Might, and man's free will, and the dogma of Retribution. Also the former have lost their traditional contents in the system of Crescas. But, after all, they are the very *causes* of the imperatives of the Torah, and, therefore, the Principles of the Torah. Not so the dogma of Retribution: Reward and punishment are the *effects* of the imperatives of the Torah, the latter being, so to speak, the *intermediate link* in the chain of causes and effects.

Hence we see the connection between the philosophic principle in the system of Crescas and the superstitious elements of the same: Reward and punishment are inherent in man's deeds themselves. To be sure, Crescas emphasizes repeatedly the value of the intention while doing something good or bad. But the importance of the intention is relegated more and more into the background in the sight of the deterministic general view, and in that of the superlatively emphasized efficiency of the deeds by *their own weightiness*. In the introduction to my History of Dogmas in Judaism I pointed out the relation of Judaism to the attitude of the church on this question. In the controversy about the question

of *opus operantis* or *opus operatum* the Council decided in favor of the latter, and we will see that it is in this sense that the attitude of Crescas presents itself. Crescas lays especial stress upon the efficiency of *Circumcision*, and in the same direction upon the *Sacrifice of Isaac* (the latter, perhaps, because of the *martyrdom of his own son*). The children owe the salvation of their souls in the world hereafter to the ceremony of *Circumcision* which was performed on them (IV tr., 8 expos. at the end; and what about the female children?). The Patres said: The children owe their salvation to the ceremony of *Baptism* which was performed on them. The *Circumcision*, says Crescas, is "as if they offered blood and flesh of their genitals to God" (II tr., 1 sect., 6 chapt., p. 28 b). The Selection of Israel was sealed by the act of the *Akeda*. Says Crescas: "He (God) led them all (the Israelites) to His service, and excepted them from the general dominion (of the heavenly bodies) on the strength of the *Sacrifice embracing the entirety of the nation, the act of Akeda*. That is to say: By offering his son Isaac, the bearer of the promise for the future, he (Abraham) offered, as it were, Isaac and all his future posterity to God, so that by this act they were removed from the dominion of somebody else and taken into the special Providence of God himself. And, indeed, it was explained in the Astrology that there is a possibility of (getting a special) influence from a (certain) star by means of the action of a (fit) operator, even if it was not so in the (horoscopic) *nativity* of the individual referred to, as all this is set forth in the book of 'Fruit' of Ptolemy. And this was the reason why God, after His wisdom had decreed to select this nation, prepared and disposed the same by this act to receive his (special) Providence, excepting it from the dominion of somebody else, though it was not determined to be so in the *nativity* (of the nation). Indeed, it is evident, that as this was an act of *grace* to our whole nation, the posterity of Isaac, it was suitable that there should remain to them a trace of that act; besides it is therein a great help for the continuation of

the special Providence. And therefore, it is probable that the intention of the two *daily sacrifices*, one in the morning and the other in the evening, thus during the change of the times, was to intimate that it (the Akeda) was a sacrifice of atonement for all Israelites with the view of removing them from the dominion of the servants (the heavenly bodies) and distinguishing them by the special Providence of God Himself" (ibid.). One can hardly escape the conclusion, that this whole conception of the Akeda is coined in the *characteristic coinage of Christology*! [In a way Crescas is influenced, here as elsewhere, by Jehuda Hallevi, but there is a difference in the principle; cf. my treatise: Jehuda Hallevi's Philosophy in its Principles.]

And also the view of Crescas about the efficiency of the *priests* in Israel we find in accordance with said standpoint: "Thus it is evident," Crescas says, "that to the conditions of this commandment (the priestly Benediction) *does not* belong that he (the priest) should be *wise or just*. For as the priests are (only) *intermediating* between the Israelites and their Father in Heaven, and as the priests are obliged to fulfill this commandment, this benediction being for the sake of the congregation—the atonement is not conditioned by the perfection of the priests in a measure that in the case of their not being perfect the outcome (of the benediction) had to be entirely missed. Besides, God inserted into the (acts of the) commandments *special dispositions*, like the medicines: *As the medicines exert their efficiency by their qualities and by the entirety of their substance, just so the (acts of the) commandments of the Torah*. And as one medicine would obliterate (neutralize) the special efficiency of the other, just so is the relation between the (acts of the) commandments and (those of) the transgressions: Namely, that sometimes the effect of (the act of) one commandment had to be some bodily fortune, yet (the act of) some transgression deprives him (the man) of that fortune, or vice versa" (II tr., 1 sect., 2 chapt., p. 63 *b*; also here the influence of Hallevi is quite evident). We see, that it is simply the principle of *opus operatum* we have to deal

with in this view of Crescas about the intellectual and ethico-religious qualities of the priests. It is the well-known Christian teaching of the inextinguishable power of the priestly Ordination, even after the priest had ceased to comply with the demands of the sacerdotal integrity and dignity.

Finally, the teaching of Crescas, that the belief in the necessity of the Highpriest being answered to his questions by the *Urim ve-Thummim*, is along the same line. And here Crescas establishes an exception from the rule just mentioned. The answer of the *Urim ve-Thummim* to the Highpriest is conditioned by his being perfect in complying with the intellectual and ethico-religious demands (III tr., 7 sect., 1 chapt., at the end). The reason for this is (cf. below), that the *Urim ve-Thummim* is not a "vessel" (a sacrament) in itself, and demands therefore certain conditions on the part of the acting priest. The belief in the *Urim ve-Thummim*, of course, cannot be considered as a superstition with Crescas, since it is based on the Holy Scripture and the Tradition. Therefore the question of how far this teaching of the Scripture can be considered as a *dogma* in Judaism is to be tested in the way of *historical and literary criticism*, a task to which we have devoted the *closing excursus* of this treatise.^{3a}

And also the fact, that Crescas counts *Repentance* and the *festivals* as dogmas, can be understood fully only by the parallelism with the relative Christian teachings (cf. the introduction to my *History of Dogmas in Judaism*).

From his philosophic principles, in combination with the superstitions implied in them, we find the way open to the "Opinions" of Crescas, too.

The world is *eternal in the future*—because in reality it is eternal in the past also. The heavenly bodies are intellectual beings—this teaching, of course, is a belief common to almost all of the philosophers of the Middle Ages, but with Crescas this teaching is of special significance in the direction of *Astrology*, *Amulets* and *Spelling-charms*—Crescas goes into

^{3a} See above p. 303 n. 1.—Editor.

the merits of these arts; he distinguishes between "vessels" the efficiency of which flows from the *act itself*, and such acts of oracles and magic power the outcomes of which are conditioned by the perfection of the acting individual (IV tr., 5 expos.; cf. above). Demons, *Metempsychosis*, Retribution, somewhat of *bodily nature*, in the *Hell* and the *Paradise* which *are located somewhere in space*, are the most striking features on the line of superstitious Opinions with Crescas. Finally, I mention his concession that in the way of miracle there may be a possibility for man to *grasp the very substance* of God. Crescas guesses that it was this way of God-cognition Moses asked for; this is in contradiction with his own philosophic teaching (I tr., 3 sect., 3 chapt.).⁴

In the foregoing exposition we disclosed the *material* points of contact between Spinoza and Crescas. The literary ones we reserved for the exposition of the next chapter, in order to avoid repetition.

II. SPINOZA⁵

The "Tractatus theologico-politicus," conceived as a *doctrine of Dogmas*, belongs to *Jewish literature*. True, Spinoza

⁴ As to the development of Crescas' inclination to conceive some Jewish teachings in the light of Christology out of his activity as a disputant, cf. his treatise "Refutation of the Dogmas of Christianity" (ed. Karni 1902), as to *Circumcision* in its parallelism to *Baptism*, pp. 8, 16, 18, 21, 61; as to the Akeda p. 79; as to Urim ve-Thummim, p. 62.—True, in the question of Creation, pp. 24, 25, man's free will, p. 84, and of Demons, p. 88, Crescas contradicts himself in "Or Adonoi," as remarked already by the translator of the treatise from Spanish into Hebrew, Joseph ben Schem-Tob. Yet, the supposition of the latter that the treatise was written *later* than the standard-work, is groundless. The opposite chronological order is an *accredited historical fact* (cf. Graetz, in the Note). Besides, to every attentive reader of the works under discussion it is beyond doubt that the treatise in its relation to the standard-work is like a sour grape compared with a fully ripe one.

⁵ *Baruch Spinoza*, Nov. 24, 1632—Feb. 21, 1677. The "Tractatus theologico-politicus" appeared anonymously in 1670 in Amsterdam, but on the title-page we read: "Hamburgi," according to this first edition I am quoting. The "Ethics" appeared posthumously.

tends to "the dogmas of the universal faith" (XIV, p. 163: *fidei universalis dogmata*), and thus we can justify the Jewish writers on this subject in their neglecting Spinoza in this regard,⁶ yet the fact, that Spinoza bases his doctrine on the *Holy Scripture*, makes the same a part of Jewish speculation on the question of dogmas. No doubt, Spinoza emphasizes his intention to base his theory on the *universal Scripture* (*ibidem*: *sive universae Scripturae intenti fundamentalia*), and at the end of the *seventh dogma* he shows with some purpose that he treats the subject indifferently, yet the fact remains that the chief discussion is on the ground and from the viewpoint of the Old Testament.

Spinoza formulates the *general principle of faith*: "There is a Highest Being who loves Justice and Charity, to whom (then) all have to be obedient in order to be saved, and whom they have to worship by the Cult of Justice and Charity in relation to fellow-men."

This general principle he analyzes, then, into *seven dogmas*:

1. "There exists a God, i. e. a Highest Being, perfectly just and merciful, or the Exemplar of the right life (conduct); for he who does not know or does not believe that He exists, can neither be obedient to Him, nor acknowledge Him as Judge."
2. "He is *unique*. Certainly, none can doubt that also this is demanded for the highest devotion, admiration and love of God. For devotion, admiration and love follow only from the excellency of the One beyond all the others."
3. "He is present everywhere, or everything is known to Him (He is omniscient). To suppose the things to be hidden from Him, or to ignore that He sees all and everything, would mean to doubt the righteousness of His all ruling Justice, or (even) to ignore the latter itself."

⁶ As far as I sec, Maybaum (*Die Methodik des jüdischen Religionsunterrichts*, p. 47, note) is the only one who mentions the dogmas formulated by Spinoza.

4. "He has the highest right and dominion over everything, not being necessitated by any right (of somebody else upon Him), but doing (all He does) out of an absolute free decree and a *singular grace* (*singulari gratia*). For all men (*omnes*) have to be absolutely obedient to Him, while He himself (needs to be obedient) to none."

5. "The worship of God, and the obedience to Him, consist only of Justice and Charity, or love of fellow-man."

6. "Only all those who are obedient to God by this way of living are saved, while the others who live under the dominion of enjoyments, are lost. For if men would not believe this firmly there would be no cause why they should prefer to be obedient to God, rather than to their passions."

7. "Finally, God forgives those who repent their sins. For there is none who would never sin, and had this not been established so, all would have despaired of their salvation; nor would there be any reason why they should believe God to be merciful; while he who believes this firmly, that is to say, that God forgives the sins of men out of mercy and grace, by which he rules all, and is inspired, therefore, greatly by the love of God, he really has recognized Christ according to the Spirit, and Christ dwells in him."

Compared with the dogmas of Crescas, we find that the *first* and the *second* dogma of Spinoza (existence and oneness of God) are contained in the *Great Root* of Crescas; the third (omniscience) is identical with the *first* Principle of the Torah; the *fourth* (right to and dominion over everything) contains the *second* and the *third* of the Principles of the Torah; the *fifth* (justice and charity exhausting the divine laws) is *parallel* to the *fourth* Principle of the Torah, Prophecy; the *fifth* Principle of Crescas (man's free will) is missing in the doctrine of Spinoza; the *sixth* dogma of Spinoza contains the *second* and *third* of the True Beliefs of Crescas (Immortality and Retribution), the first true Belief, *Creation*, being left out entirely; the *seventh* of Spinoza is identical with the *second* Belief attached to a commandment with Crescas. In the ex-

planation of this dogma Spinoza returns to Crescas' Principles of the Torah, and brings Repentance in connection with the sixth Principle, the *Purpose*, the *Love* of God. This in full accordance with the discussion of this dogma in "Or Adonoi":

Says Crescas: "According to what was said in the Torah and explained by Tradition, it belongs to the *grace* of God to accept the sinner when returning to Him; and our sages go still farther when they say that the place (the degree) on which the repentants stand is not accessible even to perfectly just men (who never did sin); or, in another passage, that the sins reckoned to their (the repentants') merits. The reason for this is evident. The active force to induce the will to worship has to be very much stronger with him who is not inclined to worship until he was overpowered (by struggle with his opposite inclination) than with him who is inclined to worship without being overpowered previously. And, certainly, he with whom the overpowering force is stronger, would be *more devoted and more accepted*; since it is the active motive the effect of which is stronger, in our case the devotion and love (of God), which has to be supposed to be the stronger. And although there is no doubt that this (the acceptance of the repentants) is a *singular grace* on the part of God, it is in accordance with the (philosophic) speculation, as it was explained that God is the absolute Good, and that the Purpose He aims at is to do good—since, indeed, the Purpose of Creation and Revelation was nothing else" (than to do good; III tr., 2 sect., p. 64).

When we compare this passage with the exposition of this thought by Spinoza, we soon see that the passage in the Tractatus cannot be fully understood unless we conceive it as an *outline* of the passage quoted from "Or Adonoi."

The passage in the Original, Tractatus p. 164, reads: qui autem hoc firmiter credit, videlicet: Deum ex *misericordia et gratia*, qua omnia dirigit, hominum peccata condonnare, et hac de causa in *dei amore magis incenditur*;—cf. Crescas: מתמיד השם יתברך לקבל החוטא בשובו אליו ראוי שיהיה יותר דבק ויותר רצוי

למה שהפועל לבח יותר חזק, שהוא הדבקות והאהבה, יצטרך, שיהיה יותר חזק.... שהענין הזה חסר נפלא ממנו יתברך....

Spinoza begins his exposition of the dogmas with the declaration: "Moreover, I shall not hesitate to enumerate the dogmas of the universal faith..." (*nec jam verebor fidei universalis dogmata... enumerare*). Indeed, there was nothing to fear: the way he was going to set out, was a well-beaten track, and it was a well proved guide whom he entrusted with the leadership. There is no room for any doubt that Spinoza while writing his *Tractatus* had the book of "Or Adonoi" (probably the *editio princeps*, Ferrara 1555) open before him on his desk!

Spinoza *did not change even the successional order of the dogmas* established by Crescas, he only left out those which were not in accordance with his view, and changed others in order to adapt them to his standpoint. These eliminations and adaptations disclose the material relation between the standpoints of the two philosophers. Yet, we cannot understand this fully until we shall have seen the *literary and material dependence* of Spinoza upon the book of "Or Adonoi" in the *argumentation* of the dogmas:

The *double* way of argumentation adopted by Crescas, by *reason* and *Scripture*, or the *philosophic* and *exegetical* argumentation—is not original with him, it is the old method of Jewish philosophy from its very beginning (introduced by Saadya). The new feature with Crescas, however, is the special emphasis on the fact that the argumentation on the ground of biblical passages represents the *common sense*, the way of religious speculation accessible to every one, not presupposing any *special philosophic education*. The significance of this distinction for the basic ideas of the *Tractatus* we shall see later on. As for the present we call attention to the interesting fact that Spinoza took his argumentation of the dogmas from the common sense argumentation in the book "Or Adonoi," leaving out the philosophic one; with some exceptions, however.

The argument of the *first* dogma with Spinoza: he who does not acknowledge the existence of God, cannot be obedient to Him—is taken from the “Premise” of Crescas in the Introduction: where there is no commander, there is no commandment. The second dogma Spinoza argues by introducing the *Love of God*: as there can be no doubt that the Love of God is an absolute demand, we must suppose God to be unique in excellency. These are almost literally the words of Crescas in the discussion of Purpose. God is to be believed unique in His perfection, since worship has to be based on the Love of God, and “the greater the perfection, the greater is the Love of and the joy in the thing beloved” (II tr., 6 sect., 1 chapt., p. 40 *b*; cf. also p. 41 *a* at the beg.). Here Spinoza eliminated the allusion of Crescas to the dogma of Creation; we shall understand this later on. The *third* dogma, Omniscience, Spinoza argues out of the discussion of the same dogma with Crescas. In his argument “according to the *roots of the Torah*” the latter says that all the stories and promises of the Holy Scripture have no ground unless we believe God to be omniscient (II tr., 1 sect., 1 chapt., p. 20 *a*).

The *fourth* dogma, might and providence, Spinoza argues according to the argumentation of Crescas in “the explanation of this Principle according to the Torah,” “that the Might of God is to be conceived infinite in every respect” (II, 3, 1 chapt., at the beginning). The argumentation of this dogma is a special striking instance of Spinoza’s dependence on Crescas. The words of Spinoza on this dogma are *entirely unintelligible*, both in the formulation of the dogma and in the argumentation of the same.⁷ The *formulation*: God is doing all He does out of an absolute free decree and a *singular grace*. As this refers to the divine *Justice* in the guidance of the world by Providence (*first* and *third* dogma), it is hard to realize how Spinoza came to the odd idea that *justice* is a

⁷ *Ipsum in omnia supremum habere ius et dominium, nec aliquid iure coactum, sed ex absoluto beneplacito et singulari gratia facere. Omnes enim ipsi absolute obedire tenentur, ipse autem nemini.*

singular grace. The common sense is inclined to think that justice is justice, not a grace, and a *singular* grace at that! Now, let us compare this with what Crescas says about Retribution in his common sense argumentation: "Says the Psalmist: Thine, O Lord, is the *grace*, for Thou dost recompense man *according to his deeds*—the Psalmist is giving thanks for the grace of God that He recompenses man according to his deeds; that is to say, that the retribution is according to the strength of the obedient or disobedient, and not according to the strength of the Commander. For according to the strength of the Commander (man can never do his duty fully, and his claim for reward is but little),⁸ besides the divine grace he enjoyed in advance, as it was mentioned in its place. Likewise he who is disobedient, even in a less important matter, would have to suffer a punishment in the extremest measure. Thus it is evident that the fact of reward and punishment being according to the strength of man, and not according to the strength of the Commander, *means undoubtedly a grace*" (III tr., 3 sect., 1 chapt., p. 55 a). It is understood, Spinoza could not enter into the merits of this homiletical discussion, yet he could not desist from using the outcome of the same. The *argumentation*: For (enim) all (men) have to be obedient to Him, while He needs to be obedient to none. This argument is a *logical monstrosity*. The duty of man's obedience to God follows from His having the highest right and dominion, and can by no means be used as an argument on which to base its own premise. The possibility of such a strange *petitio principii* with the pedantic logician Spinoza we will readily understand when compared with the discussion of this question in "Or Adonoi." Crescas arguing the infiniteness of the divine Might says: "Thus it is evident that it was the teaching of *Creation* according to Torah and Tradition which enlightened our eyes, additionally, in regard to this Principle. Namely, it will be made clear in the *third* tractate (1 sect., 5 chapt.,

⁸ The text is lacking, I completed the sentence in brackets according to the context.

p. 52 a) in a manner leaving no room for any doubt that the Universe in its entirety was created by God absolutely in the way of Will, although there was nothing prior to it (cf. above). It is, then, evident that the Creator is doing his work without any *mutual relation* between Him and the creature; since his work does not depend except on (his own) Will. And as that is so, it is evident that He has no limited might. *For the limitation or the potentiality does not take place except because of a mutual relation between the acting force and its subject; consequently, since He (God) does all He does not having any mutual relation, he cannot be limited*" (in His might; II tr., 3 sect., 2 chapt. at the beginning). We understand now *the peculiar idea* chosen by Spinoza in order to express the Omnipotence and the free Will of God, the idea of a *juridical relation*: God has the highest right, while He is not necessitated by any right of anybody else to Him. Who would think that anybody has any right, any juridical claim upon God? This strange manner of expression is intelligible only as the *translation* of the *mutual relation* from the *cosmological language* of Crescas into the *ethical language* of Spinoza. Spinoza using here the *philosophic* argument of Crescas was compelled to change the cosmological character of the relation under discussion, as being based on the Dogma of Creation *which he does not acknowledge*, into its *ethical equivalent*. He begins in the language of Crescas with the right of God upon *everything* (omnia), an expression which in his doctrine of dogmas is entirely out of the way; since God as an Exemplar of the right life has nothing to do with the "things" of the world. It is, then, this mistake which Spinoza corrects in the *conclusion* when he changes "*everything*" (omnia) into "all men" (omnes); overlooking, however, that by this change also the logical conclusion was changed. The cosmological conclusion of Crescas is all right: Since there is no mutual relation between the *Creator* and the creature, there is nothing that we can suppose to be in the condition of limiting the free Will and the Might of God; consequently,

the Will of God is absolutely free, and his Might is unlimited in every respect. The ethical conclusion of Spinoza is a *petitio principii* of the worst kind: Since all men have to be obedient to God, while He has not to be obedient to anybody, there is nothing which can be supposed to have any right upon God; consequently, He does all He does out of his free decree and has the highest right and dominion over everything. This conclusion is a strictly logical one, except the fatal circumstance that the *minor*⁹ hangs in the air. We must not forget that all preceding dogmas are waiting for the final basis in the Might of God. Yet it is just this dogma which Spinoza cannot prove by any reason intelligible to the common sense. The premise of the due obedience presupposes the dogma of Creation as its basis. And as Spinoza does not acknowledge this teaching, and still would not desist from using the ideas of Crescas for his purpose, entirely different from that of his guide, he has arrived deservedly in a hopeless *circulus vitiosus*.

To the *fifth* dogma (worship is but charity) Spinoza does not add any argumentation. We shall understand this in the following development. The argument of the *sixth* dogma (Immortality and Retribution hereafter) namely, that the belief in this kind of retribution becomes a *motive* of obedience to the divine law, is taken from the common sense argument of Crescas to the dogma of Retribution. Says Crescas: "As to the threatening of distress (to the sinner), besides the indication to him or to somebody else (implied in the punishment, *when fulfilled*), it belongs to its usefulness that it is a *convincing motive for the refusal* (הנצח והנערה) of the destructive Satan who (according to a talmudical saying) is identical with the Angel of Death and with the *Bad Will*" (III tr., 3 sect., 1 chapt. at the beginning). The argumentation of the *seventh dogma* (Repentance) was spoken of above, still we have to add that

⁹ The *major* is, as is usual in the dialectical argumentation, to be completed: Everything which does not have to be obedient to anything else, while every other thing has to be obedient to it, is free and possessed of the highest right.

also the fact that Spinoza supports this dogma through a double argument, is to be reduced to his pattern in "Or Adonoi": "Although it is beyond doubt," says Crescas in the continuation of the passage quoted above, "that this (the acceptance of repentants) is a *singular grace* on the part of God, it is in agreement also with the (philosophic) speculation: For since it was shown that God is the absolute Good, and that the aim He tends to is to do good (to His creatures), it is, then, *suitable that man be accepted* whenever he may turn to the right way, and awake from the sleep of his foolishness, so that it (the acceptance of the repentant) will become a motive to evoke in our own hearts love for Him" (III tr., 2 part, 2 sect., 1 chapt.). It is evident that the whole explanation of this dogma by Spinoza consists of the elements of the passage just quoted. Crescas refers first, in the way of the common sense argument, to the fact that the acceptance of repentants is a mere *grace* on the part of God. Then he adds a philosophic argument of two aspects; while Spinoza gives first two arguments which he gains by the simple dissolving of the argument of Crescas into its two aspects, adding afterwards the connection between repentance as a grace and the love of God out of Crescas' introduction to the argument.¹⁰

And now we come to the *omissions* in the enumeration of the dogmas by Spinoza when compared with those of Crescas.

As to the *essential dogmas* the *first omission* concerns the *third root* of the Great Root of Crescas, that of the *Incorporeality*, "that God is no body, nor a force in a body" (I tr., 3 sect., 5 chapt. at the beginning). In the dogmas of Spinoza we do not find anything about the question whether the substance of God is corporeal or not. Spinoza insists that the Holy Scripture does not state any determined opinion about this subject, moreover that its utterances as to this point

¹⁰ The phrase "singulari gratia" which Sp. uses in the *fourth* dogma, is an *exact translation* of חסד נטלא used by Crescas in this passage; cf. Tract. III, p. 39, where Sp. translates ונפלינו "separabimur"; it is, then, in accordance with this to translate נטלא, as the compr. absol., "singularis."

contradict each other. Spinoza offensively blames Maimuni for his frank confession of his readiness to interpret the Holy Scripture always in the sense of the philosophic truth (M. N. II, 24), and with enthusiastic zeal, he, Spinoza, insists that we have to interpret the Bible always literally, no matter if the statement we gain by this interpretation be evident nonsense (Tractatus VII, p. 99). The prophets did not speak in *symbols*, they told the people only what they had *seen*, or what they *believed*. And what if they erred—and where they contradict each other, one at least was in error—what if even all of them erred? The belief of a man on this point is of no significance for the right way of living. And as the prophets contradict each other in their description of the appearance of God, it is evident that this point is of no dogmatical consequence.

The *second omission* concerns the dogma of *man's free will*. Also as to this point, Spinoza says, that the Holy Scripture does not teach any established view, and that in fact the prophets contradict each other. Consequently this question is out of the dogmatical discussion.

The *third omission* concerns the dogma of *Creation*. It was shown that Spinoza used chiefly the common sense argument of Crescas. The reason for this self-restriction is given in the structure of the Tractatus, as we shall soon see. Yet we see now the deeper objective reason for that restriction. It was shown that almost all philosophic thoughts of Crescas are based on the outcome of the philosophic discussion of the dogma of Creation. And since Spinoza abandons this dogma, he cannot use the philosophic argument of his guide. And it was shown further that Spinoza while using sometimes the philosophic arguments of Crescas, is compelled to omit the allusion to this dogma, and that this manner of treatment of his main source misleads him occasionally to many a *logical salto mortale*.

As to the *historical dogmas*, as well as to the Opinions of Crescas, Spinoza omits all of them except that of Immortality,

to which he alludes at least in the *sixth* dogma. As to this point Spinoza is undoubtedly right: Since he aims only at the dogmas to be derived from the Holy Scripture, he cannot do otherwise than he does. And as far as the term Holy Scripture with Spinoza embraces the New Testament, too, he, indeed, alludes sometimes to the Christian dogmas, as f. i. to that of Messiah in the Christian sense of the word, in the explanation of the *seventh* dogma. It is, therefore, almost exclusively the *essential* dogmas in the conception and acceptance or rejection of which we have to ascertain the relation between Spinoza and his main source, Crescas.

The *key* to a thorough understanding of the omissions in Spinoza's enumeration of dogmas, moreover the key to the full appreciation of the "Tractatus" is the *fifth dogma* of Spinoza: true worship is but charity, in its relation to the *parallel dogma* of Crescas: *Prophecy*.

Spinoza's chief intention in the Tractatus (according to his declaration in the preface and, repeatedly, in the Tractatus itself) is to *mark out the boundaries* of the realm of philosophy, on the one side, and those of the realm of theology, on the other, in order to prevent mutual disturbance and interference with each other. Philosophy, according to the thesis Spinoza defends in this work, need not be the hand-maid of theology, even as the latter does not need its service, since the common sense argument is sufficient for religious speculation. And as the conclusion in view was the demand of freedom for philosophy and its teachings, Spinoza was bound to show that the subjects in which theology is interested, are entirely different from those with which philosophy deals. He had to show that the *dogmas* of religion do not touch any philosophic question, even as philosophy has no interest in dogmas. The religious dogmas concern exclusively the realm of *Good and Evil*, while the subject of philosophy is concerned with the realm of the *True and False*.

With these thoughts in view, Spinoza looking for a proper pattern in Jewish mediaeval literature, recommendable be-

cause of his being acquainted therewith as well as because of its being sufficiently inaccessible to the reader of a Latin book, could not find any better one than the book of "Or Adonoi," the last prominent work of Jewish philosophy in the Middle Ages. (It goes without saying that Spinoza could not expect to find such a pattern in the Christian dogmatical literature with which, for the rest, he was but little acquainted, besides its being accessible to all Latin readers.) In the book of Crescas Spinoza found everything he needed for the composition of his contemplated work. First of all the emphasized statement that the dogmas of faith can be sufficiently based upon common sense argumentation on the ground of the Holy Scripture and Tradition. Spinoza had only to reject the latter, and, in order to be quite assured, to blame it excessively—and the chief idea of his book was present. In the book of Crescas he found also the idea of separating the Principles of the Torah from the other dogmas. Spinoza differs from Crescas chiefly in his rejecting the dogma of Creation; yet even this he found well prepared in the book "Or Adonoi," in which this dogma was excluded from the Principles of the Torah. Spinoza having in view the distinction between the religious *life-conception*, interested only in *ethical* questions, and the philosophic *world-conception*, interested only in *cosmological* questions, found the first feature in Crescas' Principles of the Torah. For Crescas, while basing all his views on the outcome of the discussion on the dogma of Creation, justifies his exclusion of the latter from the Principles, by the consideration that the Torah is well imaginable without the dogma of Creation. Of course Spinoza deepened and enlarged this basic thought of Crescas. Still this does not weaken our thesis that Spinoza took the plan for the Tractatus out of the book of Crescas. The best way of defending this thesis is to show how adequately and exhaustively we can disclose the inmost structure of the Tractatus from our viewpoint.

Spinoza, determined to render the *formal distinction* of Crescas between the ethical Principles of the Torah and their

cosmological basis a *real separation*, was compelled to begin the development of his thought with the discussion of the dogma of Prophecy. For it was this dogma on the field of which the first decisive battle had to be fought. Therefore Spinoza starts his Tractatus with *three chapters* about Prophecy, Prophets and the *Selection* of Israel. These three chapters are built up on the discussion of these questions in the book "Or Adonoi" (II tr., 4 sect., pp. 30-34). The result of the discussion of prophecy with Spinoza is the declaration that *imagination* is the *only source* of prophecy. And since among the imaginative visions certainly those of a non-prophetic nature are in the majority, there was need of a *sign* which verified the divine vision revealed to the prophet as a prophetic one. These visions the prophets perceive according to their individual state of mind, each of them on the ground of his knowledge and his beliefs, the latter being, so to say, the *private task* of the prophet as far and as long as those beliefs do not touch the ethical dogmas (formulated by Spinoza), however erroneous and even foolish or childish they may otherwise be; that is to say, inasmuch as only cosmological questions are concerned. Especially such is the case with regard to the *miracles*. A prophet called upon to perform a miracle is only a *medium* in the hand of God, while the connection of causes interfering, apparently, with the natural course of events is hidden from him. These ideas Spinoza could take from other Jewish sources, and from these he, indeed, drew so many an element inserted skillfully in the wide-ramified seams of the Tractatus (from the *More* of Maimuni and the works of other Jewish authorities; cf. Joël's exposition of the Tractatus). However, a careful comparison of the chapters under discussion with the relative portions in the book "Or Adonoi" leaves no room for any doubt that even when using other Jewish sources Spinoza did not weave the ideas taken therefrom into the thread of his own discussion until after he had controlled the final touch they received while passing the brain of Crescas. "Prophecy," this is the definition given

by Crescas, "is an *emanation* giving to the *intelligence* of man, a *spirit of knowledge* flowing from God, through an intermediary or without any intermediary. (This spirit) gives man knowledge about subjects which he did not know before this, even without the premises from which this knowledge follows. And this knowledge concerns all matters (i. e. even the so-called *possible* ones), *with the purpose to guide* the prophet himself or others *in the right way*" (ibid., p. 30 *ab*). In the following explanation of this definition Crescas declares that he emphasizes the word *intelligence* (שכל) with the view to lay stress upon the intelligence as the generic criterion of man, and to exclude *dreams and charms* from the significance of prophecy and revelation; that he further lays stress upon "even without the premises" in order to indicate that the prophet *can* gain knowledge about things unknown to him before, and without performing logical operations on the ground of the natural sources of knowledge; and that, finally, it is only this logical operation that the prophet can neglect, while he must be in full possession of the "first (innate) ideas," flowing from the natural sources of knowledge. Of course, Crescas does not deny the dream as a means of prophetic revelation, since it is guaranteed in the Holy Scripture, and he treats the question how to distinguish between the prophetic dream and the non-prophetic one by a *sign*, since the sign itself may be the product of a delusive imagination; and he comes to the conclusion that there is a possibility of distinguishing the prophetic *sign* by the strong realizing intensity of the imagination in the prophetic dream, even as in general it is only the strong realizing intensity which marks a real perception, and assures the perceiver that he does not dream. The prophetic dream is a sort of *higher reality* (ibid., p. 33 *a*). Now, let us add to these thoughts about prophecy the statement of Crescas "that the prophet does not know the *succession of causes*" (ibid., 2 chapt., p. 32 *a*) in the events revealed to him or performed through him, and we have before us the prototype of Spinoza's doctrine of prophecy, as regards both the

agreement with and the *opposition* to the views of Crescas. For we are now arrived at that point in which Spinoza emancipates himself from the influence of his master in order to get his own standpoint. We see Spinoza in agreement with Crescas in all criteria pointed out by Crescas except one: While Crescas lays special stress upon the *intelligence* as the very prophetic force, Spinoza insists that the prophetic revelation appeals but to the *imagination* alone, not exerting any influence upon the development of the intelligence, even as it makes no difference whether or not the prophet is in full possession of the "first ideas," the natural sources of knowledge. We know that Spinoza aims at this thought: The knowledge of intelligence is to be reserved as the exclusive domain of philosophy. Yet even after he has emancipated himself from Crescas in the most decisive material point, Spinoza remains under his literary influence. And it will be only after we shall have disclosed the further continuation of this influence that we shall be in position to perceive that material relation in its full significance.

Concluding the second chapter Spinoza quite ceremoniously justifies the fact that he is going to devote the third chapter to the question whether prophecy is a *special distinction of Israel*, and, in connection therewith, to the question of Israel's *Selection*. But we see now the true reason for this exposition: It was his pattern which suggested to him to take up this question in connection with prophecy; Crescas did so, and Spinoza did so, also. And by no means do we weaken this our statement when we add that the literary influence in the exposition evoked in Spinoza the feeling of the necessity to overcome Crescas on this point, too. In the beginning of the discussion on the dogma of prophecy Crescas declares prophecy to be a special distinction "of the commanded, the *nation* in its entirety" (4 sect., introduction); an idea which Crescas already emphasized repeatedly in the foregoing discussion (II tr., 2 sect., 1 chapt. at the end; *ibid.*, 6 chapt.; *ibid.*, 6 sect., 2 chapt.). And this is the reason why Crescas endeavors to

diminish the significance of prophecy with non-Israelites. Hence we shall understand the discussion of this question with Spinoza. He endeavors painfully to diminish the significance of Israel's Selection, denies offensively its claim upon prophecy as its special advantage, and he is, especially, all anger and wrath against those who venture to diminish the significance of Bileam, and, with an excessive zeal worthy of a better cause, he repeatedly praises Bileam to the effect that he was as pious and as dignified as all the other prophets, and by no means less than those of Israel. "We see, then," concludes Spinoza, "that he (Bileam) was a *true prophet*, and, if still he is called 'Kosem' (קוסם), which means 'diviner' or 'augur,' by Joshua (13, 22), it is evident that this word is to be taken in a good sense, too... for which reason we conclude that the gift of prophecy was not peculiar to the Jews, but common to all nations. The Pharisees, however, zealously emphasize that this divine gift was peculiar to their nation alone, while the other nations were divining future events out of I do not know what diabolic virtue—is there anything superstition could not invent?" (p. 39). This anger seems to be entirely out of place. Was it not just Bileam as to whom the "Pharisees" said: "Only in Israel there was no prophet like Moses, while there was such among the Gentiles?" And again we understand this readily when we read the relative passage in "Or Adonoi": "And this is meant," says Crescas, "when the sages say: 'Only in Israel there was no prophet like Moses, while there was such among the Gentiles.' By this statement they indicate that the prophecy of Bileam was *out of the natural (usual) order*; since the prophetic perception presupposes just such virtues and perfections as those in which *that miscreant* (אִתּוֹ הָרָשָׁע) was lacking. And this is the reason why the *Scripture names him 'Kosem,' and it was only in the way of miracle and wonder that he prophesied while with Balak, because of Providence for Israel that he might not curse it*" (II tr., 4 sect., 3 chapt., p. 33a). We

know, then, who is meant by the "Pharisees" who dared to offend the reputation of Bileam as a prophet.

Out of his opposition to Crescas in the conception of prophecy and the Selection of Israel, and on the ground of the basic thought in Crescas' formulation of the Principles of the Torah as being actually of mere ethical significance, Spinoza in the two following chapters (the fourth and the fifth) comes to the conclusion that the true "Divine Law" is in accordance with the "Natural Law," that is to say, the "Ethical Law"; while the religious laws were given only to Israel, and even to it only while in its own land, and while enjoying its own independent state. And with the thought in view to eliminate the cosmological dogma of Creation from the series of dogmas, he demonstrates further that the narrative portions of the Bible are of no dogmatical consequence, being out of relation to the ethical laws, to the fulfillment of which all mankind is called upon. Or, as Spinoza formulates elsewhere this idea: "The whole Scripture was revealed first for the use of the whole (Israelitish) Nation, and afterward for that of all mankind" (Tract. V, p. 63... *tota Scriptura in usum integrae nationis prius, et tandem universi humani generis revelata fuerit*), not realizing that by this statement he concedes the Selection of Israel in its loftiest meaning. And this being so, Spinoza concludes in the continuation of the passage just quoted, since the Scripture was revealed to the entire people of Israel, nay, to all mankind, it is evident that the stories of the Bible are but adapted to the grasp of the uneducated people, in order to make the ethical laws intelligible to them, while to the educated ones who are capable of understanding the ethical laws without those stories, the latter are by no means a matter of belief. Consequently, Spinoza concludes, somewhat illogically, the stories are not a matter of belief at all, even for the uneducated people, for whose sake they are told.

With this statement, Spinoza has arrived at the decisive viewpoint of the Tractatus, and we might expect to see him

finally enter upon the merits of the same. But he does not do so, he devotes the next chapter (the sixth) to the question of *miracles* in the Bible. To the attentive reader it is evident that the intercalation of the discussion on the miracles interrupts the logical thread of the exposition, and that the *transition* by which Spinoza returns to take up the interrupted thread, is an obviously *artificial* one. We know the reason for this loose exposition: Crescas treats the miracles in connection with the dogma of prophecy; consequently also Spinoza was psychologically bound in this way. Instead of the general formula which he really aims at, and which he makes previously and afterwards the main thesis he defends—instead of the general formula that the dogmatical significance of a biblical teaching is to be found out from the viewpoint of *literary historical criticism*, he gives only a special instance of it: The *miracles* are to be perceived from the viewpoint of the *writers* of the relative portions of the Bible. To this discussion, the most important and valuable of the whole Tractatus, Spinoza sets out with a strange calumny addressed to his beloved ones, the “Pharisees.” All miracles mentioned in the Bible, Spinoza says, had natural causes. But if we find there some miracles in absolute collision with natural law, or one which cannot be explained by natural causes, “then,” he says literally, “we have plainly to be convinced that it was interpolated into the Holy Writ by sacrilegious people” (*plane credendum id a sacrilegis hominibus Sacris literis adjectum fuisse*). This is not the only time in the Tractatus that the suppressed anger and hatred against his brethren in Judaism crops out, and it is not the only time that he suspects the “Pharisees” of purposely falsifying the Holy Scripture. But we will learn from the philosopher of the famous “*nil admirari*” not to be astonished, when we see him even somewhat overzealous in paying his tribute to human nature. And we are willing to do so, the more, as we are now to point to the really grand achievement of Spinoza in the Tractatus. True, the elements of biblical criticism Spinoza found ready before him in Jewish literature

to a larger extent than he is willing to confess (cf. Joël's exposition), yet, it was he who united those elements into a scientific system of criticism which, in spite of its many defects, does not cease to deserve our full admiration even today, in the era of hypercriticism. True, it was the dogmatical viewpoint of Crescas from which Spinoza was led to use his materials for biblical criticism, gathered some years before, for establishing the historico-critical viewpoint as the only decisive one in dogmatical research of biblical times. But, after all, it was he who found the way from the speculative aspect to the historico-critical.

To the development of this his new viewpoint, Spinoza devotes the following five chapters (7-11), the last of them, however, dealing with the *New Testament*, the thorough criticism of which he escapes, not very skillfully, under the pretext of having heard that this task is to be done by another scholar better prepared for it. Spinoza comes to the conclusion that according to the state in which the Bible came down to us, and according to conditions of historical research at his time, there is no hope for great success in the endeavor to present the historical development of the Bible. Yet, as far as he can see, the biblical books have passed through many hands. Especially decisive is the fact that the original of the first "Book of the Covenant," written by Moses, Exodus 20, 22 c, 24, and increased by Joshua (cf. 24, 25, 26), is gone (VIII, p. 108, and passim). In this state of affairs, so Spinoza concludes in the following two chapters (12 and 13), there is only one way to find out the teachings dogmatically significant: We have to find out those teachings in regard to which all portions of the Bible are in full agreement, and not displaying any contradiction, or any controversy. And these are the *ethical laws* alone. The ethical laws in the Bible are in its different portions the same, not having been altered by all the happenings that they had to undergo. These laws represent the very "Word of God," the contents of the true Book of the Covenant. They are also plain and simple, accessible to all

people, not presupposing any philosophic education or capability of getting it.

Now we have arrived at our starting point, at the enumeration of the dogmas in chapter fourteen which, we have seen, was aimed at in the whole foregoing discussion. And now we understand why Spinoza does not add any explanation to the fifth dogma (Worship is but justice and charity). This dogma is the *outcome* of the research in the previous thirteen chapters. And this fact discloses a new aspect in Spinoza's dependence on Crescas. The fifth dogma, as the outcome of the foregoing discussion, we could expect at the first, or at least in the second place, after the dogma of God as being the exemplar of the right life. Yet Spinoza, following Crescas, returns in the succession of dogmas to the order established in the book "Or Adonoi." And we must say that the order in the latter is more systematic and logical than in the *Tractatus*. For not only in the enumeration, but also in the discussion of the same, the dogmas concerning the God-conception have to be taken up and dismissed prior to the dogma of prophecy, or the right way of man's worship. For it is, as intimated above, the dogma of prophecy to which the fifth dogma of Spinoza is *paralleled*. Out of his opposition to Crescas' teaching on prophecy Spinoza came to his formulation of the fifth dogma, and it was a sort of a psychological motive compelling Spinoza to put this dogma just in the place corresponding to that of prophecy in the system of Crescas. Likewise the seventh dogma furnishes one more evidence of Spinoza's dependence on Crescas: While the other dogmas are naturally treated in the foregoing discussion, although not systematically, that of *Repentance* was not treated at all. And still Spinoza counts it a dogma simply because he found it so in the system of "Or Adonoi," the only one in Jewish philosophy in which the commandment of Repentance is considered as a special dogma. Still more striking is the evidence in the last portion of the chapter (XIV) under discussion: With the view to expound now the consequence of his doctrine of dogmas, and to

show that the spheres of theology and philosophy are outside of each other, the subject of the following six concluding chapters (XV–XX), Spinoza cannot depart from the dogmas until after he has justified the *omissions* he made in his pattern, and he treats the omitted dogmas, or certain aspects of those accepted, in the *same succession*, as he has found them in Crescas. After he has explained the dogmas and added that to give up one of them means necessarily to give up the obedience to God, he continues: "For the rest, *what* God, or that exemplar of the right life, is: that is to say, *fire, spirit, light, or thought*, or what not; this (question) has nothing to do with faith," this in opposition to the third root of the Great Root of Crescas, the incorporeality of God. "Even as," Spinoza continues, (faith has nothing to do with the question) "*for which reason* God is the exemplar of the right life, that is to say, whether because he is possessed of a just and merciful soul (the reason given by Spinoza), or because all the things are *being and acting through Him...*" this second reason is in the direction of the cosmological dogma of Creation on which Crescas bases the Principles. Spinoza after he had neglected this reason in the very explanation of the dogmas thus intimates his *philosophic* view, expounded later in the "Ethics." "Further," Spinoza continues, "it does not concern the faith whether one believes God omnipresent according to his essence, or according to his might"—the former being the philosophic (pantheistic) view of Spinoza, the latter that of Crescas "that the divine knowledge is identical with the divine essence," the latter being spiritual, and identical with the divine might (II tr., 1 sect., 4 chapt., p. 23 a). "Further," Spinoza continues, (it has nothing to do with faith, if one believes) "that God guides all out of a free, or out of a *necessitated* nature; that He prescribes commandments as a Ruler, or He teaches eternal truths (as a teacher); that man is obedient to God out of his *free will*, or out of *necessity* by the divine decree; and, finally, that

the reward of the good and the punishment of the bad is *natural* (in this world), or supernatural (in the world hereafter)..." In the first and third of these four questions the difference between Crescas and Spinoza is only a *formal* one: Crescas lays stress upon the term *free Will* in regard to God, and counts man's free will a dogma, although his very philosophic conviction covers the necessity in regard to both, God and man; while Spinoza speaks only of "an absolute decree" with God, and omits the dogma of man's free will. In the matter itself both are in agreement, and still in the question of the divine Will there is a difference in principle, following from the difference in the question of the substance, and that of Creation, both to be discussed soon hereafter. In the second of these four questions Spinoza evidently opposes Crescas' conception of prophecy, and, finally, in the fourth, he opposes the large discussion about the necessity of retribution in the world hereafter (III tr., 5 sect., 4 and 5 chapt.); though Spinoza himself alludes to this in his sixth dogma. It seems that this allusion aims ad captandam benevolentiam of Christianity, as many an expression in the Tractatus does; even as the mention of *Repentance* was, apparently, welcome to Spinoza because of its being a dogma in Christianity.

Now, we are in position to formulate *the difference* in the *philosophic principle* underlying their relative doctrines of dogmas:

The original difference corresponds to the first omission Spinoza made in the doctrine of Crescas while accepting the same as his pattern; consequently the difference concerns the *substance* of God. The Spirituality of the divine substance, the exaltedness of the same above all corporeality, is the unshaken pillar of the system of Crescas. Therefore also the Omniscience of God preserves its original true meaning in the system of Crescas. And as this is so, the dogma of Creation, too, preserves some dogmatically significant meaning. Creation with Crescas is not the same as with the prophets of old, and even not as with many medieval Jewish philosophers, but

still it has a profound philosophic meaning. True, Creation with Crescas is an *eternal issue out of necessity*, but inasmuch as there is a difference between the substance of God, the Creator, and that of the creatures, the Creation means something. In the discussion of the dogma of Creation says Crescas: "There is no escape from (the necessity to posit) the issue of corporeal being out of nothing from Him (from the spiritual divine substance); this even according to the adherents of the eternity (of the world)" (III tr., 1 sect., 5 chapt., 52 a). Even according to the adherents of the eternity of the world! No doubt Crescas is one of those who believe in the eternity of the world, and still he has a right to speak of a dogma of Creation, and to base thereon the essential ones, the Principles of the Torah. It was emphasized above, that the distinction between Principles and True Beliefs with Crescas is merely a formal one. Look away from the frame of the dogmatical doctrine and take into consideration the general standpoint of Crescas as a philosopher, and you will find that this distinction means only a mere logical analysis of the inmost syllogistic succession in the literary presentation of the system. For we have to be warned against understanding the idea of "issue out of necessity" with Crescas in the sense of the neo-platonic theory of *emanation*. We are careful to translate the word "Atsiluth" (אצילות) used by Crescas by "issue," and not by "emanation," as is usual, because it would be a gross mistake to think Crescas an adherent of the neo-platonic theory of emanation. We will gain a thorough understanding of the basic thought of Crescas' system in our reconstruction of the same in the third volume of my German work *History of Jewish Philosophy in the Middle Ages*. As for the present it is sufficient to point to what was said there, that Crescas is the *Maimuni* of the post-Maimunian period,¹¹ and to add a brief explanation thereof:

¹¹ Geschichte der jüdischen Philosophie des Mittelalters, Georg Reimer, Berlin, 1907, p. 243; as to Crescas in general cf. there pp. 47, 78, 135, 179, 239, 244, 246.

The issue of corporeality from the spiritual substance of God with Crescas means the *sublimation of the material principle into its spiritual root*. This is the standpoint of Maimuni from which, however, Crescas deviates as to the aspect of *necessity*; according to Maimuni the issue of corporeality from God being (though eternal) out of an absolute free Will in the truest meaning of this term. And still even Crescas has a right to speak of the divine free Will. It is not free will in the strict sense of *liberum arbitrium*, yet since the knowledge and Omniscience of God are meant in the true meaning of that term, there is a subtle philosophic distinction to posit the divine Will free on the ground of the all-embracing *divine Consciousness* which sustains the Universe, permeating it in every turn of individual being.

This leads us to the point at which the *philosophic system* of Spinoza springs from the system of Crescas. Maimuni, Crescas and Spinoza present three links of a special chain in the development of philosophy. The sublimation of the material principle into its spiritual root, it will be shown in the said work, means the *absolute possibility* of the corporeal mode of being. Therefore the dogmas of Omnipotence, Providence and man's free will are to be understood in a real philosophic sense, even as Maimuni does, although not entirely in the traditional sense of those terms. Crescas, therefore, combining the sublimation of the material principle with necessity, and saving the said three dogmas only linguistically, giving up their real meaning in the system of Maimuni, has built his system on a *contradiction in the principles*. It was, then, this inmost contradiction to escape which Spinoza gave up the spiritual root of the corporeal being, *turning the principle of Maimuni into its opposite*. On the one side the system of Maimuni is harmonious in itself, because it presents the sublimation of the material principle into its spiritual root with its strict logical consequence, free will; on the other side, the system of Spinoza is harmonious in itself, because it presents the reduction of the spiritual principle to its material

root with its strict logical consequence, the strictest determinism; the intermediate link being presented by the system of Crescas, because it combines the premise of Maimuni with the conclusion of Spinoza. For look away from the well molded *theological language* of Spinoza, and the basic thought of his "Ethices" reads as following:

The only being is eternal matter, unlimited in time and undivided in space (for there is no emptiness in endless space), all individual beings, including man with his intellectual capacity, being merely different modes of being, the appearance of which are the effects of the proportions of movement and rest within that unique matter bearing its eternal laws in itself.

Thus it is evident that the three omissions in the enumeration of dogmas are three open doors leading from Spinoza's doctrine of dogmas into his philosophic system: One can believe that God is a body; one can believe that the world is not created; one can believe that man is necessitated in all his doings. These three omissions form the three basic principles of the system of Spinoza in his "Ethices."

The two standard works of Spinoza, both taken together, and considered in their relation to the book "Or Adonoi," present the two manners of argumentation of Crescas. *The "Tractatus" is built on the ground of Crescas' common sense and biblical argumentation, the "Ethices" on that of his philosophic argumentation.*

Such is the strong influence of Crescas upon Spinoza. And as the Tractatus was the pattern for many and many theologico-political treatises (among others for the "*Jerusalem*" of Mendelssohn), and since further the arguments for the *separation of State and Church* in the modern movement are mostly taken from the arsenal of this literature—we see that the influence of the last great work of Jewish philosophy in the Middle Ages has become a strong and decisive force not only in philosophy, but in the recent development of culture and politics, too.

HISTORICAL AND SYSTEMATIC RELATIONS OF JUDAISM TO KANT

*In Commemoration of the Two Hundredth Anniversary of
the Birth of Immanuel Kant: April 22, 1724—April 22, 1924*

I. HISTORICAL RELATIONS

THE question of the contribution of Judaism to the development of Critical Philosophy is a vast subject which cannot be fully treated in a paper. Jewish literature of all ages, the Bible not excluded, contains elements which were helpful in the slow growth of the critical trend of thought (see my articles on the subject in *Hathekupha* XI, XIV–XV). Here it will be sufficient to mention one central thought of *Philo's* and a few central thoughts in the works of the Jewish philosophers of the Middle Ages. Philo in his epistemology propounds thoughts which helped the development of critical philosophy. But since he depends here, as in general, on Greek philosophy, especially on Plato and Aristotle, it would lead too far to show wherein his special contribution consists. But there is one point wherein Philo differs with Plato. In his *Phaedon* Plato proves the immortality of the human soul by proving that it is not an accident, an epiphenomenon on the material substance, but a substance, a spiritual substance, for itself. And as substance is indestructible, the soul is necessarily immortal. This, of course, assures immortality to the wicked as well as to the good. And it is for this reason that Plato was forced to yield in this question to the eschatological mythologies of the punishment of the souls of the wicked and

the rewards to those of the good. And it is in this cardinal point that Philo dissents. He rejects the idea of soul as an indestructible substance. To him only the soul of the good is immortal, while the soul of the wicked vanishes out of reality, and this is its punishment.¹ Now *Mendelssohn* in his modern *Phaedon*, published prior to Kant's *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, bases his proof for immortality on the idea of Plato that substance is indestructible, but gives a new proof for the doctrine that the soul is a substance: Without the soul as an independent substance, he says, even the sense-perceptions would be impossible, as no sense-perception can be completed without certain intellectual forms and conceptions. Kant recognized that this thought anticipates to a certain extent the basic thought of his critical philosophy that the categories or intellectual conceptions are instrumental in building up the outside world. And the great, famous Kant gives a prominent place to the words of the Jewish bookkeeper in a Berlin dry goods store, who was five years his junior, in his *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*. Mendelssohn, he contends, has not proven his point. All that his argument proves is that, in order that there be an "ego" with a conception of the outside world, it is necessary that there be, in addition to a general materiality, also a general mentality. The process going on between these two general realities produces, under favorable conditions, what we know as our individual ego. This individual ego, being merely a phenomenon concomitant to the process between the general realities, may vanish into nothing when the conditions under which it came to manifestation have changed and disintegrated.

It is easy to see that the thought by which Kant formulates his own great contribution to critical philosophy is the same as that which Philo formulated in opposition to Plato. Philo, of course, believes in pre-existence of soul, and it may be said that he did nothing to remove the contradiction between this

¹ Cf. leg. all. II, 74; quod vet. 49 f., 75, 78, 141; de sobr. 45; de conf. 21; de fuga 113, 117; quaest. Gen. I, 75; II, 61, a.

Platonic doctrine and his own idea of destructibility of soul. Kant, on the other hand, gives the thought of Philo the consistent turn that the individual soul is destructible because its coming into being is but an incidental phenomenon in the cosmic process between the two great realities. But even Kant is not quite consistent in this question when it comes to his theory of the "intelligible" character.²

Thus two basic thoughts in Kant's epistemology go back to one ancient and one modern Jewish philosopher. The direct influence of Mendelssohn is evident in the polemics against him in the *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*. The influence of Philo on Kant is not so evident, but is nevertheless sure. Kant says that his *theory of ideas* (of which we will speak later on) is really the improved theory of ideas of Plato, there being no reason why the theory of an ancient philosopher could not be better understood in a later stage of development of human thought than its originator understood it. It is generally known and admitted that Kant's theory of ideas was the ferment in the formation of his critical epistemology. So we arrived at the *objective fact* that both Philo and Kant modified Plato's theory of ideas in a point which has a decisive bearing on the epistemological problem. Furthermore, it is known what great influence Philo had on the Florentine Academy and on other academies of the Renaissance in which the basic thoughts of critical philosophy were prepared and preformed.³

This establishes the relation between Jewish thought and critical philosophy at the two distant ends of Jewish philosophy. But what about the long period between Philo and Mendelssohn? There are *two* questions to be considered. *First*, are there in the works of Jewish philosophers elements which were helpful to the preformation and preparation of

² Cf. my article in *Hathekupha* 22.

³ Cf. Ernst Cassirer: *Das Erkenntnisproblem in der Philosophie und Wissenschaft der neueren Zeit*, vol. I, Berlin, 1906, vol. II, 1907, Verlag Bruno Cassirer.

critical philosophy? *Second*, if so, through what channels could and did the influence of Jewish philosophy come to Kant?

Answering the first question in the affirmative I will quote a few passages from the works of Jewish philosophers to prove my point: *Israeli* gives us an epistemological interpretation of Plato's theory of ideas in which he describes the process of perception in pretty much the same way as we find it in Kant, especially as to the function of phantasy in synthesizing the material impressions. Of course, he depends on previous, also neo-Platonic authorities. But he adds one point which characterizes his theory of knowledge as more critical than that of any of his predecessors. He conceives the idea of the *infinitesimal* as a method of demonstrating how qualitative impressions convey to the mind quantitative perceptions, a deep thought which Kant uses in the formulation of his "Grundsätze des Verstandes," or "Principles of the Understanding."⁴ *Saadya* fortifies the incorporeal God-conception by an analysis of the process of sense-perception, showing that the intellectual categories have an integral function in the process.⁵ He considers the human intellect as the first source of ethical authority, revelation being secondary.⁶ He proves the substantiality of the soul from an occurrence (known to him) that a blind man dreams that he sees, which proves that seeing is a function of the soul. It is the soul which is responsible for unity and interaction of the different senses (Em. VI, 3; cf. *ibid.* chapt. I, end). He recognizes that *the aesthetical* judgment has its root in man's ethical nature.⁷ He is the first to formulate the thought (often emphasized in the "Kritik") that religion, while going part of the way with philosophy, may insist on postulates which philosophy cannot prove, but not disprove,

⁴ Cf. *Geschichte der jüdischen Philosophie*, vol. I, chapter *Israeli*.

⁵ *Emunoth* II, Introduction.

⁶ *Emunoth*, Introduction and III—cf. my essay: *Saadya's Philosophy*.

⁷ *Ibid.* X, 18; cf. *Kritik der Urteilkraft*, 41-42.

either.⁸ He also formulates clearly the thought of God as *ens realissimum*: The forms of reality as they are, correspond to the constitution of man's mentality, but God could manifest himself in infinite varieties of Reality.⁹ There are other pre-critical thoughts in Saadya's works, but I have selected those the bearing of which on critical philosophy is evident without any further analysis to any one who knows Kant. These thoughts of Saadya are found also in the works of later Jewish philosophers, but I will mention the latter only where they have added some new thoughts or at least some new note to the old ones.

Bahya illustrates the utter impossibility to approach God by sense-perception by calling attention to the fact that even a material process cannot be fully perceived by the senses. A falling stone calls for the category of *causality* in order to be fully grasped.¹⁰ He distinguishes *two methods* to get at a right God-conception: the *physico-teleological* and the *ethico-teleological*, considering this latter as the starting-point, and pointing out that the idea of moral freedom and the moral impulse in man prove the divine nature of man's soul and the existence of a being wise and mighty. He also advises to recognize law, but act as if we were free; law meaning might of nature and God.¹¹

So far we quoted from the group of the strictest *monists*, the Saadya-group. The parallels to Kant are even more striking in the group of *dualists*, the Gabirol-group, who believe in two primary eternal realities, God and matter, the latter being dependent on the former only for the form-principle, but independent of him in its naked existence. Kant shares with these philosophers the general dualistic ground, and an

⁹ Em. I, 4 end.

⁸ Ibid. VII, 1; cf. Kritik der Urteilkraft 91 and Annotation.

¹⁰ Hoboth I, 10 toward end.

¹¹ I, 10; ed. Warsaw, 1875, p. 85; II, Introduction; chapt. 2 end; chapt. 5; III, 3, 7; 5 beg.; 6 beg.; chapters 8-10: freedom; X, 3; cf. Kritik der Urteilkraft, 85-91.

influence from this group would be more direct, and more decisive. In fact: God and matter in the system of Gabirol are the two "Dinge an sich" of Kant. The theory of quantity in Gabirol's philosophy is the most striking prototype of Kant's theory of ideality of space. It would lead far afield to show this in detail, but there is one parallel in Gabirol's *Fons Vitae* or מקור חיים which is in itself decisive. In order to prove his theory of the spiritual substances, he presents an analysis of the process of perception. This leads me to interpret Gabirol's upper worlds in the epistemological rather than in the mythological sense. But this question does not have to be discussed here. The fact, however, stands by itself: Gabirol's analysis of the process of perception is so much similar to that of Kant that one needs only to read the two statements to be struck by the similarity of conception and expression.¹² Also, the much misinterpreted theory of *Will* in the philosophy of Gabirol has a striking parallel in Kant. The Will expresses the tendency of God to associate with matter, as also the tendency of matter to associate with God. This is parallel to Kant's "Schematismus." The two "Dinge an sich," the corporeal and the intellectual, are directed upon each other. This group of Jewish philosophers has given up the rigid aloofness of God from the material world in a greater measure even than ever reached by Kant.

Some of the points in the philosophy of Gabirol are brought out much more clearly by some of his followers:

Hallevi expresses the idea of the unknowable "Ding an sich" in language which may easily be duplicated in the *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*. "The senses perceive of the perceptibles but their properties, not their substances."¹³ "There has not been implanted in the senses a faculty to perceive the substance of the thing, but a specific energy to perceive properties inherent in them, from which the intellect infers their sub-

¹² *Fons Vitae* I, 3-5; II, 3-4; III, 43 ff.; Munk, *Melanges*, לקושים מן ספר מקור חיים I, 5; II, 7; III, 19 ff.

¹³ Cusari, ed. Hirschfeld, IV, 3, pp. 236-237.

stance and their cause. Only the perfect intellect fathoms the essence and the conception (of the substance). And every active intellect, like angels, comprehends the concepts and the realities in their essences; while our intellect, which originally is potential (only), on account of its being submerged in the *hyle*—cannot fathom the real nature of the things, except in so far as God granted it specific energies which he planted in the senses adapted to the properties of the perceptibles, as they are always inherent in the entire (human) kind.”¹⁴ One who remembers Kant’s theorem of the difference between the human “Verstand” and the “anschauende Verstand” will marvel at the similarity of thought and expression.¹⁵ And also the idea of God and Matter forming the two realities in the eternal process of things is better expressed by Hallevi than by Gabirol. I have discussed this point in detail in my essay, *Jehuda Hallevi’s Philosophy in its Principles* in H. U. C. Catalog 1908. Also the idea of the ethico-theological method is expressed by Hallevi very clearly. He sums up his book, *Cusari*, by declaring the idea of moral freedom as the central thought of Judaism to which all other doctrines are in relation of postulates.¹⁶ Moreover, Hallevi shows that the method of Torah and Prophets is to start with the ethico-theological argument (I, 11–25). This, it may be said in passing, reminds us that the method of Kant has indeed its root in that of the early prophets who do not care for the cosmological God-conception, but concentrate all their efforts upon the definition of the ethical God-conception.

Abraham Ibn Daud, another follower of Gabirol, expresses the idea of the reciprocity of function between God and Matter much more clearly and much more definitely than any one before him: “He (God) also knows that His perfection is not meant for His own essence alone, but in a way that He

¹⁴ Ibid., pp. 238–239.

¹⁵ Cf. “Kritik,” *Transcendentale Ästhetik* 8 and *Analytik der Grundsätze*, drittes Hauptstück.

¹⁶ V, 20, especially the *six principles* at the end.

emanate it upon something else.”¹⁷ He, too, makes the idea of moral freedom the center of his system of philosophy, and he, too, formulates his God-conception according to the postulates of the idea of freedom. And as, in his view, the idea of freedom does not require that God have prescience of the deeds of man, he comes to the conclusion that God has no such prescience, but knows only that man is free, which alone is the postulate of freedom.¹⁸

Maimuni's special contribution to critical philosophy consists in three important points:

1. He gives the relation between the postulates of religion and the principles of philosophy a clear and comprehensive formulation achieved by none of his predecessors. In formulating his *Thirteen Principles* he distinguishes clearly between the philosophic and the religious doctrines of Judaism.¹⁹

2. In discussing the theorem of unity of *שכל מושגל ומשכל*, *process, subject and object of thinking*, he says that this is true also of sense-perception: There is *unity of process, subject and object of sense-perception*.²⁰ This, I believe, is the nearest pre-Kantian philosophy came to Kant's doctrine of unity of apperception.²¹ This is due to the fact that among his predecessors in Jewish philosophy there is none who accepts the theory of *potentiality of soul* as consistently as does Maimuni. According to Maimuni a man may live very long without developing anything like a real soul.²² All other Jewish philosophers believed in some form of pre-existence of soul, whether eternal or from a certain pre-natal phase in the nascence of the individual. This idea of potentiality of soul is not new with

¹⁷ Emunah Ramah, p. 93.

¹⁸ Emunah Ramah, pp. 93, 96.

¹⁹ Cf. his Introduction to his Commentary to Perek Helek, especially his remarks to the doctrine of *Resurrection*; see my history of Dogmas in Judaism (Hebrew), Odessa, 1919, vol. II, chapter Maimuni.

²⁰ M. N. I, 68.

²¹ Einheit der Apperception—"Kritik," Transcendentale Deduction der reinen Verstandesbegriffe, 17-20.

²² Cf. M. N. II, 36 and 37, and often.

Maimuni, it is known as that of Aristotle according to the interpretation of Alexander of Aphrodisias. But there is a vital difference. According to Alexander the individual soul never substantiates, it perishes with the body, while according to Maimuni there is room for individual immortality. And it is the reason for that difference which has a great bearing upon the development of critical philosophy. According to Alexander the body is the accredited reality while the soul is at best an epiphenomenon on it. Not so according to Maimuni. This leads to the third point in Maimuni's critical attitude.

3. In Saadya's *Emunoth* and, still more clearly and definitely, in Bahya's *Hoboth*, there appears the thought that God is neither substance nor accident on a substance. And, it is clear, what they want to say is: God is neither material nor spiritual substance. But if God is not substance, what is He? It was reserved to Maimuni to carry this thought to its fruitful realization: The philosophic doctrine of unity of process subject and object of thinking receives the following interpretation.²³

God is thinking, the process of thinking being His essence. This is true also of the human intellect. Moreover, this is true also of sense-perception.²⁴ Thought out to the end, it is presented by Maimuni as his great "secret."²⁵ The idea of substance as bearer of qualities and properties, and the agent of acts different from it, is entirely given up. There is no substance, neither spiritual nor material. The insistence of our thought that qualities and properties and acts require one substance as an agent and one as a substratum acted upon, is a logical delusion. Reality is the process of thinking. God is the only full reality. There is no reality outside of God.

²³ M. N. I, 68.

²⁴ See above No. 1.

²⁵ M. N. Intro. beg.; I, 16, 17, 18, 20, 28, 31-35, 37, 44, 46, 49, 52-56, 59-60, 68, 69, 70, 72; II, 2, 4-7, 10-12, 18, 19, 22, 26-30; III, 1-7, 8-11, 13 end, 15, 17, 5, 5, 18, 51.

Creation is not an addition to reality, but God in His free will chose to appear in restricted degrees of reality. The degree of reality depends on the degree of thinking. The spirits of the spheres are different degrees of reality. In the sublunar sphere man with his thinking, if it is right thinking with a moral purpose, is the highest degree of reality. All other beings have a degree of reality according to the measure of their psychic faculties, even though they do not reach the manifestation of intellect. The anorganic bodies reveal realities through their qualities and properties which constitute the field of energization of human intellect in the sciences. What appears to us as matter has no positive reality. Matter is *negative*. Its relation to reality, to intellect, is that of darkness, or shade, to light.

This "secret" of Maimuni's had no influence upon Kant, who retains his idea of substance in his two "Dinge an sich," spiritual and material. But the idea of unity of process, subject and object of sense-perception was, or at least, could have been, preformative to Kant's "Einheit der Apperception."

The elements of critical philosophy repeat themselves in the works of Jewish philosophers of the post-Maimunian period. But we will confine ourselves to mentioning that *Ralbag*, or *Gersonides*, who, like all others, missed Maimuni's "secret," goes back to the dualism of the Gabirol-group, and works out an epistemological theory which may be considered as preformative to Kant's critical philosophy on the ground of the two "Dinge an sich."²⁶ And the theory of Ralbag comes nearest to that of Kant especially for the reason that he accepts the theory of Maimuni of potentiality of soul in consistent fashion (p. 81). Opposing Maimuni's monism, and missing the "secret," he still adopts his thought which we found preformative to Kant's "Einheit der Apperception," and frames it into Gabirol's dualism. What is missing in his epistemology as compared with Kant's is the deeper critical

²⁶ Milhamoth, ed. Leipzig, 1866, pp. 73, 77, 83.

analysis of the process and the grand aspects and vistas which Kant opens by the orientation in the more developed mathematical and natural sciences of his day.

Now the possibility of Jewish influence upon the development of critical philosophy is beyond a reasonable doubt. The question of the *channels* is not difficult at all:

1. In the question of the ethico-theological method Kant himself refers to Christianity, "that wonderful religion" as his primary source.²⁷ We know that the thoughts Kant took from Christian literature are in reality the property of Jewish literature from which Christianity adopted them.

2. For his principles of Ethics and Aesthetics Kant refers to the decalog in the following words: "Possibly there is no loftier passage in the lawbook of the Jews than the commandment: Thou shalt not make unto thee an image, nor any likeness, neither of what is in heaven, nor on the earth, nor beneath the earth, &c. This commandment can singly explain the enthusiasm that the Jewish people in its (own) civilized period felt for its religion, when it compared itself with other nations, or that pride that Mohammedanism inspires. The same is also valid of the representation of the moral law and the disposition to morality in us... Where the senses do not see anything more before them, and still the unmistakable and unquenchable idea of morality remains intact, there would rather be need to bridle the swing of an unrestricted imagination, so that it may not soar to enthusiasm, than to look for support of these ideas to images and childish apparatus, for worry about their lack of power."²⁸

3. For the epistemological elements which some may be inclined to consider as the most decisive, I refer to the works of M. Joël, Jacob Guttman, Michael Wittmann and others, on the influence of Jewish philosophy on Christian scholastic philosophy. True, these scholars do not pay special attention to the elements of critical philosophy. But they show that

²⁷ Kritik der Urteilskraft, 88, Anm.; 91, Anm. 4.

²⁸ Kritik der Urteilskraft, 29, Anm., last fourth.

the great scholastic schools of thought, the Franciscan and the Dominican, divided according to Gabirol and Maimuni. It is then easy to assume that Kant, who studied scholastic philosophy so diligently in order to refute its claims and pretensions, was influenced greatly by the copious quotations from Gabirol and Maimuni found in the works of Thomas of Aquine, Albertus Magnus, William of Auvergne, and others.

4. Then, too, there were Latin translations of the works of Gabirol and Maimuni, Gabirol's *Fons Vitae* going even under a non-Jewish name. Kant may have read these books.

5. Another channel is *Spinoza*: Spinoza's *Parallelism*, contained in the famous sentence: *Ordo et connectio idearum sunt idem ac ordo et connectio rerum* (order and connection of the ideas are identical with order and connection of the things—Ethics II, 7), is an important link in the development of critical philosophy. This being admitted by the greatest authorities on Kant, it needs no discussion here, and I confine myself to mentioning that the influence of Jewish philosophy on Spinoza has been discussed and established by many writers on the subject.²⁹

6. Finally: *Mendelssohn* in the Foreword to his *Phaedon*, the very book with which Kant discusses the fundamental thought of critical philosophy, submits the declaration that he owes to the Jewish philosophers of the Middle Ages so much that he cannot give them credit for detailed utterances of theirs that may be found in his book. He is their disciple, and he uses their utterances as that of his teachers.

This *most direct* channel in itself is sufficient to establish firmly the direct historical relation of Judaism to Kant.

II. SYSTEMATIC RELATIONS

A systematic development of Jewish philosophy on the ground of critical philosophy necessarily will concern itself

²⁹ Luzatto, Joël and others; cf. also my essay, *Crescas and Spinoza*.

chiefly with the *three ideas* common to Judaism and Kant: *Freedom, God, and Immortality*. But first we must attend to the ontological situation. Historically speaking Kant's critical philosophy is based on an ontological *dualism* like that of the Gabirol-group. Kant's two "Dinge an sich" are really the same as God and Matter in the Gabirol-group. But we, monotheists, the sons of monotheists, naturally side with Maimuni's strict monotheism and monism. On the other hand, Maimuni's idea of matter being negative is not acceptable, for *two* reasons. The idea does not convey a definite meaning. Secondly, we cannot get along with strict monism. Morality and ethics mean nothing, if there is only one uniform manifestation of reality. If there is to be freedom and morality and religion there must be some split in the strict unity. There must be some dualism. As monotheists we cannot consider absolute dualism, but we must consider at least phenomenal dualism. We take from Maimuni the idea that there is no substance but process, but we reject his idea of the negativity of matter. We rather cling to his idea of unity of process, subject and object of sense-perception. There are, then, *two kinds of processes*, mental processes and material processes. These two kinds of processes make up all reality, God. There is no fear of corporealizing God, as there is no substance. The realization of the taste "sweet" or the color "green" is just as much a process-reality, as the realization of those categories and concepts which make up our mental frame. God is the sum total of these processes, but not in the sense of pantheism, but in the sense of a conscious personal being. Moreover we come first to our scientific God-conception through the idea of conscious personality. Let us dispose for a moment of all our inherited notions of substance, material and spiritual. What is reality? I mean reality pure and simple without added explanation. The assumption of spiritual and material substances are evidently hypothetical additions in order to explain reality, to name the source whence it comes, or, as Kant has it, to name the thing "that appears." Let

us not ask these questions. We must take our realities as final, they are with us, in us, identical with our very being. What is our very ego? A combination of sense-processes and mental-processes. What makes you think we need an explanation for that reality? Why look for substances and involve yourself in difficulties, and end up by saying that these "Dinge an sich" are unknowable? Why posit them, if you must declare them as absolutely unknowable?

At a recent meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, at Cincinnati, Prof. Chamberlin of the Geological Department of the University of Chicago, reduced the most characteristic result of scientific investigation of the last seventy-five years to the following sentence: "Before we dealt with a bundle of matter, now we deal with a bundle of energy." Indeed, in an age when scientists convert the familiar objects around us, nay our very bodies, and those of them whom we love and of them whom we hate, into electrical, radioactive, and gravitational fields, under different systems of coordinates—in such an age it should not be difficult to get rid of the notion of substance. In the age of *Einstein*, no matter how much we understand of his theories of relativity (he has two of them), it should be possible for religious, ideally inclined men to get rid of the logical delusion of substance, and live in the immediate reality which is theirs.

There is only one question which we must face, and this leads us to the problem of God. There is no reason why we should inquire into the sources of our realities. We take them as final. But can we take our own ego, our conscious self, as a final ontological datum, as we take sound, color and taste and touch, and the mental concepts in which they are framed? Of course, we could, but there is one obstacle. Our conscious self is accompanied by a negative time-feeling, has a *beginning*, and this makes it difficult for us to take it as a final ontological datum. It evidently is a part-process in the comprehensive cosmic combination of the two kinds of processes. This comprehensive cosmic process is God, and

man's self-conscious ego is but an incident in this large process. Thus our first step in the realization of our ego sets us in contact with God. I have expounded this view in my essay "Spirit" in the second issue of the *Journal of Jewish Lore and Philosophy*, and in my Hebrew book "A Jewish System in Critical Philosophy."³⁰ There I have discussed the problems of time and space and all other problems connected with our subject. Those who are interested will read it there. Here I will confine myself to the question, how from our point of view we may improve upon Kant's proofs for God and Immortality.

Kant, after having developed the ethico-theological proof for the existence of God, stresses again the point that such proof is only practical, but not theoretical. The idea of freedom is a practical reality, it is given to us in the moral law, the categorical imperative. If moral freedom is a reality, also God and Immortality are realities. Morality, says Kant in his argument against *Spinoza*,³¹ requires that there be a divine providence that arranges the universe in a way that the law of freedom works, and that rewards those who innocently suffer in this world, with immortality. Kant insists that this evidence is valid only for the reflective reason, but not for the theoretical reason. He explains: All theoretical elements of proof may be divided into four categories: 1, strict logical proof; 2, proof by *analogy*; 3, probable opinion; 4, hypothesis. Kant proceeds to show that none of these four modes of theoretical proof can be applied to prove theoretically the truth of the ideas of God and immortality. The reasons for this inadequacy are: *first*, all our data are taken from *this* world, and there can be no theoretically valid inference upon a being *outside* this world; *second*, all our data are accredited by our senses, while we try to get to conclusions concerning a being that is above sense-perception.³²

³⁰ "Hatoren," vols. X-XI.

³¹ *Kritik der Urteilkraft*, 73, 85, 87.

³² *Ibid.* 90.

Now, these two objections have no place in our ontological orientation. God is not outside the world, and sense-processes are part of reality, and God to us is the sum total of reality. Nevertheless, we do not mean to say that the ethico-theological proof conveys to us a theoretically absolutely valid proof.

The entire procedure by which we come to a scientific God-conception must be gone over anew. We have (in the essay "Spirit") divided the mental elements into three classes: 1, *Primary elements*, or categories; 2, *Systematic elements*, or the *scientific* data of knowledge, and 3, the *elements of freedom*. For our purpose here it recommends itself to divide the third class into two subdivisions, into the *intellectual* and the *moral* elements of freedom. These four divisions are easily identified as four phases corresponding to the four kinds of proof presented by Kant, but in the reverse order. No matter how the God-idea actually comes to nations and individuals—there are many types of development in the history of the God-conception (cf. Baḥya)—the scientific way of developing the evidence for the existence of God, begins with the lowest degree of evidence and grows in power and meaning until it reaches the highest possible degree of evidence, that of strict logical syllogism:

1. *Hypothesis*: We know from experience that self-consciousness is a matter of growth and degree. We can distinguish in ourselves stages of *minimum-consciousness* and *maximum-consciousness*. There is even a compelling reason for the idea of a cosmic maximum-consciousness as the bearer of the individual self-consciousness. We ourselves have, each one of us, a maximum-consciousness as bearer of our different limited stages of consciousness. And when we are puzzled by that negative time-feeling, that our ego has a beginning, what else can it mean than that our ego is a limited phase of consciousness, incidental to the maximum-consciousness which is comprehensive and as constantly increasing as the two kinds of processes which in their interaction make up reality. Thus the first stage of our self-consciousness in which we

realize only the most indispensable mental elements, the self-consciousness concomitant to sense-perception, suggests to us a maximum-consciousness to which our little ego is merely incidental. But it must be admitted that this inference remains an hypothesis. The negative time-feeling that accompanies our realization of our ego in the stage of sense-perception, may in spite of the plausibility of the idea of the maximum-consciousness, be as final an ontological datum as any other of the processes which make up our self-consciousness. There is no absolute logical necessity to ask for an explanation.

2. *Opinion*: The necessity of positing the maximum-consciousness is considerably enhanced when we consider the *scientific* cognition of things. In this we do not have to confine ourselves to organized things which suggest a peculiar teleological argument, as does Kant in the main. Every scientific cognition in mathematics, physics, astronomy, and other sciences elevates the hypothesis of the maximum-consciousness to the degree of a *scientific hypothesis*. The higher the degree of the scientific consciousness of man, the higher the degree of the verisimilitude of the hypothesis of the maximum-consciousness. But if, in spite of this high degree of plausibility and verisimilitude, we do not consider this evidence as an absolute logical proof, it is because the denier still may contend that even our most developed scientific consciousness must be taken as a final ontological datum that neither calls for, nor admits of any explanation.

3. *Analogy*: The analogy is based on the teleological idea. The universe shows purpose, plan and intention in all organized things, and in the unity which embraces the separate units in harmoniously interdependent functions. Kant considers here the consciousness of the individual ego in its passive phase only. But if we consider also the active phase of it, as it manifests itself in human actions which further or hinder nature's spontaneous growth and development, as in cross-breeding and the like, and especially in *scientific experiments*, then the degree of the certitude of the existence of the maxi-

maximum-consciousness is indeed very high. We do not consider here yet the ethical valuation of such human activity, but the intellectual *freedom* manifest in such activity is sufficiently urgent to enforce the hypothesis of the existence of that maximum-consciousness which we call *God*. In fact, if we sum up *all* scientific activities of the human race of our own generation, the maximum-consciousness is as near a reality as any that is given to us.

Our scientific age should, indeed, recognize the reality of God more firmly and more devoutly than any of the preceding ages. If every single natural law is an expression of plan and purpose, the harmony revealed in the great scientific discoveries is indeed an immediate incontrovertible evidence of the existence of the maximum-consciousness. Kant recognizes the great power of this physico-teleological argument, but he shrinks back before the two great objections that the analogy infers from the intellect in the world upon an intellect *outside* the world, and from an intellect connected with sense-perception upon one above sense-perception. Thus in our orientation where these two objections are meaningless and void, the analogy is so strong as to make us feel not only the "nighness of God," as the exalted religious expression goes, but God himself in all his glory. And still, we cannot deny the right of the denier. He still may claim that even this intellectual freedom does not warrant the hypothesis of the maximum-consciousness. He cannot deny any more that this hypothesis is of great help even in the study of nature, and cannot deny us the right to use it as a regulative in our study of nature, but he can claim that we have not proven the absolute necessity of such a being. He still may claim that each case of natural law is given to us as a final ontological datum, and there is no need to pay attention to the harmony manifest in the interdependent functions which suggest the idea of teleological plan and purpose.

4. *Strict Syllogism*: If, in addition to the intellectual, we consider also the ethical freedom, and consider the ethical valu-

ation of human activities, then there is a way for the strict syllogistical proof for the existence of God. When we realize that all reality is an ethical affair, that all our sense-perceptions, and all our scientific cognition, and all our scientific activity are but the field of conditions where our moral nature reveals itself, both for good and for evil—if we consider all this, we are indeed in possession of a strict logical proof for the existence of God. It all depends on the degree of reality the moral law, the ethical, and, consequently, also the intellectual freedom, has in our hearts. Those who realize freedom, *have* an absolute, theoretically valid proof for the existence of God. The only restriction we have to place upon this proof is that its cogency depends on the recognition of the idea of moral freedom. And it is here that we differ most essentially with Kant who, on account of his two objections, denies the theoretical validity of this proof even for him who admits the reality of the idea of freedom. The fact, however, that freedom may be and is being denied by many, is not a sign of weakness for the idea of freedom and the other ideas based thereon. Quite to the contrary: the moral nature of the world requires as one of its ontological conditions that there be the possibility of not realizing freedom, and that there be different degrees of that realization. It is true, to him who does not realize freedom, we cannot give a firm hold on God. But there is one thing we can do for him: We can educate him to the realization of freedom. This is something like the educational procedure suggested by Baḥya: Let man act as if he were free.³³ And when we have educated him (or he has educated himself) to ethical freedom, then we will prove to him the existence of God, and make him firm and enduring in ethical and religious conduct.

Soul: From this orientation on the God-conception there is an open path into the problem of soul and immortality. Kant confines himself to the general thought that the idea

³³ Compare Kant's famous "als ob"—on which Prof. Hans Vaihinger, Halle a. d. S., wrote a most comprehensive and instructive book.

of plan and purpose requires that there be immortality as reward for those good people who suffer innocently in this world. As a matter of fact, this postulate of his really reverts to the Mendelssohn idea of the individual soul-substance. Kant therefore denies this postulate theoretical validity, even more emphatically than to the God-conception. From our point of view, however, the idea of immortality is not as difficult as within the substance theory of Kant. The maximum-consciousness is not a closed reality, it is growing and getting richer in content and dignity. Every new individual who lived a moral-intellectual life has enriched the maximum-consciousness. This immortality, not being immortality of substance, is not burdened by those objections which are usually advanced against immortality. Immortality in our orientation does not mean the existence of a soul-substance without a body-substance, as there is no substance at all. Immortality means a continuation of consciousness within the never-ceasing interaction of the two kinds of processes. Does the individual realize his identity after death? From a strictly philosophic point of view there may be no such postulate. From a religious point of view there seems to be such a postulate. And here, too, our new ontological orientation leaves room for the hope of the ages. Our soul at all times is a combination of souls. With us lives our childhood soul, the soul of our period of adolescence, of maturing youth, of early manhood, the soul of the late twenties, of the early thirties, and so on. They are to each other in the relation of minimum-consciousness to maximum-consciousness. And no matter into how many units you split up your soul at any given time, each one of these units is a living being for itself. And the flimsiest phase of one's soul may suddenly become a very actual and a very active soul. The phenomena of double and multiple personalities, baffling within the substance theory, is easily understood within our orientation. This has a bearing on the question of immortality. All individuals, who so lived as to enrich the maximum-consciousness, may live on in their

individual identity within it, as live the component personalities in a multiple personality.

There are many problems to be treated from this new outlook. I have treated the most important of them in the afore-mentioned new book. Others I may be privileged to treat in days yet to come. In this paper I wanted only to touch upon the most central problems.

I hope this paper proves the thesis:

Kant was greatly influenced and helped by Jewish thought, and Judaism today can learn much from Kant in its onward march to new vigor and new strength.



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